Verlo et al v. City and County of Denver et al

Filing 173

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. ORDERED by Judge William J. Martinez on 07/27/2017. (angar, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 15-cv-1775-WJM-MJW
ERIC VERLO,
JANET MATZEN, and
FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHIEF JUDGE MICHAEL MARTINEZ, in his official capacity as chief judge of the
Second Judicial District,
Defendant.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs Eric Verlo, Janet Matzen, and the Fully Informed Jury Association
(“FIJA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this lawsuit to establish that they have a First
Amendment right to distribute and discuss literature regarding jury nullification on the
exterior grounds of Denver’s Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse (“Courthouse”). (ECF
Nos. 1, 13-1.) The Courthouse is where most criminal proceedings take place for
Colorado’s Second Judicial District (which is coterminous with the City and County of
Denver).
The only remaining defendant in this case is the Hon. Michael A. Martinez in his
official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District. Out of recognition that
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not target Chief Judge Martinez himself but rather a policy
promulgated by the Second Judicial District through Chief Judge Martinez, the Court will
refer below to Chief Judge Martinez as “the Second Judicial District,” unless the context

requires otherwise.
This Court previously granted a preliminary injunction requiring the Second
Judicial District to refrain from interfering with Plaintiffs’ peaceful distribution of their jury
nullification pamphlets, or with advocacy of the message contained in those pamphlets
(“Preliminary Injunction”). (ECF No. 28.) This case then proceeded through discovery,
and the Court held a Bench Trial on April 17 & 18, 2017, to determine whether to
convert the Preliminary Injunction into a permanent injunction.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), this Court is required to
announce the result of the bench trial through written findings of fact and conclusions of
law. This order provides those findings and conclusions. For the reasons explained
below, the Court finds that the Preliminary Injunction should be dissolved and that
judgment should enter in favor of the Second Judicial District.
I. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS, GENERALLY
Understanding everything below turns on understanding the Supreme Court’s
doctrine of First Amendment “forum analysis,” which is a set of inquiries intended to
resolve the extent to which the government can limit expressive activities on public
property. Much more will be said below about forum analysis, but at the outset it is
helpful to understand the basic questions. Those questions are as follows:
1.

Is the expression at issue protected by the First Amendment? If so—

2.

Is the location at issue a “traditional public forum,” a “designated public
forum,” or a “nonpublic forum”?

3.

If the location is a traditional or designated public forum, is the
government’s speech restriction narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
2

state interest?
4.

If the location is a nonpublic forum, is the government’s speech restriction
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and viewpoint
neutral?

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797–806 (1985).
II. STANDING
The Court must first address Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue this lawsuit, which
goes to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Strich v. United States, 793
F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246 n.1 (D. Colo. 2011) (“The Court has an independent and
continuing duty to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.”). Framing the
standing question requires a relatively lengthy account of how this case began and how
it has transformed since then.
A.

Early Proceedings & the Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed against the City and County of Denver and

its police chief in his official capacity (together, “Denver”). (ECF No. 1.) The complaint
was motivated by the pending prosecution of two activists, Eric Brandt and Mark
Iannicelli, whom the State of Colorado had accused of jury tampering by handing out
jury nullification literature in front of the Courthouse. (Id. ¶¶ 14–19.) Plaintiffs wished to
engage in similar jury nullification advocacy in front of the Courthouse, but feared
prosecution, given Brandt’s and Iannicelli’s experience. (Id. ¶¶ 20–22.) On the same
day they filed their complaint, Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction. (ECF
No. 2.)
Two days later, Plaintiffs amended their complaint (“Amended Complaint”) to add
3

the Second Judicial District as a defendant and to set forth allegations regarding a
Second Judicial District administrative order recently posted on the Courthouse doors.
(ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 2.) The order, designated “CJO 15-01” and dated August 14, 2015,
was titled “Chief Judge Order Regarding Expressive Activities at the Lindsey-Flanigan
Courthouse.” (ECF No. 24-1.) This order was amended on August 21, 2015, hours
before the preliminary injunction hearing in this Court, and was admitted as an exhibit in
the preliminary injunction hearing. (See ECF No. 25-1.) The same document was
admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit A in the April 2017 bench trial whose outcome is
currently under consideration, and the Court will refer to it as the “Plaza Order.” As
discussed in detail below, the Plaza Order prohibits most expressive activities in a
specified geographic area leading up to the Courthouse’s two public entrances (the
“Restricted Area”). Plaintiffs, in their Amended Complaint, alleged their belief that the
Plaza Order was entered in response to Brandt’s and Iannicelli’s actions. (ECF No. 131 ¶ 2.)
One day before the preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs and Denver
submitted a joint stipulation (“Stipulation”) that the Courthouse Plaza (comprising the
Restricted Area and certain additional surroundings) “is a public forum and any contentbased regulations must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and
reasonable time, place and manner regulations.” (ECF No. 23 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs and
Denver further stipulated “that Plaintiffs’ proposed intent of peacefully handing out jury
nullification literature to or discussing jury nullification with passersby at the Plaza,
without more, does not violate Colorado law.” (Id. ¶ 2.) And finally, as relevant here,
Denver stipulated that “that it does not intend to enforce the [Second Judicial District’s
4

Plaza Order] as written and will only impose content and viewpoint neutral reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on the use of the Plaza, and/or other exterior areas
surrounding the Plaza if Denver determines that a compelling need exists to do so.” (Id.
¶ 4.) In other words, Denver had essentially taken sides with Plaintiffs against the
Second Judicial District on this matter.
Determined to make lemonade out of this lemon, the Second Judicial District
then contended that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue because no threat of
enforcement was imminent. (ECF No. 24 at 6–8.) See also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”
includes, among other things, an “actual or imminent” “invasion of a legally protected
interest”); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (to
obtain prospective relief, a plaintiff must show a “credible threat of future prosecution”).
In its order following the preliminary injunction hearing, this Court rejected the
standing argument, finding that there still remained a possibility that the Second Judicial
District itself could attempt to enforce the Plaza Order:
The Second Judicial District’s standing argument assumes
that the only way an individual could run afoul of the Plaza
Order is through Denver’s independent enforcement efforts.
But Chief Judge Martinez, and perhaps any other judge in
the Second Judicial District, could issue a contempt citation
for violating the Plaza Order. Cf. Schmidter v. State, 103 So.
3d 263, 265–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (distributor of FIJA
literature convicted of contempt for violating an
administrative order similar to the Plaza Order). The violator
would then be required to appear before the issuing judge,
and if he or she fails to appear, an arrest warrant can issue.
See Colo. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Denver may then be obligated
to arrest the violator—not on the authority of the Plaza
Order, but on the authority of the judge’s contempt citation.
See id. (requiring the sheriff to carry out the arrest). The
5

Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Colorado state law
enforcement officers, not subject to Denver’s stipulation,
could also effect the arrest of such a hypothetical violator.
Thus, the Court finds that Article III standing still exists . . . .
Verlo v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1090 (D. Colo. 2015) (“Verlo I”).
The Court then went on to the question of “whether Denver or the Second
Judicial District speaks for the First Amendment status of the Courthouse Plaza.” Id. at
1093. This was important because, as noted above (Part I), the degree of scrutiny to
which this Court must subject First Amendment restrictions turns on whether public
property is, on the one hand, a traditional or designated public forum (requiring strict
scrutiny), or, on the other hand, a nonpublic forum (requiring a less-strict
reasonableness evaluation).
The Court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving that Denver
controls the First Amendment status of the Courthouse Plaza; and in turn likely to
succeed in proving, based on the Stipulation, that the Courthouse Plaza was “at least a
designated public forum,” making any First Amendment restrictions subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 1092–93. Moreover, the Second Judicial District had not argued for
application of the reasonableness test applicable to nonpublic fora, instead resting on
the position that the Plaza Order could survive strict scrutiny regardless of the
Courthouse Plaza’s proper forum designation. See id. at 1093 (citing ECF No. 24 at 9).
The Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and found that the portion of the Plaza Order
limiting expressive activity failed that test, and therefore violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 1094–95. The Court further found that the remaining preliminary injunction factors
favored the Plaintiffs, and therefore enjoined the offending portion of the Plaza Order as
6

it related specifically to Plaintiffs’ intended jury nullification advocacy. Id. at 1095–96.
The Court did not enjoin portions of the Plaza Order regarding obstructing entryways,
erecting tents or other structures, or using sound amplification equipment. Id. at 1096.
B.

The Appeal
The Second Judicial District appealed the Preliminary Injunction to the Tenth

Circuit. In a published opinion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Second
Judicial District had waived (for purposes of that appeal) any argument that the
Restricted Area was a nonpublic forum, and that this Court had correctly found that
Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving that the Plaza Order was unconstitutional.
See Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1130–38 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Verlo II”). Although
the Tenth Circuit acknowledged in passing that Plaintiffs’ Article III standing had been
challenged below, see id. at 1130, the same standing argument apparently was never
raised during the appeal. The Tenth Circuit concluded its opinion with some guidance
regarding ways to handle, on remand, Denver’s and the Second Judicial District’s
competing claims to the Courthouse Plaza, assuming the Plaza remained at least a
designated public forum by virtue of Denver’s Stipulation. Id. at 1138–47.
C.

Denver’s Dismissal
Shortly before the Tenth Circuit issued its Verlo II opinion, this Court granted

Denver’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 97.) The Court reasoned
that the Stipulation rendered Plaintiffs’ claims against Denver moot, and that any
possibility that Denver might still somehow enforce the Plaza Order was too speculative
to sustain standing. (Id. at 4–10.) The Court also adopted the Stipulation as an order.
(ECF No. 98.)
7

D.

