Estate of John Patrick Walter, The v. Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. et al

Filing 295

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 231 Plaintiff's Motion in Limine; and requiring further briefing on 251 Defendants' Motion in Limine, by Judge William J. Martinez on 03/18/2019. (wjmlc1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 16-cv-0629-WJM-MEH
THE ESTATE OF JOHN PATRICK WALTER,
by and through its personal representative, DESIREE’ Y. KLODNICKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF FREMONT;
JAMES BEICKER, individually and in his official capacity as Fremont County Sheriff;
TY MARTIN, individually; and
JOHN RANKIN, individually,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN
LIMINE, AND REQUIRING FURTHER BRIEFING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN
LIMINE

By way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this lawsuit addresses whether John Patrick Walter
(“Walter”) received unconstitutionally deficient medical care while in pretrial detention in
Fremont County, Colorado, eventually causing his death. Specifically, Walter was
deprived of a prescription anti-anxiety medication (Klonopin), allegedly creating severe
withdrawal symptoms that eventually killed him. Walter’s Estate, through its personal
representative (“Estate” or “Plaintiff”), originally sued numerous individuals and entities,
but has now dismissed all defendants save for Fremont County (through its board of
commissioners), Sheriff James Beicker, Undersheriff Ty Martin, and detention center
commander John Rankin (together, “Defendants”).
Currently before the Court is the Estate’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 231) and

Defendants’ Motion in Limine (ECF No. 251). For the reasons explained below, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion and calls for further briefing on
Defendants’ motion due to changed circumstances since it was filed.
I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE
A.

The Reasons for Walter’s Arrest, the Charges Against Him, and
Circumstances of the Alleged Crimes
Walter ended up in the Fremont County Jail on suspicion of assaulting a man

named Harry Scott. (ECF No. 231 at 3.) Based on Defendants’ proposed exhibits
(including many relating to the charges against Walter) and witnesses (including Harry
Scott), the Estate fears that Defendants intend to inflame the jury by portraying Walter in
a negative and otherwise undeserving light. (Id. at 3–4.) The Estate argues that the
reasons for Walter’s arrest, the charges against him, and the circumstances
surrounding his alleged crimes are irrelevant to the question of whether Walter received
adequate medical care in the Fremont County Jail, are otherwise unduly prejudicial, and
are also improper character evidence. (Id. at 4–6.)
Defendants respond that they need this evidence to establish Walter’s condition
before arriving at the jail, allegedly to show that it was consistent with his behavior after
arriving at the jail, and so to rebut the Estate’s claim that jail staff could not help but
notice Walter’s distress and need for medical attention, as opposed to perceiving
behavior that was, for Walter, typical. (ECF No. 242 at 2–4, 5.) Defendants also claim
that Walter’s physical, mental, and emotional condition before his arrest is relevant to
damages, apparently implying that some of his injuries or distress are attributable to the
incident leading to the assault charges. (Id. at 4–5.)
Regarding the jail staff’s perceptions, information about Walter’s allegedly erratic
2

behavior before arrival at the Fremont County Jail is only relevant to the extent any
particular jail staff member knew of that behavior. As for details about the crime Walter
allegedly committed, Defendants fail to explain how those details could have any effect
on any jail staff member’s perception of his physical, mental, or emotional health—
assuming the jail staff member knew those details. As for damages, Defendants’
argument is vague and unconvincing, and strikes the Court as grasping at any straw to
retain this evidence because Defendants do, in fact, wish to inflame the jury against
Walter—which is impermissible under Rule 401, or is at least unduly prejudicial under
Rule 403.
Nonetheless, the Court will permit the following testimony about Walter’s
behavior before being booked into the jail, and about his arrest:
•

The basic nature of the accusation against Walter. This likely needs to be
no more than the generic name of the charge (assault) and a very short
description of the alleged behavior leading to the charge that does not
obviously lay all blame on Walter (e.g., “getting into a fight,” as opposed to
“starting a fight,” “throwing a punch,” etc.). The jury is entitled to
understand those basic facts, for context. See, e.g., United States v.
Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995).

•

Walter’s demeanor, and physical and mental condition, before arriving at
the jail to the extent that his demeanor/condition was perceived by, or
specifically reported to, a person who: (A) observed Walter between the
time of his admission and the time of his death, and (B) will testify that
Walter’s behavior in jail was unconcerning because of what he or she

3

perceived, or was told, about his behavior before his arrival.
Except to this extent, this portion of the Estate’s Motion in Limine is granted.
B.

