Lopez v. Edwards
Filing
79
ORDER Denying Defendants' 65 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 05/15/2018. (athom, )
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 12
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM
STEPHANIE LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARL EDWARDS, individually, and
CASPER TRAILER SALES, INC., a Colorado corporation,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Carl Edwards and Casper Trailer
Sales, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 65.) Defendants argue that
(1) Plaintiff Stephanie Lopez’s claims for unpaid wages prior to May 24, 2015, are not
covered under the Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”), and (2) Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid
wages under the Colorado Wage Act (“CWA”) must be limited to recovery of final
wages. (Id.) Defendants request that the Court therefore enter summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims for unpaid wages prior to May 24, 2015, and limit her recovery under
the CWA. (Id.) For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion.
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 12
I.
A.
BACKGROUND
UNDERLYING FACTS
Casper Trailer Sales, Inc. (“Casper”) is a Colorado corporation, doing business
as JDL Trailer Sales. (Doc. # 60 at ¶ 6.) Defendant Carl Edwards (“Edwards”) is the
owner and manager of Casper Trailer Sales, Inc. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Defendants and Plaintiff
agree that at all times relevant to the Complaint, Edwards acted directly and indirectly in
the interests of the employer in relation to Plaintiff by setting her rate of pay, the method
of compensation, and determining her hours of work. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that she began working for Casper in 2009 by cleaning the shop.
(Id. at ¶ 13.) She asserts that she learned the trade of an RV technician by watching
others and that she worked as an RV technician for most of her employment with
Casper. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff claims that she worked without cash wages from 2009
until 2015 in reliance upon Edwards’ promise to transfer title to a home to her in
exchange for her work. (Id. at ¶ 16.) She also states that she received room and board
in exchange for her work during part of this time period. (Id.) She contends that
throughout most of her employment, she worked no fewer than ten hours a day and as
many as seventy hours a week. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
Plaintiff received her first paycheck from Casper in May 2015. (Doc. # 68 at 5.)
Plaintiff alleges that she was not paid minimum wage for the hours she worked in 2013
and 2014, nor was she paid one and one-half times minimum wage for hours worked
over forty hours in a single work week during this time. (Doc. # 60 at ¶ 22.) She also
alleges she was paid for some, but not all, of her hours worked in 2015 and 2016. (Id. at
2
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 12
¶¶ 23, 24.) Plaintiff terminated her employment on April 20, 2016, because she was
allegedly harassed at work and because Edwards refused to pay her. (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 49.)
On November 11, 2016, Plaintiff demanded from Defendants payment of wages owed.
(Id. at ¶ 59.)
Defendants contest the majority of Plaintiff’s allegations. (Doc. # 62.) Defendants
refute Plaintiff’s statement that she began work for Casper in 2009. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
Defendants also assert that Plaintiff worked only as part of the pit crew during her
employment, and deny that Edwards ever promised to transfer title to a house to
Plaintiff in exchange for her work. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–16.) Most relevant here, Defendants
deny all allegations regarding any hours Plaintiff worked that were not compensated.
(Id. at ¶¶ 13–61.)
B.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff commenced this suit on January 4, 2017. (Doc. # 1.) She filed an
Amended Complaint on September 18, 2017 (Doc. # 36) and a Second Amended
Complaint on November 30, 2017 (Doc. # 60). Plaintiff asserts three claims against
Defendants: (1) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206, Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff
minimum wages for all weeks worked in 2014, and some weeks in 2015 and 2016, is in
violation of the FLSA; (2) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Defendants’ failure to pay
Plaintiff overtime wages constitutes an additional violation of the FLSA; and (3) pursuant
to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109, Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff’s earned, vested, and
determinable wages is in violation of the CWA. (Id. at 1.)
3
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 12
On January 17, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(Doc. # 65.) Defendants’ Motion seeks to separate Plaintiff’s claims into two separate
time periods: prior to May 24, 2015, when Plaintiff was not a payroll employee of
Casper, and after May 24, 2015, when Plaintiff was a payroll employee of the company.
(Id. at 2.) Defendants argue that because Plaintiff cannot produce records of her
employment with Casper prior to May 24, 2015, her claim for employment can only
extend to Edwards individually, not his company. (Id.) Thus, Defendants allege
Plaintiff’s claims during this time period are not covered under the FLSA because the
FLSA only covers employees engaged in interstate commerce. (Id. at 2–3.) Because
Edwards, as an individual, is not an employer as defined by the FLSA, Plaintiff’s
employee-employer relationship with Edwards does not implicate interstate commerce.
(Id. at 3.)
In addition, Defendants seek partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for
wages owed under the CWA. (Id.) Defendants assert that under Section 109 of the
CWA, Plaintiff’s claim is limited to only unpaid final wages and penalties related to final
wages. (Id. at 20.) Defendants’ interpretation of Section 109 of the CWA relies upon
Judge Martinez’s recent opinion and certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court,
which asks:
Does Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109(1)(a) permit a terminated employee to
sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the
employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations (Colo. Rev.
4
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 12
Stat. § 8-4-122 1) has run on the cause of action the employee could have
brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a)?
