Shoals v. CHP et al
Filing
74
ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss from Defendant Timothy Creany; granting 46 Motion to Dismiss from Defendant Correctional Health Partners; granting 61 Motion by Defendant P.A. Singh to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, by Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 1/24/2017. (jgonz, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 16–cv–02602–KMT
JERROD SHOALS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHP (CLINICAL HEALTH PARTNERS),
P. A. SINGH, and
DR. CREANY,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the “Motion to Dismiss from Defendant Timothy
Creany.” (Doc. No. 30.) Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 49), to which Defendant Creany
replied. (Doc. No. 55.) Also before the court is the “Motion to Dismiss from Defendant
Correctional Health Partners.” (Doc. No. 46.) Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 69), to which
Defendant Correctional Health Partners (“CHP”) replied. (Doc. No. 71.) Finally before the
court is the “Motion by Defendant P.A. Singh to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a
Claim.” (Doc. No. 61.) Although provided with additional time to do so (Doc. No. 72), Plaintiff
did not respond to the same.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Plaintiff, a former inmate proceeding pro se, initiated this action on October 18, 2016.
(Doc. No. 1 [“Comp.”].)1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive adequate
medical care while incarcerated. (See generally Comp.) He explains that prior to his
incarceration he sustained an on the job injury to his left foot on July 10, 2015 when a nail
punctured his “first metatarsal head.” (Id. at 3, 4.) Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Natasha
Deonarain who placed Plaintiff in a surgical boot. (Id. at 4.) Records from Dr. Deonarain note
that she examined him on August 13, 2015. (Resp. at 7.) She noted Plaintiff’s report that, as a
result of a previous puncture wound in his foot, he was continuing to experience pain and
paresthesia if he stood for longer than 5-10 minutes and that a previous MRI was negative for
nerve damage. (Id. at 7-8.) Upon examination, Dr. Deonarain noted Plaintiff exhibited a normal
gait and that a puncture wound was visible over the first metatarsal heal on left foot and that it
was tender to direct palpation. (Id. at 9.) She referred Plaintiff to a podiatrist. (Id. at 7.) She
also recommended over the counter medications and limiting himself to light duty. (Id.)
Dr. Michael Zyzda, podiatrist, saw Plaintiff on September 2, 2015 and stated in his
records, “We will get him approved for some orthotics to see if we can distribute the weight and
pad that area more” and noted Plaintiff would need to get casting done for the same. (Id. at 10.)
Dr. Zyzda also noted Plaintiff might benefit from topical cream four times per day. (Id.) In late
September or October 2015, before the orthotics could be completed, Plaintiff was incarcerated
at Bent County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”). (Comp. at 4; Doc. No. 42 at 1.)
1
While this lawsuit was pending, Plaintiff was released from incarceration. (Doc. No. 65.)
2
Upon arriving at BCCF, Plaintiff requested medical attention related to his left foot.
(Comp. at 4.) According to Plaintiff’s medical records from BCCF, he was seen by Jamie
Harrelson on September 30, 2015. (Doc. No. 42 at 1.) Plaintiff reported that due to the previous
foot injury, his toe goes numb and hurts if he stands on it or wears tight shoes. (Id.) Upon
examination, Harrelson noted Plaintiff had a normal gait, normal strength in the subject toe, and
subjective complaints of pain. (Id.) Harrelson recommended Plaintiff be fitted for wide boots
and recommended he discontinue wearing the surgical boot. (Id.)
Plaintiff was next seen on October 20, 2015 by Jeremy Romero, a Registered Nurse. (Id.
at 2.) Plaintiff reported that he experienced foot pain and numbness when standing for longer
than ten minutes and when crossing over his leg. (Id.) He also stated the symptoms last for
about five to eight minutes. (Id.) Plaintiff reported that prior to his incarceration, his physicians
had performed an x-ray, prescribed pain medication, and were in the process of completing a
mold of his foot in order “to make a shoe for him.” (Id.) Nurse Romero referred Plaintiff to a
physician and requested his medical records from Concentra. (Id.)
Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Timothy Creany on December 9, 2015. (Comp. at 4; Doc.