Walter’s Criminal and Incarceration History
The Estate expects Defendants to introduce evidence of Walter’s criminal and

incarceration history, which the Estate argues to be irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and
impermissible character evidence. (ECF No. 231 at 6.)
Defendants respond that the Estate is putting Walter’s criminal history at issue
because the Estate intends to introduce an exhibit in which Walter is recorded as
reporting (apparently to booking officers) that he had a bad experience during a
previous jail stay when jail officials tried to wean him from Klonopin. (ECF No. 242 at 5
(citing ECF No. 242-3).) Defendants accuse the Estate of “want[ing] to have it both
ways by being allowed to introduce this evidence but then not allowing the Defendants
to introduce evidence about Mr. Walter’s criminal history.” (Id. at 6.)
Defendants’ argument is difficult to understand. Assuming the Estate introduces
the exhibit, the Estate is not introducing it for any purpose that makes his criminal or
incarceration history relevant. The Estate is apparently willing to reveal to the jury that
Walter has previously been jailed, but that does not “open to door” to any further
evidence because the contents or details of his criminal or incarceration history do not
make any fact at issue more or less likely.
If anything, Defendants’ argument only further convinces the Court that
Defendants are merely searching for words to obfuscate an intent to pursue a character
assassination defense. The Court will not tolerate such an approach to the trial. See
Cox v. Wilson, 2017 WL 1632506 (D. Colo. May 2, 2017) (in an excessive force case,

4

granting a new trial where the defense attorney disobeyed the Court’s instructions not to
mention the plaintiff’s criminal history, of which the defendant was unaware at the time
of the alleged excessive force). This portion of the Estate’s Motion in Limine is granted.
C.

Other Requests
The Estate makes four additional exclusion requests:
1.

Evidence gathered after Walter’s death of his reputation or character, such

as reports that he was known to frequent a house suspected of hosting drug activity.
(ECF No. 231 at 7–8.) Defendants do not respond to this request and so the Court
deems it confessed and grants it.
2.

State-court probate pleadings, which address who might inherit any

damages award. (Id. at 8–9.) This request was directed at another group of defendants
who have since been dismissed. The remaining Defendants agreed during the premotion conferral process to withdraw this exhibit. (Id. at 8 n.4.) Accordingly, this
request is denied as moot.
3.

Walter’s employment history, educational history, and relationships with

family members and others, which may show that he did not complete high school, did
not maintain relationships with his children or their mothers, and was not often gainfully
employed. (Id. at 9.)1 Defendants do not respond to this request directly, although their
response regarding Walter’s pre-booking behavior mentions that Defendants expect the
Estate to call Walter’s girlfriend as a witness, for unclear purposes. (ECF No. 242 at 4.)
Even if the Estate calls the girlfriend, the Court can see no relevance to evidence about
Walter’s relationship with anyone else, his educational history, his employment history,
1

The Estate represents that it does not seek damages for lost earnings or lost net
accumulation. (Id. at 2.)

5

and so forth. The Court will therefore grant this request.
4.

Eliciting testimony that certain trial witnesses were once defendants in this

case. (Id. at 10.) As with the probate records request, this request was directed at
another group of defendants who have since been dismissed. The remaining
Defendants agreed during the pre-motion conferral process that the parties should not
mention any former defendant’s status as such at trial. (Id. at 12.) Accordingly, this
request is denied as moot.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine (ECF No. 251) is “joint” in the sense that it
encompasses all defendants who had not been dismissed as of the date of its filing,
September 25, 2018. The Estate has since dismissed a significant number of those
parties. Accordingly, although the Court has a sense of which arguments likely still
remain in play, the Court finds it prudent to require the Estate to submit an amended
response brief announcing the matters it deems moot in light of intervening party
dismissals, and responding only to the matters that remain in dispute between the
Estate and Defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 231) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as stated above;

2.

On or before April 1, 2019, Plaintiff shall submit an amended response to
Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine (ECF No. 251) stating which matters Plaintiff
deems moot in light of intervening party dismissals, and responding only to the

6

matters that remain in dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff shall
once again be limited to 6 pages, as calculated under WJM Revised Practice
Standard III.C.1.
Dated this 18th day of March, 2019.
BY THE COURT:

______________________
William J. Martinez
United States District Judge

7