Kolbe et al v. Endocrine Services, P.C.
Filing
187
ORDER: The Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 178 ) is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties in this matter. Plaintiffs are awarded $535,880.50 in attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs are awarded $1,500.20 in litigation costs. SO ORDERED by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 2/15/2024.(jtorr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 17-cv-01871-RM-SKC
WENDY KOLBE, and
COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION, a Colorado non-profit organization,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ENDOCRINE SERVICES, P.C., a Colorado Corporation,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (ECF NO. 178)
______________________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Wendy Kolbe and Colorado Cross-Disability
Coalition’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses to be Awarded Against Defendant
Endocrine Services, P.C. (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 178), which is opposed by Defendant. Upon
consideration of the Motion, relevant parts of the court record, and being otherwise fully advised,
the Court finds and orders as follows.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Wendy Kolbe (“Plaintiff Kolbe”) and Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition
(“Plaintiff CCDC,” and together “Plaintiffs”) sued Defendant Endocrine Services, P.C.
(“Endocrine Services” or “Defendant”) after she went to their offices and Dr. Agha Kahn (“Dr.
Kahn”) informed her that she could not have her service dog, Bandit, with her during her
appointment. The Plaintiffs brought claims for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), and the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”). Plaintiff Kolbe sought both monetary damages and
declaratory relief, as well as an injunction, while Plaintiff CCDC sought only equitable relief.
The Court split the claims between those triable to a jury—the claims for money damages under
Section 504 and CADA—and those triable only to the Court—the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief under all three provisions.
A jury trial was held on March 15-17, 2022. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Plaintiff Kolbe, finding that Endocrine Services had discriminated against her, although the jury
also concluded that Plaintiff Kolbe had not proven that the discrimination was intentional. The
jury also awarded Plaintiff Kolbe $20,000 in damages pursuant to CADA. (ECF No. 168.)
The Court held a bench trial during the jury’s deliberations, during which it took
additional evidence regarding Plaintiff CCDC’s standing to bring a claim for relief and, after
receiving the jury’s verdict, directed the Parties to prepare proposed injunctions for its
consideration. 1
On March 31, 2022, the Court issued an Order in which it made findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (ECF No. 173.) In that Order, the Court found in favor Plaintiffs on their
claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The Court
then entered an injunction, ordering that within 45 days of the entry of the Order, Defendant
would modify its written policies, practices, and procedures in order to be in compliance with the
applicable statues and implementing regulations. The Court directed that Defendant distribute
that policy to all its employees, and enjoined Defendant from denying service to persons with
service animals in violation of those statutes and regulations. The Court noted that, as prevailing
1
The Court received a proposed injunction from Plaintiffs but received nothing from Defendant.
2
parties, Plaintiffs were entitled to file a motion for attorney fees. Finally, the Court retained
limited jurisdiction to hear disputes over the injunction for a period of two years.
Plaintiffs filed the Motion and requested a total of $535,880.50 in attorney fees and
$1,500.20 in litigation expenses, separate and apart from the Bill of Costs that was separately
submitted to the Clerk of Court and addressed there. (ECF No. 178.)
Defendant filed a Response, arguing that both the hourly rates charged, and the hours
expended on this matter by Plaintiffs’ counsel were excessive. (ECF No. 184.) Specifically,
Defendant made a fairly cursory argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel should not have been working
on this matter during the lengthy delays between the originally scheduled trial dates and the dates
on which the trail was reset, which happened twice in this case due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Defendant argued that a lengthy period of time elapsed between the first pretrial conference and
the eventual trial date, and that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time during that period constituted
“churning.” Defendant suggested that the Court should cut a total of 746.7 hours from the
1406.6 hours that Plaintiffs’ counsel billed. Defendant also argued that the rates charged were
unreasonable. Defendant noted that Plaintiffs’ senior attorney, Kevin Williams, charged $505
per hour, and the more junior attorney, who was also lead attorney in this case, Andrew
Montoya, charged $425 per hour. Defendant then asserted that the result was a combined hourly
rate of $930 per hour. Finally, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ counsel wasted time on several
unnecessary tasks—in particular, on the preparation and filing of a surreply that was ultimately
not accepted by the Court, researching for a motion for a Rule 11 sanction that was ultimately
not filed, drafting a motion to continue the trial, and spending 115.5 hours drafting jury
instructions.
