Quinn v. DeQuardo et al

Filing 6

ORDER Directing Plaintiff to File Amended Complaint, by Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher on 1/06/2015. (slibi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00019-GPG
MAURICE E. QUINN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DeQUARDO, M.D., Pueblo State Hospital,
SARA WELTON, Public Defender,
BILLY BOUNDS, Public Defender,
ERIC ZALES, Public Defender,
JUDGE MARTIN EGGLENHOFF, Denver District Court,
BRIAN WIGGETT, Psy. D. Staff Psychologist,
DEN D.A. ALLISON JENNINGS, and
JUDGE CHRISTINA HABAS, Denver District Court,
Defendants.

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Maurice E. Quinn is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections and currently is incarcerated at the Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility in Cañon City, Colorado. Plaintiff, acting pro se, initiated this action
by filing a Prisoner Complaint alleging that his constitutional rights were violated.
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915.
The Court must construe the Complaint liberally because Plaintiff is a pro se
litigant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10 th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not act as a pro se litigant’s
advocate. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below , Plaintiff will be
ordered to file an Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff asserts three claims regarding his court-ordered prescribed medication.
Overall, Plaintiff appears to challenge the affect the prescribed medication had on his
ability to participate in his state criminal proceeding and to enter into a knowing and
voluntary plea, and his current inability to feed himself, dial the telephone to talk to his
family, tie his shoes, push himself in a wheelchair, to which he is confined. Plaintiff
contends that Defendants have violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Plaintiff seeks release from prison, declaratory relief and money damages.
First, Plaintiff’s request for release based on the alleged constitutional violations
in his criminal proceeding more properly is addressed in a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 504 (1973).
Habeas corpus claims may not be raised in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. T he Supreme
Court has explained the role of habeas and civil rights actions as follows:
Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to
imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a
complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement
or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus,
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed.2d 439
(1973); requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may
be presented in a § 1983 action.
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
573, 579 (2006). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue any habeas corpus claims he must file a
separate habeas corpus action. Before seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court,
Plaintiff must exhaust state court remedies. See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862,
866 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that state court remedies must be exhausted prior to
seeking habeas corpus relief).
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Second, Plaintiff’s request for money damages based on the alleged
constitutional violations in his criminal proceeding is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Under Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that if a
judgment for damages favorable to a prisoner in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action necessarily
would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence, the § 1983 action does
not arise until the conviction or sentence is reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question
by the issuance of a federal habeas writ. Here, there is an underlying conviction that
would be subject to invalidation based on Plaintiff’s prescribed medications and his
associated inability to assist in his criminal proceeding and to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea. See Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Circuit 2007) (court
found Heck was not implemented in this case but stated that when there is related
underlying conviction there would be invalidation and Heck applies). If the Court were
to find that Plaintiff was so medicated during his trial that he was incapable of entering a
voluntary and knowing plea and to assist in his defense, as suggested by Plaintiff, that
finding would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction and sentence.
Finally, Defendants Sara Welton, Billy Rounds, Eric Zales, Judge Martin
Egglenhoff, Allison Jennings, and Judge Christina Habas are immune from suit for the
reasons stated below.
Defendants Judge Martin Egglenhoff and Judge Christina Habas are absolutely
immune from liability in civil rights suits when they act in their judicial capacity, unless
they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Morales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

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11-12 (1991); Stump v. Scarman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Hunt v. Bennett, 17
F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1994). Questions of competency are “ ‘intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” See Wolf v. Scobie, 28 F.
App’x 545, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Judges Egglenhoff and Habas were
acting in their judicial capacity when they ruled on Plaintiff’s competency to proceed at
trial and his prescribed medications; they were not acting in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.
Defendant Allison Jennings is entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 suits for
activities within the scope of her prosecutorial duties. See Ambler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976); The Tenth Circuit has found that state prosecutors’ “decisions
to prosecute, their investigatory or evidence–gathering actions, their evaluation of
evidence, their determination of whether probable cause exists, and their determination
of what information to show the court” are activities intimately associated with the
judicial process. See Nielander v. Bd. of County Comm’rs., 582 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th
Cir. 2009). Any part Defendant Jennings played in negotiating a plea with Plaintiff is
within the scope of her prosecutorial duties.
Defendants Sara Welton, Billy Bounds, and Eric Zales, whether private attorneys
or public defenders, who represented Plaintiff, are not state actors under § 1983 and
are not proper parties to this action. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 and
325 (1981).
Plaintiff, therefore, will be directed to file an Amended Complaint that addresses
only claims properly brought in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against properly named
defendants.
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Plaintiff is directed that to state a claim in federal court he must explain (1) what
a defendant did to him; (2) when the defendant did it; (3) how the defendant’s action
harmed him; and (4) what specific legal right the defendant violated. Nasious v. Two
Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff also is required to assert personal participation by a named defendant in
the alleged constitutional violation. See Bennett v. Passic , 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63
(10th Cir. 1976). To establish personal participation, Plaintiff must show in the Cause
of Action section of the complaint form how the named individual caused the
deprivation of a federal right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
There must be an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and each
defendant’s participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise. See Butler v. City
of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993).
A defendant may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her
subordinates on a theory of respondeat superior. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009). Furthermore,
when a plaintiff sues an official under Bivens or § 1983 for
conduct “arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities,” the plaintiff must plausibly plead and
eventually prove not only that the official’s subordinates
violated the Constitution, but that the of ficial by virtue of his
own conduct and state of mind did so as well.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677). Therefore, in order to succeed in a § 1983 suit against a government official for
conduct that arises out of his or her supervisory responsibilities, a plaintiff must allege
and demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or
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possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the
complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to
establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 1199. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that within thirty days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall
file an Amended Complaint that complies with this Order. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall obtain the Court-approved Prisoner
Complaint form (with the assistance of his case manager or the facility’s legal
assistant), along with the applicable instructions, at www.cod.uscourts.gov, to be used
in filing the Amended Complaint. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint that
complies with this Order within the time allowed, the Court will proceed to review the
merits of the original Complaint as the claims pertain to the conditions of Plaintiff’s
confinement and as alleged against properly named defendants that are currently
listed in the caption of the Complaint form.
DATED January 6, 2015, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
S/ Gordon P. Gallagher

United States Magistrate Judge

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