Hinman v. Joyce et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 15 City and County of Denver's Motion to Dismiss, by Judge William J. Martinez on 10/23/2015.(cthom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 15-cv-0751-WJM-MEH
BRIAN HINMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JONATHAN JOYCE, and
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING WITHOUT PREJUDICE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Brian Hinman (“Hinman”) sues Denver Police Detective Jonathan Joyce
(“Joyce”) and the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for alleged violation of his
constitutional rights when Hinman was held in pretrial detention for ten months on
suspicion of a crime he did not commit. (ECF No. 1.) Currently before the Court is
Denver’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons explained below, the
motion is granted without prejudice to amendment.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a
claim in a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The
12(b)(6) standard requires the Court to “assume the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ridge at
Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such
a motion, the dispositive inquiry is “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss “is a harsh remedy
which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of
pleading but also to protect the interests of justice.” Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567
F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, ‘a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
II. FACTS
The Court assumes the following facts to be true for purposes of this motion.
In October 2013, Hinman “was incarcerated in the Denver County Jail, serving a
misdemeanor sentence for violation of a restraining order relating to his ex-girlfriend,
Kendra Paquin.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13.) Hinman “shared a cell with three other inmates,
with [whom] he blunderously shared information regarding the source of his legal
troubles and the matters foremost on his mind, including the emotionally charged
nature of his relationship with Ms. Paquin.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
One of Hinman’s cellmates was a methamphetamine addict named Brien
Roberts (“Roberts”). (Id. ¶ 15.) Roberts “was known to be an unreliable [sic] and
methamphetamine addict by the Denver Police Department.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Roberts was
also “a storyteller, and knew of Denver’s willingness to provide reductions in sentences
to those who appeared to cooperate and/or [sic] by providing information about others’
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crimes.” (Id.)
On October 5, 2013, Roberts managed to speak with Detective Joyce, to whom
he told “a fantastic tale.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Roberts said that he and Hinman had been
otherwise alone in their cell for about an hour on the previous day, upon which “Hinman
had solicited [Roberts] to burglarize and murder [Paquin].” (Id.) This alleged solicitation
“included detailed information about the purported setting of the Paquin residence
surrounded by a security fence, [and] a purported hole in the security fence adjacent to
a liquor store.” (Id.) Roberts also added “true information that he had quietly collected
[from Hinman],” such as the sorts of property that Hinman had left at Paquin’s home.
(Id. ¶ 20.) In conveying this information to Joyce, Roberts made clear that he wanted to
be rewarded through early release from his sentence. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Joyce “had serious doubts about the reliability of [Roberts], and the information
[Roberts] provided.” (Id. ¶ 22.) A few days later, Joyce personally visited the Paquin
residence and learned that there was no security fence and no adjacent liquor store.
(Id. ¶ 23.) Joyce then requested the surveillance video for Hinman’s cell during the day
that the solicitation allegedly took place. (Id. ¶ 25.) The video revealed that Hinman
and Roberts “were only together, alone in the cell, during three independent periods of
time lasting for 34 seconds, 115 seconds, and 55 seconds, respectiv ely,” during which
time Hinman and Roberts were “incommunicative.” (Id.) Joyce nonetheless moved
Hinman to solitary confinement and filed charges against Hinman for solicitation of
murder and burglary. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) Joyce’s probable cause statement and later
testimony at a probable cause hearing both omitted any details about Roberts’s
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unreliability. (Id. ¶¶ 28–30.) Moreover, Joyce “falsely indicated that the [surveillance]
video showed there was sufficient time and opportunity for the exchange Roberts
described, and that [the] video showed the two exchanging information/documents.”
(Id. ¶ 30.)
