USA v. $114,700.00 in United States Currency
Filing
162
ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part 134 Claimant's Motion for Attorney Fees. That judgment shall enter in favor of Claimant and against the United States in the amount of $133,539.00 in attorney fees, by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 8/26/2020.(evana, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00452-CMA-GPG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
$114,700.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
This matter is before the Court on Claimant Richard Schwabe’s Motion for
Attorney Fees. 1 (Doc. # 134.) The Government filed a Response (Doc. # 156) on
February 28, 2020, and Claimant filed a Reply on March 30, 2020 (Doc. # 160). For the
following reasons, the Court grants Claimant’s Motion in part and denies it in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
This civil forfeiture case arises from the Government’s seizure of the defendant
currency during a search of Claimant’s property, which was conducted pursuant to a
Claimant’s request to recover litigation-related costs will be resolved by the Clerk of the Court.
Additionally, the Court considers the expenses titled, “Items Normally Itemized And Billed To
Client In Addition To Hourly Rate,” to be costs rather than attorney fees. Those items include
expenses such as Mr. Burch’s hotel bills and meals. (Doc. # 160-4 at 1–3.) Because the Court
considers the items to be costs, the Court will not address them in this Order.
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valid search warrant. The Government initiated the case on February 17, 2017, by filing
a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem. (Doc. # 1.) On April 1, 2017, Edward Burch
entered his appearance on behalf of Claimant, and he filed a Verified Claim Opposing
Forfeiture. (Doc. ## 10, 12.) Mr. Burch claims to be a specialist in civil forfeiture law, and
he charges $600 per hour for his services. See (Doc. # 134-6).
Beginning with Claimant’s Answer (Doc. # 15), which raised 14 affirmative
defenses that were as varied in subject matter as they were in legitimacy, Mr. Burch
vigorously, albeit fumblingly, advocated for his client. Among other things, Mr. Burch
filed: a Motion to Dismiss, which questioned the constitutionality of the federal forfeiture
statute (Doc. # 23); a Motion to Quash various subpoenas (Doc. # 53); a Motion to
Suppress, which challenged the validity of the underlying search warrant at issue (Doc #
65); a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 90); and a Motion in Limine (Doc. # 115).
All of those motions were denied, and some—e.g., the Motion to Quash—were very
poorly supported. See (Doc. # 57) (denying Motion to Quash and noting it was “wholly
unsupported by fact or law.”).
The Court conducted a three-day jury trial from December 2–4, 2019. Like the
motions he filed, Mr. Burch’s performance at trial was inelegant and, at times,
inappropriate. Mr. Burch displayed a lack of familiarity with basic concepts of the
Federal Rules of Evidence such as proper impeachment. Additionally, he seemed to
intentionally step over the line between permissible and impermissible conduct by
attempting to introduce evidence that had not been disclosed to the adverse party and
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employing strategies during his closing argument that bordered on deliberate jury
nullification.
However, despite Mr. Burch’s performance, the jury returned a verdict that was
favorable to his client. Specifically, the jury determined that, of the $114,700 at issue,
$21,000 was subject to forfeiture as proceeds of drug trafficking. (Doc. # 131.)
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court entered final judgment and noted that because
“Claimant has substantially prevailed in this matter, the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2465(b) shall apply regarding fees, costs and post-judgment interest under applicable
statutes, federal and local rules.” (Doc. # 133 at 2.)
Mr. Burch filed the instant Motion on December 20, 2019. In his Final Tally of
Requested Fees and Costs, he requests $520,762.50 in attorney fees for himself and
four other lawyers. (Doc. # 160-4 at 1.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a claimant “substantially prevails” against the United States in a civil
forfeiture proceeding, “the United States shall be liable for . . . reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
2465(b)(1)(A). However, “if the court enters judgment in part for the claimant and in part
for the Government, the court shall reduce the award of costs and attorney fees
accordingly.” § 2465(b)(2)(D).
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate.” Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.
3
2010) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)) (citing Robinson v. City
of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A] court must begin by calculating
the so-called ‘lodestar amount’ of a fee, . . . [which] is the product of the number of
attorney hours ‘reasonably expended’ and a ‘reasonable hourly rate.’”)). However, the
Tenth Circuit has explained:
In a case like this, where Plaintiff “achieved only partial or limited
success,” the calculation for reasonable attorney's fees requires more than
just determining “the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate” because such “may be an
excessive amount.” [Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)]
(emphasis added). Two questions must be addressed by the district court.
