Tso v. Murray et al

Filing 160

ORDER. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of (2nd) Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 62 is DENIED. By Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 9/30/18. (pabsec)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 17-cv-02523-PAB-STV
GILBERT T. TSO, a natural person and an American,
Plaintiff,
v.
REBECCA MURRAY, a/k/a Tso, individually,
TANYA AKINS, individually,
SHERR PUTTMANN AKINS LAMB PC, law firm,
JEANNIE RIDINGS, individually,
KILILIS RIDINGS & VANAU PC, a law firm,
RUSSELL MURRAY, individually,
DENA MURRAY, individually,
JOANNE JENSEN, individually,
RICHARD F. SPIEGLE, PSY.D., individually,
ELIZABETH A. STARRS, individually,
DAVID P. BRODSKY, individually,
CHARLES D. JOHNSON, individually,
ROSS B.H. BUCHANAN, individually,
DAVID H. GOLDBERG, individually,
MONICA JACKSON, individual and official capacity,
LARA DELKA, individual and official capacity,
CHRISTIAN MADDY, individual and official capacity,
JENNIFER ADELMANN, individual and official capacity,
DON MARES, official capacity,
BARRY PARDUS, official capacity,
MICHAEL DIXON, official capacity,
CYNTHIA COFFMAN, official capacity,
19th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, LAKE CO., IL,
2nd DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, CO,
DENVER DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES,
COLORADO DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES,
COLORADO DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, and
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
(2nd) Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
[Docket No. 62]. In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes his filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
This is plaintiff’s second motion for injunctive relief in this case. See Docket No.
61 at 2-3. On February 22, 2018, the Court denied plaintiff’s first motion because he did
not address the problems identified by Judge William J. Martínez in denying an almost
identical motion that plaintiff filed in a case before Judge Martínez. Id. at 3-4. The
Court stated that it would
deny plaintiff’s motion because plaintiff has not made the necessary
showing to warrant injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s present motion does not
cure the two infirmities identified by Judge Martínez. First, “‘simple
economic loss’” of the type claimed by plaintiff “‘usually does not, in and of
itself, constitute irreparable harm.’” [Tso v. Murray et al., No. 16-cv-2480WJM-STV, 2017 WL 3116338, at *2 (“Tso II”)] (quoting Heideman v. S.
Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003)). Plaintif f again
makes only conclusory allegations regarding potential insolvency and lost
opportunities that cannot be compensated. Docket No. 49 at 6-7, ¶¶ c.i,
c.ii. Second, plaintiff has not shown likelihood of success on the merits
because he does not address whether the Court will be required to abstain
from granting plaintiff the relief he seeks as a “collateral attack on the
lawfulness of final state court judgments and orders.” Tso II, 2017 WL
3116338, at *2; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.”); Docket Nos. 49, 57.
Docket No. 61 at 4-5.
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On February 23, 2018, plaintiff filed the present motion, again seeking an
injunction. Docket No. 62. Compared to his prior motion, plaintiff’s new motion adds
arguments that the loss of his driver’s license has had other effects on him and his
family; that his civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18
U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., claims provide a basis for injunctive relief and can be asserted
against government actors, including courts; and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
not automatic and requires a fact-specific inquiry with respect to each claim. Compare
Docket No. 49 with Docket No. 62.
With respect to the additional harms that plaintiff argues are caused by the loss
of his driver’s license, plaintiff again alleges economic harm, e.g. that losing his license
“significantly reduced my ability to earn a living,” and alleges potentially non-economic
harms only in conclusory fashion. Docket No. 62 at 10, ¶ c.ii. 1 Therefore, the Court
finds plaintiff has not shown irreparable harm. See Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189.
With respect to his RICO claim and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff is
correct insofar as he argues that government officers and organizations can be subject
to RICO liability and that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman is not automatic and
requires a fact-specific inquiry with respect to each claim. Docket No. 62 at 8, ¶ b.x
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Plaintiff argues that the “suspension of my driver’s license since July 2017
has had (1) a chilling and inconvenient effect on me and my family’s wellbeing,
(2) significantly reduced my ability to earn a living, (3) exposes me and
my child to unnecessary risks and endangerment from emergencies and other
negative elements by having to rely on public transportation, (4) my ability to
support to my child’s educational, social development and extracurricular
activities, and (5) to generally care for my family.” Docket No. 62 at 10, ¶ c.ii (citing Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)). Bell addresses whether due process rights apply
to revocation of a driver’s licence, but it does not support a conclusion that economic
harms or conclusory allegations warrant an injunction. See Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
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(citing United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1986)), and at 9, ¶ b.x ii
(citing Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015)). The problem with plaintiff’s
new arguments is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies with equal force to
plaintiff’s RICO claim as it does to his other claims, and the relevant inquiry is whether
each claim “‘consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the “lower”
tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.’” PJ ex rel.
Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bolden v. City of
Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006)). Like his other claim s, plaintiff seeks to
use his RICO claim to attack the correctness of state court judgments based on a claim
that those judgments were not made in accordance with law. See Docket No. 62 at 1112, ¶ d.ii; Thompson v. Romeo, 728 F. App’x 796, 799 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)
(holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction where, “for [plaintiff] to
prevail, [the federal court] would have to review, and ultimately reject, the state
determinations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the Court finds that
plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because he has not shown
that he is likely to establish that the Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims.
Because plaintiff has not shown that he can establish each of the four elements
necessary to warrant injunctive relief, the Court will deny his motion. See RoDa Drilling
Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of (2nd) Order to
Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Docket No.
62] is DENIED.
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DATED September 30, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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