No. 42 at 3.) Plaintiff reported that he was experiencing pain in his left foot from an injury
suffered in July 2015 and that he used to be on Percocet. (Id.) Dr. Creany noted Plaintiff was in
an “ortho shoe” and had a normal gait. (Id.) Dr. Creany ordered “labs to ensure no ongoing
infxn but doubt.” (Id.) He informed Plaintiff that he could prescribe pain medication that would
help to some extent. (Id.) Dr. Creany noted, “[D]oubt he will be approved to get an orthotic, but
awaiting his old records. I suspect he will cont to ask about this and not accept the answers he
gets.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges Dr. Creany informed him that he could not provide orthopedic shoes
because the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) would not allow it. (Comp. at 4.) Plaintiff
states that Dr. Creany first prescribed Lamictal for pain and when Plaintiff reacted badly, he
prescribed Pamilair instead. (Id.; Doc. No. 42 at 3.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Creany
recommended an x-ray of Plaintiff’s foot but Plaintiff refused because the primary problem with
his foot was nerve damage, which an x-ray would not detect. (Comp. at 4.) Dr. Creany also
told Plaintiff to order shoes from the DOC canteen. (Id.) Plaintiff did so but found the shoes
were too narrow, causing problems with neuropathy in his foot, and he continued instead to use
his medical boot. (Id. at 4, 5.)
In May 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility
(“AVCF”). (Id. at 4.) Similar to his arrival at BCCF, Plaintiff immediately requested medical
attention regarding his left foot injury. (Id.) Plaintiff was examined by Defendant Tejinder
Singh, a Physician’s Assistant. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Singh accused him of lying, spit
in his face, and told Plaintiff that he would not issue medical shoes and that Plaintiff had to wear
regular shoes like everyone else. (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff alleges officials of CHP were aware of his medical conditions and his lack of
treatment. (Id. at 5.) He contends he suffers constant pain and discomfort similar if not worse
than when the injury first occurred. (Id.) Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, he is
asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations of his right to adequate medical care
under the Eighth Amendment. (See generally Comp.) Each Defendant has filed a Motion to
Dismiss contending Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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LEGAL STANDARD
1. Pro Se Plaintiff
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The court, therefore, “review[s] his pleadings and other
papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.”
Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding allegations of a pro se complaint “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
However, a pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments
are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that have not been
alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
See also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that a court
may not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint”); Drake v.
City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting the court may not “construct
arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”). The
plaintiff’s pro se status does not entitle him to application of different rules. See Montoya v.
Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss
a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the
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parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally
sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d
1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
“A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bellmon, 935
F.2d at 1109. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts
which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The Iqbal evaluation requires two prongs of analysis. First, the court
identifies “the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” that
is, those allegations which are legal conclusion, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at
679-81. Second, the Court considers the factual allegations “to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief,
such claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.
Notwithstanding, the court need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting
factual averments. S. Disposal, Inc., v. Texas Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).
“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678. Moreover,
“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action will not do.’ Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 678.
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts may consider not only the
complaint itself, but also attached exhibits and documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). “[T]he district court
may consider documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the
plaintiff's claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS
1. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “cruel and
unusual punishments” shall not be inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Punishments which
“involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” violate this provision. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). Because “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat
his medical needs,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), the Supreme Court has held that
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173). The court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims involves both an
objective and subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). To prove a
claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner must establish that (1) he was deprived of a medical
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need that is, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994),
and (2) the defendant knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health or
safety.” Id. at 837. “A medical need is [sufficiently] serious if it is one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575
(10th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations omitted).
a. Objective Component
As to the objective component, the court considers whether Plaintiff has been deprived of
a sufficiently serious basic human need. “[A] medical need is considered ‘sufficiently serious’ if
the condition ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment . . . or is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Oxendine
v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224
(10th Cir. 1999)).
In Martinez v. Rittenhouse, No. 07-cv-02087, 2008 WL 2952361 (D. Colo. July 29,
2008), an inmate plaintiff asserted an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against a
nurse practitioner based on her refusal to grant his request for a bottom bunk based upon
grinding in his arthritic knees. Id. at *1. The court held the plaintiff had failed to set forth
sufficient factual allegations to support the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Id. at *2.
Martinez was not diagnosed by a medical doctor that he had an arthritic knee and
was in need of treatment. He also has not established that his medical condition
was so serious that a lay person would recognize his need for treatment.
