Paulsen v. Raemisch et al

Filing 117

ORDER. The Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge 110 is ACCEPTED. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 95 is GRANTED. Judgment shall enter in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. Within 14 days of the entry of this Order, defendants may have their costs by filing a Bill of Costs with the Clerk of the Court. This case is closed, by Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 9/18/18. (sgrim)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 16-cv-00129-PAB-KMT
MARK WALTER PAULSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARETT GEBHART, BVCF TC Manager/Acting BVCF HSA,
CHRIS TEIPEL, BVCF TC Counselor, and
DOUG ROBERTS, BVCF Health Services Administrator,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge (the “Recommendation”) [Docket No. 110] filed on June 4, 2018.
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya recommends that defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Docket No. 95] be granted. Docket No. 110 at 13. Plaintiff filed a
timely objection. Docket No. 111. In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
construes his filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mark Walter Paulsen is an inmate in the Colorado Department of
Corrections (“CDOC”). Movant’s Statment of Material Facts (“MSMF”) 1; Docket No. 95
at 1, ¶ 1. In July, 2014, plaintiff was transferred to the CDOC’s Buena Vista
Correctional Facility (“Buena Vista”). MSMF 3.

Plaintiff has the hepatitis C virus (“HCV”). MSMF 4. In order to receive HCV
treatment under the CDOC’s guidelines, an inmate must complete a drug and alcohol
treatment program. MSMF 5. One such program is the Therapeutic Community
program (the “program”), which uses group therapy. MSMF 6. The program at Buena
Vista lasts for approximately twelve months. MSMF 7.1 Plaintiff began the program on
August 6, 2014. MSMF 9. Defendant Chris Teipel was plaintiff’s counselor during the
program and documented plaintiff’s progress. MSMF 10-11. Mr. Teipel noted that
plaintiff regularly missed group time and work assignments. MSMF 12.
While plaintiff was in the program, defendant Garett Gebhart became the
manager of the program and acted as the Health Services Administrator (“HSA”),
administrating the medical, mental health, and drug and alcohol teams at Buena Vista.
MSMF 14-17. In April 2015, Mr. Gebhart responded to a “kite” f rom plaintiff requesting
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Plaintiff purports to dispute some of the asserted material facts in MSMF,
including that the program lasted twelve months. See Docket No. 111 at 1. Plaintiff’s
response did not, however, have any evidence attached or cite any evidence already in
the record as required to support a factual position at the summary judgment stage
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Docket No. 103; see also Practice Standards (Civil
Cases), Judge Philip A. Brimmer § III.F.3.b.iv (“Any denial shall be accompanied by a
brief factual explanation of the reason(s) for the denial and a specific reference to
material in the record supporting the denial.”). Further, plaintiff’s response did not
indicate whether he admits or denies the asserted facts in MSMF or provide a section
indicating any additional facts that he believes are disputed as required by the Court’s
practice standards. See Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Judge Philip A. Brimmer
§§ III.F.3.b.iv (“Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment shall, in a section
of the brief . . . styled ‘Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,’ admit or
deny the asserted material facts set forth by the movant.”), § III.F.3.b.v. (requiring that
“additional disputed questions of fact” be set out “in a separate section of the party’s
brief styled ‘Statement of Additional Disputed Facts.’”). Because of plaintiff’s failure to
provide evidence supporting his positions as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) and
his failure to follow the Court’s practice standards, the Court deems the facts recounted
in this background section admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). As discussed below,
plaintiff’s submission of evidence with his objection is unavailing.
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the HCV protocol by sending plaintiff a portion of it. MSMF 19. In June 2015, Mr.
Gebhart responded to a kite from plaintiff asking why HCV treatment had not been
started even though he had been in the program for six months. MSMF 20. Mr.
Gebhart responded that plaintiff had to complete the program before he could receive
HCV treatment. Id. Plaintiff completed the program on July 22, 2015, fifty weeks after
beginning the program. MSMF 13.
In mid-August 2015, defendant Doug Roberts became Buena Vista’s HSA.
MSMF 23. In this position, he administratively supervised Mr. Gebhart, but he did not
supervise medical treatment decisions. MSMF 24, 25.
On January 19, 2016, plaintiff filed his complaint in this case. Docket No. 1. On
March 18, 2016, Judge Lewis T. Babcock dismissed certain defendants pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the claims against them were legally frivolous and
assigned the remaining claims to this Court. Docket No. 7 at 4. On March 29, 2017,
the Court granted in part motions to dismiss filed by the then-remaining defendants.
Docket No. 52 at 9. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 under the First Amendment for retaliation and under the Eighth Amendment for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs against Messrs. Gebhart, Teipel, and
Roberts. Docket No. 1 at 8-11, 17; see also Docket Nos. 7, 52. 2 On November 9,
2017, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment seeking summary judgment
as to each of these claims. Docket No. 95.