“First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the
claim[ ] on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of
success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for
making a fee award?” Id. at 434 . . . . Plaintiff can only obtain an award of
attorney's fees for time spent prosecuting the successful claim as well as
those related to it.
However, that does not end the matter. The district court still retains
discretion to adjust the award commensurate with the degree of success
obtained. Id. at 436 . . . . This last inquiry is not amenable to a formulaic
table but is a matter of discretion. Id. In exercising this discretion, however,
we note that “[t]he record ought to assure us that the district court did not
‘eyeball’ the fee request and cut it down by an arbitrary percentage . . . .”
Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d
1307, 1314 (7th Cir.1996)).
Browder v. City of Moab, 427 F.3d 717, 722–23 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
III.
DISCUSSION
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court will begin by calculating
the applicable “lodestar” amount before considering the impact of the partiality of
Claimant’s success.
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A.
LODESTAR AMOUNT
1.
Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
In determining the reasonableness of the hours expended, a court considers
several factors, including: (1) whether the amount of time spent on a particular task
appears reasonable in light of the complexity of the case, the strategies pursued, and
the responses necessitated by an opponent’s maneuvering; (2) whether the amount of
time spent is reasonable in relation to counsel's experience; and (3) whether the billing
entries are sufficiently detailed, showing how much time was allotted to specific task.
Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 538, 542 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553-54 (10th Cir. 1983)). “The party seeking an award
of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Roth v. Coleman, 438 F. App'x 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2011).
The Tenth Circuit has noted that “[c]ounsel for the party claiming the fees has the
burden of proving hours to the district court by submitting meticulous, contemporaneous
time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours for which
compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks.” Case
v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, KS, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir.
1998). Once the court has adequate time records before it, “it must then ensure that the
winning attorney has exercised ‘billing judgment.’” Case, 157 F.3d at 1250 (quoting
Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553). “Billing judgment consists of winnowing the hours actually
expended down to the hours reasonably expended.” Id. Additionally, “the district court
must reduce the actual number of hours expended to a reasonable number to ensure
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services an attorney would not properly bill to his or her client are not billed to the
adverse party.” United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1234
(10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Mr. Burch asserts that his co-counsel and he collectively spent 862.6 hours
litigating this case. See (Doc. # 160-4 at 1). However, upon review of Mr. Burch’s Final
Tally of Requested Fees and Costs, and the documentation that supports that tally, it is
evident that Mr. Burch—and the other attorneys who assisted him throughout this
case—did not exercise sound billing judgment. Accordingly the Court “must reduce the
actual number of hours expended to a reasonable number . . . .” United Phosphorus,
205 F.3d at 1234.
a.
Time spent pursuing frivolous legal theories
Throughout this case, Mr. Burch’s litigation stratagem can be accurately
described as, “plead first analyze later.” Not only is this litigation tactic questionable at
best, it is not compensable in this Court.
For example, in the Answer that Mr. Burch filed on April 24, 2017 (Doc. # 15), he
raised fourteen affirmative defenses. The Government subsequently filed a Motion to
Strike that correctly asserted that many of those defenses were “incorrect as a matter of
law and should be stricken.” (Doc. # 16 at 3.) Mr. Burch conceded the point in his
Response, and he abandoned six affirmative defenses outright, which shows that the
pleading was not well-planned from the outset. (Doc. # 21 at 7.) The Court ultimately
struck those defenses in addition to two others—one of which was stricken only in part.
(Doc. # 44 at 2.) Because more than half of the affirmative defenses in the Answer were
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not legally supported, the Court reduces the time Mr. Burch’s billed with respect to
composing the Answer and Response to the Government’s Motion to Strike by 50%.
Therefore, although Mr. Burch’s time sheet reflects that he spent approximately
10 hours on work related to the Answer and Response to the Motion to Strike, see
(Doc. # 134-6 at 10), only 5 hours are compensable. Mr. Burch’s colleague, David
Michael, claims to have spent approximately 3 hours reviewing and editing Mr. Burch’s
above-referenced work product. (Doc. 134-7 at 11.) However, that time is excluded in its
entirety because Mr. Michael’s review apparently missed the glaring problems that
existed in Mr. Burch’s work.
Similarly, Magistrate Judge Gallagher noted that the Motion to Quash that Mr.
