McCoy v. CO Dept of Human Services et al

Filing 16

ORDER to Amend, by Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher on 3/09/2015. ORDERED Ms. McCoy have 30 days from the date of this Order to file an Amended Complaint; denying 13 Motion for Reasonable Accommodation. (slibi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00021-GPG
LEILA McCOY, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CO DEPT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
EL PASO COUNTY DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES,
ROSLYN HENCE-RANDALL, Individually and in her Professional Capacities, and
SHIRLEY RUDD, Individually and in her Professional Capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER TO AMEND

I. Background
Plaintiff Leila McCoy currently resides in Colorado Springs, Colorado. She
initiated this action by filing two Complaints on January 5, 2015. In the first Complaint,
Ms. McCoy asserts jurisdiction pursuant to “federal question,” “regulations and civil
rights violations,” and the”State of Colorado.” ECF No. 1. In the second Complaint, Ms.
McCoy asserts jurisdiction pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-101.5, 105 and 106; 5
U.S.C. § 552; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1996B, 10406, 12101; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 and
794; HIPPA; right to free exercise of religion; and the “TRAILS listing.” Ms. McCoy
seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Ms. McCoy also has submitted an
Application to Proceed in District Court W ithout Prepaying Fees or Costs, which was
granted on March 6, 2015.
II. Statement of Claims
The Court must construe Ms. McCoy’s Complaints liberally because she is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall

v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not act
as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Ms. McCoy will be
directed to file an Amended Complaint for the reasons stated below.
In the Background section of the first Complaint, Ms. McCoy states that (1) her
estranged husband filed a false abuse report against her; (2) an “Agency” denied her
reasonable accommodation and opened a case against her that was discriminatory due
to her disability, religion, and gender; and (3) the Agency retaliated against her for filing
a lawsuit in the United States District Court by removing her children from her home,
listing her as a child abuser, and using sealed court records to harass and intimidate
her. Also in the Claims for Relief section of the first Complaint, Ms. McCoy asserts
three claims:
Claim One-retaliation for filing ADA/Civil Rights complaint by:
(i) illegally using police officers to remove her children from
her home until law suit was dropped;
(ii) holding children in foster care and denying visitation until
suit dropped; and
(iii) illegally listing her in the TRAILS child abuse database
for participating in a federal civil rights investigation of the
US Department of Health and Human Services Civil Rights
Office.
Claim Two-gender and disability discrimination based on:
(i) on being diabetic and pregnant;
(ii) a finding that because she is disabled she is an unf it
mother;
(iii) her unwillingness to abort a pregnancy;
(iv) her unwillingness to engage in federal housing fraud;
(v) lack of reasonable accommodations that impeded court
appearances and grievances;
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(vi) interference with the federal home ownership voucher for
the disabled; and
(vii) interference with Plaintiff’s participation in federal
vocational rehabilitation plan for the blind.
Claim Three-religious discrimination based on:
(i) refusal of all “Plaintiffs’” religious practice while in foster
care;
(ii) use of Plaintiff’s religious practices for basis of unfit
parenting finding;
(iii) penalties for Plaintiff for refusing birth control/abortion;
(iv) denial of Plaintiff’s access to “culturally competent
services;”
(v) a finding that Plaintiff’s religious practice is a mental
illness;
(vi) mocking Plaintiff’s religion and making jokes about
Plaintiff being raped as a child during court proceeding.
ECF No. 1 at 4-6.
In the second Complaint, Ms. McCoy states in the Introduction section, that she
is the custodial parent and sole provider for her five children, she relocated to Colorado
to escape domestic violence, her location was provided to a “Reporting Party,” who the
Court assumes is her estranged husband, and then her estranged husband reported
her to the police and to the Department of Human Services (DHS) for abuse of the
children, which resulted in the placement of Ms. McCoy’s children in foster care. ECF
No. 2 at 1. In the General Allegations section, Ms. McCoy asserts that she is being
retaliated against for filing ADA and “quality of service” complaints against Roslyn
Hence-Randall and the El Paso County Department of Human Services (EPCDHS). Id.
