McKinney v. USA et al
ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss; granting 10 Motion to Dismiss; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 13 Motion for Review; finding as moot 16 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 18 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 22 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 27 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 30 Motion to Stay; finding as moot 32 Motion to Restrict; finding as moot 37 Motion for Correction; finding as moot 40 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. by Judge R. Brooke Jackson on 11/23/16. (jdyne, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge R. Brooke Jackson
Civil Action No. 16-cv-01033-RBJ
SUZANNE ELAINE MCKINNEY,
VERIZON, INC., a U.S. Corporation,
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a subsidiary of UCHealth, a U.S. Corporation,
This order addresses (1) defendants’ motions to dismiss [ECF Nos. 8, 10, 11]; (2)
plaintiff’s combined response to defendant United States’ motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment [ECF No. 12]; (3) plaintiff’s combined response to Memorial Hospital’s
motion to dismiss and motion for review of certification requirement and leave to amend [ECF
No. 13]; (4) defendant United States’ motion to strike plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
[ECF No. 16]; (5) defendant Memorial Hospital’s motion to strike plaintiff’s motion for review
of certification requirement and leave to amend [ECF No. 18]; (6) plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment against defendant United States [ECF No. 22]; (7) plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions against the attorney for defendant United States [ECF No. 27]; (8) defendant United
States’ motion to stay proceedings [ECF No. 30]; (9) plaintiff’s motion to restrict public access
to or redact portions of court documents and exhibits [ECF No. 32]; (10) plaintiff’s motion for
correction [ECF No. 37]; and (11) defendant United States’ motion for extension of time [ECF
No. 40]. The Court apologizes for its delay in addressing these motions. The motions to dismiss
are GRANTED, and all remaining motions are MOOT.
Ms. McKinney is a former employee of the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) in
Washington, D.C. She alleges that she discovered evidence of fraud at the VBA and reported it
to her supervisors, prompting retaliation. As a result, Ms. McKinney was forced to resign in
October 2013. But this case is not about the VBA’s alleged retaliation against Ms. McKinney.
Instead, this case picks up after she moved back to Colorado and began searching for a new job.
According to Ms. McKinney, VBA has orchestrated a nationwide conspiracy to harass
her and prevent her from securing a new position. She claims an unknown assailant with
connections to VBA shot her in the head, leaving a palpable entry and exit wound in her skull.
ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 31–32. She also contends that VBA is committing ongoing tortious interference
with her employment, including: “tracking through G.P.S., interference with versioning of
documents through administrative accounts, removing word-processing corrections, and
interception of Plaintiff’s emails and phone calls/texts.” Id. at ¶ 24. Her allegations continue:
V.B.A. employees have asked various social networks for their cooperation in
tracking and harassing Plaintiff . . . . In order to gain cooperation from these
various social networks, V.B.A. employees have generated slander and libel in
order to mislead these social networks into thinking they are furthering the
These facts are drawn from the Complaint. ECF No. 1. For the purpose of resolving these motions to dismiss, “all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
individual social network’s particular cause. (As an example, anti-abortion
networks have been told variously that either: 1) Plaintiff has had an abortion; or
2) Plaintiff is an abortion doctor; Plaintiff is an illegal alien who lacks “green
card” status and does not speak English.) V.B.A. employees have monitored
Plaintiff’s phone calls and texts and forwarded the content to social network
members, asking that they use specific nouns/names from those texts while
engaging in loud conversation near Plaintiff.
Id. at ¶ 45–47. Last, she claims VBA employees have been “pretending to be family members,
and . . . accusing her of many unsolved or unclosed crimes. Thereby, V.B.A. employees gained
the unknowing support of law enforcement in their efforts to defame Plaintiff and keep her from
getting support from law enforcement and other agencies.” Id. at ¶ 59.
Ms. McKinney believes Memorial Hospital and Verizon are in on this supposed
conspiracy. When she went to Memorial Hospital for an x-ray of her “readily apparent” bullet
wound, the nurse allegedly “intentionally read fraudulent x-ray results to Plaintiff,” preventing
her from receiving necessary treatment. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 39. Meanwhile, Verizon has allegedly
failed to report to law enforcement VBA’s interference with her phone calls and text messages,
and instead raised her phone bill. Id. at ¶¶ 51–52.