Burch filed on February 8, 2018 (Doc. # 53), was “wholly unsupported by fact or law”
(Doc. # 57 at 3). Mr. Burch claims to have spent approximately 20 hours on work related
to that motion, see (Doc. # 134-6 at 13–15), and Mr. Michael spent approximately 2.5
hours reviewing Mr. Burch’s work (Doc. # 136-7 at 12). All the time spent on the Motion
to Quash is excluded because the motion was groundless.
In summary, the Court excludes 25 hours from Mr. Burch’s reported time and
5.5 hours from Mr. Michael’s because that time was spent on frivolous legal work.
b.
Excessive time on particular tasks
Mr. Burch filed two motions that were the product of excessive time. First, Mr.
Burch filed a Motion to Dismiss that challenged the constitutionality of the federal
forfeiture statute. (Doc. # 23.) The motion was based almost entirely on a Statement of
Justice Thomas respecting the denial of certiorari in Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847
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(2017). Although the motion had some legal foundation to support it, that foundation
was thin to say the least. Therefore, the theory did not warrant a significant amount of
time to explore. The issue could be easily preserved for appellate purposes by a
concise motion that would take little time to draft.
However, Mr. Burch spent approximately 30 hours on work related to the motion,
see (Doc. # 134-6 at 11–14), and Mr. Michael spent 2 hours reviewing Mr. Burch’s work
(Doc. # 134-7 at 11–12). That time is excessive because the scope of the motion, and
the authority on which it was based, was extremely limited. Therefore, the Court
reduces each attorney’s time by 50%. As a result, 15 hours are excluded from Mr.
Burch and 1 hour is excluded from Mr. Michael.
The second motion that involved excessive amounts of time was the Motion to
Suppress that Mr. Burch filed on April 3, 2018. 2 (Doc. # 65.) The motion pertained to a
straightforward fact pattern regarding law enforcement’s search of Claimant’s property.
Despite the relative simplicity of the facts and underlying Fourth Amendment legal
principles, Mr. Burch’s time sheet reflects that he spent nearly 110 hours on the motion
The Government argues that time related to the Suppression Motion should be rejected in its
entirety because the motion was “an affirmative claim and does not relate to the Claimant’s
defense of the government’s case-in-chief.” (Doc. # 156 at 5.) In support of its argument, the
Government cites a decision from criminal case that denied a defendant access to discovery
and categorized a motion to suppress as a “sword.” (Id.) (citing United States v. Hunt, No. 2:11CR-441-KJM, 2013 WL 5279075, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013)). However, in Hunt, the court
was analyzing whether information was material to the Government’s case, whereas the
operative standard for recovering attorney fees considers whether a matter is related to a claim
on which a party prevailed. See Browder, 427 F.3d at 722–23. The former is certainly a more
demanding standard than the latter. In the instant case, Claimant’s Motion to Suppress did
relate to the Government’s forfeiture allegation because, if Claimant had prevailed, the motion
would have had an impact on what evidence the Government was able to present at trial in
support of its claim.
2
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and related hearing. (Doc. # 156-4.) Additionally, Mr. Michael spent approximately 7
hours on work related to the motion (Doc. # 134-7 at 12), and Mr. Burch’s colleague,
Carolyn Emison billed 45 hours for time she spent working on the motion (Doc. # 134-9
at 3–4).
Based on the Court’s review of the time sheets, it appears that Ms. Emison was
primarily responsible for research and writing with respect to the motion. However, a
substantial amount of her time overlaps with tasks for which Mr. Burch is seeking
compensation. In order to mitigate the apparent overstaffing and duplication of efforts,
the Court reduces Ms. Emison’s compensable time by 10 hours and subtracts Ms.
Emison’s time from Mr. Burch’s reported time, thus reducing it by 30 hours. The Court
subtracts an additional 15 hours from Mr. Burch’s time to bring it within the range of
what would be necessary to draft and argue a motion to suppress that is similarly
challenging. Finally, the Court excludes Mr. Michael’s time in its entirety—i.e.,
7 hours—because it was simply not necessary to involve a third lawyer on the Motion
to Suppress, especially when the motion could have been handled by only one lawyer.
In summary, due to the excessiveness reflected in their time sheets with respect
to the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress, the Court reduces Mr. Burch’s time by
60 hours, Mr. Michael’s time by 8 hours, and Ms. Emison’s time by 10 hours.
c.
Grossly excessive time spent seeking attorney fees
“An award of reasonable attorney's fees may include compensation for work
performed in preparing and presenting the fee application.” Garrett v. Principal Life Ins.
