Frasier v. Evans, et al

Filing 28

ORDER; 26 Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery is GRANTED. Discovery in this case is STAYED pending further order of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for November 30, 2015 at 10:30 a.m. is VACATED. The Court will reset the Scheduling Conference, ifnecessary, after resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, by Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on 11/5/15.(morti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-01759-REB-KLM
LEVI FRASIER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER L. EVANS, Denver Police Officer, #05151,
CHARLES C. JONES, Denver Police Officer, #04120,
JOHN H. BAUER, Denver Police Officer, #970321,
RUSSELL BOTHWELL, Denver Police Officer, #94015,
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, and
AS YET UNIDENTIFIED DENVER POLICE OFFICERS,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Stay
Discovery [#26]1 (the “Motion”). In the Motion, Defendants ask that discovery be stayed
pending resolution of their Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand [#21] (the “Motion to Dismiss”). See generally Motion [#26].
I. Analysis
Although a stay of proceedings in a case is generally disfavored, the Court has
discretion to enter a stay. Compare Wason Ranch Corp. v. Hecla Mining Co., No. 07-cv00267-EWN-MEH, 2007 WL 1655362, at *1 (D. Colo. June 6, 2007) (“A stay of all

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“[#26]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to
a specific paper by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I
use this convention throughout this Order.

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discovery is generally disfavored in this District.” (citation omitted)); with Ellis v. J.R.’s
Country Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-01916-CMA-KLM, 2012 WL 6153513, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec.
11, 2012) (granting stay of proceedings).

The “[C]ourt has inherent power to stay

proceedings ‘to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” Ellis, 2012 WL 6153513, at *1 (quoting
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254 (observing that docket management “calls for the exercise of
judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance”)); Vivid
Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir.1999) (“When a
particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay discovery concerning other issues
until the critical issue is resolved.”); Chavous v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt.
Assistance Auth., 201 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.2001) (“A stay of discovery pending the
determination of a dispositive motion is an eminently logical means to prevent wasting the
time and effort of all concerned, and to make the most efficient use of judicial resources.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also String Cheese Incident, LLC v.
Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 05-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30,
2006) (finding that a thirty day stay of discovery was appropriate when a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction was pending); Nankivil v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 216
F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that a stay may be appropriate if “resolution of
a preliminary motion may dispose of the entire action.”); 8 Charles Alan Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2040, at 521-22 (2d ed. 1994) (“[W]hen one issue may
be determinative of a case, the court has discretion to stay discovery on other issues until
the critical issue has been decided.”); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
795, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When a particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay
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discovery concerning other issues until the critical issue is resolved.”); Gilbert v. Ferry, 401
F.3d 411, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that staying discovery is not an abuse of discretion
when a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction); Chavous v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 201 F.R.D. 1,
2 (D.D.C. 2005) (“A stay of discovery pending the determination of a dispositive motion is
an eminently logical means to prevent wasting the time and effort of all concerned, and to
make the most efficient use of judicial resources.” (internal quotation omitted)). Further,
in the Motion to Dismiss [#21], Defendants Jones, Bauer, and Bothwell assert that they are
entitled to qualified immunity as to all claims brought against them in their individual
capacities. See Motion to Dismiss [#21] at 6-18. Defendant Evans also asserts qualified
immunity except as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim. Id.; see also
Motion [#26] at 3.
Qualified immunity “give[s] government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing
trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery . . . .’” Behrens
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (citation omitted). Immunity questions should be
resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding many of the
associated burdens and costs. See id. at 308, 310 (1996) (noting that discovery can be
particularly disruptive when a dispositive motion regarding immunity is pending); Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (“the qualified immunity doctrine is [designed] . . . to
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment and to avoid
subjecting government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broadreaching discovery . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Moore v. Busby,
92 F. App'x 699, 702 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming trial court’s stay of discovery pending
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resolution of absolute immunity question); Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“the Supreme Court has repeatedly ‘stressed the importance of resolving
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’” (citation omitted)). Qualified
immunity “is [designed] . . . to permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment and to avoid subjecting government officials either to the costs of trial
or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery . . . .”

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. “The

entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an
absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, an order denying qualified immunity is immediately
appealable. Id. at 527. The Court is obligated to “exercise its discretion so that officials
[properly asserting qualified immunity] are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome
discovery or trial proceedings.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998).
When exercising its discretion to enter a stay, the Court considers the following
factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously and the potential
prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendant; (3) the convenience
to the Court; (4) the interests of nonparties; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese
Incident, LLC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, 1987 WL
348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)).
In this case, a stay would apparently not prejudice Plaintiff, as he does not oppose
the requested relief. Motion [#26] at 1. Therefore, the Court finds that the first String
Cheese Incident factor weighs in favor of staying discovery. With regard to the second
factor, Defendants argue that they would be burdened by moving forward with discovery.
Motion [#26] at 7. Specifically, Defendants maintain that they would be burdened because
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(1) they have asserted qualified immunity as a defense to most of Plaintiff’s claims and (2)
discovery would likely be wide-ranging, costly, and time-consuming. Id. The Court
therefore finds that the second String Cheese Incident factor weighs in favor of a stay.
With regard to the third factor, it is certainly more convenient for the Court to enter a stay
until it is clear which claims, if any, will move forward. The Court therefore finds that the
third String Cheese Incident factor weighs in favor of a stay. With regard to the fourth
factor, there are no nonparties with significant particularized interests in this case.
Accordingly, the fourth String Cheese Incident factor neither weighs in favor of nor against
a stay. With regard to the fifth and final factor, the Court finds that the public’s only interest
in this case is a general interest in its efficient and just resolution. Avoiding wasteful efforts
by the Court and litigants serves this interest. Thus, the fifth String Cheese Incident factor
weighs in favor of a stay.
Considering these factors, the Court finds that a stay of discovery is appropriate in
this case.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#26] is GRANTED. Discovery in this
case is STAYED pending further order of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for November 30,
2015 at 10:30 a.m. is VACATED. The Court will reset the Scheduling Conference, if

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necessary, after resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.
Dated: November 5, 2015

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