Denver’s About-Face
A couple of months before trial, Denver and the Second Judicial District mended

fences—at least on paper. In a February 2017 status report, the Second Judicial
District announced that “Denver and the Judicial Branch ha[d] negotiated and reached
an agreement that they have collaborative authority under state law to regulate the
courthouse grounds.” (ECF No. 134 at 4.) Attached to this status report was an
unsigned “Memorandum of Understanding” (“MOU”) between Denver and the Second
Judicial District, apparently intended to formalize the new collaborative security
relationship. (ECF No. 134-1.)
The Second Judicial District further announced that “the decision ha[d] been
made”—apparently by itself and Denver—“to de-designate the Reserved Area of the
plaza [as a public forum].” (ECF No. 134 at 5.) Cf. Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d
906, 914 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike a traditional public forum, the government is not
required to indefinitely retain the open character of a designated public forum.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But, said the Second Judicial District, “[t]he decision to dedesignate is prospective only and is not intended to alter the Stipulation Denver entered
into prior to the entry of the Preliminary Injunction in this case.” (ECF No. 134 at 5.)
Rather, Denver and the Second Judicial District preferred to wait for this Court’s
eventual ruling on the forum status of the Courthouse Plaza:
Once that legal question is resolved, Denver and the Judicial
Branch have agreed that they will collaborate to issue a new
joint order [governing the Courthouse Plaza]. The new joint
order will reflect the collaborative authority over the
courthouse grounds, will supersede [the Plaza Order], and
may alter the scope of some of the parameters of the [Plaza
Order], although Denver and the Judicial Branch anticipate
that the [restrictions on expressive activity] will remain
8

substantially the same.
(Id.)
Given this status report and Denver’s apparent intention eventually to withdraw
its Stipulation, the Court ordered Denver to show cause why the Court should not
reinstate Denver as a party. (ECF No. 136.) Denver responded, somewhat
surprisingly, by first denying any intent to withdraw from the Stipulation (ECF No. 137
at 3) but then affirming that it had de-designated the Courthouse Plaza as a public
forum “going forward” (id. at 5) and agreeing with the Second Judicial District that the
Plaza Order “will be superseded by a substantially similar joint order after this Court has
determined the forum status of the [Courthouse Plaza]” (id. at 6–7). Denver additionally
reasoned, in essence, that its own actions were currently immaterial because Plaintiffs
were arguing that the Courthouse Plaza was a traditional public forum—an argument
which, if accepted by this Court, would mean that neither Denver nor the Second
Judicial District could change the Plaza’s forum status. (Id. at 3–4.) Thus, Denver
resisted reinstatement in the case.
The Court gave both Plaintiffs and the Second Judicial District an opportunity to
respond to Denver’s position. (See ECF No. 136.) Plaintiffs filed nothing. The Second
Judicial District, for its part, agreed with Denver that Denver’s presence in this lawsuit
was unnecessary: “However Plaintiffs choose to prove their case, neither the dedesignation nor the Defendants’ Memorandum of Understanding requires Denver’s
reinstatement as a party to resolve the continuing controversy between Plaintiffs and
the Judicial Branch [over the Plaza Order].” (ECF No. 138 at 2.) The Court therefore
discharged its order to show cause. (ECF No. 139.)
9

E.

Denver’s Current Status
Ever since Denver realigned itself with the Second Judicial District, the Court has

been somewhat confused about Denver’s actual position in this litigation. Denver
denies any intent to withdraw from the Stipulation—yet, assuming this Court finds the
Courthouse Plaza to be other than a traditional public forum, Denver states that it and
the Second Judicial District will jointly issue a new order substantially similar to the
Plaza Order. One might wonder if Denver has somehow failed to realize that this new
joint order alone would likely place it in contempt of this Court, and any attempt to
enforce the new order would certainly place it in contempt.
The Court suspects, however, that Denver understands this and is currently
attempting both to have and eat its cake. Denver managed to get itself dismissed from
this lawsuit via the Stipulation and thereby avoid future liability for attorneys’ fees,
assuming Plaintiffs prevail. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Denver knows that if it withdraws
the Stipulation before final judgment, it remains open to such liability. Denver therefore
likely wants to stay on the sidelines looking in until this Court rules one way or the other.
This order, of course, is that ruling, and the Court rules in favor of the Second
Judicial District. The Court therefore looks forward to whatever verbal gymnastics
Denver will present when it either attempts to withdraw from the Stipulation (having
denied any intent to withdraw from it) or to justify its conduct in contempt proceedings.
But that is a matter for the future. Right now, what is clear is that all of the parties
remain in functionally the same position as they were during the preliminary injunction
proceedings: Denver is on the sidelines, and the dispute remains solely between
Plaintiffs and the Second Judicial District.
10

F.

“Separate Sovereigns”
Thus the standing question returns, and the bench trial and subsequent research

has re-confirmed this Court’s prior conclusion that the Second Judicial District retains
contempt authority to enforce the Plaza Order.
As to subsequent research, the Court is satisfied that a Colorado chief judge’s
administrative order may be enforced through contempt. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Weld Cnty. v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist., 895 P.2d 545, 549 (Colo. 1995)
(“The Chief Judge ordered security to maintain the court’s existence. If the Sheriff failed
to provide security, the Chief Judge had his contempt power, another facet of a court’s
inherent authority, to enforce his order . . . .”) (“Weld Cnty.”).
As to evidence at the bench trial, there was some testimony from Chief Judge
Martinez regarding why he has never taken any action to enforce the Plaza Order
against non-enjoined behavior, such as use of sound amplification equipment. (See
Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) (ECF Nos. 164, 172) at 550–51.) Although the possibility of
contempt was never mentioned, Chief Judge Martinez at times seemed to deny that he
had ability to take action. (See, e.g., Tr. at 551 (“I’m not a law enforcement officer. I
don’t have police power. I don’t have a law enforcement or police force . . . .”); id. at
556 (“. . . I don’t have a law enforcement body that operates under my direction and
control. I don’t have a police force.”).) Elsewhere, however, the Chief Judge made
clear that his inaction was also motivated simply by a desire to avoid contempt
proceedings in this Court. (See, e.g., Tr. at 539 (“Q. Have you considered whether you
could issue an order that permits jury nullification activists to distribute their literature but
prohibits other types of expressive activities? A. I can’t do that and it’s got to be [a]
11

content neutral circumstance. I mean, if I did that, then the next thing I would get is a
challenge saying, You know, well, I want to be able to put my notice out, you know. You
know, you’re choosing them because you like them more.”); id. at 575 (“. . . I have done
my best over the—since the order was issued to comport with it, to follow it, and I
respect this Court and the Court’s authority and ability to issue the order.”); id. at 578–
79 (“I don’t want to put our court in the position where we’re disregarding this Court’s
order. I don’t want to put my employees or my staff in that position.”); cf. id. at 399
(testimony of the Hon. Lee Sinclair (ret.), expert witness in courthouse security for the
Second Judicial District: “And I am—and I am going to be very, very leery of doing
anything to in any way side-step or walk around that [preliminary injunction] order. This
is a federal judge telling me something, I’m going to be extremely careful. And I just
don’t want to maybe buy more litigation at this point in time until I could have my whole
matter heard.”).) Thus, Chief Judge Martinez’s testimony does not undermine this
Court’s conclusion that he possesses contempt authority, even if he has chosen not to
use it.
A closely related aspect of the standing inquiry also requires discussion. The
Court’s rulings up to this point, and particularly the Preliminary Injunction ruling (Verlo I),
have assumed that if Denver designated the Courthouse Plaza as a public forum, then
the Courthouse Plaza was a designated public forum for all purposes and from all
perspectives. See 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1093 (“The ultimate question, however, is
whether Denver or the Second Judicial District speaks for the First Amendment status
of the Courthouse Plaza.”). Upon reflection and review of the entire record, the Court
concludes that this assumption is too narrow in the present circumstances.
12

The Courthouse Plaza is actually governed by what may be deemed “separate
sovereigns.”1 Denver is the landowner, but the Second Judicial District is a tenant with
inherent authority to issue orders for preservation of security and decorum:
The inherent powers which courts possess consist of all
powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform
efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity,
independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they
exist because the court exists; the court is, therefore it has
the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court.
Peña v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted; alterations incorporated; emphasis in original); see also Weld Cnty., 895 P.2d
at 548–49 (“. . . the Chief Judge properly ordered security to ensure the continuing
viability of the courts. Without security the public’s confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system is threatened. The proper administration of justice requires that courts
operate in a safe and secure environment. When society views the security of the court
system with skepticism, the authority of the judicial branch is diminished. A weak
judicial branch prevents a proper functioning of the tripartite scheme of government.
The Chief Judge properly ordered security so the courts may continue to fulfill their
constitutional mandate and administer justice in an orderly and dignified atmosphere.”).
Thus, Denver’s choice not to withdraw from the Stipulation means that the
Courthouse Plaza remains a designated public forum as it relates to Denver’s ability to

1

“Separate sovereigns” is probably too strong a term, given that neither Denver nor the
Second Judicial District is “sovereign” as that word is normally used. But “co-equal branches of
government” seems entirely inapposite—Denver and the Second Judicial District (or Denver
and the Colorado judicial branch generally) are not “co-equal” under the Colorado Constitution.
Thus, lacking a better term, the Court will continue to use the language of “separate
sovereigns.”

13

impose restrictions on the property. But it is manifest that Denver’s Stipulation does not
bind the Second Judicial District. And if the preliminary injunction hearing had been
framed in these terms, the result might have been different—for, as the Court noted
then, courthouse grounds are routinely deemed to be nonpublic fora. See Verlo I, 124
F. Supp. 3d at 1093 n.5. However, no party (nor the Court) raised the question of
whether “separate sovereigns” could each designate the forum status of the same piece
of property for their own purposes, likely because it is a truly novel circumstance that
none of us had considered possible.2 Moreover, the Second Judicial District argued

2

In two years of litigation, neither the parties, nor this Court, nor the Tenth Circuit in
Verlo II, located a First Amendment case presenting competing governmental claims to the
same piece of property. See, e.g., Verlo II, 820 F.3d at 1144 (“This argument between
Defendants raises difficult and novel questions about the intersection between a government
property owner’s power to designate its property as a public forum and the rights of the
occupant of the government property—in this case another governmental entity—to use that
property without interference.”). In dicta, Verlo II offers an extended discussion of how this
Court might approach the problem. See id. at 1144–47. The Tenth Circuit’s ultimate
recommendation, drawing on decisions regarding designated public fora, is to inquire whether
Denver’s Stipulation was some sort of insincere designation, possibly “motivated by fiscal or
other considerations” and operating “so intrusively that the essential function of the Courthouse
is thwarted.” Id. at 1147. In candor, the Court disagrees that this would be an appropriate
approach. The cases cited by Verlo II in this regard are cases where a government was
attempting to avoid a court finding that it had created a designated public forum, and the court
therefore inquired whether the government’s historic practice with respect to the contested
forum showed that the government’s current litigation position was merely a smokescreen for an
intent to suppress the free speech activities that led to the lawsuit. Compare id. at 1147 (citing
cases) with id. at 1143 (discussing those same cases in terms of “post hoc justification[s] for a
desire to suppress a particular message”). There is simply no case law which addresses a
governmental entity designating a public forum—a speech-enhancing act—to the potential
detriment of another governmental entity. And whatever detriment that might be, it is not a First
Amendment issue. Although First Amendment doctrine attempts to accommodate a
government’s needs (e.g., preserving the purposes of the Courthouse) as against citizens
challenging speech restrictions, it has nothing to say about one government entity stepping on
another’s toes. See, e.g., 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3:13
(Apr. 2017 update) (“The Free Speech Clause operates as a negative restraint against
government regulation that restricts the speech of private persons and entities. The Free
Speech Clause does not instill in governmental units themselves any free speech rights.
Subordinate units of government, such as cities, counties, or public school districts, are deemed
‘creatures of the state’ and do not possess free speech rights that can be asserted against the
state government that created them.”). Rather, this a question of inter- and intragovernmental

14

solely under the strict scrutiny test. Thus, the Court had no occasion to consider
seriously the possibility that the Courthouse Plaza was a nonpublic forum as it relates to
the Second Judicial District’s separate enforcement authority.
After further consideration, this Court concludes that it may appropriately
determine the forum status of the Courthouse Plaza as it relates to the Second Judicial
District’s ability to impose restrictions on the property. That is the framework and
purpose of the following Findings and Conclusions.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Having listened attentively to each witness; having carefully judged each
witness’s credibility; and having reviewed the trial transcript, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and the parties’ proposed findings and conclusions (ECF Nos. 170 & 171),
the Court finds as follows:
A.

