Echon et al v. Sackett et al
Filing
116
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE that 106 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Justin Echon, Maribel Echon, Esmeraldo Villanueva Echon, Jr. be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. By Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 9/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 - (7) Unpublished case law) (nywlc1)
Shukla v. Sharma, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 481796
a new trial and reduced damages pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
59.
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Distinguished by Morse v. Fusto, E.D.N.Y., August 29, 2013
2012 WL 481796
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
United States District Court,
E.D. New York.
Devendra SHUKLA, Plaintiff,
v.
Sat Prakash SHARMA, individually
and as Director of Vishva Seva Ashram
of New York, et al., Defendants.
No. 07–CV–2972 (CBA)(CLP).
|
Feb. 14, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Sanjay Chaubey, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Krishnan Shanker Chittur, Chittur & Associates, P.C.,
New York, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
AMON, Chief Judge.
*1 Between December 6, 2010 and December 15, 2010,
the Court held a jury trial in the above-captioned
action. On December 15, 2010, the jury returned a
verdict, finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
defendants Sat Prakash Sharma (“Sat Sharma”), Geeta
Sharma, and the Vishva Seva Ashram of New York (“the
Ashram” or “the Temple”) were liable for forced labor
and trafficking for the purpose of involuntary servitude
or forced labor. The jury also found for defendants
on a counter-claim, that plaintiff libeled the defendants.
The jury awarded $250,000.00 in compensatory damages
for the forced labor claim, $750,000.00 in compensatory
damages for the trafficking claim, and $2.5 million in
punitive damages for the trafficking claim. The jury
awarded $300,000.00 in compensatory damages to Sat
Sharma, $150,000.00 to Geeta Sharma, and $50,000.00 to
the Ashram for the libel claim. Defendants Sat Sharma,
Geeta Shrama, and the Ashram now move for judgment
as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 or, alternatively,
I. Motion of Judgment as a Matter of Law
Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on
each of plaintiff's claims, arguing that: (1) no reasonable
juror could conclude that a reasonable person of the
plaintiff's background and circumstances would continue
to perform labor or services in order to avoid the
alleged “serious harm;” (2) no reasonable juror could
conclude that defendants' alleged acts actually caused
plaintiff to perform any labor or services; (3) certain of
plaintiff's allegations are too vague for a reasonable juror
to conclude that the allegations are either “threats” or
constitute “serious harm;” (4) certain of the alleged threats
cannot be attributed to the Sharmas or the Ashram or
were not directed at plaintiff; and (5) plaintiff's alleged
cleaning duties were not forced labor but were in fact part
of his contractual obligations.
Under Rule 50, “[j]udgment as a matter of law is proper
when ‘a party has been fully heard on an issue and there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find for that party on that issue.’ “ United States
v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 428 (2d Cir.2005)
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1)). “The court cannot assess
the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility
of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of
the jury.” Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d at 429 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a Rule 50
motion may be granted only if “the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is
insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in her
favor.” GaldieriAmbrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp.,
136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.1998). In making its evaluation,
the court should “review all of the evidence in the record.”
Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2001)
Defendants argue that the evidence introduced at trial
is legally insufficient to sustain a finding of liability for
forced labor, 18 U.S.C § 1589, and trafficking for the
purpose of forced labor or involuntary servitude, 18
U.S.C. § 1590, under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (“TVPA”). In arguing that motion, defendants break
the evidence in the record into categories, explaining why
each category does not itself support the verdict. On a
Rule 50(b) motion, however, the Court cannot isolate bits
of evidence, but must instead “view the evidence as a
whole ....” Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70 (remanding for failure
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to consider evidence as a whole). For the reasons stated
below, the Court finds that the evidence as a whole, taken
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to
support the jury's verdicts.
1. Forced Labor
*2 Civil liability for forced labor under 18 U.S.C. 1589
requires a finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the defendant obtained the labor or services of
another person; (2) the defendant did so through one of
the following prohibited means (a) through serious harm
or threats of serious harm to ... that person or any other
person; or (b) through a scheme, plan or pattern intended
to cause the person to believe that non-performance would
result in serious harm to ... that person or any other
person; or (c) through the abuse or threatened abuse of
the law or the legal process; and (3) the defendant acted
knowingly. United States v. Sabhnani, 539 F.Supp.2d 617,
629 (E.D.N.Y.2008).
“Serious harm” “includes threats of any consequences,
whether physical or non-physical, that are sufficient under
all of the surrounding circumstances to compel or coerce
a reasonable person in the same situation to provide or
to continue providing labor or services.” United States
v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on
sentencing grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162
L.Ed.2d 271 (2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1589, as amended
by Pub.L. 110–457, Title II, § 222(b)(3), Dec. 23, 2008,
122 Stat. 5068 (codifying existing case law). “Abuse of the
law or legal process” is the use of threats of legal action,
whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner
or for any purpose for which the law was not designed
in order to coerce someone into working against that
person's will. United States v. Garcia, No. 02–CR–110S–
01, 2003 WL 22956917, at *4–5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.2, 2003)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1589, as amended by Pub.L. 110–457, Title II, §
222(b)(3), Dec. 23, 2008, 122 Stat. 5068 (codifying existing
case law).
A worker's “employment and living conditions” may
provide support for a jury's conclusion that a defendant's
threats “plausibly ... compelled the victim[ ] to serve.”
United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 373 (8th Cir.2009)
(quotations omitted); see also United States v. Veerapol,
312 F.3d 1128, 1130–21 (9th Cir.2002) (considering
working conditions, including “excessive working hours,”
in analyzing involuntary servitude claim); Sabhnani, 539
F.Supp.2d at 620 (discussing working conditions). Thus,
for example, where a worker testified that his rigorous
work schedule “precluded sleep at least four times a
week,” the court in Farrell found that fact relevant to the
question of whether the victim's labor was compelled. 563
F.3d at 373.
