Paulsen v. Raemisch et al

Filing 54

ORDER; 49 Defendants Andersons, Robertss, and ONeils Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Discovery in this matter is STAYED. The October 14, 2015, scheduling conference is VACATED and will be reset a fter this courts recommendation on the Defendants Motions to Dismiss, by Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 10/6/15.(morti, ) (Main Document 54 replaced on 10/6/2015) (morti, ). Modified on 10/6/2015 to replace document with judicial officer's signature (morti, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 15–cv–00800–PAB–KMT
MARK WALTER PAULSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
PETER ANDERSON, Facility Monitor, Private Prison Monitoring Unit, CDOC,
DOUG ROBERTS, Medical Monitor, Private Prison Monitoring Unit, CDOC,
JERRY STEELE, Private Prison Monitoring, CDOC,
DENNIS O’NEIL, Outpatient Clinical Supervisor, CDOC,
RICHARD MADRID, Drug and Alcohol/Addiction Services, KCCC (Kit Carson Correctional
Center),
PATRICIA HEADLEY, CAC III, Drug and Alcohol/Addiction Services, KCCC,
L. MORTIN-EARL, MA, CAC III, Drug and Alcohol/Addiction Services, KCCC,
DESIREE ANDREWS, Health Services Administrators, KCCC,
JODI GRAY, Health Services Administrators, KCCC,
KATHY M. WILEY, NP, Health Care Provider, KCCC,
KAREN C. MITCHELL, NP, Health Care Provider, KCCC,
DAVID R. GROSS, PA, Health Care Provider, KCCC, and
SUSAN M. TIONA, MD, Facility Physician, KCCC,
Defendants.

ORDER

The matter before the court is Defendants Peter Anderson’s, Doug Roberts’s, and Dennis
O’Neil’s “Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc. No.
49 [Mot.], filed Oct. 1, 2015.) Plaintiff did not file a response but instead filed a “Motion for
Stay of Execution for Pretrial Conference.” (Doc. No. 52.)

Defendants Anderson, Roberts, and O’Neil move this court to stay discovery pending the
outcome of their Motion to Dismiss. (See id.) These defendants argue that because their Motion
to Dismiss asserts qualified immunity, they are legally entitled to a stay of discovery. (See id. at
2–5.) They also argue that a stay of discovery would promote the interest of judicial economy.
(See id. at 5–8.) The other defendants in this case have not asserted a qualified immunity
defense or moved to stay discovery. (See generally Doc. No. 44 [Answer by Defs. Tiona, Gross,
and Mitchell], filed Sept. 14, 2015; Doc. No. 43 [Mot. to Dismiss by Defs. Tiona, Mitchell,
Gross, Madrid, Gray, and Andrews], filed Sept. 14, 2015.) Plaintiff does not appear to oppose
the Defendants’ Motion to Stay and, in fact, requests a stay of his own. (See Doc. No. 52.)
Qualified immunity protects a public official not only from liability arising out of a
lawsuit, but also from the lawsuit itself, including the “ordinary burdens of litigation.” Workman
v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir. 1992). The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect
public officials from “undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats
of liability.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994). As the Supreme Court has noted:
[i]f a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making
informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to
ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be
directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government.
Accordingly, when a government defendant asserts qualified immunity as a defense to a
plaintiff’s lawsuit, even pretrial matters like discovery should be avoided if possible, Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). This is true even for other defendants in the case not
asserting qualified immunity. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“It is no answer to

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these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings
continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties
proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process
to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their
position.”).
Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly allow stays of proceedings,
Rule 26(c) permits a party to move for a discovery order protecting it from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Moreover,
[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). When deciding whether a party requesting a
stay under Rule 26(c) has shown good cause, the Court considers: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in
proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay;
(2) the burden on the defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not
parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus
Shows, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006).
Here, Defendants Anderson, Roberts, and O’Neil have shown good cause for a stay
discovery pending resolution of their Motion to Dismiss. They allege qualified immunity from
suit and have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint, in part, on that basis. (See Doc.
No. 41.) Permitting discovery to move forward against these Defendants in this context would
be a heavy burden on them—one the doctrine of qualified immunity was created, in part, to

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avoid. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (stating that the “central purpose” of
qualified immunity is to protect public officials from “undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of liability”). Granting the stay would serve the public interest
because it would grant the qualified immunity defense its intended effect, which is the protection
of public officials and the government from potentially undue interference and disruption. (See
id.) Further, staying discovery pending the outcome of the Defendants Motion to Dismiss may
reduce the court’s burden of managing unnecessary discovery disputes if some or all of the
claims against these defendants are dismissed. The burden to the plaintiff is minimal given that
the plaintiff does not appear to oppose a stay of discovery. (See generally Doc. No. 52.) Finally,
there are no non-parties with significantly particularized interests in this case.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants Anderson’s, Roberts’s, and O’Neil’s
“Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 49) is
GRANTED. Discovery in this matter is STAYED. The October 14, 2015, scheduling
conference is VACATED and will be reset after this court’s recommendation on the Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss.
Dated this 6th day of October, 2015.

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