On March 8, 2016 Ms. McKinney filed a substantially similar suit in forma pauperis in
this Court. See Complaint, McKinney v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs et al., No. 16-cv-00569LTB (D. Colo. April 22, 2016), ECF No. 1. Judge Babcock dismissed the complaint with
prejudice because he concluded that Ms. McKinney’s claims “rest on ‘fantastic or delusional
scenarios’ whose factual contentions ‘rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.’”
Order of Dismissal at 6, McKinney, No. 16-cv-00569-LTB, ECF No. 12 (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). In the
alternative, he dismissed the case without prejudice because Ms. McKinney failed to comply
with a court order that she submit her complaint on the current court-approved form as required
by local court rules. Id. at 7.
Ms. McKinney then filed this case on May 6, 2016, alleging tortious interference with
employment, personal injury, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil
conspiracy, and requesting punitive damages. ECF No. 1. On August 15, 2016 the United States
submitted a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
ECF No. 8. Memorial Hospital filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on
August 23, 2016. ECF No. 10. Verizon likewise filed a motion to dismiss on August 23, 2016
under the doctrine of claim preclusion based on Judge Babcock’s dismissal of Ms. McKinney’s
first case. ECF No. 11.
A flurry of motions has followed. On August 30, 2016 Ms. McKinney submitted a
combined response to the United States’ motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment
for her slander and libel claims. ECF No. 12. She filed her responses to Memorial Hospital and
Verizon’s motions to dismiss on September 9, 2016. ECF Nos. 13, 14.
On September 16, 2016 the United States submitted a reply brief and filed a motion to
strike Ms. McKinney’s motion for summary judgment because she included it in her response
brief in violation of this Court’s rules. ECF Nos. 15, 16. On September 23, 2016 Memorial
Hospital submitted a motion to strike Ms. McKinney’s request for review of the certification
requirement implicated by her claims and leave to amend contained in her response to Memorial
Hospital’s motion to dismiss, alleging that this combined filing also violates this Court’s practice
rules. ECF No. 18.
On September 26, 2016 Ms. McKinney submitted a response to the United States’ motion
to strike admitting error and advancing other arguments, and filed a separate motion for
summary judgment on her slander and libel claims. ECF Nos. 21, 22. She filed a motion for
sanctions against counsel for the United States on October 18, 2016. ECF No. 27. She also filed
a motion to restrict public access to or, in the alternative, redact portions of court documents and
exhibits on October 21, 2016. ECF No. 32.
The United States filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment on October 20, 2016, and the Court granted this motion the next day.
ECF Nos. 28, 29. Around the time that the Court issued its order, however, Ms. McKinney filed
a motion for default judgment against the United States for failure to timely respond to her
motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 31. The Clerk of Court properly denied this request
because the motion for an extension of time was granted. ECF No. 33. Notwithstanding the
Court’s ruling, Ms. McKinney submitted a response brief on October 24, 2016 urging denial of
the United States’ motion. ECF No. 34. She later submitted a motion for correction requesting
that the Court enter a date certain in its order granting the United States’ enlargement of time.
ECF No. 37.
The United States submitted a motion to stay proceedings and vacate the scheduling
conference on October 21, 2016. ECF No. 30. On November 10, 2016 the United States filed a
motion for extension of time to respond to plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and to respond to
plaintiff’s motion for correction. ECF No. 40. On November 18, 2016 the parties attended a
scheduling conference, mooting the United States’ request to vacate the setting.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir.
2015). There is a presumption that a cause of action lies outside a federal court’s limited
jurisdiction, “and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 770
F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, Ms. McKinney bears the burden of establishing
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) can either “(1) facially attack the complaint’s
allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations
contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which
subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003).
Where, as here, there is a facial attack on the basis for jurisdiction, the Court must consider only
the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). “Mere conclusory
allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.” U.S. ex rel. Hafter D.O.v. Spectrum Emergency
Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999).