Moreover, Martinez was observed by Rittenhouse walking without a limp at a
steady gait. I find that this evidence shows Martinez's injury was not so apparent
8
that a lay person would have been able to observe that he was in need of medical
attention.
Id.
The court finds Plaintiff similarly has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to support
the objective component of his claim. Though he suffered a puncture to his toe when he stepped
on a nail in July 2015, he does not allege he was diagnosed with a resulting medical condition.
Additionally, he has not established his problems were so serious that a lay person would
recognize his need for treatment. In each of his medical records, including records submitted by
Plaintiff from his private physicians, he is repeatedly observed as exhibiting a normal gait and
one record indicates he had normal strength in the affected toe. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 9; Doc. No. 42
at 1, 2, 3.) Additionally, Plaintiff refused the x-ray Dr. Creany intended to order on his foot.
(Comp. at 4.) Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that his alleged medical problems were so
apparent that a lay person would have been able to observe that he was in need of medical
attention.
b. Subjective Component
Although failing to allege the objective component of his Eighth Amendment claim is
fatal, even if Plaintiff had done so, his allegations still would warrant dismissal as to Defendant
Creany.2 A defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to a prisoner’s health or safety
when he was both “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists,” and he actually drew that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
2
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant Singh are relatively vague with regard to medical
care provided and therefore, the court will not address the subjective component of Plaintiff’s
claim with regard to Defendant Singh.
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Importantly, “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,
that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause . . . .”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U .S. 312, 319 (1986). Thus, “a complaint that a [medical care provider]
has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Further,
“[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811
(10th Cir. 1999) (“A negligent failure to provide adequate medical care, even one constituting
medical malpractice, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”). Finally, a prisoner does
not have a valid claim of deliberate indifference simply because he was denied “a particular
course of treatment” that he desired. Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006).
“[A] prison doctor remains free to exercise his or her independent professional judgment,”
Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997), and “[m]edical decisions that may be
characterized as ‘classic example[s] of matter[s] for medical judgment,’ such as whether one
course of treatment is preferable to another, are beyond the [Eighth] Amendment’s purview.”
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107).
There is no question Dr. Creany provided medical care to Plaintiff, including prescribing
pain medication and recommending an x-ray, which Plaintiff declined. (Comp. at 4.) Plaintiff
alleged Dr. Creany’s medical treatment was inadequate because he did not provide “orthopedics
that he knew were medically necessary to treat the injury.” (Id.) Plaintiff presupposes Dr.
Creany’s knowledge of medical necessity based solely on Dr. Deonarain and Dr. Zyzda’s alleged
conclusions and recommendations. (Id.)
10
The law is well established that a “mere difference of opinion between the prison’s
medical staff and the inmate as to the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does not
support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575; Callahan, 471 F.3d
at 1160 (explaining that a prisoner does not have a valid claim of deliberate indifference simply
because he was denied “a particular course of treatment” that he desired); see also Burns v.
Laurance, No. 10-cv-2691-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 507658, at *11 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2015)
(holding that difference of opinion between prisoner and his treating physicians about the offered
alternatives and the preferred course of medical treatment does not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation); White v. Goff, No. 07–3311–SAC, 2011 WL 624059, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb.
11, 2011) (holding that while the plaintiff sometimes did not receive the specific type of
medication he sought and was often dissatisfied with the medical attention provided and
noncompliant with the medical advice he received, his disagreement with the care offered does
not establish that he was denied constitutionally adequate medical care); Martinez v. Boyd, No.
08–cv–2181–PAB–MEH, 2009 WL 2766771, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding claims of
deliberate indifference based on prison medical personnel not granting prisoner’s request for an
alternative type of TB test and not providing him his preferred choice of medication did not
provide adequate basis for establishing an Eighth Amendment violation)).
In his Response, Plaintiff relies upon Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398 (2nd Cir. 2005) to
argue his Eighth Amendment claim should not be dismissed. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 2-3.) In
Johnson, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials, as opposed to a physician, violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to follow the medical treatment prescribed by his treating
physicians, including prison physicians. Id. at 400. The Circuit Court upheld the district court’s
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conclusion that the plaintiff had provided sufficient factual allegations to assert a deliberate
indifference claim because a jury could reasonably infer the prison officials’ refusal to follow the
recommendation of “every single one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, including prison
physicians” was evidence of deliberate indifference, especially where the defendants had not
taken any steps to investigate or verify whether ignoring the recommendations was medically
appropriate. Id. at 404.
