Thompson v. Boulder County Housing Authority et al
ORDER denying 7 Revised Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 2/26/16.(dkals, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 16-cv-00361-GPG
ANDREA R. THOMPSON,
BOULDER COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Revised Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (“Revised TRO motion”) (ECF No. 7) filed
pro se on February 22, 2016. In Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), which was filed on
February 12, 2016, Ms. Thompson alleges that her constitutional rights were violated
because when she refused to sign a Repayment Agreement (which she claims contained
a miscalculation of her rent) and filed a complaint with HUD, the Defendants retaliated
against her. According to Plaintiff, Defendants retaliated against her by conducting an
investigation to prove that another individual was a resident in her home in order to
terminate her Section 8 voucher. As a result, she alleges that her Section 8 voucher will
be terminated as of February 29, 2016 and she will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary
injunctive relief is not granted.
The Court must construe the Revised TRO motion liberally because Ms.
Thompson is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should
not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons
stated below, the Revised TRO motion will be denied.
Ms. Thompson first filed an initial TRO motion on February 12, 2016. (ECF No. 3).
The Court denied the initial TRO motion on February 17, 2016 because Plaintiff had not
satisfied the procedural requirements of certifying in writing any efforts made to give
notice of the TRO Motion to the opposing party and the reasons why it should not be
required. (ECF No. 6 at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B))). Additionally, the Court
concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to issuance of a temporary restraining order because
she had not demonstrated a "clear and unequivocal right" in order to have the request
Like her initial TRO motion, Ms. Thompson’s revised TRO motion fails to
demonstrate a clear and unequivocal right to have her TRO motion granted. Again, she
fails to allege that she has made any effort to give notice to the opposing party about the
Revised TRO motion or the reasons why such notice should not be required. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). Additionally, she has failed to demonstrate the requirements for
issuing a preliminary injunction: (1) a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2)
that she will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened
injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing
party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest. See
Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff’s Revised TRO motion
contains conclusory allegations but fails to adequately demonstrate these requirements
for a TRO. For example, in arguing that she has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on
the merits, the Revised TRO Motion states:
The Plaintiff has established that she is likely to succeed on
the merits due to the electronic documents she is in
possession of and the voice files from her voice mail which
establishes that BCHA and its counsel have no regard for the
filing of the 42 USC § 1983.
(ECF No. 7 at 2). The Revised TRO further states the Defendants are attempting to
terminate her Section 8 voucher because they allege that an unauthorized person,
Michael Trendel is living in her residence. She argues that she receives some mail for
Mr. Trendel because she has a Power of Attorney for him but that he does not live at her
residence. Assuming that Ms. Thompson is being truthful about Mr. Trendel, this
information does not demonstrate that she has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on
constitutional claims against the Defendants. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
demonstrate that she has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on her constitutional
Therefore, Plaintiff’s TRO motion will be denied. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Revised Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7) is denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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