Hartmann v. Douglas County District Court et al

Filing 19

ORDER dismissing this action, and denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 3/14/16. (dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00847-GPG
SARA M. HARTMANN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,
TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK,
DOUGLAS COUNTY, CO.,
CASTLE ROCK POLICE DEPT.,
DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF=S OFC.,
LITTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF=S OFC., and
DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ON REMAND

This matter is before the Court on the remand entered by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) in the instant action on December 30,
2015. The Tenth Circuit reversed this Court=s dismissal and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The Court will address the Complaint as follows.
Plaintiff Sara M. Hartmann has submitted a Complaint that is over 100 pages long,
including attachments, and names thirty-eight defendants. Plaintiff challenges a divorce
decree entered on April 22, 2014, in State of Colorado Case No. 12DR455. Compl.,
ECF No. 1, at 2.

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Previously, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, Hartmann v. Douglas County,
Colo., et al., 12-cv-03309-LTB(D. Colo. Feb. 7, 2013), that also challenged the same
divorce proceeding Plaintiff challenges in this action. In Case No. 12-cv-03309-LTB, the
court found that Plaintiff had a pending divorce proceeding in state court, which subjected
her claims to dismissal pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See ECF No.
6 at 4. The court also found that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over
divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders and that Plaintiff did not allege
Aspecific facts to show that the Douglas County Court proceedings do not offer her an
adequate opportunity to litigate any federal constitutional issues.@ Id. The court
dismissed Case No. 12-cv-03309-LTB for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss an action if the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
sua sponte by the Court at any time during the course of the proceedings. See
McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988). AThe party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is
within the court=s jurisdiction.@ United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.
1994). When a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal must be without
prejudice. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006.)
In this case, under the jurisdiction section of the complaint form, Plaintiff states that
she is asserting jurisdiction pursuant to the following statutory authorities:
(1) 28 U.S.C. ' 1441 (See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1991);
Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir.
2003))-based on CO state ct finality on 4/22/15 via filed AFindings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Permanent Orders;@ (2) 28 U.S.C. 1331-federal
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A?@ jurisdiction-b/c U.S. Constit=al matters exist; (3) standing based on
Bennet v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997).
ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff may assert jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '
1441 and to 28 U.S.C. ' 1331. The Court will discuss each of these statutory authorities
below.
First, if Plaintiff intends to remove Case No. 12DR455 to this Court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. ' 1441, a notice of removal must contain Aa short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served
upon such defendant or defendants in such action.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1446(a). A[T]here is a
presumption against removal jurisdiction.@ Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873
(10th Cir. 1995). AUnder 28 U.S.C. ' 1441 a defendant in state court may remove the
case to federal court when a federal court would have had jurisdiction if the case had
been filed there originally.@ Topeka Housing Authority v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247
(10th Cir. 2005). AThe removing party has the burden to demonstrate the
appropriateness of removal from state to federal court.@ Baby C v. Price, 138 F. App=x
81, 83 (10th Cir. 2005).
Defendant fails to provide a short and plain statement of the grounds that would
support a removal to this Court or to attach all process, pleadings, and orders served
upon her in the state action. Plaintiff has submitted a few court documents, but she has
not submitted all process, pleadings, and orders served upon her in the state action.
See ECF No.1 at 27-38 (Plaintiff attached the final finding of facts, conclusions of law, and
permanent orders entered in the Douglas County District Court that identifies a total of at
least fifty pleadings and orders which were entered in Plaintiff=s divorce proceedings, not
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all of the orders and pleadings referred to in the court=s order are provided by Plaintiff).
Furthermore, Plaintiff=s contentions do not demonstrate that the Court would have
had subject matter jurisdiction over this action if it had been filed originally in federal court.
The Supreme Court has stated that A >[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States.= @ Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (quoting Ex
Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)). Consequently, federal courts do not have
diversity jurisdiction over divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders,
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703; and, as discussed below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes a federal claim that is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment.
Also, Aa case may not be removed to federal court solely because of a defense or
counterclaim arising under federal law.@ See Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1247. Finally,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1441(a) defendants may remove a state court proceeding to this
Court. Plaintiff is not a defendant, or respondent, in her state divorce proceeding. For
these reasons, the Court finds that a basis for removal is deficient. As a result, the
instant action would be subject to a summary remand to the state court if this Court
construed the action as a notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c).
Second, Plaintiff=s federal question claims filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 are
best construed as alleged violations of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. Upon review of the
Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff asserts her First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.