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Plaintiff has filed another case bringing claims related to the denial of HCV
treatment before he was transferred to Buena Vista. Paulsen v. Roberts, No.
15-cv-00800-PAB-KMT (D. Colo. filed April 15, 2015) (“Roberts”).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection is “proper” if
it is both timely and specific. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as
2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). To be sufficiently specific, an
objection must “enable[] the district judge to focus attention on those issues – factual
and legal – that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” See id. at 1059 (quoting
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)). In the absence of a proper objection, the
Court may review a magistrate judge’s recommendation under any standard it deems
appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also
Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150 (“[i]t does not appear that Cong ress intended to require
district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or
any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings”).
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed f act is “material” if
under the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.
Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary
judgment. Faustin v. City & Cty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a

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verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.
1997).
However, when “the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by
identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the
nonmovant's claim.” Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a
material matter.” Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The
nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead
must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “To avoid summary judgment, the
nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each
element essential to the case.” Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115 (citing Hulsey v. Kmart,
Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994)). “In applying this standard, we view all facts
and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d
567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation with respect to both his deliberate

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indifference claim and his retaliation claim. Docket No. 111 at 1, 4. Plaintiff, however,
argues retaliation with respect to only Mr. Teipel. Id. at 12; see also Docket No. 103 at
2-4. The Court sets out the legal standards for each claim and then discusses each
defendant in turn.
“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to
an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828
(1994); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“The Eighth Amendment,
as we have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one
of which is ‘reasonable safety.’” (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989))). “The analysis [of an Eighth Amendment claim]
should not be based on ‘a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility,’” but
should reflect “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,” which the Tenth Circuit has characterized as a “lofty standard.” DeSpain v.
Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 973-74 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 351 (1981)). To prevail on his claim that a defendant violated the Eighth
Amendment, plaintiff must show that (1) objectively, the harm he complains of is
sufficiently “serious” to merit constitutional protection and (2) the defendant was
subjectively aware of a substantial risk to plaintiff’s health or safety and acted in
purposeful disregard of that risk. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir.
2009).
“Prison officials may not retaliate against or harass an inmate because of the
inmate's exercise of his right of access to the courts.” Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d

