Price v. Cathedral Energy Services Inc.

Filing 37

ORDER granting 35 Motion to Transfer Case. ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this action shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Signed by Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 12/10/15.(jhawk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00744-PAB-KMT
ALEXANDER PRICE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
CATHEDRAL ENERGY SERVICES INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Joint Motion to Transfer Venue Under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) [Docket No. 35] filed by plaintiff Alexander Price and defendant
Cathedral Energy Services Inc. (“Cathedral”). The parties request that the Court
transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
On April 9, 2015, plaintiff initiated this lawsuit as a collective action, alleging that
Cathedral has failed to provide overtime pay at a rate no less than one and a half times
their regular rate to its operators for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 215. Docket
No. 1 at 4, ¶ 19. At all relevant times, plaintiff lived and worked in the District of
Colorado. Id. at 2, ¶ 7. As stated in the parties’ joint transf er motion, defendant
maintains a corporate office in the Southern District of Texas and conducts substantial
business there, and counsel for both parties are located in Houston, Texas. Docket No.

35 at 1-2. As additional grounds for transfer, the parties state that counsel for both
parties are currently litigating another FLSA collective action involving Cathedral that,
like this case, alleges that Cathedral mis-classified certain workers as exempt from
FLSA’s overtime pay requirement. Id. at 2; see also Wallace v. Cathedral Energy
Servs., Inc., No. 14-cv-03186 (S.D. Tex. Filed Nov. 6, 2014) (“Wallace”). The parties
further state that they have a mediation scheduled in Wallace in January 2016 in
Houston, Texas and that they believe that this case and Wallace can be resolved
collectively. Docket No. 35 at 2.
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 provides, in pertinent part, that, “[f]or the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” Section
1404(a) is “intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate m otions for
transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). To warrant a transfer, the moving party
must establish that: “(1) the action could have been brought in the alternate forum; (2)
the existing forum is inconvenient; and (3) the interests of justice are better served in
the alternate forum.” Wolf v. Gerhard Interiors, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166 (D.
Colo. 2005) (citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515
(10th Cir. 1991)).
The Court first notes that the parties’ argument that their agreed choice of venue
should be given controlling weight “in all but the most exceptional cases,” Docket No.

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35 at 2, is misplaced. The case on which the parties rely, Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc.
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Texas, involved a pre-suit forum-selection clause
that provided for litigation of any disputes “in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk,
Virginia, or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk
Division.” 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013). The Supreme Court did not, in that case,
address the effect of post-filing agreements to transfer venue. The Court, therefore,
must conduct its own analysis of whether transfer is appropriate.
The Court is satisfied that this action could have been brought in the Southern
District of Texas based on Cathedral’s representation that it m aintains a corporate
office in that district and conducts substantial business there. Reg arding the
inconvenience of the existing forum, the parties have not provided much in the way of
explanation. The parties state that Wallace is set for mediation in Houston, Texas in
January 2016 and express a desire to resolve this matter at the same time, but the
parties provide no reason why a Colorado venue would prohibit them from mediating
this case in Texas. Nevertheless, because the parties filed a joint motion and because
counsel for both parties reside in the Southern District of Texas, the Court finds that the
Southern District of Texas is the more convenient venue. Finally, in light of the parties’
stated desire to settle this matter collectively with Wallace, the Court finds that
considerations of convenience and interests of justice favor the transfer of this case to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where counsel for
both parties are located. Accordingly, it is

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ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Transfer Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
[Docket No. 35] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this action shall be transf erred
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

DATED December 10, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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