Trysla et al v. Marketing Department Worldwide, LLC, The et al

Filing 26

ORDER re: 24 The Parties Joint Motion for Temporary Stay of Proceedings Pending Outcome of Mediation Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.6. it isORDERED that all proceedings in this matter are STAYED for 100 days from the date of this Order. All deadl ines, including the defendants October 9, 2015, deadline to answer Plaintiffs complaint, are VACATED. The courts scheduling conference scheduled for October 26, 2015, is VACATED. Parties shall file a Status Report with this court on or before January 18, 2016, addressing the status of the mediation and whether a scheduling conference should be set in anticipation of continued litigation, by Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 10/9/15.(morti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 15–cv–01670–PAB–KMT
MARIA TRYSLA, an individual, and
THE MARKETING DEPARTMENT, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE MARKETING DEPARTMENT WORLDWIDE, LLC, and
JOHN COOLEY,
Defendants.

ORDER

The matter before the court is “The Parties’ Joint Motion for Temporary Stay of
Proceedings Pending Outcome of Mediation Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.6.” (Doc. No. 24
[Mot.], filed Oct. 6, 2015.)
The parties, who are both of limited financial means, request the court temporarily stay
all proceedings, including an upcoming scheduling conference and a deadline for Defendants to
answer Plaintiffs’ Complaint, so they can try to economically resolve their legal dispute through
mediation with the Denver-based Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc. (Id. at 1–2.) Defendants’ deadline
to answer Plaintiff’s Complaint is October 9, 2015. The court’s upcoming scheduling
conference is set for October 26, 2015. The parties anticipate that the mediation process could
take approximately three to four months and that the mediation itself could be completed in one
day. (Id. at 3.)

Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly allow stays of proceedings,
Rule 26(c) permits a party to move for a discovery order protecting it from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Moreover,
[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). When deciding whether a party requesting a
stay has shown good cause, the Court considers: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding
expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the
burden on the defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties
to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows,
Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006).
Here, all parties move for a three to four month temporary stay of proceedings pending
the outcome of a good faith attempt to resolve their dispute through a neutral mediation process.
Considering those factors enumerated in String Cheese Incident, the court finds that parties have
shown good cause for a stay of proceedings. To begin, staying the proceedings would prejudice
neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants. All parties requested the stay and all parties argue that it
would benefit them. (See generally Mot.) The parties state that they are of limited means and
“cannot afford the legal expense of both advancing this litigation on the current schedule, which
will consume considerable attorney time over the course of the next month or more, and move
forward with a formal mediation process, which likewise requires the expenditure of
considerable attorney time.” (Id. at 3.) Defendants contend that they are in a precarious

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financial situation and that if they have to spend “extremely scarce funds” for counsel to respond
to Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, that would deprive Defendants of the financial means to engage in the
mediation process. (Id.) Plaintiff Trysla avers that she too is of limited means and would prefer
to resolve the dispute by mediation without incurring additional litigation costs. (Id. at 3–4.)
Next, the interests of both the court and the public would be furthered by a mediated resolution
of this matter. Not only would a stay here promote the efficient administration of justice by
saving the court the time, the effort, and the cost required to resolve the parties’ dispute through
litigation, it would also reduce the risk that two businesses fail because of costly, and potentially
unnecessary litigation. Finally, there are no non-parties with significantly particularized interests
in this case.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that all proceedings in this matter are STAYED for 100 days from the date
of this Order. All deadlines, including the defendants’ October 9, 2015, deadline to answer
Plaintiffs’ complaint, are VACATED. The court’s scheduling conference scheduled for October
26, 2015, is VACATED. Parties shall file a Status Report with this court on or before January
18, 2016, addressing the status of the mediation and whether a scheduling conference should be
set in anticipation of continued litigation. Should the parties come to a resolution during the
stay, they shall notify the court immediately, pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.2(b).
Dated: October 9, 2015.

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