at 3. Ms. McCoy also claims these Defendants have placed her on the TRAILS child
abuse reporting system, removed her children from her home, placed them in foster
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care, and denied her visitation in retaliation for her participation in an ongoing
investigation against the agency by the US Department of Health and Human Services
Office for Civil Rights (USDHHS-Civil Rights). Id. Ms. McCoy further asserts that the
original criminal charges filed against her, which were the basis of the decision of the
“ALJ,” were dropped for lack of evidence and because her estranged husband
recanted. Id. Ms. McCoy asserts that the criminal records were sealed, but illegally
provided by the Colorado Springs Police Department to the EPCDHS for use in a DHS
hearing. Id. at 3-4. Ms. McCoy contends that, nonetheless, the court granted Ms.
McCoy a “no fault” adjudication, found all allegations against her to be false, and
ordered the return of her children and closure of the case on two separate occasions.
Id. at 4. Ms. McCoy, however, further contends that the DHS will not remove her from
the TRAILS registry unless she drops her ADA and civil rights complaints. Id.
Ms. McCoy further asserts under the Specific Allegations section of the second
Complaint the following six claims:
Claim One-The CDHS and the EPCDHS began releasing information and
interviewing family members and accused her of using aliases even
though the court had changed her name because she was a kidnap and
sexual assault victim;
Claim Two-The CDHS, the EPCDHS, and Ms. Hence-Randall refuse to
remove Plaintiff’s information from TRAILS even after Plaintiff provided
evidence that a court had sealed her identity information;
Claim Three-Ms. Hence-Randall has a conflict of interest because Plaintiff
has filed a law suit against her, the Colorado Department of Regulatory
Agencies has an open investigation against Ms. Hence-Randall for
practicing outside the scope of her training, the DHS office refuses to
have a different case worker involved in Plaintiff’s DHS case, Plaintiff was
listed in the TRAILS registry because she refused to drop her
discrimination complaint with the USDHHS-Civil Rights and her federal
civil rights law suit, the sealed criminal report was illegally provided to the
DHS for use in Plaintiff’s DHS case, additional charges of abuse and
neglect of Plaintiff’s son were added to the DHS allegations to harass and
intimidate Plaintiff, and the DHS refused to provide accessible
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documents/discovery in accessible format to Plaintiff, which impeded her
ability to appeal her TRAILS registry determination;
Claim Four-The CDHS and EPCDHS used her religious practices as
evidence to find Plaintiff is an unfit parent, because she refused to have
an abortion when she was homeless and was diagnosed with congestive
heart failure;
Claim Five-The hostility and domestic violence Plaintiff asserts she was
subjected to by her estranged husband is due to religious mandates that if
a woman requests a divorce she loses custody of her children, is subject
to physical attack and is shunned by the community and family, which the
Colorado Attorney General used to prove Plaintiff is unfit; and
Claim Six-Plaintiff is an adult survivor of domestic violence and, therefore,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-308 and the CDHS Domestic Violence Practice
Child Protective Services assessment and TRAILS standards prohibit
listing an adult survivor as the perpetrator in TRAILS, especially since her
estranged husband is the domestic violence offender and actual
perpetrator. The DHS case worker failed to have domestic violence
assessments completed and misled the court by failing to report that the
State of Missouri had jurisdiction over the custody of the children, the
father refused to sign birth certificates of the children when paternity was
established, and he only tried to get custody when he learned he was
facing incarceration for child support evasion. The DHS case worker also
failed to investigate numerous police reports along with a custody order in
Missouri that granted Plaintiff permission to leave Missouri for her safety.
ECF No. 2 at 4-6
Ms. McCoy’s claims are repetitive and vague but clear as to several issues. Ms.
