RMH Tech LLC et al v. PMC Industries, Inc.
Filing
85
ORDER Denying Defendant's 74 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Order on Claim Construction. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 01/08/2018. (athom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 16-cv-01762-CMA-KMT
RMH TECH LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, and
METAL ROOF INNOVATIONS, LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PMC INDUSTRIES, INC., a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant PMC Industries, Inc.’s (“PMC”)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. # 74) of the Court’s previous Order on Claim
Construction (Doc. # 66). Because Defendant fails to allege extraordinary
circumstances warranting reconsideration, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court set forth the factual background to this case in its Order on Claim
Construction. (Doc. # 66.) That document is incorporated by reference, and the facts
explained therein need not be repeated here. The Court recounts only the facts
necessary to address Defendant’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Plaintiffs RMH Tech LLC (“RMH”) and Metal Roof Innovations, Ltd. (“MRI”) are
the owner and licensee, respectively, of United States Patent No. 6,470,629 (the “‘629
Patent”), which describes and claims a mounting assembly for mounting a cross
member to a standing metal roof. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) In the underlying action, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant infringed claims 15, 26, 20, and 35 of the ‘629 Patent. (Id. at 7–
9.) On January 25, 2017, Defendant filed its Amended Opening Claim Construction
Brief (Doc. # 37), and the parties submitted their Amended Joint Dispute Claim Terms
Chart (Doc. # 36). Nine claim terms were disputed. (Id.) Briefing on claim construction
followed. (Doc. ## 38, 44.) On May 11, 2017, the Court held a Markman hearing, and
the parties argued their proposed constructions. (Doc. # 52.) The parties subsequently
submitted supplemental briefing at the Court’s direction. (Doc. ## 53–55.)
The Court issued its Order on Claim Construction on October 2, 2017. (Doc.
# 66.) After detailing general principles of claim construction and the legal standard for
construing “means-plus-function” claim limitations pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), the
Court articulated its construction of each of the nine terms disputed in the claim
construction briefs. (Id.) Only one disputed term is relevant to the matter now before
the Court: “first and second means for detachably interconnecting said cross member
with said second adaptor portion of said first and second mounting adaptors,
respectively,” see (Doc. # 74 at 1), which is found in claims 15, 16, and 20 of the ‘629
Patent, see (Doc. # 1-2). The Court adopted Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of this
phrase—“[f]irst and second surfaces of the second portion of each mounting adaptor
that interface with substantially inverse surfaces of the cross member protrusion”—
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because Plaintiff’s proposed construction “accurately captures the range of permissible
structures as set forth by the text of the Patent.” (Doc. # 66 at 12–14.) Defendant’s
proposed construction, 1 by contrast, “improperly limits the claim to only the structure
shown in Figures 1–3 of the Patent” and was thus inappropriate, the Court explained.
(Id. at 13.)
Defendant filed the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration on October 27,
2017. (Doc. # 74.) Its motion contests the Court’s construction of only the disputed
term identified above: “first and second means for detachably interconnecting said cross
member with said second adaptor portion of said first and second mounting adaptors,
respectively.” (Id. at 1). Defendant asks the Court to either revise its construction of
this phrase or withdraw its construction and decline to construe the phrase altogether.
(Id.) Plaintiffs opposed Defendant’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration on November
13, 2017 (Doc. # 75), and Defendant replied in support of its motion on November 27,
2017 (Doc. # 76).
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Defendant’s proposed construction of the phrase was:
The corresponding structure that performs the claimed function is specifically shown in
Figures 1-3 of the ‘629 Patent and described in the specification and includes: (a) a
planar leg of the cross member that extends away from the upright leg of the cross
member; (b) located at the end of the planar leg of the cross member, a channel portion
that has a generally C-shaped cross section or is constructed from a series of straight
segments; (c) a raised “beaded” portion of the mounting adaptor that defines a hollow
space, is positioned between an alignment portion of the mounting adaptor and an
attachment portion of the mounting adaptor, and has inner surfaces that closely mate
with the outer surfaces of the channel portion of the cross member so that the raised
beaded portion of the mounting adaptor is engaged and interconnected with the channel
portion of the cross member by aligning the beaded portion of the mounting adaptor with
the channel portion of the cross member and then sliding the mounting adaptor onto and
along the length of the cross member; and (d) an alignment channel formed at the
intersection of the alignment leg and the upright leg that slidably receives an alignment
lip of the mounting adaptor in a closely fitting relationship.
(Doc. # 37 at 20.)