Co., 557 F. App'x 734, 738 (10th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Case, 157 F.3d
9
at 1254). However, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that if an “attorney’s fee request . . .
is outrageously excessive, the court may respond by awarding no fees at all.” Case, 157
F.3d at 1254. “The reason for acting punitively when a party asks for fees that are
outrageously excessive is to deter attorneys from ‘mak[ing] unreasonable demands,
knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction
of their fee to what they should have asked for in the first place.’” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980)).
Claimant’s counsel spent an outrageous amount of time on their request for
attorney fees in this case. Mr. Burch claims to have spent more than 120 hours—i.e.,
three full 40-hour weeks—on matters related to attorney fees and costs. Additionally,
although Mr. Michael did not provide a time sheet that reflects the time he spent working
on this matter after December 18, 2019, it appears that he spent approximately 6 hours
working on fee-related issues. (Doc. ## 134-7, 160-4.)
The Court recognizes that the Government filed a detailed Response to the
instant Motion, which prompted Claimant to file a detailed Reply. However, that does
not justify spending almost 130 hours on attorney fees. A more plausible explanation for
the extreme excess of time is that Mr. Burch and Mr. Michael faced the nearly
impossible task of trying to justify fees that bear no reasonable relationship to the
services they rendered. Therefore, as a disincentive for attempting to secure
unreasonable compensation, the Court does not award any fees that pertain to work
preparing the instant Motion.
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In summary, the compensable hours for Claimant’s attorneys are as follows:
Attorney
Hours
Burch
558.25 (763.25-205)
Michael
32.5 (52-19.5)
Hagin Emison
30 (40-10)
Zalkin
6.25
Maytin
03
2.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
“When determining the appropriate rate to apply to the reasonable hours, ‘the
district court should base its hourly rate award on what the evidence shows the market
commands for . . . analogous litigation.’” United Phosphorus, 205 F.3d at 1234 (quoting
Case, 157 F.3d at 1255). The party requesting the fees bears “the burden of showing
that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id.
(quoting Ellis v. University of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998)). The
focus must be on the “prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Id. (quoting
Ellis, 163 F.3d at 1203). “[A] district court abuses its discretion when it ignores the
parties’ market evidence and sets an attorney’s hourly rate using the rates it
consistently grant[s].” Id. (quoting Case, 157 F.3d at 1255). “The court may not use its
Lauren Maytlin claims to have billed 1.1 hours of time working on this case, but a review of her
Declaration shows that, although she represented Mr. Schwabe in the state criminal prosecution
arising from the September 2016 search and seizure underlying this case, she did little more
than refer this case to Mr. Burch and send some information to his firm. (Doc. # 134-8.)
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own knowledge to establish the appropriate rate unless the evidence of prevailing
market rates before the court is inadequate.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Case, 157
F.3d at 1257) (citing Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The parties submitted conflicting evidence with regard to what constitutes a
reasonable rate of compensation for this case. The Government submitted a
Declaration prepared by Nancy Cohen. (Doc. # 156-10.) Ms. Cohen is a partner in the
Denver office of the law firm, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith LLP and has practiced law
for approximately 38 years. (Id. at 1.) Notably, Ms. Cohen is a member of the Colorado
Supreme Court Advisory Counsel and the Colorado Supreme Court Standing
Committee on the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. (Id. at 2.) She opines that a
reasonable rate of compensation for Mr. Burch and Mr. Michael is $275 and $450,
respectively. (Id. at 3.)
Claimant, on the other hand, initially took the position that Mr. Burch and Mr.
Michael were entitled to be compensated at a rate of $600 and $825 per hour because
they “are entitled to hourly rates higher than those of a general practitioner in the
Denver area, because this case required specialized knowledge and experience not
held by any Colorado defense attorney, and Mr. Burch and Mr. Michael live in and
are based out of the San Francisco Bay area.” (Doc. # 134 at 7) (emphasis added).
However, Claimant wisely abandoned that unpersuasive argument in his Reply. Instead,
Claimant submitted a Declaration prepared by David Lane. (Doc. # 160-1.)
Mr. Lane is a partner in the Denver firm, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP. Mr.
Lane’s practice “consists of criminal defense, primarily in death penalty defense, and
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plaintiffs’ civil rights and discrimination cases.” (Id. at 5.) He opines that “the hourly rates
charged by each of the civil forfeiture lawyers on this case were reasonable for lawyers
of comparable skill and experience in the Colorado civil rights community.” (Id. at 4.)
Notably, Mr. Lane indicates that he personally charges a rate $650 per hour. (Id. at 7.)