The Denver District Attorney’s office dismissed the charges against Hinman in
July 2013, concluding “that there was a lack of evidence that the alleged crimes had
been committed.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
III. ANALYSIS
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hinman has sued Joyce for unconstitutional seizure
and prosecution. (Id. ¶¶ 34–49.) Further invoking § 1983, Hinman has also sued
Denver under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging
municipal liability on essentially three theories: (1) Denver’s alleged “policy and/or
practice of conferring benefits upon suspected or convicted criminals who provided
information about other crimes and/or the perpetrators of such crimes—whether such
information was reliable or not”; (2) Denver’s alleged failure to train its detectives about
the veracity and reliability problems of jailhouse informants; and (3) Denver’s alleged
failure to train Joyce “in how to determine appropriate probable cause in the totality of
the circumstances, and/or when/how probable cause could be vitiated during police
investigation.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 51–54.)
Denver argues that the claims against it are no more than the “labels and
conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of the cause of action” that the
Supreme Court condemned in Twombly, supra, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
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(2009). (ECF No. 15 at 3–11.) The Court agrees. The essential logic behind Hinman’s
Complaint is that Joyce committed certain constitutional violations, and therefore
Denver must have had a policy or practice (or lack of a practice, such as proper
training) that caused Joyce to act as he did. But the Complaint contains no allegations
to support the “therefore.” Hinman simply asserts the ultimate conclusions that he
wishes to prove.
Hinman responds by pointing to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, where he
alleges that Roberts “knew of Denver’s willingness to provide reductions in sentences to
those who appeared to cooperate and/or [sic] by providing information about others’
crimes.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.) But this only shows an alleged policy of providing leniency
to inmates who cooperate or assist in solving other crimes—a policy or practice likely
shared by every jurisdiction in the country. It is not the same as the policy Hinman later
alleges, i.e., a policy of providing such leniency “whether such information was reliable
or not.” (Id. ¶ 51.) Hinman alleges nothing to support that all-important qualifying
phrase.
Hinman additionally points to his allegation that “Denver’s policy and practice has
motivated other criminals to concoct false tales and accusations before.” (Id. ¶ 53.)
But again, the question is whether other criminals concocted false tales and
accusations because they knew that Denver would accept those tales and accusations
“whether . . . reliable or not.” If such a policy or practice actually existed, and if Hinman
is indeed aware of criminals other than Roberts who took advantage of it, then Hinman
should have no trouble pleading such examples. For whatever reason, he has refused
to do so, leaving this allegation without support.
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Finally, on two occasions Hinman refers to his Complaint as “factually-rich,” in
supposed contrast to the bald conclusions or assertions condem ned in Twombly and
Iqbal. (ECF No. 19 at 6, 13.) With respect to Joyce’s conduct, the Complaint is indeed
factually rich, demonstrating a pre-filing “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The allegations against Denver, however, are merely tacked
on to the end of the Complaint, lacking any detail whatsoever. Furthermore, Hinman
has cited no authority suggesting that Monell liability is a plausible inference purely from
the fact that an individual municipal official committed a constitutional violation.
The Court does not hold that Hinman could never state a claim for Monell liability
under these circumstances. Thus, although the Court must dismiss Hinman’s current
claim against Denver, the dismissal is without prejudice to amendment.1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
Denver’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED;
2.
Hinman’s claim against Denver is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
3.
To allow Hinman sufficient time within which to conduct the discovery he needs
to determine whether he can properly amend his claim against Denver to cure
1
Discovery with respect to Joyce could legitimately include discovery about the training
he received. If that discovery reveals that Joyce was indeed untrained about the skepticism
with which a detective must treat a jailhouse informant’s claims, or untrained about evaluating
probable cause, Hinman may have a basis for re-alleging his failure-to-train claim. As for the
alleged policy or practice of taking jailhouse informants’ assertions at face value, Hinman
alleges that such a practice is known among inmates. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.) The Court presumes
that such an allegation would never have been made absent a supporting basis. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(b)(3). Accordingly, whatever support Hinman may have could potentially provide
grounds to re-allege the policy/practice claim.
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the factual allegation deficiencies noted in this Order, Hinman’s deadline to
amend his complaint is EXTENDED to December 15, 2015.
Dated this 23rd day of October, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
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