Plaintiffs filed a Reply in which they addressed each of Defendant’s arguments. (ECF
No. 185.) Plaintiffs noted that this case was a civil rights case, involving specialized issues of
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both federal and state law, as well as an evidentiary dispute over Plaintiff Kolbe’s medical
condition. Plaintiffs also noted that the litigation extended over many years—five years elapsed
before trial—and that time was also expended in preparing for the trial dates that were ultimately
reset. Furthermore, Plaintiffs point out that the case involved some unique issues, such as the
question of associational standing for Plaintiff CCDC and Plaintiff Kolbe’s standing for the
purposes of prospective relief. Finally, Plaintiffs note that their counsel obtained total success,
prevailing on all theories of liability and receiving all relief sought, including both monetary
damages and declaratory relief.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter,
the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and
costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private
individual.
42 U.S.C. § 12205. The Rehabilitation Act contains the same provision. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).
Furthermore, “[e]ach circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that the considerations
that govern fee-shifting under § 706(k) of title VII or under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 apply to the
ADA’s fee-shifting provision, because the almost identical language in each indicates Congress’s
intent to enforce them similarly.” No Barriers, Inc. v. Brinker Chili’s Texas, Inc., 262 F.3d 496,
498 (5th Cir. 2001). Because these statutes are intended to provide judicial access for
individuals who claim violations of their civil rights, “a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily
recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
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In making a fee request, the claimant must prove both that he or she was the prevailing
party in the proceeding and that the requested fee is “reasonable.” Robinson v. City of Edmond,
160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998) (addressing award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to
make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an
award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may
reduce the award accordingly.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. This so-called “lodestar calculation” is presumed to be a reasonable
fee. Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281. This inquiry, then, requires the Court to determine whether the
hourly rates charged were reasonable as well as whether the hours expended were reasonable—
“whether the attorney’s hours were ‘necessary’ under the circumstances.” Id. The Court should
look to see whether the prevailing party exercised billing judgment and made a good-faith effort
to exclude from the fee request any hours that were duplicative, unnecessary, or otherwise
excessive. Id. Among the factors to consider in making a determination of reasonableness are
(1) whether the tasks being billed “would normally be billed to a paying client,”
(2) the number of hours spent on each task, (3) “the complexity of the case,”
(4) “the number of reasonable strategies pursued,” (5) “the responses necessitated
by the maneuvering of the other side,” and (6) “potential duplication of services”
by multiple lawyers.
Id. (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F2d 546, 554).
III.
DISCUSSION
In this case, the Parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was the prevailing party, and the
Court previously so concluded. (ECF No. 173.) Thus, the only question is whether or not the
amount of fees claimed is “reasonable.”
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A. Hourly Rates
Defendant first argues that the hourly rates billed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys was
unreasonable. (ECF No. 184.) Without cite to authority, Defendant apparently argues that the
Court should consider the combined rate of the two attorneys together, which would yield an
hourly rate of $930 per hour. The Court can see no reason in logic or in law why this is the
appropriate analysis. Defendant seems to argue that this is proper because “Mr. Williams
seemed to check and revise just about everything Mr. Montoya did.” Perhaps this is why
Defendant concludes the hourly rate should be combined. But the Court disagrees. “There is
nothing inherently unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys, and they may all be
compensated if they are not unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for
the distinct contribution of each lawyer.” Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs., L.L.C.,
616 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Norman v. Housing Authority of City of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.1988)). In any event, Mr. Williams and Mr.