Johnson does not provide support for Plaintiff’s claim as his claim does not arise from a
prison official’s refusal to follow medically prescribed treatment. Instead, Plaintiff’s claim is
premised upon the fact that Dr. Creany’s treatment allegedly differed from that of previous
physicians. As Defendant Creany notes in his Reply, the lower court decision in Johnson
specifically recognized if the plaintiff’s claim had been based upon “a mere disagreement
between physicians, such allegations would likely not state a claim of deliberate indifference.”
Johnson v. Wright, 234 F. Supp. 2d 352, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Similarly, Plaintiff cites to various cases in which the courts found that although the
plaintiff had been provided some medical care while incarcerated, the care did not actually treat
the complained of condition and/or amounted to little more than documenting the plaintiff’s
worsening condition. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing
district court’s granting of summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim where medical
officials persisted in same course of treatment for several years that was ineffective); Sulton v.
Wright, 265 F. Supp. 2d 292, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing that even if an inmate receives
extensive medical care, a deliberate indifference claim may still be stated if the care ignores “the
gravamen of his problem”), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Scott v. Gardner, 287 F.
12
Supp. 2d 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). These cases are distinguishable from the present case as,
based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, Dr. Creany did not refuse to treat Plaintiff’s primary
problem, nor insist on pursuing an ineffective treatment over a long period of time.3 Instead, Dr.
Creany evaluated Plaintiff’s condition, prescribed pain medication, prescribed alternative pain
medication following Plaintiff’s negative reaction to the former, and wanted to obtain an x-ray of
Plaintiff’s foot but Plaintiff refused.
“To show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs the plaintiff must
demonstrate that prison officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.” Baker v. Wilkinson, No. CIV–13–140–JHP–SPS, 2014
WL 298140, at *5 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). While not
determinative, medical records evidencing examinations, diagnoses, and medications can rebut
an inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference. Id. Plaintiff does not allege Dr. Creany
refused to treat him. Rather, he alleges Dr. Creany refused to treat him in the manner he
preferred. Such allegations are not sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.
2. CHP
In addition to Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment claim,
Plaintiff’s allegations against CHP are vague and warrant dismissal. In identifying CHP as a
Defendant, he states that CHP “contracts with the Colorado Department of Corrections to deliver
medical health care to inmates.” (Comp. at 2.) With regard to factual allegations supporting his
3
The court notes Plaintiff was only incarcerated at BVCF for approximately seven months.
(Comp. at 4.)
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claim, Plaintiff states only that, based upon a letter he sent to an attorney, “representatives for
CHP [] are aware of the medical condition and its afflictions.” (Id. at 5.)
In its Motion to Dismiss, CHP notes Plaintiff never alleges the individual Defendants are
employed by CHP and CHP denies the same. (Doc. No. 46 at 5.) In his Response, Plaintiff
concedes neither Defendant is employed by CHP, but states that they are “gatekeepers” between
inmates and CHP because when inmates require special medical treatment, such as medical
shoes, physicians contact CHP “who then relays this medical need to CDOC, approving the
treatment.” (Doc. No. 69 at 2.)
As an initial matter, the court notes that the purpose of a motion to dismiss is “to assess
whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may
be granted.’” Stinson ex rel. United States v. Maynard, 341 F. App’x 413, 417 (10th Cir. 2009)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006)). Thus, the
court generally will not consider new factual allegations included in a plaintiff’s response to a
motion to dismiss. Id. However, even considering Plaintiff’s additional allegations, his claim
still fails.
Plaintiff does not specifically allege anyone employed by CHP was involved in making
decisions about Plaintiff’s treatment and/or what medical treatment he would receive.
Construing Plaintiff’s additional allegations exceedingly liberally, if CHP had to approve certain
medical treatment, Plaintiff does not allege Defendants ever made such requests to CHP and/or
that such requests were denied. To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must plead facts which
allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has not met that burden with regard to CHP.
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Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the “Motion to Dismiss from Defendant Timothy Creany” (Doc. No.
30), the “Motion to Dismiss from Defendant Correctional Health Partners” (Doc. No. 46.), and
the “Motion by Defendant P.A. Singh to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim”
(Doc. No. 61) are GRANTED and this matter should be dismissed in its entirety.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2018.
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