McCoy asserts she has been the sole provider for her five children and has had full
custodial rights. She previously lived in Missouri, but she moved from Missouri, with the
permission of the court, to escape domestic violence. Once Ms. McCoy settled in
Colorado her estranged husband attempted to obtain custody of the children because
he was subject to incarceration for failure to pay child support. Her estranged husband
reported Ms. McCoy to the Colorado Springs Police Department and to the DHS
regarding the care of the children, not because he was concerned about the children
but because he is the domestic violence predator involving Ms. McCoy and desires to

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take the children from her based on religious and financial concerns. Ms. McCoy’s
criminal case was dropped, the records were sealed, but the evidence was used by the
DHS in Ms. McCoy’s adjudicatory proceeding before the DHS, which included a hearing
before an ALJ and an appeal.
As a result of the previous events and what appears to be the basis of Ms.
McCoy’s claims, at some time, her children were removed from her home and placed in
foster care. It is not clear if the children have been returned to her home. Ms. McCoy
now has been listed on the TRAILS registry, which identifies her as a child abuser, and
as a result, other agencies are aware of the child abuser identification and have denied
her benefits available in either state or possibly federal programs. Ms. McCoy further
contends that the DHS decision discriminates against her because she has been found
unfit based on her Muslim religious beliefs.
III. Analysis
The Court will direct Ms. McCoy to file an Amended Complaint for the following
reasons.
The twin purposes of a complaint are to give the opposing parties fair notice of
the basis for the claims against them so that they may respond and to allow the Court
to conclude that the allegations, if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See
Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of
Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1989). T he requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
are designed to meet these purposes. See TV Communications Network, Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1992).
Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statem ent of the claim
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought."
The philosophy of Rule 8(a) is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that “[e]ach
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Taken together, Rules 8(a) and (d)(1)
underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.
Prolix, vague, or unintelligible pleadings violate Rule 8.
Claims must be presented clearly and concisely in a manageable format that
allows a court and a defendant to know what claims are being asserted and to be able
to respond to those claims. New Home Appliance Ctr., Inc., v. Thompson, 250 F.2d
881, 883 (10th Cir. 1957). For the purposes of Rule 8(a), “[i]t is sufficient, and indeed
all that is permissible, if the complaint concisely states facts upon which relief can be
granted upon any legally sustainable basis.” Id.
A. Fed. R. Civ.P. 8
Based on the Court’s above review of Ms. McCoy’s two complaints, the Court
finds that she fails to provide a short and plain statement of her claims in compliance
with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms.
McCoy’s claims are repetitive, not stated in a clear and concise format, and for the most
part conclusory and vague. Furthermore, Ms. McCoy lists multiple federal statutes and
one state statute as the basis for jurisdiction in this Court that are not supported by
specific facts alleging how the certain law was violated. To the extent the noted
statutes properly provide for a cause of action in this case, as the Court identifies
below, Ms. McCoy must state with specificity how each statute was violated.
A decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is within the trial court’s
sound discretion. See Atkins v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir.
1992); Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969). The Court,
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however, will give Ms. McCoy an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the Complaints
by submitting one Amended Complaint that meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
and complies with the following directives.
B. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-4-105 and 106
As stated above, Ms. McCoy asserts jurisdiction in part pursuant to Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 24-4-105 and 106. Ms. McCoy contends that under these state statutes this
Court has the authority to enter an order prior to and following an ultimate determination
of the validity of a TRAILS listing. Ms. McCoy further contends that this action is timely
because she had forty-five to sixty-five days from the ALJ and final agency decision of
CDHS and EPCDHS to file this action.
The Court has reviewed Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-106, the state statute that
provides for judicial remedy for a person who was adversely affect or aggrieved by
agency actions. Under § 24-4-106(2) a final agency action “shall be subject to judicial
review as provided in this section.” “Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any
agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within
thirty days after such agency action becomes effective.” § 24-4-106(4). “The decision
of the district court shall be subject to appellate review as may be permitted by law or
the Colorado appellate rules.” § 24-4-106(9). The purview of § 24-4-106, as it applies
to an individual who has been adversely affected or aggrieved by a State of Colorado
agency, does not include filing an action in this Court for judicial review of the agency
action and intends for a filing of judicial action in a State of Colorado District Court.