The Courthouse Grounds Generally
1.

The Courthouse opened for operations in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit

(“PX”) 4 at 58.)3
2.

From above, the Courthouse and its grounds appear as follows, save for

yellow highlighting which was added to this aerial photograph by the Second Judicial
District and which will be discussed further below:

rights under state and municipal law. Here, fortunately, the Court’s “separate sovereigns”
finding eliminates any need to delve further into this obscure jurisprudence.
3

PX 4 is a transcript containing multiple sets of non-matching page numbers. In this
order, the Court cites to the page numbers in the upper right-hand corner, which were
apparently the original page numbers created when the court reporter finalized the transcript.

15

(Defendant’s Trial Exhibit (“DX”) A at 3.) The Court has annotated this photograph with
16

borders and labels, for ease of reference:

17

3.

It is generally known within this Court’s territorial jurisdiction that: the top

of the photograph is north; the Courthouse itself is the irregularly shaped, white-roofed
building occupying the left half of the photograph; immediately to the left (west) of the
Courthouse is Fox Street; immediately to the north is Colfax Avenue; and immediately
to the south (not depicted) is Fourteenth Avenue. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (c)(1).
B.

The West Side of the Courthouse Grounds
4.

The west (Fox Street) side of the Courthouse features the West Sidewalk

(a public sidewalk), which is crossed by driveways leading to two sally ports for entry of
official vehicles into the Courthouse. (Tr. at 561, 563, 580–81.)
5.

The west side also features the West Entrance, which is a public entrance

but is very lightly used, and usually only by employees. (Tr. at 340–41, 419, 561, 565.)
C.

The East Side of the Courthouse Grounds
6.

On the opposite (east) side of the Courthouse grounds is Elati Street,

which is closed to traffic other than official vehicles as it runs past the Courthouse. (Tr.
at 52–53.)
7.

Another helpful photograph of the east side of the Courthouse grounds,

this one from the north looking generally south, is reproduced below (again, with labels
and arrows inserted by the Court for ease of reference):

18

(Excerpt from DX H.)
8.

Elati Street bisects the Circular Plaza, an area paved in a salmon color.

9.

The west half of the Circular Plaza is mostly framed by two areas of

(Id.)

Landscaping, one larger and one smaller. (DX A.)
10.

Running along the west side of the larger Landscaping area is the Arced

Walkway, which comprises a series of shallow steps leading from the Colfax Avenue
side of the Courthouse grounds up to the Patio. (PX 2; DX A, E, H.)
11.

The Arced Walkway is often closed during the colder months of the year

due to slip-and-fall concerns. When closed, it is sometimes used for snow storage. (Tr.
at 54, 212–13, 465.)
12.

Even when the Arced Walkway is open, few passersby notice its
19

existence, and so it is rarely used. (Tr. at 82, 166–67, 337.)
13.

Running west from the Arced Walkway to the outer wall of the Courthouse

itself is the Gravel Area, which is a passive security feature. (Tr. at 361; PX 4 at 48–
49.)
D.

The Patio
14.

The southern end of the Arced Walkway and Gravel Area forms the

northern end of the Patio, which is also framed by the two Landscaping areas, the Main
Entrance, the Glass Wall (the outer wall of the Jury Assembly Room), the Lunch Area (a
gravel area with picnic tables), and the East Sidewalk. (Tr. at 162–63; DX A, G, H.)
15.

The Patio is separated from the East Sidewalk by a line of low metal

bollards, followed by three steps down to the East Sidewalk itself. (Tr. at 164–65;
DX H.)
16.

The Patio is separated from the Circular Plaza by the Landscaping and by

what the parties have described as “concrete bollards.” (Tr. at 431.) These are not
traditional bollards, but are instead long rectangular blocks through which a pedestrian
must navigate, like “staggered walls.” (Tr. at 447, 449–50.) These blocks are about 40
feet from the Main Entrance. (Tr. at 359.)
17.

The Patio is at a slightly higher elevation than the neighborhood’s

surrounding sidewalks; hence the steps up from the East Sidewalk and the shallow
steps that form the Arced Walkway. The Circular Plaza also gradually slopes upward
from Elati Street to the Patio. (Tr. at 426–27, 451.)
18.

The Patio contains the Area of Repose, a set of three circular planters

surrounded by curved benches, which David Tryba (the master urban design architect
20

for the Courthouse) intended to be an area “to accommodate private conversations
between family members who need to be consoled or who are getting prepared to go
into a process that most people are unfamiliar with.” (Tr. at 427.)
19.

Pedestrians intending to walk from Fourteenth Street to Colfax Avenue, or

vice versa, almost never do so by crossing through the Patio and Arced Walkway.
Rather, they walk along Elati Street and through the Circular Plaza. Nearly every
person who enters the Patio or Arced Walkway, by contrast, does so to reach the
Courthouse’s Main Entrance. (Tr. at 342–43, 467.)
E.

Architectural Intent
20.

Tryba designed the Patio to be architecturally integrated with the

Courthouse itself, and to function as an extension of the Courthouse’s lobby. (Tr. at
432, 433.)
21.

Tryba’s further intent for the Patio was to create “a key transitional and

arrival space . . . so that people can get prepared, as they enter a building with such
consequences,” thus “maintaining the dignity of the process.” (Tr. at 426, 427.)
22.

The architectural elements signaling the intended sense of transition

include the raised grade of the Patio and the shallow upward motion needed to reach it
(a substitute for a monumental staircase that was not feasible on the particular plot of
land); the bollards; the increased quality of the building materials and landscaping; and
the difference in the color and texture of the Patio’s concrete as compared the
surrounding walkways. (Tr. at 426–27, 432–33, 444, 445, 446–47, 449–50, 451–52.)
F.

The Jury Assembly Room
23.

The Patio and the Courthouse’s Jury Assembly Room are immediately
21

adjacent, separated by the Glass Wall, which runs southeast from the Main Entrance to
the Jury Assembly Room’s easternmost corner, and then continues toward the Lunch
Area for a few more feet. (DX A, H.)
24.

Individuals on the Patio can see through the Glass Wall into the Jury

Assembly Room, and they can be heard through the Glass Wall as well, if they speak
loudly enough. (Tr. at 284, 500–04.)
G.

The Detention Center
25.

Immediately east of the portion of Elati Street running past the Courthouse

is Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center (“Detention Center”), as depicted in the
following photograph, which was taken from the south looking north:4

(Excerpt from DX G.)

4

Despite the location of the Google-inserted “Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse” label in this
photograph, the Courthouse is the building on the left and the Detention Center is the building
on the right; Elati Street runs down the middle. According to the Second Judicial District, the
official name for the entire area between the Courthouse in the Detention Center is the Dale
Tooley Plaza. (ECF No. 144 at 1.)

22

H.

The Courthouse’s Operations
26.

It is generally known within this Court’s territorial jurisdiction that both the

Second Judicial District and the Denver County Court occupy the Courthouse. See
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (c)(1).
27.

The Second Judicial District hears only felony cases in the Courthouse.

(Tr. at 531.)
28.

Up to 750 potential jurors are summoned to the Courthouse each Monday

and Tuesday, and another 200 jurors are summoned each Wednesday. (Tr. at 167.)
29.

Due to discounted parking south of Fourteenth Street, almost all jurors

approach the Courthouse by walking up the East Sidewalk from the south and then
ascending the three steps that lead up to the metal bollards and finally onto the Patio.
(Tr. at 74, 169, 291–92.)
30.

A queue of 200 to 300 potential jurors may form outside the Main

Entrance as they wait to get through the security screening process that occurs just
inside the Main Entrance. (Tr. at 463.)
31.

When a queue forms outside the Main Entrance, it sometimes extends

directly away from the Main Entrance and onto the Circular Plaza, and at other times it
curves past the Area of Repose and then onto the East Sidewalk. (Tr. at 170; DX A38,
A46.)
32.

Once potential jurors make it into the Jury Assembly Room, they receive

an orientation and Chief Judge Martinez addresses them about the seriousness of their
duties. (Tr. at 185, 492–93.)

23

I.

The Plaza Order
33.

During the summer of 2015, the Courthouse was the site of a capital

murder trial, People v. Dexter Lewis. (Tr. at 494–95; PX 4 at 36–37.)
34.

During the course of the Lewis trial, racially-charged civil unrest had taken

place in cities such as Baltimore, Maryland, and Ferguson, Missouri. In addition, the
Arapahoe County capital murder trial of James Holmes (the Aurora theater shooter) had
concluded with a sentence of life in prison, rather than death. Chief Judge Martinez’s
awareness of these events prompted a concern that the Courthouse grounds needed
stricter behavioral standards to ensure the Courthouse’s essential functions. In
particular, Chief Judge Martinez and his security staff worried about the public’s
possible reaction if Lewis (who is black) received a death sentence in contrast to
Holmes (who is white). (Tr. at 494–95; PX 4 at 38.)
35.

