USA v. Pioneer Natural Resources Company et al

Filing 194

ORDER Denying 193 Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent Decree. The Stay previously entered in this case (ECF No. 170 .) is hereby LIFTED. The Magistrate Judge is requested to set a status conference as soon as practicable to assess with counsel the matters or deadlines remaining to be set in this action in light of the Courts Order, including without limitation the scheduling of a prompt Final Pretrial Conference. ORDERED by Judge William J. Martinez on 4/7/2020.(angar, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 17-cv-0168-WJM-NYW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY, and
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES USA, INC.,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT DECREE
______________________________________________________________________
The United States brings suit against Defendants Pioneer Natural Resources
Company (“Pioneer Natural Resources”) and Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc.
(“Pioneer-USA”) (together, “Defendants”)1 under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., to
recover costs incurred by the United States in response to the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances from the Commodore Waste Rock Pile (“CWRP”) of the
Nelson Tunnel/Commodore Waste Rock Pile Superfund Site (“Site”) in Mineral County,
Colorado. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.)

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Pioneer-USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pioneer Natural Resources. (ECF No. 1
¶ 2; ECF No. 114 ¶ 2; ECF No. 115 ¶ 2.) Pioneer Natural Resources is the successor to the
CERCLA liabilities of Pioneer Nuclear, Incorporated (“PNI”). United States v. Pioneer Nat. Res.
Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 923, 933 (D. Colo. 2018). Pioneer-USA is the successor to the CERCLA
liabilities of Mesa Limited Partnership (“MLP”) and Mesa Operating Limited Partnership
(“MOLP”). Id. at 929, 931. The United States alleges that PNI conducted mining operations at
the Site between 1982 and 1986, and that MLP and MOLP conducted mining operations at the
Site between 1986 and 1989. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.)

Now before the Court is the United States’ Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent
Decree (“Motion”). (ECF No. 193.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is
denied without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
The Court previously set forth the basic Site history in an Order granting the United

States’ early motion for partial summary judgment on corporate successor liability. United
States v. Pioneer Nat. Res. Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 923 (D. Colo. 2018) ECF No. 88. The
Court presumes familiarity with that Order.
The Site is located approximately 1.5 miles north of Creede, Colorado, and
encompasses an area that was mined for silver from the 1880s into the 1980s. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 7.) The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has designated two operating
units at the Site, the CWRP (“OU1”) and the Nelson Tunnel (“OU2”). The United States
alleges that Defendants’ predecessors conducted mining operations at the OU1 Site
between 1982 and 1989. (Id. ¶ 2.)
The Nelson Tunnel was constructed for “locating ore, haulage, and dewatering
mines.” (ECF No. 193 at 2.) In time, the Nelson Tunnel partially collapsed and was
abandoned. (Id.) It continues to drain water from several mines, discharging acid mine
drainage into West Willow Creek, which flows into the Rio Grande approximately four
miles from the Site. (Id.)
CWRP is a waste rock pile located adjacent to the openings for the Nelson Tunnel
and the Commodore No. 5 Tunnel (“Commodore 5”). Over the years, waste rock from