Nonetheless, the findings of a state administrative agency do not generally bind
federal courts. Estate of Bassatt v. School Dist. No. 1 in the City and County of Denver ,
775 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796
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(1986). However, federal courts must give preclusive effect to factual and legal
determinations made by state courts when reviewing state administrative agency
actions. Estate of Bassatt, 775 F.3d at 1237-38 (citing Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.
456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).
C. ADA/Sections 12101 and 794
First, Ms. McCoy cannot maintain an ADA claim against individual defendants in
their individual capacities because the statute does not im pose individual liability. See
Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999). Title II of the ADA
provides that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. The Act defines a “public entity” as any State or local government,
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government; and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any
commuter authority. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(1) (emphasis added). See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 500
F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
Second, to state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege that (1) [s]he is a
qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion,
denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of a disability.” Robertson , 500 F.3d
at 1193. Ms. McCoy does not state with any specificity in either Complaint that she is a
qualified individual with a disability and how she was excluded from participation in or

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denied benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and how such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was because of her disability.
D. Sections 1981,1983, and 1985
Ms. McCoy’s alleged discrimination based on religious belief may be considered
as filed pursuant to § 1983. Ms. McCoy, however, has failed to identify a specific
constitutional violation. To state a constitutional deprivation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Ms. McCoy must explain (1) what a defendant did to her; (2) when the defendant
did it; (3) how the defendant’s action harmed her; and (4) what specific legal right the
defendant violated. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007).
Ms. McCoy also is directed that she must assert personal participation by a
named defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. See Bennett v. Passic, 545
F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976). To establish personal participation, Ms. McCoy
must show how each named individual caused the deprivation of a federal right. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). There must be an affirmative link
between the alleged constitutional violation and each defendant’s participation, control
or direction, or failure to supervise. See Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055
(10th Cir. 1993).
Supervisors can only be held liable for their own misconduct. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). A supervisor cannot incur liability under § 1983 for his
mere knowledge of a subordinate’s wrongdoing. Id.; see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523
F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[Section] 1983 does not recog nize a concept of strict
supervisor liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract authority
over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.”). Furthermore,
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when a plaintiff sues an official under Bivens or § 1983 for
conduct “arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities,” the plaintiff must plausibly plead and
eventually prove not only that the official’s subordinates
violated the Constitution, but that the of ficial by virtue of his
own conduct and state of mind did so as well.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677). Therefore, in order to succeed in a § 1983 suit against a government official for
conduct that arises out of his or her supervisory responsibilities, a plaintiff must allege
and demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or
possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the
complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to
establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 1199.
Section 1985(3) only applies to conspiracies motivated by some class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971);
see also Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). Ms. McCoy does not
allege facts showing that she is a member of a statutorily protected class. As for
§ 1981, Plaintiff fails to invoke the language of the statute, and she fails to assert any
facts that would give rise to a claim under the statute.
E. Section 552
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, provides in general that
the public has a right of access, to federal agency records, and the right is enforceable
in court. Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir.
1990); Stewart v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2009);
5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The FOIA governs requests made for records of a federal agency.
See Trentadue v. F.B.I., 572 F.3d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 2009). Section 5 51(1), which
applies to the FOIA, clearly defines an agency, under the Act, as “each authority of the
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Government of the United States.” Therefore, a complaint filed pursuant to § 552 is not
available for someone to seek judicial review of a denial of records requested from
sources that are not federal agencies. None of the named defendants are agencies
under the federal government. Furthermore, Ms. McCoy’s claims as presented do not
fall within the purview of § 552.
5. HIPPA
The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)
does not create a private right of action. See Thompson v. Larned State Hosp., --- F.
App’x —, *2 n.1 (10th Cir. Mar. 3, 2015) ) (citing Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256,
1267 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010) (not squarely addressed by the Tenth Circuit but at least two
sister circuits have determined HIPPA violations not remedied in a § 1983 action and
collecting cases noted that support this proposition). Accordingly, since HIPPA does
not make available a private right for a cause of action, Ms. McCoy cannot state a claim
based upon alleged violations of the HIPPA protections.
