Grady v. DIrectTV Customer Services Inc et al
Filing
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ORDER denying Plaintiff's 34 Rule 59 Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend Judgment. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 07/16/2015. (athom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 14-cv-03474-CMA-NYW
LATOYA GRADY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIRECTV CUSTOMER SERVICES INC.,
ALAN PALMER, and
JESSICA SISNEROS,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RULE 59 MOTION TO RECONSIDER, ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff LaToya Grady’s Pro Se 1 Rule 59
Motion to Consider, Alter, or Amend Judgment. (Doc. # 34.) For the reasons set forth
below, the instant Motion is denied. 2
1
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes her Motion and holds it to
less stringent standards than that of a formal motion drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
2
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Motion is procedurally improper. Grounds warranting a motion
to reconsider include: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence
previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See
Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir.1995). Such a motion
is not an appropriate vehicle to advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff did not respond
to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (see Doc. # 32 at 3), but should have made the
arguments she made in the instant Motion in such a response.
The Arbitration Agreement at issue in the instant case defines “[d]isputes which
shall be submitted to binding arbitration for final resolution” as being “all claims or
controversies (“claims”), past, present or future, arising out of an employee's
employment or termination, . . . that an employee may have against any of the
following (1) the Company; (2) its officers, directors, employees or agents in their
capacity as such or otherwise, (3) the Company's parent, subsidiary and affiliated
entities.” (Doc. # 30-3 at 2) (emphasis added). The Arbitration Agreement also
provides that “Claims for . . . Unemployment Compensation benefits cannot be
submitted to binding arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement.” (Id.)
In determining whether an issue falls within the scope of an arbitration clause,
the Court examines the factual underpinnings of a claim, rather than the legal labels
attached to it. Chelsea Family Pharmacy, PLLC v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 567 F.3d
1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009). “If the allegations underlying the claims touch matters
covered by the parties’ [arbitration agreement], then those claims must be arbitrated,
whatever the legal labels attached to them.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Co. of Oklahoma, 636 F.3d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Chelsea Family
Pharmacy, 567 F.3d at 1198). Additionally, the Court classifies the particular arbitration
clause at issue as either “broad” or “narrow.” Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 404 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). Where the arbitration clause is broad,
a presumption of arbitrability arises, and “matters that touch the underlying contract
should be arbitrated.” Id.; see also Brown v. Coleman Co., Inc., 220 F.3d 1180, 1184
(10th Cir. 2000) (same).
2
The Court finds that the arbitration clause at issue here, which uses the phrase
“arising out of,” is broad in scope; the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that such a
phrase signifies that the parties intended their arbitration agreement to be construed
broadly. See, e.g., Newmont U.S.A. Ltd. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 615 F.3d 1268, 12741275 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Looking to the plain language of the arbitration provision . . .
including its use of the phrase ‘arising out of,’ we have little trouble determining that it is
a broad provision.”) As such, a presumption of arbitrability attaches here.
Next, the Court looks to the factual underpinnings of the claim. Plaintiff argues
that the Court should not have compelled arbitration because her “Second claim for
relief, paragraph 67, specifically states causes [sic] of action for denial of unemployment
benefits in retaliation for filing administrative complaints of discrimination,” and is thus
“is outside of the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.” (Doc. # 34 at 2.) However, an
examination of the factual underpinnings of that “cause of action” claim make clear that
Plaintiff is not bringing a traditional, independent claim for unemployment benefits
against Directv, as would ordinarily be envisioned by the Agreement’s exception for
such claims; indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint acknowledges that she has already brought
such a traditional claim with the Colorado Department of Labor, and won that claim on
appeal, when she was granted a “full award” of benefits. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 81.) Rather, the
factual allegations she makes with respect to unemployment benefits are derivative of
(and made in support of) her Title VII retaliation claim, which is undoubtedly arbitrable.
Specifically, in the larger context of discussing how she was retaliated against by
Defendants, paragraph 67 of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “[t]he Deputy of Colorado
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Department of Labor and Employment relied upon [the] information and documents
provided by Defendant Laura Barnett and Defendant Alan Palmer to deny plaintiff
Unemployment Benefits [on] September 20, 2013.” (Doc. # 1, ¶ 67.)
To put it slightly differently, Plaintiff has already won the benefits themselves; the
only issue left to determine is whether Defendants acted in retaliation, in violation of
Title VII, in allegedly preventing her from initially obtaining these benefits. This issue fits
squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause, as it “arise[s] out of” her employment
or its termination. As such, it must be determined in arbitration, and the Court did not
err in compelling that process. See Chelsea Family Pharm., 567 F.3d at 1196 (noting
that a stay of an entire case to allow for arbitration is appropriate even where there are
collateral claims, if arbitrable claims predominate the lawsuit). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Rule 59 Motion to Consider, Alter, or Amend Judgment (Doc. # 34) is hereby DENIED.
DATED: July 16, 2015
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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