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mining of the Nelson Tunnel and Commodore 5 was “cast down the mountainside into the
West Willow Creek drainage.” (ECF No. 88 at 3.) “Layers of cribbing to contain waste
rock comprising the CWRP and makeshift hydraulic structures to convey West Will Creek
over and under the CWRP . . . were installed over many years by several mining
companies that operated at the OU1 Site.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 12.)
In 2005, the CWPR water conveyance system failed, and the CWRP collapsed
into West Willow Creek, releasing contaminated mine waste into the creek. (Id. ¶ 36.)
On September 3, 2008, the EPA placed the Site on the National Priorities List as provided
under Section 105 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. 73 Fed. Reg. 51368 (Sept. 3, 2008).
In 2008 and 2009, the EPA conducted certain time critical removals to stabilize the
CWPR. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 39.)
In 2011, the EPA issued a Remedial Investigation (“RI”) report for the entire Site to
assess the nature and extent of the contamination. (ECF No. 193-1 at 3.) The RI was
updated in May 2019, and the EPA is currently conducting a feasibility study for remedial
options at the Site. (Id.) Once the feasibility study is complete, EPA will prepare and
issue a record of decision regarding the remedial action selected, although there is no set
timeline for the record of decision. (Id.)
In 2016, the United States and Colorado entered an approximately $6 million
settlement with CoCa Mines, Inc., which resolved that entity’s liability for past and future
response costs at the Site. United States v. Coca Mines, Inc., 16-cv-847 (D. Colo., filed
June 15, 2016) ECF No. 13. According to the United States, that settlement took into
account the defendant’s limited ability to pay. (ECF No. 193 at 3.) Of the settlement,
10% was allocated to OU1 and 90% was allocated to OU2. (ECF No. 193-2 at 4.) In
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addition, the Asarco Environmental Trust contributed $1,421,462 toward work at OU2.
Prior to March 31, 2017, the EPA incurred $8,501,526.68 in unreimbursed costs
for OU1 and “site-wide costs and costs not associated with a particular consent decree,
order or activity,” referred to as “OU0.” (ECF No. 193-2 at 3.) From April 1, 2017 to
December 31, 2019, EPA estimates that it incurred $2,164,347.91 in unreimbursed OU1
and OU0 costs. (Id. at 4.) This estimate includes Department of Justice costs only from
October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018. (Id.) Accordingly, the United States adds an
additional $342,121.51 for DOJ costs incurred since October 1, 2018. (Id. at 5.) Thus, as
of December 31, 2019, EPA had approximately $11,007,996.10 in unreimbursed OU1
and OU0 costs.
In addition, EPA estimates that it has incurred $8,824,487.14 in OU2 response
costs as of December 31, 2019. (Id.) Taking into account the $4,860,000 from the Coca
Mines settlement and the $1,421,462 from the Asarco Environmental Trust allocated to
OU2 work, EPA currently has $2,543,025.14 in unreimbursed OU2 response costs as of
December 31, 2019. Thus, as of December 31, 2019, the United States has incurred
approximately $13,551,021 in unreimbursed response costs at the Site. (Id.)
EPA estimates that future costs for OU1 will be approximately $1,125,000, and
that future costs for OU2 will be $83.2 million. (ECF No. 193-1 at 4; ECF No. 193-2 at 6.)
Thus, total estimated Site-wide future costs are approximately $84.4 million. (ECF No.
193-2 at 6.)
B.

Procedural History
The United States filed this action against Defendants on January 19, 2017, to

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recover unreimbursed costs incurred in connection with response actions at OU1 only.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 53.) Defendants filed a counterclaim against the United States, alleging
that the United States is a potentially responsible party (“PRP”) under CERCLA and
therefore responsible for certain removal, remediation, and response costs. (ECF
Nos. 61 & 62; see also ECF Nos. 114 & 115 (amended counterclaims).) In May 2017,
the United States filed an early partial motion for summary judgment on the liability of
Defendants as successors in interest to prior site operators, which the Court granted.
(ECF Nos. 46 & 88.)
In addition to the instant Motion, there are four motions pending before the Court.
Defendants filed an Unopposed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on two issues:
(1) the United States is the current owner of the CERCLA facility, and (2) the United
States is a historical owner of the CERCLA facility. (ECF No. 152.) In its response, the
United States clarified that it does not dispute that it owns land underneath a portion of
the CWRP, and owned land under a portion of the CWRP at the time hazardous
substances were disposed. (ECF No. 156.) The United States also filed a partial motion
for summary judgment regarding Defendants’ liability under CERCLA, the amount of
response costs, and its third-party defense. (ECF No. 153.) Defendants moved to
exclude evidence from two of the United States’ experts, on whom the United States
relied in its summary judgment briefing. (ECF No. 155.) The United States moved to
exclude expert testimony on which Defendants relied in their response to the partial
summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 160.)
On February 26, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the litigation pending
settlement negotiations, which the Court granted. (ECF Nos. 168 & 170.) The stay was
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repeatedly extended as the settlement negotiations and process progressed. (ECF
Nos. 178, 181, 183 & 185.)
On November 25, 2019, the United States submitted the proposed consent decree
to the Court. (ECF No. 188.) Under the consent decree, Defendants agree to pay
$5,775,000 to EPA. (ECF No. 188-1 ¶ 4.) The United States, on behalf of the
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), will also pay
$425,000 to EPA. (Id. ¶ 8.) In return, the United States agrees not to sue or take
administrative action against Defendants under Sections 106 and 107(a) of CERCLA for
any past or future response costs incurred at the Site. (Id. ¶ 15.) EPA agrees not to take
administrative action against DOI or USDA under Sections 106 and 107(a) of CERCLA
for any past or future response costs in connection with OU1, or any past response costs
at OU2. (Id. ¶ 16.)
For their part, Defendants agree not to assert claims against the United States for
past or future response costs at the Site. (Id. ¶ 19.) DOI and USDA agree not to assert
any claim for reimbursement under specified sections of CERCLA for past or future
response costs associated with OU1, past response costs incurred in connection with
OU2, or the consent decree. (Id. ¶ 20.)
On December 16, 2019, the United States published a notice of the proposed
consent decree in the Federal Register (“Notice”), commencing a 30-day public comment
period. 84 Fed. Reg. 68490 (Dec. 16, 2019). The City of Creede, Colorado submitted a
comment, objecting to entry of the consent decree as “neither fair nor reasonable.” (ECF
No. 193-3 at 6.) Creede raised concerns about the inclusion of OU2 in the consent
decree, the release of Defendants’ liability for future costs at the Site, and the lack of
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protection for the environment, the alleged failure to take into account known costs
between March 31, 2017, and the standard for judicial review. On February 19, 2020, the
United States filed the instant Motion asking the Court to enter the consent decree. (ECF
No. 193.) The United States explained why in its view Creede’s objections are unfounded
(id. at 16–20), and included cost estimates for work between March 2017 and December
2019, as well as estimated future costs (ECF Nos. 193-1 & 193-2). It did not make any
changes to the proposal based on Creede’s comments. (ECF No. 193 at 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may either approve or deny a consent decree, and generally may not
change the terms. United States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991). In
reviewing a proposed CERCLA consent decree, the district court “must ensure that the
agreement is not illegal, a product of collusion, or against the public interest. The court
also has the duty to decide whether the decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Id.
“Reasonableness, fairness, and fidelity to the statute are, therefore, the horses which
district judges must ride.” United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st
Cir. 1990); see also United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 951 (D. Colo.
1993) (a court must “satisfy itself that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and consistent
with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve” (internal quotation marks omitted;
alteration incorporated)). “If the court discerns a problem with a stipulated agreement, it
should advise the parties of its concern and allow them an opportunity to revise the
agreement.” Colorado, 937 F.2d at 509.
The fairness of a CERCLA consent decree is evaluated in terms of procedural and