6. Section 794, 1996B,10406, and TRAILS
The Court has reviewed the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1996B and 10406
and finds no basis for a private cause of action under these statutes. Furthermore, Ms.
McCoy fails to assert how the TRAILS database, which includes a list of identified child
abusers, provides the basis for jurisdiction in this Court to challenge the database
information.
IV. Conclusion
Ms. McCoy has two other cases pending in this Court, Case Nos. 15-cv-00018GPG and 15-cv-00238-GPG. If Ms. McCoy asserts claims in the Amended Complaint
that are repetitive of claims asserted in her two pending actions the claims may be
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dismissed as frivolous or malicious. See Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
Furthermore, the Court notes that Ms. McCoy refers to “Plaintiffs” and actions
that affected her children throughout both Complaints, which indicates she may be
attempting to represent them in this case. To the extent Ms. McCoy is acting as a
representative for her children under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), she may elect to sue or
defend on behalf of a minor. Ms. McCoy, however, is not able to assert such claims pro
se on their behalf. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2007) (a
legal guardian is not able to bring suit without assistance of counsel) (citing Meeker v.
Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986)).
“[I]t is not in the interests of minors or incompetents that they be represented by
non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to
trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected.” Mann, 477 F.3d at 1150
(citing Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). If
Ms. McCoy desires to proceed pro se in this case, her children may not proceed as
named plaintiffs to this action.
Also, the Court will deny Ms. McCoy’s Motion for Reasonable Accommodation,
ECF No. 13, with leave to refile at a later date. In response to Ms. McCoy’s first request
for permission to utilize electronic case filing, the Court denied the request as improper,
but directed Ms. McCoy to the Court’s website to complete the proper form to register
for ECF Account-Pro Se. See ECF No. 10. W hen Ms. McCoy then submitted the
proper form to register for an account on January 26, 2015, in this case and in Case
No.15-cv-00021-GPG, the District of Colorado Case Management/Electronic Case
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Filing (CM/ECF) Team contacted her on January 27, 2015, to inquire about the
capabilities of her computer and how training could be facilitated. Per the Team, Ms.
McCoy indicated she has limited access to the public library computer in Colorado
Springs, but the computer has a reader function/software program. The CM/ECF Team
agreed to attempt to make all accommodations possible for Ms. McCoy with the
reader/software programs she has available. Local Rules and CM/ECF rules were
emailed to Ms. McCoy by the Team for review prior to CM/ECF training. Ms. McCoy
was directed to provide a telephone number where she could be reached so that she
could participate in the CM/ECF training, which was scheduled for February 4, 2015.
Ms. McCoy failed to provide a telephone number or inform the Team whether she
intended to participate in the training. As of the date of this Order, Ms. McCoy has not
communicated with the Court or the CM/ECF Team regarding the Court’s continuing
efforts accommodate her needs.
Finally, the Court notes that Ms. McCoy has previously asked for appointment of
counsel and each request was denied as premature. The factors used to decide
whether to appoint counsel generally include the merits of the claims, the nature of the
factual issues raised, the plaintiff’s ability to present her claims, and the complexity of
the legal issues being raised. See Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.
1995). “The burden is on the [plaintiff] to convince the court that there is sufficient merit
to [her] claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d
836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). Ms. McCoy fails to demonstrate that appointment of counsel
is necessary or appropriate at this time. She does not demonstrate that she is unable
to provide a clear and concise statement of the claims she is asserting.
Accordingly, it is

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ORDERED that Ms. McCoy shall have thirty days from the date of this Order
to file an Amended Complaint as directed above. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is to send to Ms. McCoy two
copies of the Court-approved Complaint form to be used in filing an Amended
Complaint. Ms. McCoy only needs to submit one form to the Court for the purpose of
filing. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that if Ms. McCoy fails to comply within the time allowed
the Court will address the claims pursuant to the federal rules of civil procedure and
dismiss improper and insufficient claims accordingly. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Reasonable Accommodation, ECF No.
13, is denied with leave to refile as needed at a later date.
DATED March 9, 2015, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
S/ Gordon P. Gallagher
________________________
United States Magistrate Judge

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