Beals v. Colvin

Filing 19

ORDER Affirming Decision of Administrative Law Judge, by Judge William J. Martinez on 11/10/2015. (ebuch)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 14-cv-3367-WJM
STERLING BEALS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

This is a Social Security benefits appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff Sterling Beals (“Beals”) challenges the final decision of Defendant, the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for
supplemental security income benefits and disability insurance benefits. The denial
was affirmed by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who ruled that Beals was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. This appeal followed.
For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ’s decision denying Beals’s application
for supplemental security income benefits and disability benefits is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
Beals was born on May 4, 1974, and was 37 years old on the alleged disability
onset date of August 20, 2011. (Administrative Record (“R.”) (ECF No. 10) at 59, 116.)
Beals’ highest completed grade was eighth grade, and, although he eventually obtained
a high school diploma, he admits that he cheated to pass the required courses. (R. at

26, 40.) Before the alleged disability onset date, Beals worked as a semi-truck driver
and dump truck driver. (R. at 55.)
Beals applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
on January 5, 2012. (R. at 59.) He claimed that he is disabled due to severe
depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), bipolar disorder, and obsessivecompulsive disorder (“OCD”). (Id.) His application was denied on May 8, 2012. (R. at
58–69.) Beals requested and received a hearing in front of an ALJ, Jennifer B.
Millington. (R. at 24, 73.) On July 24, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision in
accordance with the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. 1
At step one, the ALJ found that Beals had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 20, 2011. (R. at 13.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Beals suffered from “the following severe
impairments: major depression; obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD); and alcohol abuse.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Beals’s impairments, while severe, do not meet
or medically equal any of the impairments listed in the Social Security regulations. (R.
at 13–15.)
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Beals’s residual functional

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The five-step process requires the ALJ consider whether a claimant: (1) engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment;
(3) had a condition which met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
her past relevant work; and, if not, (5) could perform other work in the national economy. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750–51 (10th
Cir. 1988). The claimant has the burden of proof through steps one to four; the Social Security
Administration has the burden of proof at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2007).

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capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ concluded that Beals has the RFC
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with
the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant can
understand, remember and carry out simple tasks that can
be learned in one month or less, in employment that has no
to rare work interactions with the public and occasional work
interactions with coworkers and supervisors.
(R. at 15.) Then, at step four itself, the ALJ concluded that Beals retains the RFC to
perform his past work as a dump truck driver. (R. at 17.)
The ALJ’s conclusion at step four was, by itself, sufficient to deny Beals’s
disability application. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ nonetheless
proceeded to step five and alternatively found that other jobs exist within Beals’s RFC.
(R. at 17–18.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Beals could work as a janitor, warehouse
worker, and hand packager, and that positions for each of these jobs are sufficiently
numerous in both the national and Colorado econom ies. (R. at 18.) Accordingly, the
ALJ found that Beals was not disabled and therefore not entitled to Social Security
benefits. (Id.)
Beals appealed to the Social Security Appeals Council (R. at 6), which denied
review (R. at 1). Beals then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s July 24, 2013
decision. (ECF No. 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether substantial
evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
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adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). Evidence is not
substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (10th Cir. 2005). In rev iewing the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006). “On the other hand, if
the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a
lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.
1993).
III. ANALYSIS
Beals’s sole argument for reversal is that the ALJ improperly assessed his RFC,
thus leading the ALJ into further error at steps four and five. (ECF No. 15 at 21–29.) 2
When assessing Beals’s RFC, the ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinion of
Dr. Brett Valette, a psychologist who examined Beals at the Commissioner’s request.
(R. at 16.) The ALJ likewise gave “great weight” to Dr. Gayle Frommelt, a psychologist
who formed an opinion based solely on reviewing Beals’s records. (Id.; see also R. at
59–69, 193.) Both Valette and Frommelt concluded that Beals has the capacity at least
to follow simple instructions and accept infrequent supervision. (R. at 67, 190–91.)
Valette provided his opinion in April 2012 and Frommelt provided her opinion in
May 2012, after which Beals began seeking treatment at Aurora Mental Health. (R. at
198.) Beals received individual and group therapy through this organization at least
2

All ECF page citations are to the page number in the ECF header, which does not
always match the document’s internal pagination.