Defendants do not dispute that they obtained plaintiff's
labor or services. Nor is there any dispute, for purposes
of this motion, that defendants acted knowingly. Instead,
defendants challenge the sufficiency of the harm at issue.
Here, viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, the harm or threatened harm alleged was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff
was subjected to forced labor.
*3 According to plaintiff's testimony, he was first
approached in India by Satya Dev Sharma (“Satya Dev”),
defendant Sat Sharma's brother, in January or February
of 2000 about coming to the United States to work at the
Ashram. 1 (Tr. 49). Sat's brother made certain assurances
to plaintiff about his living conditions and salary. (Tr.
51). When he arrived, plaintiff found that these assurances
were untrue. The room he was promised turned out to be
a cramped, dirty, rat-infested, windowless space next to
a public bathroom. (Tr. 59–61; 458). And, although the
veracity of this claim is contested, plaintiff claims that his
bed was positioned directly below a truncated pipe. (Tr.
60).
Plaintiff testified that throughout his time at the Temple,
his typical work day began at 5:00 a.m. and ended at 10:00
p.m. (Tr. 98–99). He testified that he would not be able
to eat dinner until after 11:00 p.m. (Tr. 99). In addition
to his responsibilities as priest, the Sharmas required him
to perform janitorial work. He would clean the basement
and bathroom, provide maintenance for the Temple, and
wash the dishes, pans, and pots. (Tr. 98). He was put to
work painting several apartments on the second floor of
the Temple that were rented out to tenants (Tr. 104–05),
and was told to do the plumbing. (Tr. 105). Additionally,
plaintiff testified that over the course of the seven years he
lived at the Temple, Sat Sharma put him to work doing
construction and yard work at the Sharma's house. (Tr.
103).
According to plaintiff, the defendants also restricted his
freedom and privacy. He was under strict instructions
to report to Geeta Sharma what had happened every
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day. (Tr. 98). Plaintiff also testified that at least one of
his phone conversations with his wife was recorded and
played back to him by another of Sat Sharma's brothers.
(Tr. 220–21).
Plaintiff testified that when he first arrived in the United
States, the Sharmas confiscated his passport. (Tr. 156;
see also Tr. 414–19, 430, 461, 476, 501–02 (testimony of
other witnesses)). According to plaintiff, the passport was
not returned until June 2007 when he decided to leave
the Temple and went to the police. (Tr. 67, 162, 165–68).
Plaintiff testified that in 2006, Geeta Sharma informed
him that his residence in the United States was not legal.
(Tr. 153). He testified that subsequently, Geeta Sharma
and Satya Dev, Sat Sharma's brother, warned him “that
they own bars and they are friends with judges, that
the police commissioner comes to their bar and that if
[plaintiff] took a step in the wrong direction, just like he
sent [plaintiff's] brother away, he will have [plaintiff] sent
away, just like that.” (Tr. 154).
Plaintiff further testified that in April or May 2007,
defendants took his possessions. He explained that one
night, from around 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., Sat Sharma
took him to a Home Depot. (Tr. 133). When they
returned, they found the door ajar, and plaintiff's personal
effects, including his computer and cell phone, had been
removed. (Tr. 133–34). Although the incident appeared
to be a burglary, plaintiff then found his belongings in a
garbage bag elsewhere in the Temple. (Tr. 133). Plaintiff
told Sat Sharma that they should call the police, but
Sharma responded that it was already too late in the night.
(Tr. 136). Sat said he would take the bag home with him
for fingerprinting. (Tr. 136). Plaintiff testified that he did
not get his telephone back until he confronted the Sharmas
and left the Temple in June. (Tr. 136).
*4 One of the items taken from plaintiff at the time of
the alleged burglary was a laptop computer. (Tr. 136).
The computer was lent to him by a devotee, Amit Buree.
(Tr. 136). Plaintiff testified that after Sat Sharma took
plaintiff's possessions, Buree told Sat Sharma that the
computer in fact belonged to him. (Tr. 137). Plaintiff
testified that when Buree spoke to Sat Sharma, the
following occurred in his presence: “[T]hey were both, Mr.
Sharma and Mrs. Sharma, they were yelling at Amit there
and accusing him for his courage in making a gift to me.
And both of them, Mr. Sharma's son is also Amit, they
together beat up on the other Amit.” (Tr. 138).
Crediting plaintiff's allegations, as it must, the Court
now turns to their legal sufficiency. The threat of
deportation may itself constitute a threat sufficient to
satisfy the second element of forced labor. United States
v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir.2008); see also
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948, 108 S.Ct.
2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) ( “[T]hreatening ... an
immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat
of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude,
even though such a threat made to an adult citizen of
normal intelligence would be too implausible to produce
involuntary servitude.”). In Calimlim, the defendants
retained the victim's passport, never informed the victim
that they were themselves breaking the law by employing
her, and never offered to regularize her presence in the
United States. The court explained that the defendant's
“vague warning that someone might report [the victim]
and their false statements that they were the only ones who
lawfully could employ her could reasonably be viewed as a
scheme to make her believe that she or her family would be
harmed if she tried to leave.” “That is all the jury needed
to convict.” Calimlin, 538 F.3d at 713.
Defendants argue that the threat of deportation was
not sufficient because plaintiff testified that he wanted
to return to India, (Tr. 153). But returning to India
lawfully and being subjected to deportation are clearly
distinguishable. As plaintiff himself testified, “I came from
India here not to get arrested here .” (Tr. 154). Defendants
also argue that because Geeta Sharma is an immigrant
with a language barrier, it is not plausible that she was
sufficiently connected to authorities that she could have
had plaintiff sent away. But it was not unreasonable,
considering his background and circumstances, that
plaintiff lacked the courage to call her bluff. And
even if plaintiff did recognize Geeta's specific threat as
puffery, a reasonable person of plaintiff's background and
circumstances could still fear that Geeta Sharma might
contact the authorities if plaintiff was uncooperative.
