Stone et al v. Amaya et al
ORDER Affirming and Adopting in Part the February 14, 2018 Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 3/7/2018. (swest)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00617-CMA-MJW
GENIE CONNAGHAN, in her official capacity as Thomas Neilsen’s parole officer,
RICK RAEMISCH, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the DOC, and
MAGGIE M. MCELDERRY, in her official capacity as DOC facility parole officer,
ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING IN PART THE FEBURARY 14, 2018
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the February 14, 2018, Recommendation by
United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. # 54) be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. # 61.) The
Recommendation is incorporated herein by reference. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The Recommendation advised the parties that specific written objections were
due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the Recommendation.
(Doc. # 49.) Despite this advisement, no party filed objections to Magistrate Judge
Watanabe’s Recommendation. “In the absence of timely objection, the district court
may review a magistrate [judge’s] report under any standard it deems appropriate.”
Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 150 (1985) (stating that “[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require
district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or
any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”)).
The Court has reviewed all the relevant pleadings concerning Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and the Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Watanabe concluded
that Plaintiff’s request for an injunction against Defendants Raemisch and McElderry is
moot because Plaintiff has been released onto parole. (Doc. # 61 at 7–9.) He also
noted that because “neither party ha[d] provided any details as to the current conditions
of Plaintiff’s parole,” it was “possible that Plaintiff is living with his wife at his home, thus
rendering this entire action moot.” (Id. at 9.) Because he could not determine whether
the entire action was moot, the Magistrate Judge continued on to address Plaintiff’s
other claims. (Id. at 9–10.) He recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against Defendants Connaghan and McElderry be permitted to proceed.
(Id. at 15.)
After receiving the Recommendation, this Court ordered the parties to file a
status report informing the Court as to whether Plaintiff is currently living with his
spouse. (Doc. # 62.) On February 28, 2018, Plaintiff informed the Court that he is
currently living with his wife in their home. (Doc. # 63.)
Accordingly, this action is moot and must be dismissed. Mootness is a threshold
issue because “Article III delimits the jurisdiction of federal courts, allowing us to
consider only actual cases or controversies.” McKeen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d
1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F. 3d 1301, 1311
(10th Cir. 2010)). In deciding whether a case is moot, “the crucial question is whether
granting a present determination of the issues offered . . . will have some effect in the
real world.” Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009)
(internal citation omitted). “When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective
relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot.” Id. (citing United
States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). Because Plaintiff in
the instant matter is currently living with his wife, determination of his remaining claims
will have no effect in the real world.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that the Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Watanabe (Doc. # 61) is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED IN PART as to his analysis of
mootness with respect to Plaintiff’s claim seeking his release onto parole. The Court
rejects the Recommendation to the extent that it permits Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief with respect to unauthorized parole conditions to proceed. For the
reasons set forth above, the Court finds that those claims are moot. Therefore, it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 54) is
GRANTED in full and the entire action is dismissed as moot.
DATED: March 7, 2018
BY THE COURT:
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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