Johnson v. Pelle

Filing 44

MINUTE ORDER denying 41 Motion for Expert Witness; denying 42 Motion to Appoint Counsel by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 7/16/2015.(mdave, ) Modified on 7/17/2015 to edit text (mdave, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00105-MEH
ANDREW LYNN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOE PELLE,
REVADA FARNSWORTH, and
BRUCE HAAS,
Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER
Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on July 16, 2015.
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Request for Expert Witness [filed July 15, 2015; docket #41],
and Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel [filed July 16, 2015; docket #42], which the
Court construes as motions and denies.
The Court previously denied motions from Plaintiff regarding the appointment of counsel
and the appointment of an expert witness. See dockets ##27, 28; see also Order, docket #32. As
then, the Court finds that, unlike in a criminal case, there is no legal or constitutional right to counsel
in a civil case. See Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (civil
litigants enjoy no constitutional rights to an attorney). The Court also reiterates that it finds no
authority to appoint at government expense an expert to help a plaintiff in a civil suit for damages.
See Order, docket #32. Further, the cases Plaintiff cites to in his current Motions do not stand for
the proposition that a court need provide counsel or experts in a civil case.
To the extent Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel also seeks access to documents
relevant to his case, the Court finds his request premature but notes he will be able to seek them
through the formal discovery process as the case progresses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
To the extent Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel also contains general requests
for access to legal research materials, the Court notes that it will not interfere with the jail protocols
in providing such materials. While Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), cited by Plaintiff,
holds that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires . . . providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from person’s trained in the law,” the
Supreme Court has also held that general statements of inadequacy are not sufficient:

Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal
assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing
that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical
sense. . . . Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, “meaningful access
to the courts is the touchstone,” . . . and the inmate therefore must go one step further
and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance
program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example,
that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical
requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities,
he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he
wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law
library that he was unable even to file a complaint.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
As such, the Court will not prematurely act on Plaintiff’s general concerns regarding legal
research and will strike any further motions by Plaintiff seeking the appointment of counsel or
experts unless filed upon request of the Court.

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