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940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990). “Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his
or her First Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that
the plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant’s
actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s adverse
action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.” Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1203
(10th Cir. 2007).
A. Defendant Teipel
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Teipel delayed his graduation from the program as a
result of deliberate indifference and in retaliation for plaintiff’s law library usage. Docket
No. 1 at 11. Based on the approximately twelve-month length for the program in the
Overview of Therapeutic Community form that plaintiff signed, the magistrate judge
found that plaintiff could not show that he was harmed by a delay caused by Mr. Teipel
because plaintiff graduated in less than twelve months; “thus there was no delay.”
Docket No. 110 at 7. Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that it
was undisputed that he graduated early from the program because the program actually
required nine months to complete, not twelve. See Docket No. 111 at 1. Plaintiff,
however, bases his argument on one page from a document entitled “Prevention
Identification and Treatment of Viral Hepatitis C” that he attached to his objection to the
Recommendation. Docket No. 111 at 12. By failing to provide such evidence in
response to the summary judgment motion, plaintiff is not able to belatedly create an
issue of material fact through his objection. Moreover, plaintiff did not contest that the
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program at Buena Vista lasts approximately twelve months. MSMF 7; see also
Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised f or the first time
in objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.” (citations
omitted)). As a result, plaintiff does not demonstrate that the magistrate judge
committed error in finding that plaintiff failed to show any delay, which is his alleged
harm.
Moreover, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate because
plaintiff has not shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
cause of his extended time in the program. Defendants provide numerous clinical
notes, written by Mr. Teipel, indicating that plaintiff missed many program group
activities and failed to complete assignments on time because he chose, instead, to go
to the law library. See, e.g., Docket No. 95-2 at 11 (“He is losing group time due to
frequent trips to [the] law library”), 26 (“He continues to blame on the law librarian his
frequent absences from [program] groups in order to attend the law-library.” [sic]), 52
(“He is missing groups due to attendance in the Law Library.”). The clinical notes
indicate that plaintiff’s progress in the program was delayed as a result of such
absences. See, e.g., id. at 34 (“He has chosen to miss groups in favor of [going to the]
law library, and as a result his promotion to the next phase may be delayed.”), 48
(“Client’s progress this week in his Service Plan goals is none. He has attended a few
groups, and is losing credit for ones he misses.”), 52 (“[Plaintiff] was informed . . . that
he will not be given TC credit for days that he does not attend the treatm ent group. He
said he is OK with this, and that his legal motions should be filed in three weeks, at
which time his participation level will become normal.”). Based on this evidence,
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defendant argues that, “[i]f Plaintiff spent more time than he anticipated in the program,
Plaintiff himself caused any such delay by regularly missing meetings and failing to
submit homework on time.” Docket No. 95 at 8.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he spent a significant amount of time in the law
library and that he missed program sessions and activities as a result. See Docket No.
111 at 2. He also does not dispute that he was required to attend program sessions in
order to make progress or that his failure to do so would lead to delays. See id.
Plaintiff argues, however, that the lack of progress was actually retaliation for his using
the law library and that such retaliation is the source or his delayed progress in the
program. Docket No. 111 at 2. But plaintiff does not present any evidence that would
support an inference that the program delays were caused by retaliation related to his
law library usage as opposed to the fact that his law library usage resulted in him
missing activities necessary for him to progress in the program. See Docket No. 103 at
2-3. In particular, there is no evidence that supports an inference that Mr. Teipel had a
motive to retaliate against plaintiff for using the law library such that “‘but for’ the
retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers, . . . would not have taken place.”
Maschner, 899 F.2d at 947 (citations omitted); see also Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d
1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998). Notably, Mr. Teipel is not a party to plaintiff’s prior lawsuit,
which would have been pending at that time, and relates only to events that occurred at
a different prison. See Roberts, No. 15-cv-00800-PAB-KMT, Docket No. 10.3 Plaintiff
notes that Mr. Teipel asked about his law library use, Docket No. 111 at 2, but there is
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Mr. Roberts is a defendant in both actions because he held positions related to
health care for each prison during the period plaintiff was incarcerated there.
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no reason to infer sinister motives behind such questions based on the summary
judgment record; after all, there is ample evidence that plaintiff’s law library usage was
negatively impacting plaintiff’s participation in the program for which Mr. Teipel was
plaintiff’s counselor. MSMF 10. Likewise, plaintiff has not provided evidence that his
alleged delay in graduating was caused by Mr. Teipel’s deliberate indifference to his
medical situation, as opposed to plaintiff’s spotty attendance and failure to complete
required assignments on time. Because plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of
material fact that Mr. Teipel improperly delayed plaintiff’s completion of the program
and attendant receipt of HCV treatment, the Court will grant summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Teipel. See Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1135 (D. Colo. 2010) (“It is well-established that in an action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must provide not only a constitutional violation, but also
demonstrate that the constitutional deprivation caused him some actual injury.” (citing
Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1993))).
B. Defendant Gebhart
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Gebhart was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
in failing to adequately respond to his requests for HCV treatment. Docket No. 1 at 911. In particular, plaintiff claims that Mr. Gebhart failed to confirm with CDOC that
plaintiff completed the program, resulting in a delay in treatment. Id. at 10. The
magistrate judge found that plaintiff “attempts to merely rely on his own assertions and
disagreement regarding procedure, instead of presenting evidence of causation – that
Defendant Gebhart was actually required to submit the [program] completion form, and

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that he had subjective knowledge that delay or failure to do so would result in significant
medical impairment.” Docket No. 110 at 9-10. By contrast, the magistrate judge noted
that Mr. Gebhart “submitted p[r]oof that Plaintiff was on notice that . . . the drug and
alcohol staff was not responsible for determining whether Plaintiff would qualify for
Hepatitis C treatment [and] informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s medical provider would
direct him to ‘complete the appropriate form for treatment consideration.’” Id. at 10
(quoting Docket No. 95-6 at 3).
Plaintiff objects that “Gephardt was responsible for assuring that the required
verification was submitted so the Plaintiff could receive much needed [HCV treatment]”
and that the suggestion that the program is not “connected to the medical department
[in] regards to HCV [treatment] document forms is absurd.” Docket No. 111 at 7.
Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that Mr. Gebhart failed to assure that forms were
submitted on his behalf.
The evidence in the summary judgment record shows that, in response to
plaintiff’s kites, Mr. Gebhart told plaintiff what he needed to do to be considered f or
treatment. Docket No. 95-6 at 1, 3. There is no evidence that Mr. Gebhart failed to do
anything that prevented plaintiff from being considered for treatment by the medical
staff had plaintiff done as instructed. See id.; Dodge, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (“It is
well-established that in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintif f must
provide not only a constitutional violation, but also demonstrate that the constitutional
deprivation caused him some actual injury.” (citation omitted)). The Court agrees with
the magistrate judge that the plaintiff has not presented evidence showing a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether Mr. Gebhart’s actions caused his
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treatment to be delayed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Therefore, the Court will
accept the recommendation that summary judgment be granted as to plaintiff’s claims
against Mr. Gebhart.
C. Defendant Roberts
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Roberts caused a delay in his treatment by failing to
assure that CDOC addressed plaintiff’s lack of care. Docket No. 1 at 9. In particular,
plaintiff claims that he discussed Mr. Gebhart’s responses to his kites with Mr. Roberts,
which indicated that plaintiff “must complete the TC program prior to any treatment
beginning,” Docket No. 95-6 at 3, but that Mr. Roberts told plaintif f, instead, he had to
wait six months after starting the program. Id.4 Plaintiff notes that Mr. Roberts spoke to
Mr. Gebhart, who told Mr. Roberts that plaintiff had completed the program, but plaintiff
nonetheless did not start receiving treatment. Docket No. 111 at 5. Plaintiff claims that
he was harmed because Mr. Roberts “did nothing to ensure that the lack of care issue