Montoya clearly performed a number of distinct tasks over the course of five years of actively
litigating this case, and they did keep meticulous billing records that the Court has carefully
reviewed. The Court therefore considers each of their billable rates independently.
Mr. Williams included with the petition his curriculum vitae which revealed his over 25
years of experience working for the Civil Rights Legal Program at the Colorado Cross-Disability
Coalition. (ECF No. 178-2). He also listed as examples of his work 27 different cases involving
litigation to vindicate the rights of disabled individuals in Colorado. And he noted that those
cases represent a fraction of the cases in which he was involved. Also attached to the Motion
was the expert opinion of Darold Killmer who opined that Mr. Williams’ rates were “solidly
within the ranges charged within the Colorado legal community” by attorneys of similar
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experience and skill. (ECF No. 178-9.) The Court concludes that the rate of $505 per hour for
Mr. Williams’ work was clearly reasonable.
Mr. Montoya similarly attached his curriculum vitae to the Motion and noted that he has
worked for the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition as an attorney since 2010. (ECF No. 178-7.)
He also worked for the Coalition prior to completing law school, from 2005 through 2007 in the
role of Legal Program Assistant. He listed 16 cases, all involving the civil rights of disabled
individuals, as examples of his work. Mr. Killmer also offered his opinion that the rate of $425
per hour for Mr. Montoya’s time was reasonable and within the range of rates charged in
Colorado for attorneys with similar experience. (ECF No. 178-9.)
Finally, Plaintiffs’ attorneys included the curriculum vitae of Kara Gillon, the legal
program assistant with whom the named attorneys worked on this case. (ECF No. 178-8.) Ms.
Gillon had worked at the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition since 2019. But uniquely Ms.
Gillon was actually also a licensed attorney. While she was not a member of the Colorado Bar,
the Motion noted that, as a result of her legal education and experience (she was a practicing
attorney for approximately 13 years), Ms. Gillon was able to perform tasks more traditionally
performed by attorneys, such as researching points of law, that would not have been within the
normal job description of a legal assistant. And Mr. Killmer opined that he believed someone
with Ms. Gillon’s credentials should actually have been charged at a rate higher than the $190
per hour billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. (ECF No. 178-9.) He also noted that the rate of $190 per
hour was reasonable.
Defendant makes no effort to rebut the evidence put forth by Plaintiffs’ counsel and fails
to cite a single piece of authority to suggest that the rates charged in this case were unreasonable.
In light of the evidence presented, as well as the Court’s own knowledge of the prevailing rates
7
in this legal market, the Court finds that the rates charged by each member of Plaintiffs’ legal
team were reasonable.
B. Hours Expended
Defendant makes only a slightly more robust argument regarding the hours expended.
Defendant’s arguments about hours expended appear to be that (1) Plaintiffs’ counsel should not
have expended any time on this case between the time of the final pretrial hearing and the month
before trial took place in March of 2022; (2) Mr. Williams should not have spent any time
supervising Mr. Montoya; (3) Plaintiffs’ counsel should not have expended any time drafting a
surreply to a Motion when the filing of surreplies is discouraged by the Court’s rules and because
the Court ultimately declined to consider the surreply; (4) Plaintiffs’ counsel should not have
spent time researching a Rule 11 sanction that was never filed; (5) Plaintiffs’ counsel should not
have expended more than one hour on a Motion to Continue; (6) Plaintiffs’ counsel expended
excessive time on drafting jury instructions.
As an initial matter, in reviewing the amounts Plaintiff requests, the Court is mindful it
has no obligation to play the “green-eyeshade accountant” as the essential goal is “to do rough
justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Nevertheless,
the Court has carefully reviewed the 153 pages of billing records submitted by Plaintiffs in this
case and concludes as follows.
