Maehr v. Koskinen et al

Filing 9

ORDER denying 1 Motion for Emergency Injunction by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 4/1/16.(dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 16-cv-00512-GPG
JEFFREY T. MAEHR,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN KOSKINEN, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
JOHN VENCATO, Revenue Agent,
GINGER WRAY, Revenue Agent,
JEREMY WOODS, Disclosure Specialist,
WILLIAM SOTHEN, Revenue Agent,
GARY MURPHY, Revenue Agent,
THERESA GATES, Program Manager,
SHARISSE TOMPKINS, Disclosure Manager,
CAROLYN COLVIN, SSA Acting Administrator,
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-100,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Emergency Injunction (ECF No. 1)
filed pro se by Plaintiff, Jeffrey T. Maehr. The Court must construe the motion liberally
because Mr. Maehr is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the
Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Mr. Maehr failed to pay his federal income taxes for several years and still owes
the IRS the amount of his unpaid liabilities for those years. See Maehr v. C.I.R., 480 F.
App’x 921 (10th Cir. 2012). Although he has not filed a pleading that provides a short and

plain statement of his claims in this action, he apparently contends that his due process
rights have been violated in connection with the efforts of the IRS to collect from him.
The relief Mr. Maehr seeks in the motion for an emergency injunction is nearly identical to
the relief he requests in his complaint.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues;
(3) the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). “Because a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and
unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.
2003).
“[T]he primary goal of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status
quo.” RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore,
“courts should be especially cautious when granting an injunction that requires the
nonmoving party to take affirmative action - a mandatory preliminary injunction - before a
trial on the merits occurs.” Id. If the movant is seeking a mandatory preliminary
injunction that seeks to alter the status quo, he must make a heightened showing of the
four factors listed above. See id. at 1209.
“[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, Mr. Maehr “must first

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demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the issuance of an
injunction will be considered.” Id.
“To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not
theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Mr. Maehr “must establish both that harm
will occur, and that, when it does, such harm will be irreparable.” Vega v. Wiley, 259 F.
App’x 104, 106 (10th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, a party seeking preliminary injunctive
relief “must show that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear
and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Heideman, 348 F.3d
at 1189. A preliminary injunction is only appropriate “to prevent existing or presently
threatening injuries. One will not be granted against something merely feared as liable
to occur at some indefinite time in the future.” Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660, 674 (1931).
Mr. Maehr fails to demonstrate, clearly and unequivocally, that he is entitled to a
preliminary injunction. He is not seeking to preserve the status quo and he fails to allege
specific facts that demonstrate he will suffer irreparable injury if no preliminary injunction
is issued. He also fails to allege specific facts in support of his claims that demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits in this action. Accordingly, it is

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ORDERED that the Motion for Emergency Injunction (ECF No. 1) is denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 1st

day of

April

, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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