Defendants also argue that a reasonable person in
plaintiff's circumstances would not have been compelled
to continue to provide labor or services. Defendants
attempt to characterize plaintiff as a community leader
who could easily turn to his congregants for help, as
indeed he did in 2007. But defendants again fail fully to
appreciate that the jury could have considered plaintiff's
background and circumstances. The jury could have
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concluded that plaintiff was an immigrant without his
passport, that he had no money, and that that he did
not speak English. Under the circumstances, a rational
jury could find that a reasonable individual in plaintiff's
position would feel compelled to provide the labor and
services in question.
2. Traficking
*5 Defendants were also found liable for trafficking
plaintiff for forced labor or involuntary servitude. An
individual has committed trafficking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1590, where that person “knowingly recruits,
harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means,
any person for labor or services [for the purpose of forced
labor or involuntary servitude].” Samirah v. Sabhnani, 772
F.Supp.2d 437, 448 (E.D.N.Y.2011). Defendants do not
dispute, for purposes of this motion, that they knowingly
harbored plaintiff. As the Court has already found that
a reasonable jury could find that defendants subjected
plaintiff to forced labor, the Court finds that the elements
of trafficking are satisfied.
F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1. Plaintif's Testimony
Defendants contend that they are entitled to a new trial
because plaintiff's testimony was perjured. Defendants
argue that plaintiff perjured himself when he stated that
he never received any salary for the work he performed,
that he was too “mortally scared” to reach out to the
Indian embassy for help, that his bedroom in the basement
had a “truncated pipe” protruding from the wall directly
above his head where he slept, and that he could not speak
English.
a. Salary
Defendants argue that plaintiff perjured himself by stating
that “he never received any salary for any of the work
he performed.” Defendants misstate the record. Although
plaintiff did state, as translated, “I never got a salary,” (Tr.
115), in the part of the record cited by defendants,
plaintiff's full testimony was as follows:
II. Motion for a New Trial as to Liability
Defendants next move for a new trial pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Defendants argue that they
are entitled to a new trial because: (1) plaintiff's testimony
was in part perjured; (2) trial counsel failed to introduce
certain evidence; (3) plaintiff's testimony was not credible;
and (4) the jury's verdict was inconsistent.
*6 Q: When was the first time when you received your
salary Mr. Shukla?
Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or
some of the issues—and to any party ... for any reason
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an
action at law in federal court.” Fed R. Civ. P. 59(a). A
court “has significant discretion in deciding whether to
grant a Rule 59 motion for a new trial.” Manganiello v.
Agostini, 2008 WL 5159776, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (citing
Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d
Cir.1999)). Unlike a Rule 50 motion, which calls upon a
court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict winner, a court considering a Rule 59 motion
“may independently weigh the evidence.” Id. Nonetheless,
a court should not grant a new trial unless the “court
determines that, in its independent judgment, the jury has
reached a seriously erroneous result or [its] verdict is a
miscarriage of justice.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414
THE COURT: Yes.
A: I never got a salary. Maybe $50 when he came back
from India.
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, your Honor, can I
ask him to repeat the answer?
A: Well, after I made a demand when they came back
from India and I asked for it they gave me $50.
Q: So, you are telling us that was the only compensation
you got or that will be the only salary which you will
receive?
A: Well, the first time that is all I got.
Q: After their return, did you ever get any other monies
paid by your employers for your salary?
A: Well, every month they would give me $50 from 2000
onwards. From 2001 onwards, they raised to to [sic] 100.
After about a year, let's say, in 2001, they for the first
time sent some money to my home.
Q: Do you recall what was the amount?
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A: Well, that will convert to something like one Lakh of
Indian Rupees at the currency value at that time.
Q: Do you know how many dollars it would make
100,000 Indian Rupees?
A: At that time, as far as I recall, the rate at that time
was about 42, 43 Rupees to a dollar.
THE COURT: How much money did they send to your
family?
THE WITNESS: One Lakh, a hundred thousand
Rupees, the first time.
....
Q: So would it be correct to state that after a year your
family received approximately $2,200?
c. Truncated Pipe
Next, defendants argue that plaintiff perjured himself
by testifying that there was a “truncated pipe” in his
basement bedroom, protruding from the wall directly
above his head where he slept. Defendants have submitted
an affidavit from Theodore Wagner, who states that he
is a licensed master plumber, that he installed plumbing
in the basement of the Ashram in 1993, and that no
pipes were installed in any room other than the kitchen
and bathroom. (Def.Mot., Ex. A.) Wagner affirms that
he inspected the premises on January 6, 2011, and states
that “there has been no alteration to the plumbing in the
Temple's cellar since I initially installed it in 1993.” (Id.)
Defendants also submit an affidavit from Mario Anthony
Pesa, who states that he worked on the Ashram in 1994.
(Defs.Mot., Ex. B.) Pesa stated that “there is no indication
that any plumbing work was performed on Mr. Shukla's
room in the basement .” (Defs.Mot., Ex. B.)
A: By that math, yes.
(Tr. 115–116).
As the above cited testimony shows, plaintiff testified that
he did receive some salary. His testimony was that he
did not receive any salary at first, but that subsequently
he received $50 per month and later $100 per month
personally, with an additional $2,200 per year being sent
to his family.
Defendants note that plaintiff testified at his deposition
that his family had received 949,000 rupees, which, by
their calculation, equaled roughly $20,100. By contrast,
$2,200 per year for seven years equals $15,400. The Court
does not find this disparity troubling, however, especially
in light of the qualification “approximately.” Moreover,
elsewhere in plaintiff's testimony, he stated that his family
in India received approximately $20,000. (Tr. 225).
b. “Mortally Scared” to Contact the Indian Embassy
Defendants argue that plaintiff perjured himself by
testifying that he was too “mortally scared” to reach
out to the Indian embassy for help. Defendants argue
that plaintiff's testimony must be perjured because he did
eventually contact the Indian embassy in 2007. This logic
is not persuasive. The fact that plaintiff finally mustered
the courage to contact the embassy does not mean that he
was not afraid to do so at an earlier point in time.
