Sponsel v. City of Thornton, Colorado

Filing 30

MINUTE ORDER denying 28 Plaintiff's Motion (to take judicial notice), by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 11/17/2015.(emill)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-01616-RM-MJW
RICHARD JOHN SPONSEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF THORNTON, COLORADO,

Defendant.
MINUTE ORDER
Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe
It is hereby ORDERED that the pro se plaintiff’s Motion (Docket No. 28) is
denied. Once again, plaintiff asks the court to take judicial notice of some purported
facts and his legal arguments. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court
may take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Judicial notice is a means by which
facts can be established as true in a court of law, without the normal requirements of
proof by evidence. In order for a fact to be judicially noticed pursuant to Rule 201,
“indisputability is a prerequisite.” Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d
1344, 1354 (7th Cir.1995). That is, judicial notice should be exercised with great
caution—the matter noticed must be of common and general knowledge, and it must be
authoritatively settled and free from doubt or uncertainty. See, e.g., Lussier v. Runyon,
50 F.3d 1103 (1st Cir.1995); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1415
(N.D.Cal.1984) (“Care must be taken that Rule 201 not be used as a substitute for more
rigorous evidentiary requirements and careful fact finding.”). Such is not the case here.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.
Date: November 17, 2015