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substantive fairness. United States v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 2008 WL 863975, at *5 (D.
Colo. Mar. 26, 2008); Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 86. “To measure procedural fairness,
a court should ordinarily look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor,
openness, and bargaining balance.” United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400,
1402 (D. Colo. 1994) (quoting Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 86). “Substantive fairness
introduces into the equation concepts of corrective justice and accountability: a party
should bear the cost of the harm for which it is legally responsible.” Cannons Eng’g, 899
F.2d at 87.
At least three factors are relevant to determining whether a consent decree is
reasonable: whether the consent decree is technically adequate to achieve the goal of
cleaning the environment, whether the consent decree sufficiently compensates the
public for the costs of remedial measures, and whether it reflects the relative strength of
the parties’ litigating positions. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. at 1402; accord Cannons
Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 89–90. “Overlaid on this evaluation is the most important factor:
whether the consent decree is in the public interest and upholds the objectives” of
CERCLA. Kerr-McGee Corp., 2008 WL 863975, at *5.
The Court is mindful that settlement of disputes is encouraged. Colorado v. City &
Cnty. of Denver (“City & Cnty. of Denver”), 2010 WL 4318835, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 22,
2010). “This presumption is particularly strong where a consent decree has been
negotiated by the Department of Justice on behalf of a federal agency, like the EPA,
which enjoys substantial expertise in the environmental field.” Kerr-McGee Corp., 2008
WL 863975, at *5. However, a court may not “merely rubber-stamp a consent decree.”

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Id. In a case where the parties seek the “imprimatur of judicial approval,” a court must
give the agreement more scrutiny. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2010 WL 4318835, at *5.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Procedural Fairness
A lengthy litigation history and extensive negotiations weigh in favor of finding a

proposed consent decree was developed in a procedurally fair manner. City & Cnty. of
Denver, 2010 WL 4318835 at *5; Telluride, 849 F. Supp. at 1403. The United States
explains that the parties arrived at the agreement in the consent decree after “years of
arm’s-length negotiations and mediation.” (ECF No. 193 at 9.) “[E]ven after reaching
agreement in principle on key terms, negotiations on the precise language of the Consent
Decree took several months” (id.), as reflected in the numerous extensions of the stay
after the parties reached their initial agreement (ECF Nos. 178, 181, 183 & 185). The
parties were advised by experienced counsel, technical advisors with knowledge of the
Site, third-party consultants, and expert witnesses. (ECF No. 193 at 9.) The parties also
engaged in discovery, including depositions of expert and lay witnesses, and briefed
motions for summary judgment. (Id.) However, the parties do not address whether any
third parties, impacted communities, or political representatives (elected or appointed)
played any role in the negotiations.
Federal regulations also require that the United States publish the Notice in the
Federal Register soliciting public comment on the proposed consent decree, which it did
in December 2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at 68490; see Telluride, 849 F. Supp. at 1404–05.
“This is not an inane exercise. . . . [T]he manifested willingness of the EPA to thoroughly