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Plaintiff refers at various points to an expectation that HCV treatment could
begin after he participated in the program for six months, and claims that Mr. Roberts
stated as much. See, e.g., Docket No. 111 at 8. Although it is not relevant to the
disposition of this case, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record, apart
from Mr. Roberts’ alleged statement, that plaintiff was eligible for HCV treatment after
completing six months of the program. Rather, the evidence indicates that plaintiff had
to complete the program in order to be eligible for treatment. MSMF 5; Docket No. 95-6
at 3; Docket No. 111 at 12. Plaintiff and Mr. Roberts’ understanding to the contrary is
perhaps due to the HCV treatment protocol in effect prior to 2013. See Roberts, No.
15-cv-00800-PAB-KMT, Docket No. 157 at 3, ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Docket No. 157-3 at 11)
(“The offender has signed the contract for Substance Abuse Education Class, enrolled
and completed six months of substance abuse education prior to liver biopsy.”). But the
policies adopted in 2013 and afterward appear to have dropped the provision for a liver
biopsy any time before a drug and alcohol program was completed. See Roberts, No.
15-cv-00800-PAB-KMT, Docket No. 158-2 at 6 (“The offender must complete drug and
alcohol treatment as determined appropriate by CDOC drug and alcohol program and
outlined in AR 700-20 . . . prior to liver biopsy or approval for hepatitis C treatment.”).
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was addressed or ever followed up on, resulting in a delay or deprivation of treatment.”
Id. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff had not shown that Mr. Roberts was
“directly involved in any constitutional violation” and that plaintiff “has, at best, shown
that Defendant Roberts negligently failed to ensure that Defendant Gebhart submitted
documents,” which is insufficient to show deliberate indifference. Docket No. 110 at 8.
Plaintiff objects that Mr. Roberts “knew about problems the Plaintiff was having”
receiving HCV treatment and “should have been well aware of the rules and regulations
provided by the HCV protocol” pertaining to HCV treatment. Docket No. 111 at 4-5.
Plaintiff argues that, as the HSA, Mr. Roberts “should have been aware of the dangers
the Plaintiff would/could face left untreated” because of his declining health and related
test results. Id. at 5. Plaintiff does not, however, dispute Mr. Roberts’ statement that he
had “only a working understanding of HCV.” Docket No. 95-4 at 2, ¶ 7. Instead,
plaintiff argues that Mr. Roberts only needed to follow the HCV treatment protocol and
ensure that it was followed by his subordinates. Docket No. 111 at 6.
The evidence in the summary judgment record indicates that, regardless of Mr.
Roberts’ awareness of plaintiff’s condition, Mr. Roberts did not understand that a delay
in HCV treatment presented a serious health risk to plaintiff. Mr. Roberts states in his
declaration that he understood HCV as a chronic condition that “af fects only a low
percentage of carriers with increased health risks” and, “[r]egarding the delay in treating
HCV, [his] understanding was that such delay did not impact the course of treatment
and that delay did not lead to adverse health effects.” See Docket No. 95-4 at 2, ¶¶ 78. While plaintiff argues that Mr. Roberts “should have” been aware that a delay in
treatment would cause plaintiff a significant health risk, even if plaintiff is correct, the
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fact that Mr. Roberts should have been aware of a risk is insufficient to support a claim
for deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] a prison official cannot be
found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.”). Because plaintiff has not shown that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Mr. Roberts actually understood that inaction could result in serious
medical harm to plaintiff, the Court will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket
No. 110] filed on June 4, 2018 is ACCEPTED. It is further
ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 95] is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.
It is further
ORDERED that, within 14 days of the entry of this Order, defendants may have
their costs by filing a Bill of Costs with the Clerk of the Court. It is further
ORDERED that this case is closed.

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DATED September 18, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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