*7 To begin with, defendants have proffered no reason
why the testimony of Wagner and Pesa could not have
been introduced at trial. At trial, defendants did in fact
introduce testimony from Willie Pearson, a “handyman,
carpenter, [and] plumber,” (Tr. 528), who testified that
he had performed repairs at the Temple since 1999 (Tr.
529), that he had visited the plaintiff's room (Tr. 530), and
that he had never seen the pipes depicted in the pictures
introduced by plaintiff. (Tr. 531.) He further testified,
however, that he had observed damage on the wall in
plaintiff's bedroom indicating that the wall had been cut
“at the front where I'm thinking the head of the bed would
be. Like on the pictures where you saw the pipes coming
out.” (Tr. 544–45).
The affidavits provided by defendants indicate that at
the time renovations were performed in 1993–94, no
plumbing was installed in plaintiff's bedroom, and that
when Wagner and Pesa returned in January 2011 there
had been no change to their work. The affidavits do not
establish, however, that there had never been a pipe in
plaintiff's bedroom. Indeed, the fact that Pearson saw
damage to the wall where plaintiff had indicated the
pipes were located could indicate that pipes had been
removed and the wall patched up. And in any event,
even if Wagner's and Pesa's testimony were persuasive,
defendants have not explained why these statements,
having never been subjected to adversarial testing, should
be considered so weighty as to warrant a new trial.
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In sum, the Court does not find that this dispute over the
truncated pipe rendered the result seriously erroneous or
a miscarriage of justice.
d. English Language Skills
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff's reliance on a
translator at trial was “perjury at worst and grossly
misleading at best.” (Tr. 18–19). Defendants base this
assertion on a DVD video of a prayer service submitted to
the Court in which plaintiff conducted prayer in English
(Def.Mot., Ex. D). They also provide yet another posttrial affidavit, this time from Dolsi Sen, who states that
he is a devotee at the Ashram, that he has known plaintiff
since he arrived in the United States, and that he has
observed plaintiff writing in English, speaking English
during a prayer at Sen's house, translating for his sisters,
who do not speak Hindi, and explaining religious concepts
to them in English. (Def.Mot., Ex. D).
The fact that plaintiff has some English language facility,
however, would not indicate that plaintiff was so fluent
in English that a translator was not required at trial.
With respect to the DVD, clerics in many faiths conduct
services in languages in which they would not be able to
testify. And other evidence in the record corroborates that
plaintiff's Engligh language skills are somewhat limited.
Priya Sahani Sood testified that she gave plaintiff weekly
English lessons for a period of time, but that this ended
abruptly in 2004 when plaintiff stopped contacting her.
(Tr. 512–14). Sood further testified that when she and
plaintiff speak now, she tries to force him to speak English
and “felt good that he's learning a little English.” (Tr. 516).
The testimony of another devotee, Aresh Sahani, indicates
that plaintiff lacked English language skills at least as late
as 2005, (Tr. 415), contradicting testimony that he could
speak English at the time he arrived in the United States.
*8 The Court finds that defendants have not submitted
evidence showing either that plaintiff perjured himself by
using a translator, or that such use was misleading.
2. Counsel's Failure to Introduce Certain Evidence
Defendants next argue that they are entitled to a
new trial because of trial counsel's failure to introduce
certain evidence. Specifically, they argue that their
trial counsel should have introduced “voluminous
construction contracts, invoices, receipts, and checks to
pay for construction work that the Sharmas had done on
their various properties between 2000–2007” (Def.Br.20),
testimony from an expert witness as to the typical duties
of a Hindu priest, and “evidence that plaintiff had at least
four more email addresses than the one he acknowledged
at trial.” Additionally, defendants argue that trial counsel
“failed to introduce into evidence an invoice indicating
that mikitivari @hotmail.com ordered penis enlargement
[p]ills.” (Defs.Br.20.)
As an initial matter, defendants have not established that
they may attack the jury's verdict on the ground that
their trial counsel decided not to advance certain evidence.
Civil litigants are “held accountable for the acts and
omissions of their chosen counsel.” Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 397,
113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also Hoodho
v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2009) (“[A] party
who voluntarily chose an attorney as his representative
in an action cannot avoid the consequences of the acts
or omissions of this freely selected agent.” (internal
quotation marks, citation, alterations omitted)). Put
simply, defendants cite no case in which a court found
that an attorney's allegedly unreasonable decision not to
introduce certain evidence requires a new trial. Second,
even assuming some egregious oversight by counsel would
warrant a new trial, defendants have not made such a
showing.
a. Construction Records
Counsel's failure to introduce “construction contracts,
invoices, receipts, and checks to pay for construction work
that the Sharmas had done on their various properties
between 2000–2007” did not result in a seriously erroneous
result or a miscarriage of justice. Defendants argue
that such documents would rebut plaintiff's claims that
the Sharmas took him out of the Ashram to perform
construction work late at night. They reason that “if the
Sharmas were already paying trained professionals to do
that work, they lack any motive to have an untrained
amateur perform those same services.” (Def.Mot.20.)
It is not inconceivable, however, that defendants paid
professionals to perform some work, while attempting to
save money or speed the process by requiring plaintiff to
perform other work. The documents in question would
therefore not even contradict plaintiff's testimony.
b. Expert Witness Testimony
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Defendants next complain that counsel did not introduce
evidence from an expert witness. Defendants argue that
because plaintiff testified that certain tasks made him
miserable or were performed only because defendants
required it, trial counsel should have called an expert
witness on the duties of Hindu priests who would have
testified that the tasks in question were not unusual.
Defendants provide an affidavit from Pardeep Sharma,
who states that he is a Hindu priest and who further
states that tasks such as cleaning deities, visiting devotees'
homes, and conducting services until late at night are
standard for Hindu priests. (Def.Mot., Ex. H.)