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consider all oral and written comments made with regard to the proposed decree is a key
indicator of whether the decree was negotiated in good faith and is fair.” Telluride, 849 F.
Supp. at 1404–05 (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States addressed the
substance of Creede’s concerns in the Motion.
The Court notes that Notice simply states that the proposed consent decree
requires Defendants to pay $5,775,000 for past and future response costs at the Site,
and “will resolve all CERCLA claims alleged in this action by the United States against”
Defendants. 84 Fed. Reg. at 68490. As the City of Creede points out in its comment,
however, the Notice failed to alert the public that the proposed decree would also fully
and forever release Defendants from further liability for OU2 costs. Beyond the manifest
incompleteness of the Notice, the Court is troubled by the fact that this material omission
pertained to an operable unit (OU2) which was never included as a claim or counterclaim
in the litigation.
While this omission alone does not counsel against entering the proposed consent
decree, the Court views it as a factor in its overall analysis of the fairness of the consent
decree. Moreover, the Court recognizes that despite the omission, the public had access
to the full agreement, from which it is clear that liabilities for OU2 are also resolved, as
evidenced by Creede’s objection to including OU2.
In sum, while the Court has some concerns about the procedural fairness of the
proposed decree, and would have ideally preferred to have more information pertaining to
the issue (missing information which is more fully discussed infra), on the whole it
appears to the Court that the agreement was the product of arms-length negotiations
after protracted litigation, and thus is procedurally fair.
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B.

Substantive Fairness and Reasonableness
1.

Scope of Consent Decree

As previously noted, Creede objects to the consent decree in part because it
resolved Defendants’ liability for past and future costs at OU2, although OU2 is not at
issue in the litigation. (ECF No. 193-3 at 3.) The United States argues that the scope of
the consent decree is appropriate because it “comports with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
established principles” in Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501 (1986). The Court agrees.
Under Firefighters, a scope of a consent decree may exceed that of the underlying
litigation when the consent decree (1) “spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve a dispute
within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”; (2) comes within the general scope of the
case made by the pleadings; and (3) “further[s] the objective of the law upon which the
complaint is based.” Id. at 525. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over CERCLA
cost recovery disputes, and the United States contends that the consent decree furthers
the general objective of CERCLA. (ECF No. 193 at 16–17.) The Court also finds that
Site-wide cost recovery, including recover for OU2 costs, comes within the general scope
of the case made by the pleadings. Here, the parties wish to enter into a broad
settlement based upon their activities or predecessors’ activities at the Site, which caused
release of metals into West Willow Creek. The Court finds that such a consent decree is
not objectionable merely because it releases liability for Defendants for all past and future
costs associated with OU2, beyond the relief that could have been granted under the
initial complaint. While OU2 may be properly included in a consent decree, the inclusion

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of OU2 impacts the substantive reasonableness of the consent decree, as discussed
below.
2.

Share of Liability and Litigation Risk

In evaluating the substantive fairness and reasonableness of a proposed consent
decree, a court considers whether the consent decree sufficiently compensates the public
for the cost of remedial measures and reflects the relative strength of the parties’ litigating
positions. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. at 1402. “[S]ettlement terms must be based upon,
and roughly correlated with, some acceptable measure of comparative fault, apportioning
liability among the settling parties according to rational (if necessarily imprecise) estimates
of how much harm each PRP has done.” Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 87. “Common
sense suggests that a PRP’s assumption of open-ended risks may merit a discount on
comparative fault, while obtaining a complete release from uncertain future liability may
call for a premium.” Id. at 88. “The manner in which the government has apportioned
liability should be upheld whenever there is a reasonable, good faith basis for it.”
ASARCO, 814 F. Supp. at 955.
In support of the proposed consent decree, the United States contends that the
consent decree is substantively fair and reasonable “because it reflects the Parties’
careful and informed assessment of the merits of each other’s claims, each Party’s
relative contribution to harm at the Site, and the costs associated with further litigating this
case.” (ECF No. 193 at 11.) The United States explains that the monetary settlement
“reflects an appropriate compromise between Parties who asserted substantially different
positions during a contested litigation,” particularly on the question of divisibility of harm,

