Santiago v. Hoffman et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying the motion for a preliminary injunction 12 by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 3/19/15.(dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 15-cv-00051-GPG
JIMMY SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN HOFFMAN, HSA,
DR. WEINPAHL, M.D.
JODI SINKER, Nurse III, R.N., and
MEDICAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS, at Colorado Springs,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter is before the Court on the “Memorandum of Law in Support of Order
to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction” (ECF No. 12) filed pro se by Plaintiff, Jimmy
Santiago, that has been docketed as a motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court
must construe the motion liberally because Mr. Santiago is not represented by an
attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se
litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Mr. Santiago is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections. He initiated this action by filing a Prisoner Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 5, 2015, Mr. Santiago filed an amended Prisoner
Complaint (ECF No. 9). On March 16, 2015, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher
ordered Mr. Santiago to file a second amended Prisoner Complaint that complies with

the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Mr.
Santiago failed to provide a clear and concise statement of the specific claims for relief
he is asserting in this action.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues;
(3) the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). “Because a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and
unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.
2003).
“[T]he primary goal of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status
quo.” RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore,
“courts should be especially cautious when granting an injunction that requires the
nonmoving party to take affirmative action - a mandatory preliminary injunction - before
a trial on the merits occurs.” Id. If the movant is seeking a mandatory preliminary
injunction that seeks to alter the status quo, he must make a heightened showing of the
four factors listed above. See id. at 1209.
“[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc.
v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, Mr. Santiago
“must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the
issuance of an injunction will be considered.” Id.
2

“To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not
theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Mr. Santiago “must establish both that
harm will occur, and that, when it does, such harm will be irreparable.” Vega v. Wiley,
259 F. App’x 104, 106 (10th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, a party seeking preliminary
injunctive relief “must show that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there
is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Heideman,
348 F.3d at 1189. A preliminary injunction is only appropriate “to prevent existing or
presently threatening injuries. One will not be granted against something merely feared
as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future.” Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931).
Mr. Santiago fails to demonstrate, clearly and unequivocally, that he is entitled to
a preliminary injunction because he fails to allege specific facts that demonstrate he will
suffer irreparable injury if no preliminary injunction is issued. The absence of specific
factual allegations to demonstrate irreparable injury is compounded by the fact that Mr.
Santiago has not yet filed a pleading that provides a short and plain statement of his
claims in this action. Mr. Santiago also fails to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of his constitutional claims. Accordingly, it is

3

ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 12) is denied.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

19th

day of

March

, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

4