Shields v. United States Postal Service, The

Filing 46

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer on 8/18/17 GRANTING 43 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a third amended complaint wit hin 30 days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file a third amended complaint within the time allowed, the action may be dismissed without further notice. Although Plaintiff is once again given leave to amend, she does not have an unlimited right to amend her pleadings or allege new claims.. (nmarb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 16-cv-02517-CBS
Mia M. Shields,
Plaintiff,
v
United States Postal Service,
Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer,
This matter comes before the court on Defendant United States Postal Service’s Motion
to Dismiss (doc. # 43), filed June 14, 2017. Pro se Plaintiff Mia M. Shields filed her Response
(doc. # 44) on June 16, 2017. This case was reassigned to the court pursuant an Order Drawing
Case (doc. # 10), and all parties consented (doc. # 13) to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C § 636(c) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1 for all proceedings in this action. The court has
reviewed the motion and related briefing, the pleadings, the entire case file, and the applicable
laws, and is sufficiently advised in the premises.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff Mia Shields is a former employee of Defendant United States Postal Service
[hereinafter USPS]. Ms. Shields commenced this action by filing her initial Complaint (doc. # 1)
on October 11, 2016, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Her first Amended Complaint (doc. #

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8) alleged claims for wrongful termination and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Ms. Shields’ Second Amended Complaint (doc. # 41) was filed on June 1, 2017, and remains the
operative pleading in this case. The Second Amended Complaint drops the previous claims and
alleges only violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206.
Plaintiff Shields’ Second Amended Complaint (doc. # 41) consists of a single full-page
paragraph which is repetitious and in parts difficult to understand. Ms. Shields contends that she
was hired as a City Carrier Assistant on May 18, 2013, for a 90 day probationary period. She
then alleges that she worked a full 365 days before serving a second 90 day probationary period
that ended in August 2014. While the chronology of events is unclear, Ms. Shields goes on to
suggest that she suffered a “compensable traumatic on the job spinal injury” in March 2014. Ms.
Shields alleges that she was converted to a “Career status[sic] Mail Carrier Technician” on
August 23, 2014. Ms. Shields indicates that starting in August 2014, she was on “light duty” as a
result of her injury, and that a “USPS nurse” “stated [she] needed to attempt to carry the mail on
a trial basis or else [she would] be separated.” 1 According to Ms. Shields, she was then
reassigned to the Northglenn Post office, 18 miles from her residence, despite “definitely
need[ing] a reasonable accommodation.” She contends that USPS changed her work location in
order to induce attendance issues. Ms. Shields then takes issue with the “Union’s” lack of help, 2
and ends her Second Amended Complaint writing “Many men have converted to full time
regular positions after 90 days under this agreement. I am requesting equal pay, benefits and
damages up to 300,000USD to full-time career status.”

1

“Separations” are personnel actions that result in taking the employee off the rolls of the Postal Service. 365
Separation, (Accessed Aug. 16, 2017), https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/elmc3_026.htm.

2

Plaintiff frequently references a “Union Contract” in her complaint and response, but no document or citation has
been provided.

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Defendant USPS’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 43) argues that Ms. Shields’ operative
pleading fails to state a claim suitable for relief and is appropriately dismissed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant additionally raises the two year statute of limitations
for Equal Pay Act claims, arguing that the Second Amended Complaint should not relate back
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Ms. Shields’ Response argues (doc. # 44) that she was
not paid equally to her male colleagues, and that because her termination was willful, her claim
is within the appropriate three year statute of limitations.
Analysis
USPS moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain enough factual
allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the
factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
favor of the plaintiff. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th. Cir. 2006).
Because Ms. Shields is a pro se plaintiff her “pleadings are to be construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
Pleadings involving a pro se litigant should be considered to state a valid claim when reasonable,
even if a pro se litigant fails to cite proper authority, confuses legal theories, or is unfamiliar with
pleading requirements. Id. To that end, “[t]he Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a
pro se litigant.” Id. at n. 3. However, the court cannot be a pro se litigant’s advocate. Yang v.

