Robledo-Valdez v. Schrader et al

Filing 5

ORDER dismissing this action without prejudice, and denying without prejudice leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 2/19/15. No certificate of appealability will issue. (dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 15-cv-00307-GPG
CRAIG ROBLEDO-VALDEZ,
Applicant,
v.
JEFF SCHRADER, and
PAUL WEIR,
Respondents.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Applicant, Craig Robledo-Valdez, is a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson County
Detention Facility in Golden, Colorado. Mr. Robledo-Valdez has filed pro se an
Emergency Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF
No. 1) seeking either his immediate release on bond or dismissal of the criminal
charges pending against him.
The Court must construe the Application liberally because Mr. Robledo-Valdez is
not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not
be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Mr. Robledo-Valdez alleges that he was arrested in Texas on December 9, 2014,
and extradited to Colorado. He specifically claims that his arrest and the extradition
were unlawful. Mr. Robledo-Valdez further alleges that a judge in Jefferson County,
Colorado, has imposed an unreasonable and excessive cash-only bond, that he is being

held at the Jefferson County Detention Facility in violation of numerous laws and
statutes, and that his public defender refuses to help him. Mr. Robledo-Valdez also
alleges that his name was slandered and defamed prior to his arrest in Texas and that
he was extradited in an unsanitary van.
The Court notes initially that whatever claims Mr. Robledo-Valdez is asserting
regarding the alleged slander and defamation and transport in an unsanitary van may
not be raised in this habeas corpus action. “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function
of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s allegations regarding slander and defamation
and being transported in an unsanitary van do not implicate the legality of his custody.
Therefore, the Court will not address those allegations further and whatever claims Mr.
Robledo-Valdez may be asserting based on those allegations will be dismissed.
Mr. Robledo-Valdez also may not challenge the lawfulness of his extradition from
Texas in this action. “Before a fugitive in custody is extradited to the demanding state,
he may challenge the authority of the asylum state by seeking a federal writ of habeas
corpus. Yet, ‘once the prisoner has been returned to the demanding state, the writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available to challenge his confinement upon grounds arising
in the asylum state.’” Gee v. State of Kan., 912 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (citations omitted)). Therefore, Mr.
Robledo-Valdez’s claims challenging the lawfulness of his extradition from Texas must
be dismissed.
Finally, the Court will abstain from addressing the Application to the extent Mr.
2

Robledo-Valdez is asserting claims that challenge the ongoing state court criminal
proceedings. Absent extraordinary or special circumstances, federal courts are
prohibited from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997).
Abstention is appropriate if three conditions are met: “(1) the state proceedings are
ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to present the federal constitutional
challenges.” Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889.
The first condition is met because Mr. Robledo-Valdez concedes the state court
proceedings are ongoing. The second condition also is met because the Supreme
Court “has recognized that the States’ interest in administering their criminal justice
systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations
that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45). With respect to the third
condition, Mr. Robledo-Valdez fails to demonstrate the absence of an adequate
opportunity to present his claims in the state proceedings.
Mr. Robledo-Valdez “may overcome the presumption of abstention ‘in cases of
proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without
hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances
where irreparable injury can be shown.’” Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889 (quoting Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)). However, the fact that Mr. Robledo-Valdez will be
forced to appear in state court on criminal charges, by itself, is not sufficient to establish
great and immediate irreparable injury. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; Dolack v.
3

Allenbrand, 548 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1977).
Courts have considered three factors in determining whether a prosecution is
commenced in bad faith or to harass:
(1) whether it was frivolous or undertaken with no reasonably
objective hope of success; (2) whether it was motivated by
the defendant’s suspect class or in retaliation for the
defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights; and (3) whether
it was conducted in such a way as to constitute harassment
and an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, typically through
the unjustified and oppressive use of multiple prosecutions.
Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889. It is Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s “‘heavy burden’ to overcome the
bar of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or
harassment.” Id.
Mr. Robledo-Valdez fails to allege facts that demonstrate the criminal case
against him was commenced with no reasonable hope of success. He also fails to
allege specific facts that demonstrate any improper motivation for the charges. Finally,
he fails to allege facts that indicate the criminal case against him has been conducted in
such a way as to constitute harassment or an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. In
short, Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s conclusory assertions that he is innocent are not sufficient
to overcome the bar of Younger abstention.
To summarize, Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s claims challenging the ongoing state court
criminal proceedings will be dismissed because he fails to allege facts that indicate he
will suffer great and immediate irreparable injury if the Court does not intervene in those
proceedings. If Mr. Robledo-Valdez ultimately is convicted in state court and he
believes that his federal constitutional rights were violated in obtaining that conviction,
he may pursue his claims in federal court by filing an application for a writ of habeas
4

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after he exhausts state remedies.
The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status will be
denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Applicant files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $505 appellate
filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the habeas corpus application is denied and the action is
dismissed without prejudice for the reasons stated in this order. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will issue because
Applicant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied without prejudice to the filing of a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

19th

day of

February

, 2015.

BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

5