Chief Judge Martinez accordingly issued the Plaza Order, a general

administrative order for the Second Judicial District that reads as follows (as amended
August 21, 2015):
The Court has the responsibility and authority to ensure the
safe and orderly use of the facilities of the Second Judicial
District; to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt,
interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct
of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or
perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide
for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to
promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on
sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial
decorum. Those having business with the courts must be
able to enter and exit the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse
freely, in a safe and orderly fashion and unhindered by
threats, confrontation, interference, or harassment.
Accordingly, the Court hereby prohibits certain expressive
activities on the grounds of the Courthouse, as depicted in
the highlighted areas of the attached map, without regard to
24

the content of any particular message, idea, or form of
speech.
Prohibited Activities: The activities listed below shall be
prohibited in the following areas: anywhere inside the
Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse, including courtrooms,
corridors, hallways, and lobbies; the areas, lawns, walkways,
or roadways between the Courthouse and public sidewalks
and roads; and any areas, walkways, or roadways that
connect public sidewalks and roads to Courthouse entrances
or exits. This includes the Courthouse entrance plaza areas
on the east and west sides of the Courthouse as depicted in
the highlighted areas of the attached map.
1.

Demonstrating; picketing; protesting; marching;
parading; holding vigils or religious services;
proselytizing or preaching; distributing literature
or other materials, or engaging in similar conduct
that involves the communication or expression of
views or grievances; soliciting sales or donations;
or engaging in any commercial activity; unless
specifically authorized in writing by
administration;

2.

Obstructing the clear passage, entry, or exit of
law enforcement and emergency vehicles and
personnel, Courthouse personnel, and other
persons having business with the courts through
Courthouse parking areas, entrances, and
roadways to and from Courthouse and
Courthouse grounds;

3.

Erecting structures or other facilities, whether for
a single proceeding or intended to remain in place
until the conclusion of a matter; or placing tents,
chairs, tables, or similar items on Courthouse
grounds; except as specifically authorized in
writing by administration; and

4.

Using sound amplification equipment in a manner
that harasses or interferes with persons entering
or leaving Courthouse grounds or persons
waiting in line to enter the Courthouse.

25

(DX A at 1–2 (boldface in original).)5
36.

The “attached map” referenced in the opening paragraph of Plaza Order is

the aerial photograph reproduced at ¶ 2, above. The “highlighted areas” mentioned in
that same paragraph are the yellow-colored areas to the east and west of the
Courthouse itself—which this Court refers to collectively as the “Restricted Area.”
37.

The Plaza Order does not prohibit individuals approaching the Courthouse

from wearing clothing with political messages, or discussing politics with others in the
security queue. (Tr. at 533, 534.)
38.

Before Chief Judge Martinez issued the Plaza Order, jury nullification

activists Eric Brandt and Mark Iannicelli had been charged with jury tampering because
they had been distributing jury nullification literature on Courthouse grounds. (Tr. at 30–
35.)
39.

When Chief Judge Martinez issued the Plaza Order, he had not been

aware of either Brandt’s or Iannicelli’s prosecution. He had been generally aware of jury
nullification activists’ activities on the Courthouse Plaza, but those activities did not
inform his decision to issue the Plaza Order. (Tr. at 495.)
J.

Events Following the Preliminary Injunction
40.

This Court issued the Preliminary Injunction on August 25, 2015. (ECF

No. 28.)
41.

At some point soon after the Preliminary Injunction issued, the Second

Judicial District posted the Plaza Order at the Main Entrance with Paragraph 1 blacked
5

To the extent needed, the Court will refer to the Plaza Order’s numbered paragraphs
by their number, e.g., “Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order” (referring to the forms of prohibited
expressive activity).

26

out. (Tr. at 49.)
42.

On August 27, 2015, Dexter Lewis was sentenced to life in prison rather

than death and no demonstrations regarding that outcome arose. (Tr. at 496.)
43.

Although the immediate motivation for the Plaza Order had passed, Chief

Judge Martinez chose to keep the Plaza Order in place because this Court’s Preliminary
Injunction had, in the intervening days, emboldened activists to descend on the
Courthouse Plaza and aggressively advocate their causes in numerous ways. (Tr. at
496–97.) For example, activists began an Occupy-style camping protest in the
Restricted Area (and in the Circular Plaza). (Tr. at 91–92, 249; DX A24.) These early
protests even involved public defecation in the Landscaping, ostensibly as a form of
protest against public bathroom restrictions. (DX J.)
44.

Although it appears that the camping protest has ended, demonstrations

regarding various causes have continued in the Restricted Area. For example:
(a)

Demonstrators have paraded and sometimes skateboarded back

and forth outside the Jury Assembly Room holding signs or flags. (Tr. at 176, 184, 283–
84.) The following photograph depicts a man near the Area of Repose carrying a “Fuck
Cops” flag:

27

(Excerpt of DX A31.)
(b)

Demonstrators have written messages in chalk in the Area of

Repose (as in the above photograph), including messages immediately outside the Jury
Assembly Room and therefore visible through the Glass Wall, as depicted in this
photograph taken from inside the Jury Assembly Room:

(Excerpt from DX P.)
(c)

Demonstrators have written chalk messages elsewhere in the
28

Restricted Area, including coarse and demeaning messages, such as that depicted in
the following three photographs taken just outside the Main Entrance on separate
occasions:

(Excerpt from DX O.)

(Excerpt from DX A34.)

29

(Excerpt from DX A39.)
(d)

Some demonstrators’ chalk messages have addressed specific

ongoing cases, as in the following photograph of chalk messages addressing the highprofile retrial of Clarence Moses-EL:

(Excerpt from DX A40; see also Tr. at 514–15.)
(e)

Demonstrators have used the benches in the Area of Repose to set

up fake headstones, as depicted in this photograph:
30

(Excerpt from DX R.)
(f)

Demonstrators have donned costumes and put on skits, as

depicted in this photograph taken just outside the Main Entrance:

(Excerpt from DX A9.)
(g)

Demonstrators have shouted their messages, sometimes through

megaphones, including while standing “right up against” the Glass Wall when jurors are
31

present in the Jury Assembly Room. (Tr. at 188–90, 287–88, 500–05.)
(h)

Demonstrators have played loud music or simply turned on the

siren feature of a megaphone for minutes at a time. (Tr. at 179, 500.)
45.

Demonstrators’ shouting, noise-making, and other attention-grabbing

activities have frequently distracted jurors during their orientation. (Tr. at 185–86, 200,
500–05.)
46.

As for jury nullification pamphleteers such as Plaintiffs, they have often

spoken in friendly tones when first approaching a potential target of their message, but
at times they have become “combative” and “nasty” when their literature is refused.
(Tr. at 173.)
47.

By coincidence, Tryba (the architect) was called for jury service at the

Courthouse sometime in the six months before the Bench Trial. While standing in the
security queue, a demonstrator screamed at him and put a sign directly in front of his
face. (Tr. at 436–37.)
48.

Insistent jury nullification pamphleteers will sometimes follow individuals

right up to the Main Entrance and open the door for those individuals. (Tr. 214, 238.)
Chief Judge Martinez personally experienced this treatment as he approached the
Courthouse on one occasion after declining a pamphlet. The pamphleteer repeatedly
asked Chief Judge Martinez to take a pamphlet, while a woman dressed “in a costume
like a convict” stood directly in front of Chief Judge Martinez while “back-stepping as [he
was] walking towards the [Main Entrance].” When Chief Judge Martinez arrived at the
Main Entrance, he reached for the door handle but the woman grabbed it first and
opened the door for him. (Tr. at 497–98.)
32

49.

Demonstrators have learned to recognize Courthouse employees and

have frequently shouted vulgar and combative messages at those employees. Some
employees have begun to fear for their safety, and employee morale has declined.
(Tr. at 188–89, 192–93, 250–52, 508–12.)
K.

Plaintiffs’ Preferred Location
50.

Plaintiffs’ have advocated for jury nullification almost exclusively on the

Patio, because that is where Plaintiffs can reach the vast majority of prospective jurors
and others with court business as they approach the Courthouse and stand in the
security queue. (Tr. at 46–47, 77–79, 121, 171–72, 284, 459–60.)
51.

The only time Plaintiff Matzen has attempted to reach individuals at the

West Entrance was when the Main Entrance was closed for construction. (Tr. at 294.)
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The Forum Analysis Standard
As explained at the outset, whether Plaintiffs have a First Amendment right to

engage in the activities prohibited in the Restricted Area by the Plaza Order requires
this Court to engage in a “forum analysis,” comprising the following questions:
1.

Is the expression at issue protected by the First Amendment? If so—

2.

Is the location at issue a traditional public forum, a designated public
forum, or a nonpublic forum?

3.

If the location is a traditional or designated public forum, is the
government’s speech restriction narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest?

4.

If the location is a nonpublic forum, is the government’s speech restriction
33

reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and viewpoint
neutral?
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797–806.
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs wish to engage in expression protected by the
First Amendment, so the Court will not provide any separate analysis of the first
question. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the Restricted Area—the only portion of the
Courthouse Plaza affected by the Plaza Order—is a traditional or designated public
forum (i.e., designated by Denver), and have not asserted in the alternative that the
Plaza Order fails the reasonableness test applicable to a nonpublic forum. (See ECF
No. 110 at 5–6 (Final Pretrial Order); ECF No. 154-1 (pretrial proposed Conclusions of
Law); ECF No. 170 at 11–16 (post-trial proposed Conclusions of Law).) Thus, to the
extent the Court finds that the Restricted Area is not a traditional or designated public
forum, the Court need not further analyze the Plaza Order under a reasonableness
standard.
B.

Sorting Out the Proper Approach to Traditional Public Forum Analysis
Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that the Restricted Area is a traditional public

forum. (See id. at 12–14.) Although the Court has made numerous findings of fact,
above, there remains the question how many of those findings are relevant to
determining whether the Restricted Area is a traditional public forum. As the following
analysis will hopefully make clear, Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit case law have
consistently shown that applying or stripping the “traditional public forum” label from a
particular public space requires very little fact-finding because traditional public fora
comprise an essentially fixed set of historically determined categories: public streets,
34

public sidewalks, and public parks.6
However, one unusual Tenth Circuit decision, First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), suggests a much more
detailed analysis that does not comport with the decisions both preceding and following
it. Yet the parties here frame their proposed conclusions of law in terms of the factors
discussed in First Unitarian. (See ECF No. 144 at 18; ECF No. 170 at 12, 14; ECF No.
171-1 at 13.)
Thus, the Court must sort out what the proper inquiry really is. A survey of
relevant case law is helpful to this process.
1.

Perry (1983)

The first clear statement of the Supreme Court’s current “forum analysis”
approach to public spaces came in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), a dispute about restrictions on a particular
union’s ability to place circulars and other communications in teachers’ school
mailboxes. See id. at 40–41. The Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the
three forum types into which the school mailboxes might be classified:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state
to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one
end of the spectrum are streets and parks which have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. . . .
A second category consists of public property which the
6

As discussed in Part IV.B.13, below, other courts have extended this category to open
areas abutting legislative and executive buildings.

