Stout v. Woodson et al

Filing 57

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 56 Motion for Extension of Time re 49 Notice of Appeal. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 08/15/2018. (athom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-01904-CMA-STV
CHARLES J. STOUT,
Plaintiff,
v.
LORI SEITZ,
MICHELLE WESOLOWSKI,
ELLIARD,
ELISON, and
LEGGET,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXTENTION OF TIME
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Charles J. Stout’s Motion for Extension
of Time to Appeal Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5), which he filed in response to an Order of
the Tenth Circuit directing a limited remand to this Court to consider whether Mr. Stout’s
late-filed Notice of Appeal should be accepted. (Doc. ## 55, 56.) Having thoroughly
reviewed the Motion and applicable law, the Court denies Mr. Stout’s request.
The time limits for filing a notice of appeal are mandatory and jurisdictional.
United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960). Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) requires the filing of a notice of appeal “within 30 days after entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.” When, as here, a party has filed his notice of

appeal beyond the time specified in Rule 4, that party may seek relief by showing good
cause or excusable neglect. United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243, 245 (10th Cir. 1979).
Good cause comes into play “in situations in which there is no fault—excusable
or otherwise. In such situations, the need for an extension is usually occasioned by
something that is not within the control of the movant.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); Bishop
v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004).
The excusable neglect standard is even more stringent, existing only when a
defendant has done “all he could do under the circumstances” to perfect a timely
appeal. United States v. Avendano–Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir.1986).
“[W]ith the exception of ‘extraordinary cases where injustice would otherwise result,’ few
cases will ordinarily qualify under the excusable neglect rubric.” Reinsurance Co. of
America v. Administratia, 808 F.2d 1249, 1251 (7th Cir.1987). Circumstances giving
rise to excusable neglect include failure to learn of the entry of judgment, unpredictable
events affecting the delivery of notice of appeal to the clerk, uncontrollable delays in
mail delivery, illness of counsel, and unpredictable events affecting the feasibility of
appeal. United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993); see United
States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1986) (excusable neglect existed on
part of an unrepresented criminal defendant who was in intensive care unit of civilian
hospital, and later in federal prison hospital, while “groggy and incoherent” due to his
medication).
Another well-established rule with particular relevance to Plaintiff’s situation holds
that ignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall
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short of good cause and excusable neglect. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 392; United States v. Dumont, 936 F.2d 292,
294–5 (7th Cir.1991); Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.1988); see also
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d at 999 (“The ancient legal maxim continues to
apply: ignorance of fact may excuse; ignorance of law does not excuse.”). “[E]ven for
an incarcerated pro se petitioner, [ignorance of the law] generally does not excuse
prompt filing.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
In this case, Mr. Stout concedes that he filed his Notice of Appeal late. (Doc. #
56.) Mr. Stout claims that his motion was untimely filed because he mistakenly relied on
the 60-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal when the United States, or its agency or
officer, is a party. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Mr. Stout believed that two of the
Defendants were United States agents because they are “part of the Sex Offender
Management Board (SOMB), an agency of the State of Colorado.” (Doc. # 56.) He
adds that he “knows[s he is] supposed to meet all deadlines in the Court” and attributes
his mistake to his being pro se. (Id.)
Having thoroughly considered the issue, this Court finds that Mr. Stout’s only
claimed basis for delay—that he misunderstood the law because he does not have legal
counsel—is insufficient to support the relief he seeks. Indeed, this Court sees no
reason to stray from the general and longstanding maxim that ignorance of law is no
excuse. Moreover, [w]hile “a party’s pro se status may be considered in determining
whether excusable neglect has been demonstrated, it does not in and of itself constitute
an excuse for the litigant’s non-compliance with procedural rules.” Goldwyn v.
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Donahoe, No. 12-4099-JTM, 2013 WL 3778919, at *2 (D. Kan. July 18, 2013) aff’d, 562
F. App’x 655 (10th Cir. 2014) (denying relief under Rule 4(a)(5) grounded on nothing
other than plaintiff's pro se status; citing numerous cases in support); see also Cordell v.
Pacific Indem., 335 Fed. Appx. 956, 960 (11th Cir.2009) (no showing of excusable
neglect by pro se appellants, as “even pro se pleadings must adhere to time
requirements”).
Relief under Rule 4(a)(5), particularly when based on a mistake of law, is
intended for extraordinary circumstances; granting the Plaintiff’s motion here would alter
this standard by authorizing what would be essentially automatic relief under Rule
4(a)(5) for any pro se litigant who misunderstands his procedural obligations. The Court
declines to do so, instead finding that, pursuant to long-standing legal precedent,
Plaintiff demonstrates neither excusable neglect nor good cause.
The Court accordingly DENIES Mr. Stout’s Motion for Extension of Time to
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5). (Doc. # 56.)
DATED: August 15, 2018

BY THE COURT:

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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