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II.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly authorize a motion for
reconsideration. However, the Rules allow a litigant who was subject to an adverse
judgment to file a motion to change the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or a motion
seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Van Skiver v. United States,
952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). In this case, Plaintiff moves for partial
reconsideration under Rule 60(b). (Doc. # 74 at 2.)
Relief under Rule 60(b) “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional
circumstances.” Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., Inc., 909 F.2d
1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990). A litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying
one or more of Rule 60(b)’s six grounds for relief from judgment. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d
at 1243–44. These six grounds are:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Here, Defendant asserts that reconsideration is proper pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) for “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” (Id.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6)).
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III.
ANALYSIS
Defendant requests that the Court reconsider its construction of the term “first
and second means for detachably interconnecting said cross member with said second
adaptor portion of said first and second mounting adaptors, respectively” for two
reasons. (Doc. # 74 at 2.) First, Defendant argues that the Court’s construction fails to
include “an explicit limitation from claim 15: the requirement of a first and second means
for detachably interconnecting a cross member with a mounting adopter.” (Id.) Second,
Defendant asserts that the Court’s construction improperly “broadens the limitation to
include structures that are not equivalent to the structure disclosed in the specification
of the ‘629 Patent.” (Id.)
Defendant fails to assert a reason sufficient to justify relief pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Defendant previously raised its first argument—that the claims require
“a ‘first and second means’” for detachably interconnecting a cross member and a
mounting adapter, see (Doc # 74 at 4)—in its opening claim construction brief. See
(Doc. # 37 at 22) (“By its very terms, claim 15 requires dual, separate, first and second
‘means’ for detachably interconnecting the cross member 108 with the second adaptor
potion of the mounting adaptor 112.”). And in responding to Plaintiffs’ proposed
construction of this term—which the Court ultimately adopted—Defendant again
reiterated that the claim is for a mounting system with two separate means for
detachable interconnection. (Doc. # 44 at 8) (“[The inventor] invented a very specific
and narrowly-claimed mounting system that includes two longitudinally-sliding structural
means to interconnect the cross member with the mounting adaptor’s second adaptor
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portion.”). The Court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument in its initial briefings,
and it is not persuaded now. Defendant’s first argument merely restates an assertion
that the Court has already rejected.
Defendant’s second argument, that the Court’s construction of the term does not
include the entirety of the claimed function and thus improperly broadens the scope of
the claim language, see (Doc. # 76 at 2, 5), also does not justify reconsideration. In its
opening claim construction brief, Defendant identified the claimed function as
“detachably interconnecting said cross member with said second adaptor portion of
said first and second mounting adaptors, respectively.” (Doc. # 37 at 21) (emphasis
added). And at the Markman hearing on May 11, 2017, Defendant’s counsel again
identified this as the claimed function. 2 Defendant now sings a different tune, asserting
that “the specific functional limitation” is actually “to resist movement in all other
directions.” (Doc. # 74 at 5, 10.) This change in Defendant’s argument as to the
claimed function does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The Court may grant a
Rule 60(b)(6) motion only “in extraordinary circumstances and only when necessary to
accomplish justice.” Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 729 (10th Cir.
1993). The Tenth Circuit has “sometimes found such extraordinary circumstances to
exist when, after entry of judgment, events not contemplated by the moving party render
enforcement of the judgment inequitable.” Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d
2
Defendant stated at the Markman hearing that “the function is described in the claim language.
And I don’t think there is any dispute among the parties about that, really about what the
function is. . . . [T]o define function, essentially what you are looking at is everything after the
phrase ‘means for.’ . . . So the function, thankfully for us today . . . is that the function is laid out
in the claim itself.” (Doc. # 56 at 129–30.)
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572, 579 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing, e.g., Zimmerman v. Quinn, 744 F.2d 81, 82–82 (10th
Cir. 1985)). Here, however, Defendant does not allege an unanticipated intervening
change in circumstances. See id. “The only event not contemplated by Defendant was
that [the Court] would disagree” with its proffered construction of the term, and that is
“not the kind of intervening event contemplated by Rule 60(b)(6).” See id. at 579–80.
Alternatively, Defendant asks the Court to withdraw its construction of the term
and decline to construct it altogether. (Doc. # 74 at 12.) The Court declines this
request. As Plaintiffs note (Doc. # 75 at 4), both parties requested construction of this
term. See (Doc. ## 36–38.) Defendant’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration itself is
evidence that the claim language is complex. The Court’s construction of the term will
assist the trier of fact in determining whether Defendant infringed the ‘629 Patent.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration (Doc. # 74) of the Court’s previous Order on Claim Construction
is DENIED.
DATED: January 8, 2018
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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