Barrington v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Filing
125
ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 111 Motion for Post-Trial Remedies. Defendant's previous award of costs is STRICKEN (Doc. # 69 .) By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 05/22/2018. (athom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00590-CMA-MLC
JAYMEE BARRINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL REMEDIES
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jaymee Barrington’s Motion for Posttrial Remedies, wherein Plaintiff seeks the following forms of relief:
1. Institution of a retaliation complaint system at United Airlines to and through the
year 2027 in which an independent outside ombudsman (with staff paid for by
United Airlines) is assigned to all complaints of retaliation, with full authority to
discipline managers found to have retaliated.
2. Imposition of disciplinary action against Kenneth Brown, to include involuntary
termination from employment at United Airlines.
3. Removal and striking of Plaintiff’s existing 2012 Year-End Rating.
4. Replacement of Plaintiff’s 2012 Year-End Rating with a revised rating stating,
“Meets or Exceeds Expectations” in all categories.
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5. Removal and reversal of Kenneth Brown’s United Airlines’ decision that Plaintiff
is ineligible for promotion, and promotion of Plaintiff to the next available
temporary manager upgrade position; and
6. Front pay in the sum of $20,000. 1
Defendant United Airlines objects to these requests, and for the following
reasons, the Court denies them.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to identify any
procedural or jurisdictional mechanism that supports the relief she seeks. Because she
is requesting that this Court alter, and essentially add to, the final judgment on the
merits in this case, the Court finds that her motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). 2 Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1323–24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
motion will be considered under Rule 59(e), when it involves reconsideration of matters
properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.”) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
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Plaintiff also requests that the Court strike Defendant’s prior cost award (Doc. # 69) and award
her reasonable attorney’s fees. Defendant concedes that its prior cost award should be stricken
(Doc. # 119 at 10, n. 2), and the Court grants the request. The Court defers ruling on Plaintiff’s
request for attorney’s fees—a request for which Plaintiff has filed a separate motion. An order
on that motion will issue in due course.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which governs a request for judgment as a matter of
law, could also apply. However, a prerequisite to a Rule 50(b) motion, and one implicit in its
nature as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, is that the moving party have made
a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law during trial. Marshall v. Columbia Lea
Regional Hosp., 474 F.3d 733, 738 (10th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff did not move for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50(a) at trial and is therefore precluded from bringing a Rule 50(b)
motion at this time.
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“A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment should be granted only “to
correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 1324
(quoting Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th
Cir.1992)). A Rule 59(e) motion is directed at reconsideration “of matters properly
encompassed in a decision on the merits, and not initial consideration.” White v. New
Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982). The district
court has broad discretion when deciding a Rule 59(e) motion, and its ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
II.
DISCUSSION
None of Plaintiff’s contentions warrant altering, or adding to, the judgment in this
case. The Court addresses each request in turn.
1. Injunctive Relief - Institution of Complaint System
Plaintiff’s Complaint sought the following relief:
(a) a declaratory judgment declaring that the defendant
corporation has violated the above-described statute and
committed the above-described wrongs by the aforesaid acts
against plaintiff;
(b) promotions and professional advancement within the
defendant corporation as have been denied to plaintiff, with
all attendant benefits and other amenities that she would
have received were these illegal actions not taken against
her;
(c) all compensation, back pay, equal pay, front pay and
benefits that plaintiff was denied because of the defendant's
acts, in a sum to be determined by the court and jury;
(d) liquidated and compensatory damages, including for
past, present and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of
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enjoyment of life, in a sum to be determined by the court and
jury;
(e) exemplary or punitive damages in a sum to be
determined by the court and jury;
(f) legal fees, disbursements, expert fees, and costs of this
action;
(g) all legal interest on sums awarded;
(h) all issues so triable to be decided by a jury;
(i) such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.
None of these requests includes the present request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff also
did not move for an injunction at any point during the pendency of this case, and the
Court need not consider the request for the first time on a post-trial motion. See Bldg. &
Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1428, 1429 (D.
Colo. 1991) (“Rule 59(e) is aimed at reconsideration not initial consideration.”)
Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that the “jury verdict does not end” the trial court’s
obligations in this case and that the trial court “has equitable jurisdiction and an
obligation to take appropriate steps to achieve justice based upon the evidence
presented in the litigation and at trial.” (Doc. # 111 at 3.) Plaintiff, however, cites no
legal authority to support her assertion that this Court has an obligation to consider a
post-verdict injunction request never before brought to the Court’s attention and based
on evidence and argument available to Plaintiff well before the conclusion of the case.