35

state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a state to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to
the public even if it was not required to create the forum in
the first place. . . .
Public property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication is governed by different
standards.
Id. at 45–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). This language plainly frames the
“traditional public forum” question specifically in terms of “tradition,” “long tradition,” and
even “time out of mind”—in contrast to designated public fora (“public property which
the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity”) and
nonpublic fora (“[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication”). The Court in Perry, however, had no need to apply its tradition
analysis to the school mailboxes because the parties agreed that those mailboxes did
not fall into the “traditional” category. Id. at 46 & n.8.
2.

Grace (1983)

About two months after deciding Perry, the Supreme Court released another
forum-analysis opinion, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Grace is of
particular interest in this lawsuit because it was a challenge to a federal statute that
banned political advocacy on the grounds of the United States Supreme Court building
in Washington, D.C. Id. at 172–73. However, the challengers limited their attack to the
application of that statute on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court
grounds; they did not challenge the statute’s application to, e.g., the plaza in front of the
main entrance. Id. at 173–75.
In Grace, the Court’s description of the various types of fora was less precise
36

than in Perry. Similar to (and citing) Perry, Grace stated that “‘public places’ historically
associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks,
and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’” Id. at 177. But in
contrast to Perry, Grace never explicitly distinguished traditional from designated public
fora. Nonetheless, the concept was certainly in the Court’s mind when it later declared
that “whether the property has been ‘generally opened to the public’ is a factor to
consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of
the people for communicative purposes.” Id. (emphasis added). And this phrasing is
significant, given its suggestion that how the government has treated a particular public
space should only be relevant if a potential designated public forum is at issue.
In any event, Grace did not need to engage in such an inquiry because a public
sidewalk is already considered a traditional public forum:
The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court
grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in
Washington, D.C., and we can discern no reason why they
should be treated any differently. Sidewalks, of course, are
among those areas of public property that traditionally have
been held open to the public for expressive activities and are
clearly within those areas of public property that may be
considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public
forum property.
Id. at 179 (footnote omitted). As will become important below, the Supreme Court went
on to note specifically that “[t]here is no separation, no fence, and no indication
whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as
the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of
enclave.” Id. at 180. The Court accordingly declared the relevant statute
unconstitutional as applied to the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court grounds.
37

Id. at 183–84.
3.

Cornelius (1985)

Two years after Perry and Grace, the Supreme Court handed down the
previously-cited Cornelius decision. Cornelius was a dispute over which types of
organizations the federal government could exclude from soliciting funds through “the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC or Campaign), a charity drive aimed at federal
employees.” 473 U.S. at 790. Cornelius has little to say about traditional public fora,
other than that “[p]ublic streets and parks fall into this category.” Id. at 802. Having said
as much, the Court immediately went on to the designated public forum category, and
expounded at length on factors relevant to determining whether such a designated
forum had been created. Id. at 802–04. In particular, the Court noted that it had
previously “looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it
intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public
forum,” and it had “also examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity to discern the government’s intent.” Id. at 802. Applying these
inquiries, the Court held that the CFC was a nonpublic forum.
What is most interesting about Cornelius for present purposes is the lack of any
suggestion that the “policy and practice of the government” and the “nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity” have anything to do with a
traditional public forum analysis. This will become significant in the context of later
decisions.
4.

Frisby (1988)

The next relevant decision is Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), a dispute
38

over a Brookfield, Wisconsin, ordinance that “completely ban[ned] picketing ‘before or
about’ any residence.” Id. at 476. The picketing in question involved anti-abortion
protesters “picketing on a public street outside the Brookfield residence of a doctor who
apparently perform[ed] abortions at two clinics in neighboring towns.” Id. The Supreme
Court’s emphatic affirmance of those public streets as traditional public fora is notable
for its reliance on basic categorical analysis:
The relevant forum here may be easily identified: [the
picketers] wish to picket on the public streets of Brookfield.
Ordinarily, a determination of the nature of the forum would
follow automatically from this identification; we have
repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a
traditional public forum. “[T]ime out of mind” public streets
and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and
debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum.
[Brookfield and the other defendants], however, urge us to
disregard these “clichés.” They argue that the streets of
Brookfield should be considered a nonpublic forum. Pointing
to the physical narrowness of Brookfield’s streets as well as
to their residential character, appellants contend that such
streets have not by tradition or designation been held open
for public communication.
We reject this suggestion. Our prior holdings make clear
that a public street does not lose its status as a traditional
public forum simply because it runs through a residential
neighborhood. . . .
In short, our decisions identifying public streets and
sidewalks as traditional public fora are not accidental
invocations of a “cliché,” but recognition that “[w]herever the
title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public.” No
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific
street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public
trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.
Accordingly, the streets of Brookfield are traditional public
fora. . . .
Id. at 480–81 (citations omitted).
39

Frisby does not explicitly state that all traditional public fora may be identified so
easily. Nonetheless, Frisby’s rejection of Brookfield’s argument strongly suggests as
much, with no need to refer to any particular characteristics of the space in question.
5.

Kokinda (1990)

A potential breakdown in the doctrinal consensus was on display about two years
after Frisby in a fractured decision captioned United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990). Kokinda concerned a Postal Service regulation that prohibited solicitation on
Post Office premises, as applied to a sidewalk leading from a particular Post Office’s
parking lot into the Post Office itself. Id. at 722–24.
Kokinda produced no majority opinion. Justice O’Connor (writing for herself,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Scalia) concluded that the sidewalk in
question “[d]id not have the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to
expressive activity. . . . [T]he postal sidewalk was constructed solely to provide for the
passage of individuals engaged in postal business . . . not to facilitate the daily
commerce and the life of the neighborhood or city.” Id. at 727–28. This appears to be a
deviation from previous cases, where a public sidewalk was a public forum simply
because it was a public sidewalk. That is precisely the criticism leveled in an opinion by
Justice Brennan, writing also for Justices Marshall, Stevens, and (in relevant part)
Blackmun. Id. at 740–49. Justice O’Connor responded by pointing to the language in
Grace that nothing distinguished the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court from
any other public sidewalk in Washington, D.C. Id. at 728. But instead of arguing that
the Post Office sidewalk possessed such distinguishing characteristics, Justice
O’Connor offered a broader statement: “the location and purpose of a publicly owned
40

sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public forum.”
Id. at 728–29. But, again, this was simply the opinion of four justices, as was Justice
Brennan’s opinion.
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself only, was the tiebreaker. He opined, “If our
public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective
characteristics of Government property and its customary use by the public may control
the case.” Id. at 737–38. Justice Kennedy nowhere explained precisely what he meant
by this, nor did he make clear whether this was meant as a criticism of anything in either
Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s respective opinions. From one perspective,
one might interpret this as an expression of agreement with Justice O’Connor regarding
the need for an inquiry into “the location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk.”
However, Justice Kennedy did not make any such agreement explicit, and in fact
announced that he could avoid categorizing the sidewalk as a public or nonpublic forum
because, in his view, the Postal Service regulation in question survived scrutiny under
the strict standard applied to traditional public fora. Id. at 738. He therefore concurred
in the O’Connor opinion’s judgment, which found that the sidewalk was a nonpublic
forum and that the Postal regulation satisfied the reasonableness standard. Id. at 733–
37.
Thus, the outcome of Kokinda was that the Postal Service regulation stood under
any applicable standard of review, although with no majority opinion regarding the
proper forum classification of the sidewalk.
6.

Lee (1992)

The fractures evident in Kokinda soon returned in International Society for
41

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (“Lee”). The plaintiffs in Lee
were disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds at the airports controlled by
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark). Id. at
674–75. By regulation, however, the Port Authority prohibited “continuous or repetitive”
person-to-person solicitation and distribution of literature. Id. at 675–76. The Second
Circuit held that the airports were not public fora and that the regulation was reasonable
as to solicitation but not as to distribution. Id. at 677. The dispute then went to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari specifically “to resolve whether airport
terminals are public fora,” among other questions. Id.
Relying on a historical-categorical approach divorced from consideration of any
specific airport terminal, the Court answered the public forum question in the negative:
[A]irport terminals have only recently achieved their
contemporary size and character. . . . [G]iven the lateness
with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance,
it hardly qualifies for the description of having “immemorially
. . . time out of mind” been held in the public trust and used
for purposes of expressive activity. Moreover, even within
the rather short history of air transport, it is only “[i]n recent
years [that] it has become a common practice for various
religious and non-profit organizations to use commercial
airports as a forum for the distribution of literature, the
solicitation of funds, the proselytizing of new members, and
other similar activities.” Thus, the tradition of airport activity
does not demonstrate that airports have historically been
made available for speech activity.
Id. at 680 (citations omitted). “Nor can we say,” the Court continued, “that these
particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by
their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing litigation evidencing the
operators’ objections belies any such claim.” Id. at 680–81. Then, invoking the
reasonableness test that applies to government regulation of nonpublic fora, the Court
42

affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding that the solicitation ban was reasonable. Id. at
683–85.
Five justices (Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) joined all of the
major rulings regarding the solicitation ban, including the nonpublic forum status of
airport terminals and the reasonableness of the ban. The outcome regarding the
distribution ban, however, commanded no majority opinion. Justice O’Connor, applying
the reasonableness standard for nonpublic fora, agreed with the Second Circuit that the
distribution ban was not reasonable. Id. at 690–93 (opn. of O’Connor, J.). Justice
Kennedy, joined in relevant part by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, agreed
that the Second Circuit’s judgment regarding the distribution ban should be affirmed, but
on different grounds, namely, under a strict scrutiny test (because these justices
believed that the airport terminals should be deemed a public forum). Id. at 708–10
(opn. of Kennedy, J.). The result was that the Second Circuit’s invalidation of the
distribution ban was affirmed without any opinion commanding a majority view.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion (on behalf of himself and Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter) dissented from the majority’s approach to classifying airport terminals as
nonpublic fora: “Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories
rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into
one which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.” Id. at 693–94
(emphasis added). However, he said, “it seems evident that under the Court’s analysis
today few, if any, types of property other than those already recognized as public
forums will be accorded that status.” Id. at 697. In Justice Kennedy’s view, “the policies
underlying the [public forum] doctrine cannot be given effect unless we recognize that
43

open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be public
forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise
classification of the property.” Id.
Justice Kennedy then returned to the “objective characteristics”/“customary use”
paradigm he had mentioned in Kokinda but failed to expound upon:
Under the proper circumstances I would accord public forum
status to other forms of property, regardless of their ancient
or contemporary origins and whether or not they fit within a
narrow historic tradition. If the objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public
access and uses that have been permitted by the
government indicate that expressive activity would be
appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is
a public forum. The most important considerations in this
analysis are whether the property shares physical similarities
with more traditional public forums, whether the government
has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the
property, and whether expressive activity would tend to
interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the
government has as a factual matter dedicated the property.
Id. at 698–99. Notably, although Justice Kennedy did not cite Cornelius in this portion
of his opinion, his proposed analysis is materially indistinguishable from the factors
Cornelius prescribed for evaluating whether the government has created a designated
public forum. (See Part IV.B.3, above.)
As will become clear below, Justice Kennedy’s exposition here takes on
surprising importance in the Tenth Circuit’s First Unitarian decision, which accords it
controlling weight. It is nonetheless beyond debate that five Supreme Court justices in
Lee agreed under a historical-categorical analysis that airport terminals are not public
fora. Id. at 680–81.7
7

The Tenth Circuit has applied this holding in a categorical manner. Mocek v. City of

44

7.

