Brode et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association et al

Filing 7

ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 4 Emergency Ex Parte Motion for TRO. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 03/02/2015. (athom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00420-CMA
KAREN LOUISE BRODE, and
JEFFREY ALLAN BRODE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
STATE OF COLORADO, and
MONICA KADRMAS,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ PETITION
FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiffs Karen Brode and Jeffrey Brode petition this Court for an emergency
temporary restraining order to stop the “unlawful foreclosure sale held on or about
March 10, 2010, by JP Morgan.” (Doc. # 4, 1.)
This Court’s review of Plaintiffs’ motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(b), which states:
(b) Temporary Restraining Order.
(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary
restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party
or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly
show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the movant before the adverse party can be
heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made
to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.
In essence, a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) “is designed to preserve the
status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a
preliminary injunction and may be issued with or without notice to the adverse party.”
Charles Alan Wright, et al., 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2951 (3d ed. Apr. 2014
update). Moreover, while “[t]he issuance of a temporary restraining order is a matter
that lies within the discretion of the district court,” a party must demonstrate “irreparable
injury” as “an essential prerequisite to a temporary restraining order.” Id. And most
courts hold that a party “must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability of prevailing
on the merits” in order to obtain such relief. Id.
Finally, while a motion for a TRO is distinct from a motion for a preliminary
injunction, some courts in this District adhere to the familiar four-part test for granting a
preliminary injunction when considering whether to grant a temporary restraining order.
See, e.g., Salba Corp., N.A. v. X Factor Holdings, LLC, No. 12-CV-01306-REB-KLM,
2014 WL 128147 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2014). That standard requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate likelihood of success and irreparable harm but also “that the balance of
equities tips in [Plaintiff’s] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 1

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While Courts in this District have considered these latter two factors, they are discretionary.
See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, et al., 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2951 (3d ed. Apr. 2014
update) (“The court also may balance the harm that might be suffered by defendant if the order
were issued against the injury that would result to plaintiff if the application for the restraining
order were denied. This balancing of the hardships approach is fairly common, particularly
when one of the parties is a governmental unit. More generally, it also may be appropriate for
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Plaintiffs’ motion requesting a preliminary injunction and emergency TRO is
convoluted and unclear. As best this Court can tell, the Plaintiffs allege the foreclosure
proceeding in state court pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 120 is unlawful and in violation of
the United States Constitution, and that Defendant JP Morgan Chase “engaged in
falsification, counterfeiting, use, and publication of erroneous and misleading records in
the Colorado, Eagle County land title and Public Trustee offices.” (Doc. # 4, 3.)
Moreover, the precise nature of the injunctive relief requested is not clear as Plaintiffs’
motion indicates that the foreclosure sale pertaining to their property took place almost
five years ago, on March 10, 2010. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to
establish that this Court should issue an emergency TRO.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Emergency
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. # 4) is DENIED.
DATED: March

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, 2015
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

the court to consider the effect of the requested order on the public interest.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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