Even upon consideration of Plaintiff’s request, the Court rejects it. Injunctive
relief in Title VII cases is authorized when the court finds that the defendant “has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
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practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g). The Court must also consider whether the facts
indicate “a danger of future violations of the Act.” Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir. 1997). Indeed, “the whole
purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations.” United States v. W.T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
This Court does not find that Defendant “intentionally engaged in” an unlawful
employment practice such that there exists a “danger of future violations” necessitating
the imposition of an injunction. Plaintiff has the burden of showing “more than a mere
possibility” that “a danger of future violations” is “cognizable” and that this Court’s
continued intervention is necessary. Roe, 124 F.3d at 1230 (citing W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. at 633). Plaintiff has not met that burden. She highlights several cases brought by
former employees against Defendant—all are readily distinguishable from the facts of
this case. Two of those cases occurred well before the management involved in this
case arrived at DIA; indeed they took place before the merger of United Airlines with
Continental Airlines and implicated a wholly separate leadership team. The other case
involves an employee who was terminated from United Airlines under circumstances
distinct from those in this case—namely, breaching confidentiality during an ongoing
investigation.
Plaintiff also references “other victims of retaliation [who] were identified before
or during the trial.” (Doc. # 111 at 7.) With respect to these “other victims,” Plaintiff
does nothing more than list their names. Plaintiff provides no information regarding the
circumstances of their employment and/or their termination. Simply providing this Court
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with a conclusory list of names without any supporting explanation or documentation is
insufficient to support a judicial finding that Defendant “intentionally engaged in” an
unlawful employment practice such that there exists a “danger of future violations” or
the need for an injunction. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is accordingly denied.
2. Imposition of Disciplinary Action Against Kenneth Brown
Plaintiff’s request that this Court discipline Mr. Brown by ordering an “involuntary
termination” of his employment is also denied. (Doc. # 111 at 9–10.) Plaintiff’s request,
spanning two short paragraphs, includes no supporting authority. It is wholly conclusory
and without merit. Indeed, “relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not
individual employees whose actions [may] constitute a violation of the Act.” Sauers v.
Salt Lake Cty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. Striking of Ms. Brown’s Year-End Rating
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s request that her 2012 Year-End Rating be
“struck and each category of evaluation changed to ‘Meets or Exceeds Expectations.’”
(Doc. # 111 at 10.) Again, Plaintiff did not bring this request to the Court for review
before or during the trial in this case, and Rule 59(e) does not provide for the
consideration of requests for relief for the first time on a post-trial motion. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s short, conclusory request does not reference any case or statute that would
enable this Court to provide the requested relief. The request is also devoid of any
citations to the record supporting her claim that “ample evidence at trial” supports
changing her performance review to “Meets or Exceeds Expectations”—a review that
Defendant asserts she has never received in her tenure as Ramp Supervisor at DIA.
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4. Removal and Reversal of Defendant’s Determination that Plaintiff is Ineligible
for a Promotion
The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for an order stating “that Plaintiff [shall]
receive the next promotion to temporary upgrade manager at United Airlines.” (Doc. #
111 at 11.) Again, Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support her request. She
merely asserts that her “bogus 2012 Year-End Rating” has “rendered her de facto
unpromotable.” (Id.) However, at trial, the Managing Director of Human Resources at
United Airlines testified that Plaintiff was not rendered “unpromotable” as she claims.
He testified as follows:
Q. Let me turn your attention now to the compensation
structure at United Airlines. A member of management
in this case a ramp supervisor, if she receives an
unfavorable performance evaluation, does that one
unfavorable performance evaluation affect [her] pay for
the rest of her career at United?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Why not?
A. Because at the end of the day that happens, and that
bad review or performance review could easily be
overcome the next year with a good performance and
that happens all of the time.
Because Plaintiff’s request has no basis in law or fact, the Court denies it.
5. An Award of Front Pay
“Front pay is an equitable remedy awarded by the court (not the jury).”
Whittington v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 1000 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court may
award front pay when necessary “to make the plaintiff whole.” Id. Front pay, however,
is not awardable in all employment discrimination cases. Front pay is only awarded “for
lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of
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reinstatement.” Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001).
There was no cessation of Plaintiff’s employment in this case; she has remained
employed by United Airlines since 1987. Thus, there is no “period between judgment
and reinstatement” or a need for payment “in lieu of reinstatement.” Plaintiff also
provides no legal authority for her assertion that front pay is warranted because her
“salary was depressed.” (Doc. # 111 at 11.) Plaintiff’s request for front pay is
accordingly denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Post-trial Remedies is DENIED.
(Doc. # 111), and Defendant’s previous award of costs is STRICKEN (Doc. # 69.)
DATED: May 22, 2018
BY THE COURT:
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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