Church on the Rock (10th Cir. 1996)

For present purposes, the first relevant Tenth Circuit decision came four years
after Lee, and was a dispute over whether a church could exhibit a religious-themed film
at a city-owned senior center. Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d
1273 (10th Cir. 1996). Principally citing Perry and Cornelius, the Tenth Circuit set forth
the three types of fora (traditional public, designated public, and nonpublic) along with
the standards of review attached to each. Id. at 1278. Then, without any analysis into
any particular senior center, the Tenth Circuit announced that the senior center in
question “may not be classified as a traditional public forum because it is not a
traditional location of public debate or assembly.” Id. The senior center was, rather, a
designated public forum given city policies that allowed non-seniors to use senior
centers for classes, lectures, and presentations. Id. at 1277, 1278. The Tenth Circuit
held that the city did not satisfy strict scrutiny in excluding religious-themed messages
from this policy. Id. at 1280–81.
Church on the Rock, then, affirms that the traditional public form analysis is
essentially a question of preexisting categories.
8.

Forbes (1998)

The forum-analysis debate soon returned to the Supreme Court in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (“Forbes”), a case
about whether a state-owned public television station lawfully excluded an independent
Congressional candidate from a televised debate featuring the Republican and
Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 930 (10th Cir. 2015) (“As an initial matter, an airport is a nonpublic
forum, where restrictions on expressive activity need only ‘satisfy a requirement of
reasonableness.’” (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 683)).

45

Democratic candidates for that same seat. Id. at 670–71. Thankfully, Forbes produced
a majority opinion—written by none other than Justice Kennedy.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court begins its analysis with a fairly typical
recitation of the three forum categories established by the preceding fifteen years’
jurisprudence. Id. at 677–78. However, Justice Kennedy inserted a small measure of
his “objective characteristics” language (from Kokinda and Lee) into the description of a
traditional public forum:
Traditional public fora are defined by the objective
characteristics of the property, such as whether, “by long
tradition or by government fiat,” the property has been
“devoted to assembly and debate.” . . .
***
. . . traditional public fora are open for expressive activity
regardless of the government’s intent. The objective
characteristics of these properties require the government to
accommodate private speakers.
Id. at 677–78. Lest this be seen as some sort of doctrinal innovation, however, Justice
Kennedy quickly went on to confirm that the traditional public forum category is
essentially closed: “The Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status
extends beyond its historic confines, see [Lee], 505 U.S., at 680–681 . . . .” Id. at 678.
Justice Kennedy then reasoned that the television debate was a nonpublic forum and
that the state acted reasonably in its refusal to allow participation by the independent
candidate. Id. at 678–83.
In short, Forbes is something of a feint toward opening up the traditional public
forum category based on the notion of “objective characteristics,” but it then pulls back
by affirming that the category is “historic[ally] confine[d].” Id. at 678. Moreover, the only
46

examples Forbes provided of such “objective characteristics” are those used by Perry to
describe traditional and designated public fora: “whether, ‘by long tradition or by
government fiat,’ the property has been ‘devoted to assembly and debate.’” Id. at 677
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
9.

Hawkins (10th Cir. 1999)

About a year after Forbes, the Tenth Circuit decided another forum-analysis
case, this time regarding the “Galleria,” i.e., the large open-air plaza/walkway
connecting the various theaters, concert halls, and other facilities of the Denver
Performing Arts Complex (“DPAC”). Hawkins v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281,
1284 (10th Cir. 1999). Before the Galleria’s construction, the area had been a public
street, but the Galleria was now restricted to foot traffic only. Id. A Denver policy
banned all picketing and leafleting on the Galleria. Id. at 1284 & n.2.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Galleria was not a traditional public forum, even
though it had once been a public street:
The Galleria does not qualify as a traditional public forum, for
it is not a park, nor is it analogous to a public right of way or
thoroughfare. The Galleria does not form part of Denver's
automotive, bicycle or pedestrian transportation grid, for it is
closed to vehicles, and pedestrians do not generally use it as
a throughway to another destination. Rather, the Galleria's
function is simply to permit ingress to and egress from the
DPAC’s various complexes. . . . Moreover, the fact that the
Galleria was constructed on what used to be a public street
does not render it a traditional public forum. The
government may, by changing the physical nature of its
property, alter it to such an extent that it no longer retains its
public forum status.
Id. at 1287. In other words, Hawkins employed a straightforward categorical analysis,
although with reference to the factual record to confirm that the Galleria no longer
47

possessed the characteristics of a public street. Hawkins went on to conclude that the
Galleria was a nonpublic forum and that Denver’s restrictions were reasonable. Id. at
1287–92.
10.

First Unitarian (10th Cir. 2002)

We now reach the First Unitarian decision, which, as noted above, is difficult to
square with decisions that preceded it. First Unitarian “concern[ed] a portion of Main
Street in downtown Salt Lake City that the City closed and sold to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church).” 308 F.3d at 1117. The portion of Main
Street in question ran between two city blocks owned by the LDS Church, with the
iconic “Temple Square” on the west side of Main Street and various LDS Church
administrative buildings occupying the block on the east side of Main Street. Id.
In 1998 and 1999, the City and the LDS Church put in motion a plan to close that
portion of Main Street and convert it to a pedestrian plaza uniting the two Church-owned
blocks. Id. at 1117–18. The City therefore sold that portion of Main Street to the LDS
Church but also reserved to itself a pedestrian easement. Id. at 1118. The easement,
however, declared that it should not “be deemed to create or constitute a public forum”
and went on to reserve to the LDS Church the right to prohibit numerous activities,
including activities such as demonstrating and picketing. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The LDS Church then went on to redevelop that former segment of Main
Street into a Plaza with “planters, benches, and waterfalls, a large reflecting pool, and
changes in grade.” Id. at 1119.
A number of local groups eventually sued, “assert[ing] [that] the [easement’s]
restrictions are facially invalid because the entire plaza, or alternatively the retained
48

easement, remains public property on which speech cannot be so restricted.” Id. The
plaintiffs, however, later abandoned their claim as directed at the entire plaza, and
therefore narrowed the case to the question of the City’s easement. Id. at 1120 n.3.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City and the LDS Church (as
intervenor), but the Tenth Circuit reversed.
The Tenth Circuit first satisfied itself that the City’s easement comprised the sort
of public property interest to which First Amendment forum analysis could apply. Id. at
1121–24. Having so decided, the Tenth Circuit set forth the three categories of fora and
quickly “reject[ed] the contention that the City’s express intention not to create a public
forum controls [the] analysis. The government cannot simply declare the First
Amendment status of property regardless of its nature and its public use.” Id. at 1124.
Only in the case of designated public fora, said the Tenth Circuit, is an inquiry into
governmental intent appropriate. Id. at 1124–25.
This becomes a key transition point in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, and the
beginning of what this Court respectfully deems to be a certain amount of confusion. In
support of this proposition regarding governmental intent, the court cites Forbes,
Cornelius, and Hawkins—all of which are on-point for that particular proposition. The
Tenth Circuit then follows these citations with a “cf.” cite to a part of Justice Kennedy’s
concurring-in-judgment opinion in Kokinda where he discusses what the Tenth Circuit
characterizes as “objective factors” that courts might need to consider regardless of
governmental intent. Id. at 1124–25 (citing Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738). Finally, in a
footnote attached to the citation, the Tenth Circuit announces, “We cite Justice
Kennedy’s [Kokinda] concurrence as controlling Supreme Court precedent because his
49

concurrence provided the fifth vote on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 1125 n.6
(emphasis added).
Again, with great respect, this reasoning appears incorrect. When a Supreme
Court justice provides the necessary fifth vote through a concurring-in-judgment opinion,
it does not thereby transform that justice’s entire opinion into controlling Supreme Court
precedent. Rather, the question is the “position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). And this only
produces a true holding “when [the concurring-in-judgment] opinion is a logical subset of
other, broader opinions.” Large v. Fremont Cnty., 670 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The question as it related to Kokinda, then, was the
narrowest ground on which Justice Kennedy concurred with Justice O’Connor, and that
was simply that the Post Office regulation at issue did not violate even the strictest
potential standard of review.
Nonetheless, having decided that Justice Kennedy’s entire Kokinda opinion
deserved controlling weight, the Tenth Circuit went on to cite the same portion of
Kokinda as support for the following transitional sentence:
In contrast [to designated public fora], for property that is or
has traditionally been open to the public, objective
characteristics are more important and can override express
government intent to limit speech. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
738 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (legitimate justifications for
restrictions notwithstanding, “other factors may point to the
conclusion that the Government must permit wider access to
the forum than it has otherwise intended.”) . . . .
First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125 (parallel citation omitted). The court then went on to
link “objective characteristics” to Forbes: “As Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority in
50