Defendant first contends Plaintiffs’ counsel should not have expended any time on this
case between the time of the final pretrial hearing in January 2020 and the month before trial
took place in March of 2022. Defendant concedes that time entered in the month prior to a
scheduled court date is appropriate, but states that “a COVID delay was no surprise,” apparently
arguing that Plaintiffs’ counsel should not have wasted time in trial preparations during the
month prior to the original trial date on September 14, 2020, and the month prior to the second
8
trial date set for March 15, 2021. (ECF No. 184, p.2.) Defendant also apparently believes that
any time expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel outside of those month-long pretrial periods was
unnecessary and inappropriate.
With regard to Defendant’s argument that “a COVID delay was no surprise,” the Court
notes that Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Continue Deadlines and Trial Preparation Conference on
July 21, 2020. (ECF No. 110.) In that Motion, Plaintiffs also requested to continue the trial date,
although they also expressed a preference to move forward with the trial as scheduled if possible.
Less than 2 months before trial, Defendant opposed the continuance. (ECF No. 114.) While the
continuance requested by Plaintiffs was not due to COVID-19, the Parties’ conduct makes it
clear that they both believed trial would take place as scheduled beginning on September 14,
2020. This court then denied the Motion to Continue on July 28, 2020. (ECF No. 116.) The
jury trial was not vacated until August 24, 2020, only three weeks before trial and after the trial
preparation conference had already taken place. (ECF No. 134.) Had Plaintiffs’ counsel failed
to prepare for trial under those circumstances they would have been professionally irresponsible.
Similarly, although the Parties both jointly requested a continuance of the second trial date (ECF
No. 139), the Court did not grant that Motion until January 27, 2021, barely more than two
weeks before the rescheduled trial preparation conference (ECF No. 140.) The Court cannot
conclude that in preparing as though trial would be taking place as scheduled, Plaintiffs’ counsel
were wasteful—rather, they were taking steps the Court would expect of competent counsel.
The months between those scheduled dates also included a number of billing entries to
which Defendant objects. Again, the Court has carefully reviewed the time records of Plaintiffs’
counsel and notes that during the period between the first scheduled trial and the date on which
the trial was ultimately held, (omitting the one-month trial preparation time that Defendant
concedes is reasonable), the majority of time expended went towards the following: (1) preparing
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and revising briefing regarding standing, as requested by the Court; (2) reviewing information
regarding juror disqualification in light of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s concern that the Court intended to
exclude any jurors who had diabetes; (3) research on Rule 11 sanctions in light of conflict with
Defendant’s counsel over jury instructions; (4) revising jury instructions; and (5) drafting a
Motion for Continuance. (ECF No. 178-3.) The Court will not second guess the time invested
by Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding time spent drafting the brief on the questions of standing which
the Court itself requested. Plaintiffs’ expert, Killmer, opined that the standing issues in this case
were “atypical” and that they “present unique hurdles” in this type of civil rights claim. (ECF
No. 178-9.) Nor is the Court inclined to speculate about the need for Plaintiffs’ counsel to
research questions surrounding jury service or Rule 11 sanctions. And the Court is not willing to
say that, simply because it was never filed, it was unnecessary for Plaintiffs’ counsel to draft a
Motion for Rule 11 sanctions—the existence of such a motion and the willingness to file it may
provide adequate remedy for improper conduct by an opposing counsel. Similarly, simply
because a surreply is discouraged by the rules of this Court, and was not ultimately accepted, the
Court cannot conclude that the drafting of such a document was inherently unnecessary and a
waste of time. The Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel expended
excessive amounts of time drafting the Joint Motion for Continuance in this case. (ECF No.
139.) This was not merely an ordinary motion to continue, but rather was one centered around
the unique facts in this case. Namely, that the COVID-19 pandemic was increasingly dangerous
at that time and that several of the participants in the trial, including Plaintiff Kolbe and
Plaintiffs’ counsel, had comorbidities putting them at higher risk of contracting COVID-19 and
of having a negative outcome once contracted. Under those circumstances, the Court is
unsurprised that the request for a continuance required more time than the one hour that
Defendant apparently believes is sufficient.