However, Mr. Lane has “tried well over 225 jury trials over 40 years,” unlike Mr. Burch,
who is seeking a similar rate for his services despite having substantially less
experience. (Id. at 16.)
With that in mind, the Court finds Ms. Cohen’s opinion to be more credible than
Mr. Lane’s. Between the two practitioners’ analysis of this case, Ms. Cohen’s
assessment closely matches the Court’s own observations. For instance, she states:
Mr. Burch’s skills at trial were not of a lawyer who had been practicing law
for 12 years. Not knowing how to impeach witnesses with deposition
testimony and Mr. Burch offering evidence that had been excluded is what
one might expect from an inexperienced associate, but not a twelve year
lawyer. Mr. Burch prevailed at trial despite his performance.
(Doc. # 156-10 at 7.) Additionally, the Court credits Ms. Cohen’s intuitive assessment
that, “[c]ontrary to Mr. Burch’s Declaration, there are competent lawyers in Colorado
who handle this type of litigation. Thus, it was not necessary to retain out of state
counsel who live in a city with a higher cost of living . . . .” (Id. at 5.) Perhaps most
importantly, Ms. Cohen accurately observed that “[t]his case was not complex. It
involved one asset and one claim. The facts are straightforward.” (Id.)
Therefore, due to the simplicity of the case, the availability of local counsel, and
Mr. Burch’s relatively modest skillset, charging a rate of $600 per hour is fundamentally
unreasonable. On the other hand, Ms. Cohen persuasively asserts that $275 is a
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reasonable rate for Mr. Burch’s services, and that $250 and $450 are reasonable rates
for Ms. Emison and Mr. Michael, respectively.
In summary, the compensable hours and rates for Claimant’s attorneys are as
follows:
Attorney
Rate
Hours
Amount of Fees
Burch
$275
558.25
$153,518.75
Michael
$450
32.5
$14,625.00
Hagin Emison
$250
30
$7,500.00
Zalkin
$250
6.25
$1,562.50
Total Fees
$177,206.25
B.
PARTIAL SUCCESS
As the Court has previously noted, 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(D) indicates that, “[i]f
the court enters judgment in part for the claimant and in part for the Government, the
court shall reduce the award of costs and attorney fees accordingly.” In this case, the
Government prevailed as to $21,000, or approximately 18%, of the $114,700 at issue.
Therefore, the plain language of § 2465(b)(2)(D) requires Claimant’s attorney fee award
to be reduced. As a result, the Court reduces Claimant’s award by 18%, which is the
proportion of the proceeds that were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of drug trafficking.
Additionally, Ms. Cohen accurately points out that Mr. Burch and Mr. Michael’s
time sheets are littered with block billing and “paralegal work [that] should not be
charged at the lawyer hourly rates.” (Doc. # 156-10 at 7); see, e.g., (Doc. # 134-6 at 12)
(Mr. Burch’s time sheet billing for reviewing order granting motion for extension of time
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and calendaring deadlines); (Doc. # 134-7 at 11) (Mr. Michael’s time sheet curiously
billing for retrieving and forwarding a disc from one person to another). Rather than
scouring the time sheets for all the instances in which Mr. Michael and Mr. Burch bill for
non-substantive legal work, the Court finds that an additional 7% reduction in their
attorney fees is warranted. See, e.g., Zisumbo v. Ogden Reg'l Med. Ctr., 801 F.3d 1185,
1208 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Here, the district court's reasons for reducing Zisumbo's
attorneys' fee award by 40%—Zisumbo's limited success overall and the generally
haphazard manner in which his counsel litigated this case—were both appropriate and
supported by the record.”).
In summary, the final award of attorney fees that accounts for an 18% reduction
overall, and an additional 7% reduction for Mr. Burch and Mr. Michael, is as follows:
Attorney
Rate
Hours
Amount of Fees
Including Applicable
Reductions
Burch
$275
558.25
$115,139.00
(153,518.75 reduced
by 25%)
Michael
$450
32.5
$10,968.75
($14,625.00 reduced
by 25%)
Hagin Emison
$250
30
$6,150.00 ($7,500.00
reduced by 18%)
Zalkin
$250
6.25
$1,281.25 ($1,562.50
reduced by 18%)
Total Fees
$133,539.00
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that Claimant’s Motion for Attorney
Fees (Doc. # 134) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as reflected in this
Order. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of Claimant and against
the United States in the amount of $133,539.00 in attorney fees.
DATED: August 26, 2020
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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