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Plaintiff contends that her First Amendment rights have been violated because
Defendants allowed a
Acourt-appointed psychiatrist, who is an atheist (non-believer) to withhold
[her] children from [her] and obstruct [her] parenting rights by deeming [her]
Christian beliefs regarding praying and having faith in a God/Holy Trinity
that I cannot concretely and definitively prove ever actually existed or exists
concerning this World. Defendants have violated my U.S. Constitutional
right and freedom of Christian religious exercise by corroborating and
condoning the aforementioned violative mentality/actions into law via my
4/22/14 Perm Orders Decree.
ECF No. 1 at 5.
Plaintiff further asserts that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated
because
A[t]hrough [her] case # 12DR455, all defendants herein, either directly or
indirectly endorsed via government action and/or inaction the improper
unjustified, and/or illegal search and seizure protectionistic rights I possess.
Specifically, and most egregiously, Defendants herein allowed the
court-appointed psychiatrist to egregiously exceed the very limited scope of
his involvement and purpose in my case # 12DR455. Through action
and/or inaction, Defendants, herein, allowed (and there by colluded with)
the court-appointed psychiatrist to violate every protectionist measure in
which I advocated concerning by court sanctioned psych. eval. at
Respondents [sic] incessant request. Defendant violations ranged from
temporal mandates, test/evaluation funding, authorized inclusions, private
investigator unbeknownst inclusion and doc=t theft/usage agst. me,
inclusion of my dad in the psych. findings whom I had a criminal restraining
order agst. at the time, Respondent having access to the findings + given a
copy of it etc. Respondent=s PCPO agst. me made otherwise civil
proceedings Acriminal@ in nature agst. me
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff also asserts that her Sixth Amendment rights have been violated
because
A[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
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accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for defence.@ (emphasis added). I know,
understand, and/or concede that my case #12DR455 was purely civil in
nature, but from 5/25/12, Defendants have treated me and my filing
therefrom as Acriminal@ and me being Aguilty until proven innocent@ in direct
contravention [sic] to foundationally and imperatively justice preserving
legal structure.
Id. at 7.
Plaintiff further asserts that her Eighth Amendment rights have been violated
because
[a]gain, my case #12DR455 should have been both in theory and practice
purely civil in nature, but it was not, Virtually from my case #12DR455's
inception, I have been treated-personally and procedurally-as a Acriminal@
who is Aguilty until proven innocent.@
Overarchingly, Defendants, herein, by and through the CO DCDC
and Respondent, have advocated for, reached justifications for, and
condemned/punished me, solely, for circumstances created by their own
personal choices/decisions/actions/inactions. Specifically, Defendants,
herein, persisted in punishing/condemning me for my continued P.T.S.D.,
depression, and anxiety primarily associated with divorcing Respondent
and having my children completely taken away from me on 5/25/12 to
present while at the same time perpetuating and increasing my symptoms
via permitting me no redemption, exonerating evidence admittance,
counsel, adequate necessity support, etc. Additionally, all Defendants
herein catered continually to Respondent=s advocacy for self-indigency
while at the same time Respondent chose to live a lavish lifestyle (i.e., buy a
house, buy an Acura MDX, go skiing, constantly buy our kids an
overabundance, etc.) and Respondent chose to hire and retain counsel
representation and through such chose to borrow money from both his
mom and my father.
Id. at 9.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that her Fourteenth Amendment rights have been
violated because

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the CO DCDC had no latitude whatsoever to deny my request made therein
and therefrom. The CO DCDC, and all Defendants, herein, via action
and/or inaction by association therewith, not only improperly allowed
Respondent=s objection to the purely-Petitioner procedural right/privilege,
but also further committed (knowingly) criminal illegalities in stating on the
record in its denial that, QUOTE A[t]his matter was filed as a co-petition, and
[since] the co-petitioner objects to dismissal [,] [t]he request to dismiss is
denied.@ My case was never filed and/or referenced as a Aco-petition.@
My case #12DR455 has been contentious in nature from its inception, and
all Defendants, herein, know this fact, plus the CO DCDC and all
defendants herein know and reference Darren AJed@ Hartmann as
ARespondent,@ not ACo-Petitioner,@ in my case #12DR455.
Id. at 9.
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff also sets forth a laundry list of alleged
violations that were a result of her divorce proceedings. She claims that she was (1)
falsely accused; (2) denied opportunity to defend herself; (3) denied enforcement of the
Permanent Civil Protection Order against herself; (4) denied law/court enforcement
concerning the vast majority of proceedings; (5) denied her right to petition CO DCDC for
a hearing; (6) denied her right to peacefully assemble on social media venues without
court condemnation and punishment; (7) denied her right to express and possess
Christian beliefs; (8) denied basic, fundamental living and or safety necessities; (9)
denied the right to have competent, honest, and impartial licensed individuals involved
with the 12DR455's proceedings; (10) exposed and/or victim to criminal activities,
including eviction, homelessness, repeated law breaches, rape, assault, etc.; (11)
illegally detained; (12) denied marital assets; (13) denied proper notice and/or service of
process; (14) denied legitimate subpoena enforcement; (15) denied mandatory

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disclosures; (16) denied a judge at all Afuture@ proceedings; and (17) forced to flee for my
life after Respondent threatened it.
Id. at 5-9.
Plaintiff=s constitutional claims, which challenge the state court proceedings and
final decision in her divorce case, are subject to dismissal for the following reasons.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the United
States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking review of state court
judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes Acases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.@ Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (stating that the losing party in a state court proceeding is
generally Abarred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state
court judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party=s claim that the
state judgment itself violates the loser=s federal rights@). Review of the state court
judgment must proceed to the state=s highest court and then to the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1257. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543
(10th Cir. 1991).

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars not only cases seeking direct review of state
court judgments; it also bars cases that are Ainextricably intertwined@ with a prior state
court judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. ATo determine whether a federal
plaintiff=s claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, [the Court] must pay
close attention to the relief the plaintiff seeks.@ Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans,
389 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280. AWhere a plaintiff seeks a remedy that would disrupt or undo
a state court judgment, the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment.@ Crutchfield, 389 F.3d at 1148. Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Aprecludes not only review of adjudications of the state=s highest court, but also the
decisions of its lower courts. See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199
(4th Cir. 1997).
As part of her relief, Plaintiff is requesting that this Court reverse and remand her
case back to the state court for reconsideration and/or refiling. ECF No. 1 at 11. She
also seeks money damages. Id. Although Plaintiff alleges federal constitutional claims,
the alleged conduct occurred in the course of Plaintiff=s State of Colorado divorce
proceedings. Because Plaintiff seeks to undo or disrupt a state court judgment, and for
Plaintiff to prevail this Court would have to review and reject the state court findings, the
constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with the Plaintiff=s state divorce
proceedings. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff=s
claims, therefore, are clearly within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. When a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal must
be without prejudice. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th
Cir. 2006).
The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this Order is not taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status will be denied
for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). If
Plaintiff files a notice of appeal she must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or file a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and the action are dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

14th

day of

March

, 2016.

BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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