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through May 2013, not long before his June 2013 ALJ hearing. (R. at 57, 296.) These
therapy sessions generated numerous medical records (R. at 197–297), which Beals
describes as “subsequent medical opinion evidence.” (ECF No. 15 at 25.) Beals
argues that these opinions from treating practitioners should normally receive more
weight than opinions from non-treating practitioners (such as Valette and Frommelt),
but the ALJ failed to evaluate the treating practitioners’ opinions as such and failed to
explain why those opinions should receive less weight than Valette’s and Frommelt’s
opinions. (Id. at 21–27.)
The Government counters that the Aurora Mental Health records are treatm ent
notes, not treating practitioners’ opinions. (ECF No. 16 at 8.) Beals filed no reply brief,
leaving this argument unanswered. Moreover, the Court’s review of the Aurora Mental
Health records shows that the Government is correct.
“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other
acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your
impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do
despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(a)(2). None of the Aurora Mental Health treatment notes meet this
standard. These notes certainly record information about Beals’s symptoms and
various diagnoses, but they contain no prognosis, nor do they “reflect [any
practitioner’s] judgment[]” regarding what Beals can still do despite his impairments.
Furthermore, the Social Security regulations make clear that there is a difference
between an opinion and the treatment notes that might support it. For example, the
regulations state that the Social Security Administration will “give more weight to
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opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Thus, treatment notes may contain
“objective medical findings” or “reports of individual examinations,” and may be useful
as such to support an opinion, but the notes are not them selves an opinion.
Because there was no treating-source opinion evidence, the ALJ did not err in
failing to properly consider treating-source opinion evidence. Nonetheless, the ALJ was
still required to consider the treatment notes as “relevant evidence.” See id.
§ 404.1527(b) (“In determining whether you are disabled, we will always consider the
medical opinions in your case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence we
receive.”). In pertinent part, the ALJ’s evaluation of the treatment notes was as follows:
[Beals] has received treatment in the form of group and
individual therapy, along with medication. Medical records
show that [Beals] responded well to group therapy, and he
stated he enjoyed group sessions, though he left group
therapy in 2013.[3] [Beals] reported doing well in November
of 2012 and reported a reduction in his drinking. He
described an increase in symptoms when he stopped taking
his medication, but again indicated that therapy was “going
well” when he restarted medication. [Beals] said that he felt
better with an increase in medication in January of 2013. He
had an increase in symptoms in April of 2013 after leaving
group therapy, but reported no suicidal or homicidal
ideations in May of 2013. Notably, [Beals] has received

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Beals argues that the ALJ erred in this point, and that he “was still in therapy at [Aurora
Mental Health] at the time of the June 2013 hearing.” (ECF No. 15 at 25.) Beals cites no
record evidence to support this assertion. Regardless, Beals does not explain, nor can the
Court discern, how the ALJ’s allegedly incorrect belief materially affected her decision.

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relatively conservative treatment for his mental impairments,
and has not required any inpatient hospitalizations or
emergency room visits.
(R. at 16 (citations omitted).) Considering all this, the ALJ concluded that Beals’s
“treatment history does not support his description of his symptoms or his allegations
concerning the limiting effects of his mental impairments.” (Id.)
Having reviewed the Aurora Mental Health treatment notes, the Court concludes
that, in combination with the rest of the evidence, the notes comprise such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052. This Court therefore may not reweigh the
evidence. Salazar, 468 F.3d at 621. 4
Beals, however, insists that the ALJ should have solicited additional medical
opinion testimony. (ECF No. 15 at 25–26.) Beals relies on Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d
1285 (10th Cir. 2012), which vacated an ALJ’s decision to deny benefits because,
among other reasons, the ALJ relied on an opinion rendered in 2008 but “[t]he relev ant
medical record obviously underwent material changes in the twenty months between
[that opinion] and the ALJ’s decision in November 2009.” Id. at 1292.
This case is similar to Chapo in that the Aurora Mental Health treatment notes,
which are the bulk of the medical evidence, post-date the opinions on which the ALJ
relied. This case is different from Chapo, however, in that the treatment notes do not

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Beals does not argue that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony based on a
perceived failure to seek treatment or to follow a treatment regimen. Cf. Thompson, 987 F.2d
at 1490 (discussing factors the ALJ must consider before “rely[ing] on the claimant’s failure to
pursue treatment or take medication as support for [a] determination of noncredibility”).

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represent a “material change” to the record. Rather, the treatment notes are broadly
consistent with Valette’s and Frommelt’s opinions that Beals retains the RFC to perform
simple work as long as he has little interaction with the public and only occasional
interaction with supervisors or coworkers. Thus, the Court finds no reversible error in
the ALJ’s RFC assessment.5
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk
shall enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and shall terminate this case. Both
parties shall bear their own attorney’s fees and costs.
Dated this 10th day of November, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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Although the record contains extensive discussion of Beals’s alcohol abuse, the ALJ
found that Beals’s impairments “exist independently of any alcohol or substance related
disorder.” (R. at 17.) To the extent Beals’s alcohol abuse continues, nothing prevents him from
filing a new disability application specifically to explore his eligibility for benefits in light of his
alcoholism.

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