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As stated, the Court will not second guess every strategic decision made by the party
seeking fees. Cf. Robinson, 160 F.3d 1275, 1283 (noting that litigants should be given
“breathing room” to raise alternative legal theories and noting that the ultimate result of the suit
is what matters for the purpose of awarding fees). Rather, this Court must ensure that Plaintiffs’
counsel exercised “billing judgment” by “winnowing the hours actually expended down to the
hours reasonably expended.” Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.¸
No. 90-cv-02757-WYD-KMT, 2014 WL 793363 at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2014) (quoting Case v.
Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cty. Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998)). The
Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel delegated significant amounts of research on the juror service
question to the legal program assistant, thus significantly reducing the cost of that work.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel attest that they cut time such as that spent on purely
administrative tasks, time that was more than expected on a specific task, and time for certain
other tasks, such as speaking with the media, given that compensation for such tasks has been
denied by other courts. They also reduced the billed amount for certain instances of conferral
between counsel and collaboration. Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ counsel cut more than $50,000 in time
and also chose not to seek fees for the time spent preparing the Motion itself.
The Court also disagrees with Defendant that Mr. Williams appears to have unnecessarily
duplicated or supervised the work of Mr. Montoya. This case represented Mr. Montoya’s first as
lead counsel. Mr. Williams, as the much more experienced attorney, appropriately oversaw his
work, and the result was a complete victory for Plaintiffs. Furthermore, by permitting Mr.
Montoya to complete the bulk of the work, and having Mr. Williams act primarily as a
supervisor, Plaintiffs’ counsel reduced the overall amount billed, given Mr. Montoya’s lower
billing rate. In addition, the Court reiterates that Plaintiffs’ counsel frequently delegated legal
work to Ms. Gillon, a licensed attorney who was nevertheless billed at a legal assistant’s rate.
11
Defendant’s final argument is its most persuasive. Defendant points out that Plaintiffs’
counsel spent a total of 115.5 hours drafting and redrafting jury instructions between August 30,
2021, and March 11, 2022. Defendant argues that only 20 hours should have been required to
draft the instructions. “In determining what is a reasonable time in which to perform a given task
or to prosecute the litigation as a whole, the court should consider that what is reasonable in a
particular case can depend upon factors such as the complexity of the case, the number of
reasonable strategies pursued, and the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other
side.” Ramos, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (disapproved on other ground by Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizen’s Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 729 (1987)). In Ramos, therefore, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs’ counsel had recorded more than 100 hours spent drafting
the complaint. Id. The Court concluded that “[w]hile this expenditure of time may have been
reasonable, it demands explanation.” Id. So too does the expenditure of so much time on jury
instructions require explanation in this case.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has, however, provided that explanation here. In the Reply, Plaintiffs’
counsel explains that “[t]his [time spent on jury instructions] is one of the many times in which
Defendant’s actions or inactions drove up the fees incurred by Plaintiffs’ counsel.” It is true that
Defendant failed to timely file its proposed jury instructions prior to the second trial preparation
conference. (ECF Nos. 155, 158.) It is also true that, when Defendant did belatedly submit its
instructions, those instructions were identical to the earlier-filed set and contained many of the
same errors, including misidentification of the parties to the suit. (ECF Nos. 124, 154.)
Furthermore, Defendant’s counsel signed off on a set of stipulated instructions that were
submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, but that when it ultimately submitted its own set of instructions,
some of Defendant’s instructions conflicted with those previously stipulated. (ECF Nos. 144,
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154.) For example, it submitted a different burden of proof instruction. It also submitted a
conflicting instruction on damages.