Forbes, ‘public fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property.’” Id.
And what does “objective characteristics” mean? According to the Tenth Circuit,
“Justice Kennedy elaborated on what he meant by examining objective characteristics
to determine if property is a public forum in his concurrence in [Lee].” Id. The Tenth
Circuit then block-quoted the portion of Justice Kennedy’s Lee opinion in which he calls
for consideration of “whether the property shares physical similarities with more
traditional public forums,” “whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in
broad public access to the property,” and “whether expressive activity would tend to
interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government has as a factual
matter dedicated the property.” Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 698–99). (See also Part
IV.B.6, above.) Finally, the Tenth Circuit declared that it would “apply these factors to
assess the easement’s character for First Amendment purposes.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning appears to have been as follows: Justice
Kennedy’s deemed-to-be-controlling Kokinda opinion, and his later majority opinion in
Forbes, both say that “objective characteristics” govern the question of whether a public
space is a traditional public forum; therefore, Justice Kennedy’s elaboration on
“objective characteristics” in a different opinion (Lee) has now been adopted by a
majority of the Supreme Court. This reasoning displays several difficulties.
First, as noted, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Kokinda is not controlling on the
doctrinal point of how a traditional public forum is identified. Second, as described
above in Part IV.B.8, Justice Kennedy’s re-invocation of “objective characteristics” in the
Forbes majority opinion cannot be read as an importation of his views expressed in prior
non-majority opinions—and in particular not his views in Lee—given his statement in
51

Forbes that Lee “rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its
historic confines.” 523 U.S. at 678. Third, the First Unitarian opinion itself later implicitly
acknowledges that Justice Kennedy’s Lee opinion was not controlling in any respect.
First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125 & n.7 (citing Justice O’Connor’s Lee concurrence and
noting that it “provided the fifth vote on the narrowest grounds”).
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit went on to examine the easement’s nature and
purpose, its compatibility with expressive activities, and whether the City had expressly
designated speech as a purpose of the property. Id. at 1126–31. Among various
considerations, the Tenth Circuit noted what would have been (in this Court’s view) the
dispositive factors: (1) “[t]he easement through the plaza was specifically retained in
order to preserve and enhance the pedestrian grid in the downtown,” id. at 1126; and
(2) “because the purpose of the easement is not limited to ingress and egress to Church
facilities, but is intended rather for pedestrian passage, it is distinguishable from those
walkways that have been held not to be public fora [such as the Galleria in Hawkins or
the Post Office sidewalk in Kokinda],” id. at 1127. Under traditional forum analysis,
these considerations alone would appear to be enough to declare that the City had not
effectively divested itself of the preexisting property interest, which was certainly a
traditional public forum (i.e., a public sidewalk).8 In any event, based on the foregoing
and many other considerations, the court concluded that the easement was a public
forum, and that the City’s restrictions failed strict scrutiny. Id. at 1131–33.
8

In fact, on remand, the City and the LDS Church appear to have adopted this view.
The City simply sold the easement outright to the Church, thus ceding all control. See generally
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding sale
against various constitutional challenges, and finding the plaza was now entirely private
property and no longer subject to First Amendment analysis).

52

11.

Doe (10th Cir. 2012)

The Tenth Circuit has since reverted to the historical-categorical approach, as
evidenced in Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). Doe
addressed a municipal policy banning registered sex offenders from public libraries. Id.
at 1115–16. Neither side of the dispute had contended that public libraries were a
traditional public forum, and the Tenth Circuit explicitly announced its agreement with
the parties’ apparent concession: “public libraries are not analogous to ‘streets and
parks which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.’” Id. at 1129 n.11 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
45–46). The Tenth Circuit instead found that the library in question was a designated
public forum and that the city’s policy failed strict scrutiny. Id. at 1128–35.
12.

McCullen (2014)

The Supreme Court also continues to speak of traditional public fora in historicalcategorical terms, as in McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), a case regarding
a Massachusetts statute designed to restrict “sidewalk counseling” by anti-abortion
activists outside abortion clinics. Id. at 2526–27. Although the case was
unquestionably about a traditional public forum (public streets and sidewalks), the
Supreme Court spoke in terms of categories and “labels”:
Such areas occupy a “special position in terms of First
Amendment protection” because of their historic role as sites
for discussion and debate. [Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.] These
places—which we have labeled “traditional public fora”—
“‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.’” Pleasant Grove City v.
53

Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (quoting [Perry, 460
U.S. at 45]).
***
In short, traditional public fora are areas that have historically
been open to the public for speech activities.
Id. at 2529 (parallel citations omitted). The Court went on to conclude that the
Massachusetts statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 2530–41.
13.

Synthesis & Conclusion

The vast weight of Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit authority approaches the
traditional public forum question simply by asking whether the public space in question
fits within a pre-existing category declared by the Supreme Court itself: public streets,
public sidewalks, and public parks. By analogy, a number of extra-circuit cases have
added to this list public spaces that abut or lead into legislative or executive buildings,
such as a pedestrian mall spreading away from such a building, see Warren v. Fairfax
Cnty., 196 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 1999), or the steps of city hall, see Pouillon v. City of
Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 716–17 (6th Cir. 2000). But the inquiry remains the same: Is
this public space within the category of public spaces that have, by long tradition, been
recognized as places for public assembly, advocacy, and debate? To be sure, one can
fairly criticize this approach from a doctrinal point of view—as Justice Kennedy has
done—because the list it generates is essentially frozen in time. But, as Justice
Kennedy has also acknowledged, the Supreme Court has rejected any other approach.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
This does not mean that a more-specific factual inquiry into the contested space

54

is never needed. A good example is Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016), which is essentially the sequel to Grace. Whereas
Grace dealt with the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building, Hodge
addressed the plaza fronting the building’s public entrance. Id. at 1149–50. The D.C.
Circuit found great significance in Grace’s observation that nothing about the
surrounding sidewalks would signal to a person that he or she had “‘entered some
special type of enclave.’” Id. at 1158 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 180). By contrast,
[t]he plaza’s appearance and design vividly manifest its
architectural integration with the Supreme Court building, as
well as its separation from the perimeter sidewalks and
surrounding area. The plaza is elevated from the sidewalk
by a set of marble steps. A low, patterned marble wall—the
same type of wall that encircles the rest of the building—
surrounds the plaza platform and defines its boundaries.
And the plaza and the steps rising to it are composed of
white marble that contrasts sharply with the concrete
sidewalk in front of it, but that matches the staircase
ascending to the Court's front doors and the façade of the
building itself.
Id. Further finding that “[t]he area surrounding a courthouse traditionally has not been
considered a forum for demonstrations and protests,” id. at 1159, the D.C. Circuit
eventually concluded that the Supreme Court grounds within its perimeter sidewalks
were a nonpublic forum, id. at 1158–62. The D.C. Circuit also concluded that the
government’s regulation of the plaza was reasonable in light of the purposes served by
the picketing restriction, namely, maintaining decorum and preserving the appearance
of a judiciary immune to public pressure. Id. at 1162–70.
The Hodge decision thus demonstrates that, following Grace, a plaintiff might
argue for traditional public forum status because a location falling outside the
“traditional” category is effectively indistinguishable from surroundings that are
55

indisputably traditional public fora. And, presented with such an argument, a court must
make a factual inquiry into the specific characteristics of the contested space as
compared to its surroundings. But nothing in Hodge, or any other case of which this
Court is aware apart from First Unitarian, suggests that the inquiry must go deeper, e.g.,
into specific historical uses of the space in question, its compatibility with expression,
etc. As already noted, inquiries into history, compatibility with expression, and other
“objective characteristics” are essentially what the Supreme Court set forth in Cornelius
as relevant to whether the government had designated a public forum, not whether a
particular space is a traditional public forum. (Compare Parts IV.B.3 & IV.B.6, above.)9
All that said, both Plaintiffs and the Second Judicial District argue from First
Unitarian as if it is controlling here. So what to do with First Unitarian? The Court
observes that First Unitarian did not announce its approach as the definitive or
mandatory approach to traditional public forum inquiries. Rather, First Unitarian set
forth Justice Kennedy’s exposition on “objective characteristics” from Lee, and then
simply stated, “We apply these factors to assess the easement’s character for First
Amendment purposes.” 308 F.3d at 1125. Given this, the Court concludes that First
Unitarian is best read as an analysis specific to the unique situation presented there—
the government sold a traditional public forum to a private party but retained an

9

Cf. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation of City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144,
1151–58 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that certain display case in an airport was designated public
forum based on “consistent policy and practice”); Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111,
116–18 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a public university campus was a designated public forum
for student speech given historical practice and policy); Paulsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d
65, 69–71 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a public stadium complex was a designated public forum
based on evidence of its historical use and lack of enforcement of a supposed policy against
leafleting).

56

easement in the property so that the property would continue to serve the same
purpose it served (from the government’s perspective) before the sale. If First Unitarian
is treated any more broadly, it basically collapses any distinction between traditional and
designated public fora—which most certainly contradicts Supreme Court forum analysis
precedent.
Here, the Courthouse is a recently-built structure, but no party has presented
evidence of how the land was used before it was built. In particular, no party has
presented evidence of how the land now comprising the Restricted Area had previously
been used. Accordingly, First Unitarian’s analysis does not apply. The Court therefore
applies the historical-categorical approach to the question of whether the Restricted
Area is a traditional public forum.
C.

Plaintiffs’ Lack of Standing to Challenge the West Side Restricted Area
The portions of the Restricted Area on the west side of the Courthouse

encompass parts of a public sidewalk. (¶ 4.)10 Following Grace, then, a traditional
public forum analysis would normally be appropriate. However, Plaintiffs have shown
no desire or intent to advocate on the west side of the Courthouse. That side is lightly
used and is not an effective place to spread their message, given that the vast majority
of persons with court business enter and exit through the Main Entrance on the east
side. (¶¶ 5, 19, 29–31, 50.) Plaintiff Matzen distributed literature at the West Entrance
while the Main Entrance was closed for construction (¶ 51), but Plaintiffs have failed to
introduce evidence from which the Court could find any ongoing or “present desire . . .

10

All citations to a paragraph number, without more, are to the Court’s findings of fact in
Part III, above.

57

to engage in . . . speech [prohibited by the Plaza Order]” on the west side of the
Courthouse. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir.
2006).
Plaintiffs therefore have failed to establish that the Plaza Order, as it relates to
the west side of the Courthouse, threatens imminent injury to their First Amendment
rights. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (injury sufficient to
support standing must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to challenge the Plaza
Order to the extent the Restricted Area encompasses certain areas on the west side of
the Courthouse. 11
D.

Forum Status of East Side Restricted Area
The Court now turns to the Restricted Area as it relates to the east side of the

Courthouse. All further references in this order to “Restricted Area” refer only to the
east side of the Courthouse.
Plaintiffs argue that the Restricted Area is a traditional public forum. As already
noted, the Supreme Court treats the traditional public forum category as a historically
closed set comprising public streets, public sidewalks, and public parks. The Supreme
Court has never addressed whether the grounds of a courthouse might also fall into this
category, save for the surrounding public sidewalks. A courthouse-related decision predating the Court’s systematic “forum analysis” approach, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

11

For similar reasons, there is a fair argument that Plaintiffs lack standing as to the
Arced Walkway. (See Tr. at 82 (Plaintiff Verlo denying interest in demonstrating on the Arced
Walkway, given its obscurity).) However, Plaintiffs’ claim as to the Arced Walkway fails on its
merits in any event, as described below.