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Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2008). Although the court construes a pro se
plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, a litigant “still retains the burden of alleging sufficient facts on
which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Nasious v. Nu-Way Real Estate, No. 07-cv01177-PSF-MEH, 2007 WL 4858800, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2007).
A cause of action under the Equal Pay Act arises when an employer pays different wages
to employees of opposite sexes for equal work in jobs that are substantially similar. See Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). Specifically, to state a claim under the Equal
Pay Act, a plaintiff must allege facts that show she was 1) performing substantially similar work
considering the skills, duties, supervision, effort and responsibilities of the jobs, 2) the conditions
of the work were basically the same, and 3) employees of the opposite sex were paid more under
the same circumstances. See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir.
1997).
USPS argues that Ms. Shields has not alleged facts demonstrating that she was paid
differently from her male counterparts for performing the same work. Defendant asserts that the
only mention of male employees in the Second Amended Complaint is Ms. Shields’ contention
that male employees have converted to full-time positions while she has not. Ms. Shields’
Response (doc. # 44) includes a series of uncited quotations from a “Union Contract” discipline
procedure, with several statements randomly interspersed throughout block excerpts of the
purported contract. Ms. Shields mentions at various points that, “The United States Postal
Service cannot be allowed to keep stating I was a probationary employee and deny back pay
when evidence clearly shows I was a Career Mail Carrier Technician 2,” and that the USPS “has
failed to pay me what they would pay a male mail carrier with my same job title.” She concludes

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saying, “I have not been paid or allowed to be paid equal to the male mail carriers or the white
mail carriers.”
Ms. Shields’ Second Amended Complaint does not allege facts that support any element
of an Equal Pay Act claim. 3 The only facts she brings forth concerning her work responsibilities
are that she was on “light duty,” that a nurse told her she would have to attempt to carry mail,
and that she needed a reasonable accommodation. Ms. Shields’ contention that many men have
converted to full-time positions is not sufficient to state a claim. Even if her transfer to the
Northglenn office was a form of constructive discharge, as she appears to allege, that alone
would still not justify relief under the Equal Pay Act. In her Response, Ms. Shields states in
conclusory fashion that she was not paid an equal amount compared to male employees.
However, Ms. Shields cannot modify her pleadings in a response brief, nor would the mere
conclusory accusation of pay discrimination suffice to state a claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 550
U.S. at 547. Drawing all reasonable inferences for Plaintiff, the Second Amended Complaint
does not allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim under the Equal Pay Act.
Further, even though she is pro se, Ms. Shields’ complaint must still comply with the
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Moore v. Delta County Police,
396 Fed. Appx. 529, 532 (10th Cir. 2010). The purpose of a complaint is to give the opposing
parties fair notice of the basis for the claims so that they may respond, as well as to allow the
court to conclude that the allegations show the plaintiff is entitled to relief if proven. See
Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of Kansas, 891
F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1989). As Ms. Shields was instructed after her initial complaint, Rule

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Plaintiff attaches multiple documents to her complaint without reference or explanation. Several documents appear
to have little relevance to an Equal Pay Act claim, and were also attached to her prior complaints. Ms. Shields
agreed to withdraw all of her previous claims during the June 5, 2017 status conference (doc. # 42), when the court
accepted the current Second Amended Complaint.

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8 requires that a complaint contain 1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction,
2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and 3) a
demand for the relief sought. See also Order Directing Plaintiff to File Amended Complaint (doc.
# 5). Rule 8(d)(1) requires that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” See also
Id.
There is nothing simple, concise, or direct about Ms. Shields’ Second Amended
Complaint. It presents a somewhat contradictory non-chronological narrative that is randomly
interspersed with conclusions and accusations toward parties not part of this lawsuit. While an
arrangement of the facts she presents may state some type a claim, her current pleading is barely
intelligible. It is worth noting that each revision of Ms. Shields’ complaint has resulted in
abandoning prior claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons Defendant USPS’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. 4 Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a third amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file a third amended
complaint within the time allowed, the action may be dismissed without further notice. Although
Plaintiff is once again given leave to amend, she does not have an unlimited right to amend her
pleadings or allege new claims. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), see also Boerger
v. Fidelity Investments, No. 10-cv-02477-WYD-KMT, 2011 WL 255148, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 26,
2011).

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The Equal Pay Act’s statute of limitations need not be addressed because the court finds the Second Amended
Complaint does not state a plausible claim.

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DATED August 18, 2017.

BY THE COURT:
s/ Craig B. Shaffer
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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