*9 The fact that certain tasks are frequently performed
by Hindu priests does not show that plaintiff was not
forced to perform them through threats of serious harm
or the abuse of legal process. And although the testimony
from an expert witness might have aided the jury in
evaluating plaintiff's testimony, this Court is left only to
speculate about precisely how helpful it would have been
to defendants' case. Perhaps counsel concluded that such
testimony would not stand up to cross-examination, or
that it might contain other revelations that would do
more harm on balance. The absence of one-sided expert
testimony, considered in the abstract, is not enough to
warrant a new trial.
c. Email Addresses and Penis Enlargement Pills
Trial counsel's failure to introduce evidence that plaintiff
had more than one email address and that plaintiff used
one email address to purchase “penis enlargement pills”
also did not lead to a seriously erroneous result or a
miscarriage of justice. Defendants argue that this evidence
would rebut plaintiff's allegation that he was too “mortally
scared” to leave the Ashram. Apparently, defendants'
argument is that if plaintiff was too scared to leave the
Temple, he should also have been too scared to order
sexual material, like penis enlargement pills.
Even if this logically followed, defendants did submit
evidence showing that plaintiff had ordered pornographic
movies, (Tr. 564), and called sexually explicit (900)
phone numbers, (Tr. 781–82, 784). Accordingly, even
if the email addresses and penis enlargement pills were
somehow relevant, this evidence would be little more than
cumulative. The jury obviously was not persuaded that
this type of evidence undermined plaintiff's claims. A new
trial is not warranted on this basis.
3. Trial Counsel's Cross–Examination
Defendants argue that a new trial is warranted because
trial counsel “failed to adequately cross-examine the
plaintiff on the inconsistencies between plaintiff's trial
testimony and his deposition.” (Def.Br.21.) Defendants
do not indicate precisely which deposition testimony
counsel should have cross-examined plaintiff about.
Defendants do make reference to their prior argument
about plaintiff's allegedly perjured testimony. But the
only arguable inconsistency noted in this section between
plaintiff's deposition and trial testimony involved the
amount of his salary. As already stated, it is not clear
that such statements were in fact inconsistent or even
misleading. Even assuming defendants could move for
a new trial on this ground, the Court finds that trial
counsel's cross-examination did not lead to a seriously
erroneous result or a verdict that is a miscarriage of justice.
4. Plaintif's Credibility
Defendants next attack the verdict on the ground that
plaintiff's testimony was generally not credible. They point
to a series of facts that they believe severely undermine
plaintiff's claim that he was “mortally scared.” First, they
argue that plaintiff's claim that he was afraid to call for
help on the phone because he believed Geeta Sharma
was eavesdropping is undermined by (a) his admission
that he did not think she listened to every phone call; (b)
that he did not know how Geeta Sharma was recording
his phone calls; and (c) that he had at least one email
address, so he could have emailed for help. Second, they
argue that plaintiff's claim that he was scared to call for
help is undermined by the fact that plaintiff did indeed
complain about some of the conditions in the Temple
to another devotee, Arish Sahani, who testified at trial.
Third, they argue that plaintiff's alleged fear to go to the
Indian Embassy is undermined by the fact that he did in
fact go to the U.S. Attorney's Office and the police, and
that surely he would have been more comfortable going to
the Indian Embassy given his English language deficiency.
*10 Fourth, defendants complain that it is implausible
that plaintiff would report his stolen passport to the
authorities but not also tell them that he was subject
to forced labor. Fifth, they again argue that ordering
adult films and dialing (900) sex numbers is inherently
inconsistent with being subjected to forced labor. Sixth,
they argue that the fact that plaintiff, according to his
testimony, was aware of the “freedoms and liberty”
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available in the United States makes it implausible that he
would be scared to seek help. And lastly, they argue that
plaintiff's decision finally to leave the Temple was in fact
motivated by the installation of a security camera designed
to thwart his independent astrology business.
These inconsistencies are not nearly as damning as
defendants suggest. Each is targeted primarily at one
isolated (and translated) phrase—“mortally scared”—
which defendants apparently take as plaintiff's assertion
that he was at all times between 2003 and 2007
paralyzed with fear. The Court does not find the phrase
“mortally scared,” when compared with the remainder of
plaintiff's testimony, so troubling. Indeed, the purportedly
uncomfortable inconsistencies pointed to by defendants
could just as easily be seen as forthright qualifications of
plaintiff's assertion of “mortal fear.” The jury, apparently,
read them this way, for it credited plaintiff's testimony.
The Court sees no reason to upset the jury's considered
judgment.
5. Weight of the Evidence
Defendants next ground for a new trial is that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. It is well-recognized
that a district court has discretion to order a new trial on
this ground. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 540, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958).
Defendants argue (a) that two witnesses saw plaintiff with
his passport at certain times and that two others saw the
passport in the Temple with statues of Hindu deities; (b)
that plaintiff's room was larger than he alleged, that he had
another living quarters, and that no pipe was protruding
from the wall; and (c) that plaintiff was paid for his work
because he signed a ledger each month indicating that he
had received his salary, and that his family in India did
indeed receive their half of his salary.
These arguments are little more than recapitulations of
those discussed above, and again the evidence pointed to
by defendants is far less compelling than they suggest. As
to the passport, none of the individuals who allegedly saw
plaintiff's passport provided direct evidence that it was in
fact plaintiff's passport. As to plaintiff's living quarters,
another witness, Priya Sood, corroborated plaintiff's
estimate on the size of the room, (Tr. 516), and Ron
Luther's assertion that plaintiff had another apartment
upstairs was mostly surmise (Tr. 608). And as to whether
plaintiff received a salary, the defendants' circumstantial
evidence is simply not enough to upset the jury's decision
that plaintiff's account at trial was the truthful one.
6. Jury's Verdict
*11 Finally, defendants argue that a new trial is required
because the jury's verdicts are internally inconsistent.
