Boyd et al v. Montezuma County Sheriff's Office, et al

Filing 43

ORDER ON MOTIONFOR CLARIFICATION granting 37 Motion to Clarify by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 7/22/2015. The individual capacity claim against Defendant Spruell is bifurcated and will be included in the second phase of this case in the event Plaintiffs prevail in the first phase.(mdave, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00101-MEH
JONATHAN BOYD, and
JAMI LARSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MONTEZUMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
DENNIS SPRUELL, in his individual and official capacities as Sheriff of Montezuma County,
ADAM ALCON, in his individual and official capacities,
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Clarification [filed June 22, 2015; docket #37].
In my Order sought to be clarified (see docket #31), I bifurcated the individual and Monell claims.
In their motion underlying that Order, Defendants did not seek the individual capacity claim against
Dennis Spruell in their requested relief and, accordingly, that theory of liability was not included
in the bifurcated Monell claims. In their Motion for Clarification, Defendants now request that I
bifurcate that claim as well, asserting that the purpose of the original Motion would be defeated if
discovery and trial were permitted to proceed on the claim against Spruell, who was the County
Sheriff, had no direct involvement with the alleged underlying constitutional violation, and is liable
only to the extent of his instigation of a policy that caused a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights or his
knowledge of and acquiescence in the constitutional violation. Obviously, proving the latter would
require the type of discovery into policies and practices that my original Order intended to postpone.
Plaintiffs’ Response is well taken. They ask that the Spruell individual liability claim be
permitted to proceed. They correctly argue that the Motion for Clarification seeks new relief. Yet

despite this, I think it is in the interests of justice, which include Plaintiffs’ interests, that I grant the
Motion. My primary reason for doing so is to protect the integrity of Plaintiffs’ claim against
Spruell. I must necessarily limit practice and policy discovery in light of my original Order, and that
is proper. But in so doing, I am also concerned about tying Plaintiffs’ hands in achieving full and
piercing discovery for that claim. I believe I run a risk of legal error if I try to parse and tailor
discovery to accomplish the purpose of bifurcation yet do not bifurcate the supervisory liability
claim against Spruell. That would create the likelihood of meandering discovery rulings and require
just as much work on my and the parties’ parts as if the case were not bifurcated.
This being said, I do believe that the complete history of Spruell’s direct involvement with
Defendant Alcon is discoverable for the individual liability phase. In so stating, I do not make any
rulings on admissibility but only discoverability. Although this may necessitate the parties seeking
occasional guidance on the permissible scope of discovery, I believe it is an appropriate component
of proper discovery.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Clarification [filed June 22, 2015; docket #37] is
granted. In accordance with this Order, the individual capacity claim against Defendant Spruell is
bifurcated and will be included in the second phase of this case in the event Plaintiffs prevail in the
first phase.
Dated and ordered in Denver, Colorado, this 22nd day of July, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

Michael E. Hegarty
United States Magistrate Judge

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