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). While the Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Robbins v. Wilkie, 300 F.3d 1208, 1210
(10th Cir. 2002), purely conclusory allegations are not entitled to be presumed true, Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). However, so long as the plaintiff offers sufficient factual
allegations such that the right to relief is raised above the speculative level, he has met the
threshold pleading standard. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “The court’s function on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to
assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999) (quoting Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Although Ms. McKinney brings this action pro se, she is not entitled to have her filings
construed liberally because she is a trained attorney. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140,
1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court will construe her
Complaint liberally because she is not licensed to practice in this Court. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However,
the Court will not serve as an advocate for a pro se litigant. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Defendants seek dismissal of Ms. McKinney’s complaint. In particular, the United States
argues that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity does not cover
her claims, and that she does not plausibly allege facts sufficient to sustain her claims. Memorial
Hospital contends that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged intentional actions of its
employees and, in any event, that Colorado law requires a certificate of review before Ms.
McKinney may bring her claims against the hospital. Verizon alone argues that Ms. McKinney
is precluded from bringing her case following Judge Babcock’s dismissal of her substantially
similar claims brought in forma pauperis. The Court will address the legal sufficiency of Ms.
McKinney’s claims against each defendant in turn. 2
A. The United States.
“Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, the United States, as sovereign, is
immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . .” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608
The FTCA generally waives sovereign immunity in suits against the United States
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). However, this waiver is subject to a number of enumerated
exceptions. See id. § 2680. The exceptions in section 2680(h) bar all but one of Ms.
McKinney’s claims, which fails for other reasons.
Ms. McKinney misreads the section 2680(h) exceptions to the United States’ waiver of
sovereign immunity as applying only to certain claims arising out of acts or omissions of federal
investigative or law enforcement officers, and thus not precluding her claims. The statutory
language is confusing, but this reading is incorrect. The “law enforcement proviso,” as Ms.
McKinney calls it, is a carve out from the section 2680(h) exceptions. Restated without the
double negative, section 2680(h) bars suit unless a claim is based on certain law enforcement
actions. See Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1442 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Tort
The United States believes that Judge Babcock’s dismissal under the unique provisions of the federal in
forma pauperis statute may not have claim preclusive effect here because Ms. McKinney has paid the
filing fee in this case. See ECF No. 8 at 3 n.5 (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992);
Cedrins v. USCIS, 383 F. App’x 811, 812 (10th Cir. 2010)). Verizon makes a persuasive argument that
Congress’s 1996 amendments to the statute eliminated this procedural quirk, but the Court need not
resolve this open question of law because Ms. McKinney has failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Similarly, the Court need not address Memorial Hospital’s argument that Ms.
McKinney must obtain a certificate of review before her claims can proceed against the hospital because
her claims would warrant dismissal even if she had obtained a certificate of review.
Claims Act . . . waives the Government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, including those
based on certain intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers.”).
Consequently, the section 2680(h) exceptions to the United States’ waiver of sovereign
immunity apply with full force here.
First, the FTCA denies federal courts jurisdiction over claims involving “interference
with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This provision covers allegations of tortious
interference with employment. Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046, 1049 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding the
“allegation that government attorneys interfered with [plaintiff’s] right to contract for
government employment” barred by section 2680(h)); accord U.S. Info. Agency v. Krc, 989 F.2d
1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Restatement (First) of Torts § 766 (1939) (identifying
interference with business relations as a type of interference with contract rights).
Second, the FTCA precludes claims arising out of battery. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Therefore, this Court also does not have jurisdiction to hear Ms. McKinney’s allegation that she
has been shot through the head “as a direct and proximate result of V.B.A. employees attempting
to silence [her],” or that she “is losing sight in her right eye” due to “V.B.A. employees tracking
[her] through the Global Positioning Satellite system.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 31, 40.
Third, the FTCA does not authorize federal courts to hear claims arising out of slander or
libel against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Slander and libel are the equivalent of
defamation. Cooper v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 602, 613 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, Ms.