The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendants had committed forced labor in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1589 and had trafficked plaintiff for involuntary
servitude or forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1590. The jury also found, however, that plaintiff libeled
defendants by making oral statements to Kathianne
Bonniello of the New York Post and George Joseph
of India Abroad, which were subsequently published by
those newspapers, including:
• Defendants kept plaintiff as a slave since 2000,
repeatedly told plaintiff “this is what happens to
people with brown skin,” and showed news clippings
to plaintiff of terrorists jailed at Guantanamo Bay;
• Defendants, since 2000, forced plaintiff to work 16–
hour days, forbade him from leaving the Ashram,
and constantly threatened him physically and
emotionally.
Although a party may challenge inconsistent general
verdicts on the ground of an alleged error in the trial
court's jury instructions, 2 see Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co.,
283 F.3d 33, 56 (2d Cir.2002), many courts have expressed
doubt whether the inconsistency of a civil verdict itself
is grounds for a new trial. In re Vivendi Universal Sec.
Litig., 765 F.Supp.2d 512, 554 n. 33 (S.D.N.Y.2011)
(collecting cases). Compare Zhang v. American Gem
Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.2003) (“We
have found no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case in
which an appellate court has directed the trial court to
grant a new trial due to inconsistencies between general
verdicts, and Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that we
cannot do so.”); Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 91 (1st
Cir.1984) (“We subscribe ... to a substantial reluctance
to consider inconsistency in civil jury verdicts a basis
for new trials.”); Malm v. U.S. Lines Co., 269 F.Supp.
731, 731–32 (S.D.N.Y.1967) ( “Inconsistent jury verdicts
upon different counts or claims are not an anomaly in
the law, which at times recognizes a jury's right to an
idiosyncratic position, provided the challenged verdict is
based upon the evidence and the law.”), with Diamond
Shamrock Corp. v. Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 F.2d 1416,
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1423 (10th Cir.1986) (recognizing that facially inconsistent
general verdicts may be grounds for a new trial); Will v.
Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 677 & n.
5 (7th Cir.1985) (same).
In any event, it is clear to this Court that if it does have
the authority to order a new trial on this ground, it also
has the duty to “adopt a view of the case, if there is one,
that resolves any seeming inconsistency.” Cf. Brooks v.
Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp., 958 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.1992);
Munafo v. Metro. Transit Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d
Cir.2004) (“To justify setting aside an otherwise valid jury
verdict, the special verdict answers must be ‘ineluctably
inconsistent.’ ”)
The jury's verdicts are not without tension, but the
Court finds that they can be harmonized. First, although
trafficking and forced labor are often described as
“modern slavery,” e.g. United States Dep't of State,
What is Modern Slavery, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/what/
index.htm (last visited January 22, 2012), a reasonable
juror's conception of slavery may not be perfectly
congruent with the conduct proscribed by the TVPA.
As defendants point out, a “slave” is traditionally
understood as “a person held in servitude[;] one
that is the chattel of another,” Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 2139 (3d ed.1986). The latter
half of this definition connotes the atrocity of holding
an individual as property, a practice sadly familiar to
anyone with even a passing knowledge of American
history, and one that continues today, see United States
Dep't of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, at
19 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/164452.pdf (“People are bought and sold
as commodities within and across borders to satisfy
demand from buyers.”). But liability under § 1589 does not
require that the victim be the defendant's chattel. That is,
liability does not require that the victim be the defendant's
property in the sense that he was purchased by defendants
or that he could have been marketed or sold by defendants
to another. The jury could have seized on this distinction
in rendering its verdicts.
*12 Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to a new
trial.
III. Motion for a New Trial as to Damages, or for
Remittitur
Defendants also challenge the damage awards in this
case. As explained above, the jury awarded compensatory
damages of $250,000.00 total on the forced labor claim,
compensatory damages of $750,000.00 total on the
trafficking claim, and punitive damage awards on the
trafficking claim of $750,000.00 against both Geeta
and Sat Sharma and $1 million against the Ashram.
Defendants argue that the compensatory damage awards
—$250,000.00 for the forced labor claim and $750,000.00
for the trafficking claim—are duplicative of each other,
and that, in any event, both the compensatory and
punitive damage awards are excessive. The Court does not
find that the compensatory damage awards are duplicative
or excessive, but does find remittitur appropriate on the
punitive damage awards.
1. Duplicative Compensatory Damages
Defendants argue that the Court must conduct a
new trial on damages because the “compensation
for the alleged violation of the forced labor statute
essentially compensates for the same injuries that were
the result of the alleged violation of the trafficking
statute.” (Def.Br.40). For three reasons defendants'
argument fails.
First, despite ample opportunity, defendants did not
object to the jury instruction or verdict form, nor did
they object to the jury's verdict after it was rendered and
before the jury was discharged. Their objection is therefore
waived. See Bseirani v. Mashie, 1997 WL 3632, at *1
(2d Cir.1997) (“By not objecting to the instructions ...
or requesting that the jury be questioned before being
discharged, [defendant] has waived the argument that the
damages are duplicative.”).
Second, the Court specifically warned the jury not to
duplicate its award:
[Y]ou
should
not
award
compensatory damages more
than once for the same injury.
For example, if a plaintiff were
to prevail on two claims and
establish a one dollar injury, you
could not award him one dollar
compensatory damages on each
claim—he is only entitled to be
made whole again, not to recover
more than he lost. Of course, if
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different injuries are attributed to
the separate claims, then you must
compensate him fully for all of the
injuries. (Tr. 1222).
Accordingly, the Court's instruction was not improper.
Third, there is at least “a hypothetical scenario on which
the damages are not duplicative,” see Bseirani, 1997 WL
3632, at *2. As the jury was instructed, the trafficking
claim involves the extra requirement that the defendant
“harbored” the victim. As such, the jury could have
rationally split the harms for forced labor and trafficking
into those flowing from the services obtained through
defendants' compulsion and those flowing from the
conditions of harboring to which plaintiff was subjected,
both of which were supported by record evidence. This
would explain why the two compensatory damage awards
were not the same values, as one might expect if the jury
had considered the injuries for both counts to be the same.
*13 This is not a case in which one, indivisible
injury is compensable through alternate legal theories.