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an issue raised in the partial motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 11–12.)
The United States further contends that it could recover 100% of costs from
Defendants, while Defendants argue that their predecessors contributed a divisible share
of between 1.349% and 7.07% of the environmental harm. The Motion states that this
percentage estimate of liability was for “harm at the Site,” (see id. at 12), although
Defendants’ response to the partial motion for summary judgment suggests that these
percentages relate only to OU1 (ECF No. 157 at 23–24, ¶¶ 170–79; ECF No. 157-22).
Critically, however, there is almost no substantive assessment and certainly no
evidence of any kind in the record which addresses the scope or magnitude of
Defendants’ potential liability at OU2. The only information before the Court on this issue
is the United States’ representation that, in an OU2 action, “Defendants would have also
likely argued that any divisible share of costs is minimal based on an allegation that the
acid mine drainage from the Nelson Tunnel adit was primarily caused by mining activities
before the timeframe of Defendants’ predecessors.” (ECF No. 193 at 13.)
Additionally, the United States argues that the settlement amount takes into
account the parties’ “equitable share of Site costs based on available evidence of relative
contribution to Site contamination,” based on the relative amount added to the CWRP
and the length of involvement of Defendants’ predecessors at the Site. (Id.) However,
the United States also states that the “evidentiary record of the historical development of
the Site is incomplete,” and that the “Site was also mined by other non-party operators
(now defunct).” (Id. at 12–13.)
Finally, the United States explains that the settlement saves substantial time,
costs, and resources. (ECF No. 193 at 14.) It explains that resolving OU2 response
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costs in the propose consent decree will save the time and expense of a second lawsuit,
one that would entail “significant risk” because of the costs to develop the OU2
evidentiary record and the complexity of tracing sources of acid mine drainage. (ECF No.
193 at 13–14.) It also explains that the consent decree would save time and the expense
of litigating OU1 through trial. (Id. at 14.) The consent decree, the movant contends,
would also provide funds now and avoid potential delays by further litigation. (Id. at 15.)
Under the consent decree, Defendants would pay $5,775,000, or approximately
only 6.84% of the aggregate unreimbursed past costs and estimated future costs of the
Site (OU1 and OU2). While the United States represents that this is an “appropriate
compromise” given the parties differing views on divisibility of harm equitable share of Site
costs, the United States does not provide a clear explication or evidentiary support for its
conclusion. For example, there is no indication of whether there are other PRPs and their
potential relative liability, although the Motion suggests that other PRPs are “now
defunct.” (Id. at 13.)
While the United States seeks deference to EPA’s expertise as to the comparative
fault of the parties, the Court need only defer when there is a “reasonable, good faith
basis” for the apportioned liability. See ASARCO, 814 F. Supp. at 955. Here, the United
States has not articulated a “rational (if necessarily imprecise) estimate[] of how much
harm each PRP has done.” See Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 87. The Court finds there
is not a sufficient factual basis to defer to EPA’s expertise on apportionment of liability.
Most importantly, given the huge potential range of liability—from 1.349% to 7.07%
to 100%—the Court cannot conclude that a settlement for 6.84% of the total
unreimbursed past and future costs, and a smaller percentage of total Site costs, is
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substantively fair and reasonable.
C.

Public Interest
The goal of CERCLA is to remediate sites, and have the expenses borne by

polluters (or their successors in interest) and not the public. Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.3d at
90–91. Here, the United States would resolve all liability of Defendants without so much
as explaining the extent of their liability for costs at OU2, whether there are other
potentially responsible parties, or addressing Defendants’ ability to pay. The United
States does not address if or how it will obtain funds for the remainder of the cleanup
costs, or whether downstream water users will simply continue to suffer harm. On the
record before the Court, the United States has failed to discharge its burden to
demonstrate that recovering approximately 6.84% of unreimbursed past expenses and
estimated future Site-wide costs, with no potential other funding for remediation, serves
the goals of CERCLA or would be in the public interest.
Finally, the Court notes that in addition to the deficiencies discussed above, the
Motion does not address how long remediation will take, when a remedy will be selected
for OU2, whether there are impacts to public water systems and the concomitant costs of
any such impacts, and whether other state funds are allocated to Site remediation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The United States’ Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent Decree (ECF

No. 193) is DENIED because the United States has failed to discharge its burden of
showing that the consent decree is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest;

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2.

This Order is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the parties seeking approval of an

amended proposed Consent Decree, which meaningfully and substantially addresses the
deficiencies the Court has pointed out in the rejected Decree;
3.

The Stay previously entered in this case (ECF No. 170.) is hereby LIFTED;

4.

The Magistrate Judge is requested to set a status conference as soon as

and

practicable to assess with counsel the matters or deadlines remaining to be set in this
action in light of the Court’s Order, including without limitation the scheduling of a prompt
Final Pretrial Conference.
Dated this 7th day of April, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

_________________________
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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