McKinney may not bring her claims of slander, libel, or defamation against the United States.
Ms. McKinney’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is similarly barred because it
arises out of her slander, libel, and defamation causes of action. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 54 (“[A]s a
direct and proximate result of V.B.A. employees’ slander, defamation and libel, Plaintiff has
suffered severe emotional distress . . . .”).
Lastly, while a claim of civil conspiracy can be brought against the United States under
the FTCA, Ms. McKinney has failed to plead a valid claim. In Colorado a civil conspiracy claim
requires proof of five elements:
[T]here must be: (1) two or more persons, and for this purpose a corporation is a
person; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object
or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the
proximate result thereof.
Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 502 (Colo. 1989). Here Ms. McKinney alleged a
civil conspiracy between “V.B.A. employees” and “their employer.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 57. The
United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action, and the FTCA treats the United
States as a singular individual. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Bowling v. United States, 740 F. Supp.
2d 1240, 1250 (D. Kan. 2010). Accordingly, Ms. McKinney has failed to allege that two or
more persons agreed on a course of action that resulted in an unlawful overt act.
Ms. McKinney’s response to the United States’ motion to dismiss counters that she
“simply alleges that V.B.A. employees enlisted the aid of various social networks and misled
local law enforcement personnel into aiding and abetting” the United States’ allegedly wrongful
actions, “whether knowing or otherwise.” ECF No. 12 at 9. This claim is inadequate as well.
Ms. McKinney’s complaint describes the relationship between the United States and “various
social networks” as follows: “In order to gain cooperation from these various social networks,
V.B.A. employees have generated slander and libel in order to mislead these social networks into
thinking they are furthering the individual social network’s particular cause.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 46
(emphasis added). She similarly writes that the United States took steps to “gain the
unknowing support of law enforcement in [its] efforts to defame Plaintiff and keep her from
getting support from law enforcement and other governmental agencies.” Id. ¶ 59 (emphasis
added). Thus, even if Ms. McKinney’s claim of civil conspiracy is read to allege a conspiracy
between the United States and other actors, she fails to claim that there was the necessary
“meeting of the minds.” Indeed, the logical inference of her allegations is that these social
networks and law enforcement agencies were unwittingly manipulated and did not agree to
advance any unlawful goal the United States allegedly had.
As a result, Ms. McKinney’s claims against the United States must be dismissed.
B. Memorial Hospital.
Ms. McKinney’s only claim against Memorial Hospital is her second claim for relief
related to her experience at the hospital. She alleges that a nurse “intentionally read fraudulent
x-ray results” to her and that an individual who may have been “an associate of Memorial”
appeared at her bedside and urged her to “believe” what she was told about her x-ray. ECF No.
1 at ¶¶ 38–39. These actions allegedly prevented her from receiving necessary medical
treatment. Id. at ¶ 32. Ms. McKinney does not name this nurse or the potential associate of
Memorial in this suit, however, instead proceeding against the hospital on the theory of
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for
the tortious actions of its employees when they act within the scope of their employment.
Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, 130 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Colo. 2006). “However, if
an employee commits an intentional tort solely for reasons that do not further his employer’s
business or cannot be considered a natural incident of employment, the employer cannot be
vicariously liable.” Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 330 n.27 (Colo. 1993).
Ms. McKinney claims that Memorial’s nurse and alleged associate committed intentional
tortious acts that caused her harm, but she does not suggest that these actions were undertaken to
further Memorial’s business or as a natural incident of employment. Viewing the facts alleged in
the light most favorable to Ms. McKinney does not bridge this gap. Memorial Hospital is in the
business of treating patients. The hospital does not stand to gain from its employees denying
patients medical care, nor are fraudulent actions a natural incident of treating patients.
Accordingly, Ms. McKinney has failed to state a claim against Memorial Hospital.
Ms. McKinney’s arguments in response to Memorial’s motion to dismiss overlook the
respondeat superior issue. In particular, her claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might
allow the inference that Memorial was negligent does nothing to make the hospital liable for the
allegedly intentional actions of its staff. And even that theory is undermined by Ms. McKinney’s
assertion that she “is not proceeding under a legal theory of medical malpractice,” ECF No. 15 at
5, since that would be the only plausible basis for invoking burden shifting under res ipsa.