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 789, 801–02 (D. Colo.
2017). In Hernandez, Judge Martinez considered the defendant’s argument that
Section 109 “pertains only to the sorts of payments that tend to be due upon
termination (e.g., hours worked since the close of the last pay period, accrued
vacation, unreimbursed travel expenses, etc.).” Id. at 798. Defendants in the
case now before the Court similarly request that the Court limit Plaintiff’s
recovery to unpaid final wages unless or until the Colorado Supreme Court rules
otherwise. (Doc. # 65 at 3.)
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claim under the relevant substantive law. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc.,
259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such
that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v.
Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). When reviewing motions for
summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. However, conclusory statements based merely on conjecture,
1
Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122, the statute of limitations requires all actions to be
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, or within three years if the
violation is willful.
5
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 12
speculation, or subjective belief do not constitute competent summary judgment
evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In
attempting to meet this standard, a movant who does not bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial does not need to disprove the other party’s claim; rather, the movant
need simply point out to the Court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential
element of that party’s claim. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th
Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Once the movant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The nonmoving party
may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Id. Rather, the nonmoving
party must “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of
trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” Adler, 144 F.3d at
671. Stated differently, the party must provide “significantly probative evidence” that
would support a verdict in his favor. Jaramillo v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. 14, 680 F.3d
1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2012). “To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by
reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.”
Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. In addition, answers to interrogatories may properly be
considered by courts in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Champlin v.
Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 1959); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 12
III.
A.
ANALYSIS
FLSA CLAIMS
The Court begins by addressing Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff was not an
employee of Casper prior to May 24, 2015. Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s FLSA
Claims should be dismissed because (1) with respect to Casper, Plaintiff does not
adequately demonstrate that she had an employment relationship prior to May 24,
2015; and (2) Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to prove enterprise coverage or individual
coverage under the Act prior to May 24, 2015. (Doc. # 65.)
Under the FLSA, an “employer” is defined as “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .” 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d). An “employee” is defined as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The FLSA “defines the verb ‘employ’ expansively to mean, ‘suffer or
permit to work.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). Consistent with these broad definitions, “[t]he Supreme Court has
instructed courts to construe the terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ expansively under the
FLSA.” See id.; Rutherford Ford Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947).
Where the employer-employee relationship is in question, courts are to consider
the “economic realities” of the relationship, grounding the analysis in “economic reality
rather than technical concepts.” Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28,
33 (1961). Applying the economic realities test, courts consider “whether the alleged
employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employee, (2) supervised and controlled
the employee’s work schedule or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and
7
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 12
method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Schindler v. Whiting
Petroleum Corp., No. 17-CV-1051-WJM-NYW, 2017 WL 5969814, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec.
1, 2017). “No one of the four factors standing alone is dispositive. Instead, the [. . .] test
encompasses the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33;
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730.
Plaintiff contends that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff
was employed by Casper prior to May 24, 2015. (Doc. # 68.) In Plaintiff’s Interrogatory
Number 1, when asked to describe her duties “as an employee of JDL” between
January 4, 2014 and May 24, 2015, she stated:
I typically arrived at work at 7:30, no later than 7:45, to open gates to sales
lot, set up workstation, swept up shop, put tools away worked on tasks
assigned to me by Mr. Edwards from changing out vents, fans, shrouds,
skylight windows, light bulbs, lenses, repairing wires, replacing wires,
replacing water pumps, water lines, replacing gaskets on septic, clean out
wax seals and toilets, removing old speakers and TVs, as well as installing
new speakers and TVs, repairing damaged roofs, replacing rubber roofs,
cosmetic repair two framework, winterizing/de-winterizing tin work, repair
and replace customizing refurbishing units, even worked on several units
that had been condemned or totaled out by customers. As well as
maintaining Mr. Edwards many properties which included mending fences,
mowing down weeds, picking up debris, feeding his dogs, Properties
maintained: one on Acero, one on California Street, one on Poplar Street
and three on Lake Avenue, as well as the property on Elko. I moved
trailers with the forklift, ran errands, got parts from other locations. Picked
up propane, performed a perimeter check when asked to do so. I worked
until the shop closed and sometimes later. I worked with Mr. Edwards on
Saturdays I did whatever I was asked to do. I would go to the flea market
and sell Mr. Edwards property for him on weekends.
(Id. at 10.) Here, Plaintiff’s reference to the “shop” is in reference to JDL Trailer Sales.
(Id.) In addition to Plaintiff’s interrogatories, Plaintiff seeks to support her claim that she
worked for Casper prior to May 24, 2015, by using several of Edwards’ documented
8
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 12
statements. (Id.) The first statement says “[Plaintiff] works for me” and is stamped “JDL
Trailer Sales . . . .” (Doc. # 68-1 at 2 (date omitted)). A second statement dated
February 18, 2014, written by Plaintiff and signed by Edwards, states “I still work for
Carl Edwards at JDL 6 days a week doing clean up and Pit crew.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff
argues that these statements present a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff
was employed by JDL Trailer Sales, in association with Casper, prior to May 24, 2015.
(Doc. # 68 at 11.)