Accordingly, even if defendants have not waived their
duplication argument, the Court is confident that its
instruction properly warned the jury and that, at worst,
the jury rationally divided several years' of harm across
somewhat overlapping claims. See Bender v. City of
New York, 78 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir.1996) (“In some
cases, seemingly duplicative awards made separately
for overlapping causes of action or against different
defendants have been sustained where it appeared that the
jury intended to award the aggregate sum.”).
2. Amount of Compensatory Damages
Defendants next seek a new trial or conditional remittitur.
A district court may, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, either order a new trial or order a
conditional remittitur, “giv[ing] the plaintiff the choice
of voluntarily remitting his award to a set lesser amount
in lieu of a new trial.” Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc. ., 652
F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.2011). “Where there is no particular
discernible error,” as is true here, “a jury's damage award
may not be set aside as excessive unless the award is so
high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a
denial of justice.” Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149,
165 (2d Cir.1998).
The Court's instruction on compensatory damages was as
follows:
The purpose of the law of
damages is to award, as far
as possible, just and fair
compensation for the loss, if
any, which resulted from the
forced labor or harboring of the
plaintiff. If you find that the
defendant is liable on the claims,
as I have explained them, then
you must award the plaintiff
sufficient damages to compensate
him for any injury proximately
caused by the defendants'
conduct. These are known
as “compensatory damages.”
Compensatory damages seek to
make the plaintiff whole—that
is, to compensate him for the
damage suffered. Compensatory
damages are not limited merely to
expenses that plaintiff may have
borne. A prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to compensatory damages
for the pain and suffering, mental
anguish, shock and discomfort
that he suffered because of a
defendant's conduct. (Tr. 1223–
24).
Defendants are likely correct that most, if not all, of
the $1 million compensatory damage award in this
case is for pain and suffering, mental anguish, shock,
and discomfort because the record evidence would
not otherwise support such a substantial recovery.
As a general matter, such damages include “fright,
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock,
humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension,
terror, or ordeal.” 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 201.
Courts and commentators have long recognized that
“the law does not provide a precise formula by which
pain and suffering and emotional distress may be
properly measured and reduced to monetary value,”
Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 308
(S.D.N.Y.2001), and the Second Circuit has indicated its
willingness “to uphold substantial damage awards [for
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2012 WL 481796
mental distress] where warranted,” Ismail v. Cohen, 899
F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.1990).
*14 To determine whether an award is excessive, the
Court must “look to other awards in similar cases” to
ensure that the award is “within reasonable range.” Sinkov
v. Americor, Inc., 419 F. App'x 86, 93 (2d Cir.2011). As
defendants point out, the TVPA's civil cause of action is
too new to have generated a body of case law on damage
awards. Defendants offer the Court two non-TVPA cases
as reference points. In the first, Schramm v. Long Island
R.R Co., 857 F.Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y.1994), the court
held that a $232,500.00 award for pain and suffering was
excessive. The plaintiff had been struck in the head with a
tree limb through the defendant's negligence. He suffered
a concussion and ongoing symptoms related to “postconcussion syndrome,” and he testified that his condition
prevented him from fully enjoying his life.” Id. at 258.
In the second case cited by defendants, DiSorbo v. Hoy,
343 F.3d 172 (2d Cir.2003), the Second Circuit reduced a
damage award of $400,000.00 to $250,000.00. Id. at 185–
86. The plaintiff in that case sustained serious physical and
psychological injury as a result of the defendants' use of
excessive force and battery. Id.
These cases, which involve serious injury or indignity, are
not wholly unhelpful, and the Court has identified similar
federal and state cases with awards in a similar range. See
Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir.1996)
($150,000 for blow to the mouth with no lasting physical
injury, 24 hours' confinement, the pendency of criminal
proceedings for six months, and sleep problems); Gardner
v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348, 1353
(2d Cir.1990) ($150,000 for psychiatric issues including
personality change arising from false imprisonment and
battery by department store security guard); Bert v. Port
Auth. Of N.Y. & N.J ., 166 A.D.2d 351, 561 N.Y.S.2d
416 (1st Dep't 1990) ($100,000 for 3.5 hour detention and
humiliation in front of family).
Another helpful line of cases contains awards in a slightly
higher range for mental anguish resulting from lengthy
and concerted harassment. See Town of Hempstead v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 233 A.D.2d 451, 649
N.Y.S.2d 942 (2d Dep't 1996) ($500,000 for nine months
of extreme sexual harassment); Tiffany & Co. v. Smith, 224
A.D.2d 332, 638 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dep't 1996) ($300,000
under state human rights law for “constant, egregious,
and blatant conduct”); Quinn v. Nassau County Police
Dep't, 53 F.Supp.2d 347, 362 (E.D.N.Y.1999) ($250,000
for nine years' sexual orientation discrimination, including
tormenting plaintiff with pornographic cartoons and
making anti-gay remarks); Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benev.
Ass'n of City of N .Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876 (1988) ($225,000
for sustained harassment and adverse employment
decisions over a period of two years).
Based on these two lines of cases, the Court cannot
conclude that the jury's $1 million verdict was
unreasonable. The plaintiff in this case was subject to the
conduct for which defendants are liable for far longer than
in the line of cases cited by defendants, which generally
involve discrete, relatively brief incidents. The jury in this
case predominantly awarded pain and suffering damages
not for proximate symptoms that degrade one's enjoyment
of the remainder of life-conditions like post—traumatic
stress disorder—but for the humiliation, indignity, and
ordeal directly inflicted over three-and-one-half years of
compelled labor. Accordingly, one would expect pain and
suffering damages in this case to be substantially higher
than the several hundred thousand dollar awards in the
first line of cases.
*15 And one would also expect a larger award here
than in the second line of cases, which do involve a
longer course of conduct by the defendants. That is
because the harms inflicted by even extreme workplace
harassment, although obviously serious, are not as grave
as the extraordinary indignity of compelled labor. Even if
the jury's award was for only pain and suffering, mental
anguish, shock, and discomfort for the roughly 1300 days
of defendants' conduct, compensation would work out
to under $800 per day. Given the difficulty of affixing a
mathematical value to such injuries, the Court cannot find
that this result is unreasonable.