58

559 (1965), seems to point in two directions.
Cox arose from an individual’s conviction for violating a Louisiana statute that
prohibited “pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of
Louisiana” if done “with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court
officer, in the discharge of his duty.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Supreme Court treated this statute not as a regulation of expression alone, but as
regulation of “expression mixed with particular conduct,” namely picketing and parading.
Id. at 564. And in this light, the Court said,
[t]here can be no question that a State has a legitimate
interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures
which picketing near a courthouse might create. Since we
are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is
of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be
absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that
the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is
part of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy.
The constitutional safeguards relating to the integrity of the
criminal process attend every stage of a criminal proceeding,
starting with arrest and culminating with a trial in a courtroom
presided over by a judge. There can be no doubt that they
embrace the fundamental conception of a fair trial, and that
they exclude influence or domination by either a hostile or
friendly mob. There is no room at any stage of judicial
proceedings for such intervention; mob law is the very
antithesis of due process. A State may adopt safeguards
necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration
of justice at all stages is free from outside control and
influence. A narrowly drawn statute such as the one under
review is obviously a safeguard both necessary and
appropriate to vindicate the State’s interest in assuring
justice under law.
Id. at 562 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court went on to declare that
the legislature has the right to recognize the danger that
some judges, jurors, and other court officials, will be
consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations
in or near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of
59

the trial. A State may also properly protect the judicial
process from being misjudged in the minds of the public.
Suppose demonstrators paraded and picketed for weeks
with signs asking that indictments be dismissed, and that a
judge, completely uninfluenced by these demonstrations,
dismissed the indictments. A State may protect against the
possibility of a conclusion by the public under these
circumstances that the judge’s action was in part a product
of intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly
working of the judicial process.
Id. at 565.
On the one hand, this reasoning seems to validate much of what the Plaza Order
was intended to promote, namely, “a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality,
bias, prejudice, or favoritism,” and “to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of
hearings and trials.” (¶ 35.) On the other hand, the Supreme Court made much of the
fact that the Louisiana statute was “narrowly drawn” to prohibit picketing and parading, a
form of conduct that it found separable from expression itself. Cox, 379 U.S. at 562,
564. This looks somewhat like a strict scrutiny analysis applicable to what the Court
would later call a traditional public forum.
From a broader perspective, moreover, courthouses are undeniably the locations
of momentous political and social decisions, just like legislative and executive buildings.
And demonstrations at least near (if not on) the grounds of a courthouse seem to be a
relatively common affair throughout the country.
Nonetheless, since the advent of historical-categorical forum analysis in Perry,
apparently every court to address the issue has held that the grounds of a courthouse
(apart from surrounding public sidewalks) are not a traditional public forum. See Hodge,
799 F.3d at 1161 (“[T]here is no background assumption—grounded in tradition—that
the [Supreme Court plaza] is a public forum. The plaza plainly is not a street or
60

sidewalk. Nor is it a park.”); Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2005)
(courthouse grounds, including its parking lots, were not a traditional public forum);
Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (combined
municipal-judicial building was not a traditional public forum because it was “not, like a
public street or park, the kind of public property that has ‘by long tradition or by
governmental fiat . . . been devoted to assembly and debate’” (quoting Perry, 460 U.S.
at 45)), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); United
States v. Gilbert, 130 F.3d 1458, 1461–62 (11th Cir. 1997) (portion of courthouse
grounds had previously been a designated public forum, but the government
permissibly withdrew that designation and imposed new restrictions that satisfied the
reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic fora); Schmidter v. State, 103 So. 3d
263, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“courthouses and courthouse grounds (with the
exclusion of perimeter public sidewalks) have uniformly been treated as nonpublic
forums for purposes of First Amendment analysis”). Notably, Plaintiffs have cited no
contrary authority.
This Court need not decide the proper forum designation for courthouse grounds
generally, because only the Restricted Area is at issue here. The Restricted Area was
primarily intended to be, and in fact functions as, an ingress/egress area for those with
court business—in effect, as an extension of the Courthouse lobby. (¶¶ 19–21, 30–31.)
At least that portion of the grounds of a courthouse has never been traditionally viewed
as an area of public assembly and debate. Thus, it does not qualify as a traditional
public forum. Moreover, there is no argument that the Second Judicial District has
designated the Restricted Area as a public forum.
61

As for the questions raised in Grace and Hodges, the average pedestrian can
easily distinguish the Patio and Arced Walkway (which comprise the Restricted Area)
from the surrounding public sidewalks, and from the Circular Plaza, and thus the
average pedestrian would understand that he or she had “entered some special type of
enclave” when setting foot on the Patio or Arced Walkway. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
The Arced Walkway is bordered by Landscaping on one side and the Gravel Area on
the other; it comprises a series of shallow steps that are unusual on public sidewalks;
and, due to its shape and location, it signals to anyone approaching it from the public
sidewalk on the Colfax Avenue side that it can only lead closer to the Courthouse, and
not, for example, to some location beyond the Courthouse. (¶¶ 10–13.)
As for the Patio, a pedestrian must ascend steps or a shallow grade to reach it
and then pass through bollards,12 after which the pedestrian would find higher quality
building materials and landscaping along with concrete that differs from the surrounding
concrete in color and texture. (¶¶ 14–17, 22.) Consequently, there is no basis for
treating the Restricted Area as anything but a nonpublic forum. Cf. Hodge, 799 F.3d at
1158–59 (holding that the Supreme Court plaza is a nonpublic forum based on its
architectural integration with the Supreme Court building itself and its features that
distinguish it from the surrounding sidewalks, including its raised elevation, its
enclosure, and its distinctive paving materials).
First Amendment restrictions in a nonpublic forum may still be challenged as
unreasonable in light of the purposes they are intended to serve. See Hawkins, 170
12

A pedestrian using the Arced Walkway to reach the Patio would not pass through
bollards. But, as already noted, the Arced Walkway itself signals to any pedestrian that he or
she has left the normal pedestrian grid and entered a special enclave.

62

F.3d at 1287. But Plaintiffs have consistently failed to advance any unreasonableness
argument, even in the alternative, and the Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have
waived such a challenge in the true sense of “waiver,” i.e., “‘intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270,
1272 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court has no
occasion to examine the Plaza Order for reasonableness, and the Court’s Preliminary
Injunction must be dissolved.
V. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
Plaintiffs began this lawsuit seeking to vindicate the precious freedom of
expression protected by the First Amendment. But the trajectory of this case has taken
a turn few would have predicted two years ago. On the one hand, Denver immediately
turned its back on the Second Judicial District—motivated, the Court suspects, more by
fiscal considerations than by any truly principled commitment to freedom of expression
in the Restricted Area.
Plaintiffs and their fellow demonstrators, on the other hand, at times came to
grossly abuse the expressive freedom granted to them in the Preliminary Injunction.
The undersigned was very disturbed by some of the testimony elicited at the Bench
Trial, testimony which described the conduct of some of the demonstrators inside the
Restricted Area. This troubling conduct most often targeted hard-working, earnest
employees of the Second Judicial District, for no apparent reason other than their status
as state judicial branch employees. It was difficult for the undersigned to listen to
testimony from these individuals—including the Chief Judge—describing the significant
deterioration of the quality of their daily work life brought about by the implementation of
63

the Preliminary Injunction. This problematic behavior on the part of Plaintiffs and their
allies was frequently needlessly combative, aggressively intimidating, gratuitously
vulgar, and intentionally disruptive—often with no apparent purpose or point other than
to flaunt the supposed right to be combative, intimidating, vulgar, and disruptive.
Perhaps some of this behavior amounted to a criminal violation and need not
have been tolerated. Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly tried to make that very point at the
Bench Trial. But the Court is also sympathetic to the fine line that government officials
must walk in this regard. It is technically a criminal offense, for example, to “[r]epeatedly
insult[], taunt[], challenge[], or make[] communications in offensively coarse language to,
another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response.” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-111(1)(h). But the Colorado Supreme Court has construed this as a “fighting
words” statute, “proscrib[ing] only those words which have a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the words are addressed. The
test is what men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight.” People ex rel. VanMeveren v. Cnty. Court in & for
Larimer Cnty., 551 P.2d 716, 719 (Colo. 1976); cf. People in Interest of R.C., 2016 COA
166, 2016 WL 6803065, ¶¶ 16–17 (Colo. App. Nov. 17, 2016) (suggesting that “fighting
words” is an all-but-extinct category). Failed prosecutions under such statutes are
repeatedly the stuff of later § 1983 lawsuits. Added to that in this case was the threat of
contempt under the Preliminary Injunction.
To the extent Plaintiffs broke no law and were in fact exercising their First
Amendment right to freedom of expression, they apparently failed to grasp the real
world, practical responsibility that accompanies that right. No doubt, the cause of civil
64

rights in this country has more frequently than not been advanced by courageous
individuals whose views or conduct were upsetting to the majority. Among other
reasons, the Bill of Rights exists to protect the rights of political and racial minorities, the
unpopular, and the offensive, as much—or more—than to protect the rights of the
majority, or those whose views or appearance cause no disruption or offense. And the
undersigned yields to no one in his resolve to defend and preserve those treasured
rights. Nevertheless, when the offensive and disruptive manner of communication far
eclipses any ability for the listener to consider the substance of what is communicated,
the speaker should realize that the pride and privilege of exercising free speech has
unfortunately overtaken the purpose of doing so.
In this case, Plaintiffs crossed that line. Their “in your face” taunting of and
screaming at court employees—individuals whose only offense was to attempt to
discharge their duties as court employees—was wholly unnecessary and in the end
counterproductive. On this record one could argue that jury nullification is less the
cause that Plaintiffs seek to advance than is the cause of preserving their own
perceived entitlement to emphatically disrupt the essential operations of the state
judicial system, on whatever pretense, at whatever cost. Plaintiffs have manifestly
failed to realize that “the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part
of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy,” Cox, 379 U.S. at 562, including
the court system’s ability to protect Plaintiffs’ own First Amendment freedoms.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, above the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 28) is DISSOLVED;
65

2.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Second Judicial District and
against Plaintiffs, and shall terminate this case; and

3.

Each party shall bear her, his, or its own court costs.
Dated this 27th day of July, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

______________________
William J. Martinez
United States District Judge

66