Plaintiffs also note that the Parties vigorously disputed the proof necessary to
demonstrate liability in this case. (Compare ECF Nos. 154, 158.) Defendant repeatedly insisted
that in order to prove the elements of liability under the ADA, Plaintiff Kolbe was required to
prove that her “doctor certified to Defendant that she had a disability, and the requested
accommodation was necessary.” (ECF No. 154, p.25.) While the Parties both agreed that
Plaintiff Kolbe was required to prove her disability at trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel forcefully argued
that Defendant was not entitled to require such proof prior to providing her with accommodation.
As is clear from this Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order of Judgment and
Injunction, and as is also plain as a matter of law, Defendant could legally make only two
inquiries before denying service: (1) whether Plaintiff Kolbe’s service animal was required
because of a disability, and (2) what work the service animal had been trained to perform. (ECF
No. 173, p.6; 28 C.F.R. §36.302(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12186(b), 12205a.) The dispute over this
question required Plaintiffs’ counsel to submit additional briefing on the issue to the Court.
(ECF No. 158.) This same dispute was apparently the subject of the potential Rule 11 sanctions
Plaintiffs’ counsel considered requesting. In this case, therefore, the Court concludes that a
substantial portion of the time spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel on jury instructions was the result of
Defendant’s maneuvering.
The Court concludes that the hours billed in this case were ultimately reasonable. The
issues involved were deceptively complex, involving both state and federal civil rights laws.
Furthermore, from filing through trial, this case lasted almost five years, and it involved two
motions for summary judgment as well as additional motions, and the added complication of
litigating during a pandemic in a case involving a number of participants with
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immunodeficiencies. Plaintiffs’ counsel have provided detailed and meticulous billing records
justifying the time they expended and demonstrated the use of billing judgment by eliminating
approximately 10 percent of their billable time. To the extent that Defendant argues the fees
requested are inappropriate because they are disproportionate to the damages awarded to Plaintiff
Kolbe, the Court notes that “cases of this nature often provide a relatively small monetary
incentive and a significant commitment of time, resources, and risk for counsel. It is for that
very reason that attorneys’ fee awards are authorized by civil rights statutes, in order to provide
effective access to justice.” Longdo v. Pelle, No. 15-cv-01370-RPM, 2016 WL 10591328, *6
(D. Colo. Sept. 8, 2016).
Finally, the Court notes that Defendant’s counsel has given the Court very little
assistance in determining precisely how much the requested fees should be reduced. Rather, they
have merely counted the number of pages of billing records submitted for each of the contested
periods of time, which it concludes are 57, and then multiplies that number by what they say is
the average number of hours per page, 13.1. (ECF No. 184, p.2.) From that they suggest that
Plaintiffs’ counsel overbilled for 746.7 hours of time. In addition to all of the reasons already
discussed, the Court is not willing to rely on such an imprecise calculation. Given all of the
factors, the Court concludes that it will not reduce the requested fee award. The Court therefore
GRANTS the Motion and awards Plaintiffs $535,880.50 in attorney fees.
C. Litigation Costs
Plaintiffs also request recovery of their litigation costs pursuant to the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12205. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek $1,500.20 for certain expenses related directly to litigation
and not otherwise recovered as costs. (ECF No. 178-4.) The majority of the expenses are for
travel, and the remainder appear to cover the costs of printing and/or sending various documents
necessary for trial. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such costs
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under the ADA or the amount requested. The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion and awards
the requested $1,500.20 in litigation costs.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs finally argue that none of the amounts already awarded against Defendant have
been paid, and request that the Court set a date certain by which time all amounts due are to be
paid. (ECF No. 185, p.15.) The Court will not do so at this time. It is generally the
responsibility of the judgment creditor to secure payment from the judgment debtor, and here
Plaintiffs have not shown that other available remedies, such as the procurement of a judgment
lien or attorney’s lien, are inadequate.
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED
(1) That the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 178) is GRANTED in
favor of Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties in this matter;
(2) That Plaintiffs are awarded $535,880.50 in attorneys’ fees; and
(3) That Plaintiffs are awarded $1,500.20 in litigation costs.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
RAYMOND P. MOORE
Senior United States District Judge
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