2
Plaintiff also disputes Defendants’ assertion that she was not employed by
Casper, an enterprise engaged in commerce. Casper is certainly an enterprise engaged
in commerce. (Doc. # 62 at ¶ 7.) Its gross receipts are in excess of $500,000 and it has
and had “employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that
have been moved in . . . commerce . . . .” See 28 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(1); see also
(Doc. # 62 at ¶ 7.) As previously discussed, Plaintiff has presented evidence to dispute
Defendants’ assertion that May 24, 2015, is the date she was hired by. See (Doc. # 68.)
This Court finds that there is undoubtedly a genuine dispute regarding whether
Plaintiff was employed by Casper prior to the receipt of Plaintiff’s first cash payment for
wages. The parties agree that Plaintiff’s claim turns on this fact. See (Doc. ## 65, 68.)
Plaintiff asserts that the above evidence provides sufficient legal grounds to deny
Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. # 68 at 2.) The Court agrees. See Champlin, 269 at 920;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, Plaintiff has set forth “specific facts showing that there is a
2
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s documented statements amount to unauthenticated and
inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. # 72 at 4.) Although the Court makes no ruling on this issue at this
time because Defendants have not filed an appropriate motion to exclude evidence, the Court
would note that these statements appear to be non-hearsay pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
9
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 12
genuine issue for trial.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. This evidence is significant
probative evidence that may support a finding that Plaintiff was denied wages and thus,
is entitled to a verdict in her favor. See Jaramillo, 680 F.3d at 1269. Defendant is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiff was not an employee of Casper
prior to May 24, 2015.
B.
CWA CLAIM
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint includes a claim for all unpaid wages
under the CWA from January 4, 2014, until the termination of her employment. (Doc.
# 68 at 19.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s cause of action under Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 8-4-109 applies to final wages only. (Doc. # 65 at 18.) Defendants primarily base their
argument upon a recent District Court opinion authored by Judge Martinez. (Id.); see
Hernandez 250 F. Supp. 3d at 801–02. In Hernandez, Judge Martinez issued a certified
question to the Colorado Supreme Court, requesting clarification between the overlap of
covered wages in Section 103 and Section 109 of the CWA, where Section 109 in effect
revives all past actionable claims upon an employee’s termination. 250 F. Supp. 3d at
797–98.
Section 109 of the CWA applies “[w]hen an interruption in the employeremployee relationship by volition of the employer occurs, the wages or compensation
for labor or service earned, vested, determinable, and unpaid at the time of such
discharge is due and payable immediately.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109(a). Pursuant to
Section 122, the employee has two years from that date to bring a cause of action for
10
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 12
non-willful violations, and three years from that date for willful violations. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 8-4-122.
Defendants raise issue with Plaintiff’s claim for all unpaid wages under Section
109 because, they assert, Section 103 of the CWA “establishes that all wages and
compensation, other than those mentioned in Section 109, become due and payable
ten days after each pay period.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103; see (Doc. # 65 at 19.)
Plaintiff asserts that Judge Martinez’s certified question does not pertain to
Plaintiff’s CWA claim because the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s Section 109 claim
has not expired. (Doc. # 68 at 20.) Plaintiff made a demand for payment of wages
pursuant to Section 109 on November 11, 2016. (Doc. # 60 at ¶ 59.); see Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 8-4-109(3). The demand included unpaid wages for all hours worked in 2013 and
2014, as well as unpaid wages for some hours worked in 2015 and 2016. (Doc. # 60 at
¶¶ 22, 23.) When Plaintiff’s demand for unpaid wages remained unanswered by
Defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on January 4, 2017. (Doc. # 1.)
At the outset, the Court observes that Plaintiff has not expressly stated
Defendants willfully denied her payment of unpaid wages. However, reading Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 60) and Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 68) in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
interprets Plaintiff’s Section 109 claim to imply a willful violation. Thus, her claims for
unpaid wages dating back to 2013 would satisfy the three year statute of limitations for
actionable claims. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122.
11
Case 1:17-cv-00045-CMA-KLM Document 79 Filed 05/15/18 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 12
Judge Martinez’s certified question requests clarification regarding the scope of
unpaid wages under Section 109 in relation to Section 103. Hernandez, 250 F. Supp. 3d
at 798. The Colorado Supreme Court’s determination of the question does not pertain to
the instant case because the statute of limitations has not run for Plaintiff’s Section 109
claim. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122. While Judge Martinez’s opinion regarding the overlap
between Section 103 and Section 109 is pertinent, it is not binding on this Court.
Therefore, this Court will not limit Plaintiff’s recovery under Section 109 to final
wages. The plain language of Section 109 allows for recovery of all “earned, vested,
determinable, and unpaid” wages. 3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109. It is Plaintiff’s burden to
prove the necessary elements of her claim. Of which, a jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor.
See Jaramillo, 680 F.3d at 1269. The Court, therefore, denies Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 65.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 65).
DATED: May 15, 2018
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
3
The “determinable” requirement was added by the Colorado legislature in 2003 to protect
claims for wages that cannot be ascertained. Norwood v. WBS, Inc., 15-cv-0622, ECF No. 85 at
10 (Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing the legislative history of the statute).
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?