Barnett v. Cozza-Rhodes et al

Filing 8

ORDER denying 5 Motion for Injunction Relief by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 10/19/15.(dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-cv-02207-LTB
ANDREW LAUD BARNETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
T.K. (I) COZZA-RHODES, Warden, in his individual and official capacities; and
(I) SILVA, S.I.S. Correctional Officer, in his individual and official capacities,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 5) filed
pro se by Plaintiff, Andrew Laud Barnett. Mr. Barnett seeks preliminary injunctive relief
against Defendants that would require them to: 1) transfer him to another facility which
houses “informants/ gang dropouts;” 2) prohibit interaction between himself and
Defendants; and 3) to change his housing designation from special housing unit (SHU) to
protective custody (PC).
The Court must construe the motion liberally because Mr. Barnett is not represented
by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro
se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Mr. Barnett is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at
the Florence High Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. He has filed a Prisoner Complaint
(ECF No. 1) claiming his rights were violated when Correctional Officer Silva called him a

snitch and a “drop-out” gang member.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: 1) a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; 2) he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; 3)
the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the
opposing party; and 4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.
See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). “Because a preliminary injunction
is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater
Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). Similarly, a temporary
restraining order is appropriate only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
“[T]he primary goal of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status quo.”
RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “courts should
be especially cautious when granting an injunction that requires the nonmoving party to
take affirmative action - a mandatory preliminary injunction - before a trial on the merits
occurs.” Id. If the movant is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction that seeks to alter
the status quo, he must make a heightened showing of the four factors listed above. See
id. at 1209.
“[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, Mr. Barnett “must first
demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the issuance of an
injunction will be considered.” Id.
2

“To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not
theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Mr. Barnett “must establish both that harm will occur,
and that, when it does, such harm will be irreparable.” Vega v. Wiley, 259 F. App’x 104,
106 (10th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief “must show
that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need
for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.”

Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189.

A

preliminary injunction is only appropriate “to prevent existing or presently threatening
injuries. One will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at
some indefinite time in the future.” Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674
(1931).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable injury if he remains at the facility
where he currently is housed. He is confined in the SHU, which is a strictly supervised area
within the prison that does not permit any prisoner-to-prisoner contact. His vague and
conclusory allegations that he feels threatened are not sufficient to justify preliminary
injunctive relief. Moreover, Plaintiff is not entitled to be incarcerated within a particular
penal institution. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983). Where a plaintiff requests an
injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a state or
federal prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in
determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of
prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a
correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
3

418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).

Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded

wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are
needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 527 (1979). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Motion for Injunction Relief (ECF No. 5) is denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

19th

day of

October

, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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