3. Amount of Punitive Damages
Finally, defendants move for a new trial or remittitur as to
the jury's $2.5 million award of punitive damages. As with
compensatory damages, courts must not disturb a jury
award unless it “shocks the judicial conscience.” Paterson
v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir.2006). This inquiry
is guided by the three factors identified by the Supreme
Court in BMW of North America., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996): “(1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the tortious conduct; (2)
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages;
and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil
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penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” In
addition to the Gore factors, district courts must consider
the financial circumstances of the defendants. Paterson,
440 F.3d at 121. As the Second Circuit has recognized,
“one purpose of punitive damages is deterrence, and that
deterrence is directly related to what people can afford
to pay .” Id. at 122. Accordingly, a punitive damage
award that “result[s] in the financial ruin of the defendant”
cannot stand.
The first Gore factor, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, is “[p]erhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. This “reflects the
accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy
than others.” Id. Forced labor is, of course, extremely
reprehensible. This would ordinarily favor a very large
punitive damage award. But this case is an unusual one,
because here the jury found both that defendants were
liable for forced labor and trafficking and that plaintiff
had libeled defendants. This result can be reconciled only
by concluding that the jury found each element of forced
labor and trafficking satisfied, but found that plaintiff's
description of defendants' conduct as “enslavement” was
overstated to the point that it injured defendants. Given
this, the first Gore factor does not weigh as strongly in
favor of the $2.5 million award as it otherwise might.
The second Gore factor is the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, which in this case is 2.5:1.
The Supreme Court has been “reluctant to identify
concrete constitutional limits” for the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424, 123 S.Ct. 1513,
155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). It has recognized that an
important consideration in determining whether the
ratio is permissible in a given case is the size of
the compensatory damage award. Id. at 425. That is,
although a higher ratio may be appropriate where “a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages,” “[w]hen compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.” Id. The $1
million compensatory damage award in this case is quite
substantial. As such, the 2.5:1 ratio seems excessive and a
1:1 ratio would appear more appropriate. See Thomas v.
iStar Fin., Inc., 652 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.2011) (affirming
district court's conclusion that 1:1 ratio was appropriate
because of substantial $190,000 compensatory damage
award).
*16 The third Gore factor considers the “difference
between this remedy and civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases .” Just as above, this
inquiry is a difficult one because of the dearth of
reported awards under the TVPA. But the Court cannot
find, and plaintiff has not cited, analogous case law
imposing a punitive damage award as enormous—both
generally and in proportion to the compensatory damage
award—as that returned by the jury here. The sorts of
harassment and discrimination verdicts that the Court
used as reference points above generally impose punitive
damage awards in the range of $50,000 to $300,000.
See Ortiz–Del Valle v. National Basketball Ass'n, 42
F.Supp.2d 334 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (remitting $7,000,000
award to $250,000); Tse v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 568
F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (remitting $3,000,000
award to $300,000); Manzo v. Sovereign Motor Cars, Ltd.,
2010 WL 1930237 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (upholding $200,000
award); see also Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F.Supp.2d
252, 263 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (noting $50,000 to $300,000
punitive damage cap in Title VII claims). Accordingly,
even after accounting for the greater reprehensibility of
defendants' conduct in this case, a $2.5 million punitive
damage award is excessive.
Lastly, the Court must consider the defendants'
financial circumstances. Although it is true that “it
is the defendant's burden to show that his financial
circumstances warrant a limitation of the award,”
Paterson, 440 F.3d at 122, and although the evidence in
the record on this issue is not extensive, the Court thinks
it is sufficient to establish that the individual defendants
and the Ashram are of modest means. Sat Sharma owns
a construction business, is the sole stockholder in another
corporation called De–Temps, Inc. (the nature of the
corporation's business does not appear in the record), and
owns a small property in upstate New York. (Tr. 911).
Geeta Sharma has no independent income. (Tr. 1018).
The Ashram, for all it appears, has always struggled to
remain afloat. (Tr. 796, 992–93). In short, the Court has
every reason to believe that the massive punitive damage
awards returned by the jury would cause financial ruin
to the individual defendants and the Ashram. In such
circumstances, remittitur is appropriate. Id. at 122.
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In sum, the Gore factors and defendants' financial
circumstances indicate that the $2.5 million award of
punitive damages is excessive. The awards against all
three defendants are reduced by $500,000. The result is a
punitive damage award of $250,000 against Sat Sharma;
$250,000 against Geeta Sharma; and $500,000 against the
Ashram. This award is certainly sufficient to deter similar
conduct by these or similarly situated individuals, and the
resulting 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
comports with due process. Plaintiff may either elect to
accept the remitted award or the Court will hold a new
trial on punitive damages.
Conclusion
*17 For the reasons stated above,
Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 is DENIED;
Defendant's motion for a new trial on liability under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 is DENIED;
Defendant's motion for a new trial on damages under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 is DENIED with respect to the
compensatory damage award and GRANTED with
respect to the punitive damage award unless plaintiff
elects to accept a remitted punitive damage award of
$250,000 against Sat Sharma; $250,000 against Geeta
Sharma; and $500,000 against the Vishva Seva Ashram.
SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 481796
Footnotes
1
2
Defendants could not be held liable for any conduct prior to the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act in late 2003, which added a civil cause of action. The jury was instructed as such. As the jury was
also instructed, however, the evidence can be considered as background and context for the alleged post-amendment
conduct.
Defendants do not assert that the Court's jury instruction was error. Nor could they, because any such objection is waived
by their failure to object to the instructions before the jury retired to deliberate. See Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d
33, 56 (2d Cir.2002) (“Objection to an inconsistency between two general verdicts that is traced to an alleged error in
the jury instruction or verdict sheet is properly made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51,” but “a party must object before the jury
retires to deliberate.”)
End of Document
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