Thus, Ms. McKinney’s claims against Memorial Hospital must also be dismissed.
Verizon makes a procedural argument in its motion to dismiss, but the merits of Ms.
McKinney’s claims against it are much easier to address. Only Ms. McKinney’s third claim for
relief mentions Verizon, alleging defamation, slander, libel, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising from defamation. These claims are based entirely on the United
States’ alleged actions. Nevertheless, Ms. McKinney asserts these claims against Verizon as
well because it allegedly has not cooperated with Ms. McKinney’s requests for the company to
preserve evidence, investigate VBA’s purported interference with her phone calls and text
messages, and report VBA’s activities to law enforcement, and because Ms. McKinney’s “phone
bill went up from $70.00 per month to over $250.00 per month without apparent cause.” ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 50–52.
Defamation, whether through slander or libel, requires a showing of: “(a) a false and
defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c)
fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of
the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). Ms. McKinney has made no such
allegation against Verizon.
Ms. McKinney’s response to Verizon’s motion to dismiss clarifies that she is claiming
Verizon’s actions violated a legal duty owed to her. The Complaint alleges that Verizon’s
refusal to inform law enforcement of VBA’s intentional acts and “violations of Federal and state
law” have caused her to be homeless and unable to find meaningful professional work as an
attorney.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 55. However, this is far too conclusory to satisfy Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). Ms.
McKinney’s response identifies four specific statutes she believes Verizon violated. But three of
these statutes are parts of criminal codes that do not provide private rights of action. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 4, 2261A; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-125. The fourth statute creates a civil cause of
action under Colorado law against a person who commits unauthorized trading in telephone
records, which is defined by statute as occurring when a person:
(a) Knowingly procures or attempts to procure a telephone record;
(b) Knowingly sells, buys, offers to sell, or offers to buy a telephone record;
(c) Possesses a telephone record with the intent to use such record, or information
contained in such record, to harm another person; or
(d) Receives a telephone record of a resident of Colorado knowing that such
record was obtained without lawful authorization or by fraud or deception.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-21-122.5, 18-13-125. Once again, Ms. McKinney has made no such
allegations against Verizon.
Therefore, Ms. McKinney’s claims against Verizon must be dismissed as well.
The Court has taken Ms. McKinney’s allegations seriously, but the facts alleged do not
sufficiently support her legal claims for relief. Going forward, however, I am sincerely
concerned that Ms. McKinney says she “has never properly been neurologically evaluated after
being shot in the head.” ECF No. 22 at 2. Head injuries, however caused, are serious and might
not simply fix themselves. Instead, they can present latent cognitive and psychological problems
that get worse without professional help. I recommend that treatment, not more futile litigation,
should be Ms. McKinney’s top priority.
1. Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8], Defendant Memorial
Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 10], and Verizon, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
11] are GRANTED. The case and all claims therein are dismissed with prejudice, each party to
bear her and its own costs.
2. Plaintiff’s Combined Response to Defendant U.S. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Summary Judgment for Slander and Libel Claims [ECF No. 12], Plaintiff’s Response to
Memorial Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Request for Review of
Certification Requirement and Leave to Amend [ECF No. 13], Defendant United States’ Motion
to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Slander and Libel Claims [ECF No. 16],
Defendant Memorial Hospital’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Review of Certification
Requirement and Leave to Amend [ECF No. 18], Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment for
Slander and Libel Claims Against Defendant U.S. [ECF No. 22], Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Against Attorney for Defendant U.S. [ECF No. 27], Defendant United States’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings and Vacate Scheduling Conference [ECF No. 30], Plaintiff’s Motion to Restrict
Public Access to, or in the Alternative, Redact Portions of Court Documents and Exhibits [ECF
No. 32], Plaintiff’s Motion for Correction [ECF No. 37], and Defendant United States’ Motion
for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and to Respond to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Correction [ECF No. 40] are MOOT.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
R. Brooke Jackson
United States District Judge
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