Martines Palmeiro Construction, LLC v. Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, The et al

Filing 37

ORDER Granting Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Remand. The Court GRANTS MPC's Renewed Motion to Remand (Doc. # 32 ) and REMANDS this case to the Denver District Court. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 12/20/2017. (athom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-02604-CMA-KLM
MARTINES PALMERIO CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,
THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, a
foreign non-profit corporation, and
MACHINERY ERECTORS LOCAL 1607,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO REMAND
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Martines Palmeiro Construction, LLC’s
(“MPC”) Renewed Emergency Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 32.) Because MPC’s
Amended Complaint raises only a state law trespass claim, this Court no longer has
jurisdiction and accordingly grants the motion and remands the case to state court.
I.

BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2017, Defendants Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and Millwright Erectors Local
1607 (Defendants, collectively) removed this lawsuit from the Denver District Court on
grounds that the second claim in MPC’s Complaint (Doc. # 1-1) was completely
preempted by federal law. (Doc. # 1.) MPC disagreed and filed an Emergency Motion

to Remand. (Doc. # 6.) After briefing, the Court denied MPC’s motion and held that
MPC’s second claim for relief—tortious interference with contract—was completely
preempted by § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. (Doc. # 22.)
MPC then moved for a hearing on its pending motion for a preliminary injunction.
(Doc. # 25.) In lieu of a preliminary injunction hearing, the Court set the matter for a
status conference. (Doc. # 28.) At the status conference, MPC advised that it intended
to amend its Complaint to remove its claim for tortious interference with contract.
Concerned that such an amendment would strip this Court’s federal jurisdiction, the
Court declined to enter a preliminary injunction pending the filing of said complaint.
Shortly thereafter MPC filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 31). MPC indeed
removed the tortious interference with contract claim and all associated allegations.
The Amended Complaint contains only a state law claim for trespass and a related
request for injunctive relief. (Id. at 4–5.)
MPC subsequently filed a Renewed Motion to Remand, contending that this
Court no longer has any basis to exercise federal jurisdiction over its only remaining
state law claim. (Doc. # 32.) On December 18, 2017, Defendants filed a Brief in
Opposition to Remand, arguing that, in substance, MPC’s Amended Complaint still
argues its tortious interference claim and that the Court should therefore continue to
exercise jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. # 35). The Court disagrees with Defendants
and finds remand appropriate.

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II.

LAW

Federal district courts have limited jurisdiction, possessing “only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). This case was removed based on the existence of a federal
question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall
have original Jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” “The presence or absence of federal question is
governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal question
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s
properly pleaded Complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Thus, federal question jurisdiction will lie only if the complaint pleads a federal cause of
action. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Louisville &
Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
“[A] court [must] deny jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction does not
affirmatively appear on the record.” Colorado v. Lewis, Civil No. 08-cv-01612-LTB-KLM,
2008 WL 5423358, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2008) (citations omitted). Defendants, as
the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden of proving that such jurisdiction
exists. Tafoya v. Amer. Family Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 08-cv-01656-MSK-MEH,
2009 WL 211661, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2009).
III.

ANALYSIS

MPC’s Amended Complaint raises only a state law claim for trespass and a
corresponding request for injunctive relief. Absent circumstances not present here, this

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Court does not have jurisdiction over state law claims and a remand is clearly
warranted. Defendants nonetheless argue that the Amended Complaint contains
allegations “well-beyond a mere trespass claim” making it clear that MPC is still
pursuing a tortious interference claim “camouflaged in ‘trespass’ clothing.” (Id. at 2–3.)
The Court disagrees. MPC removed at least twenty paragraphs from its initial
Complaint—expressly excising its tortious interference claim and all associated
allegations. The Amended Complaint no longer alleges secondary boycott activities,
accuses Defendants of harassing and intimidating subcontractors, or asserts that
Defendants are interfering with MPC’s contracts on those bases. It instead lodges, in
form and substance, only state law trespass allegations—allegations over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
Defendants’ attempt to defeat remand by referencing select words and phrases
is unavailing. Indeed, “the true construction of an instrument . . . cannot be ascertained
by lifting a single phrase, sentence or even paragraph out of its natural setting and
considering it alone. The instrument must be considered and construed as a whole,
and only in that way can its true intent and import be ascertained.” Kasishke v. Keppler,
158 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1947).
Defendants do not construe the Amended Complaint as a whole. They instead
highlight various sentences out of context, arguing that they are irrelevant or insufficient
to support MPC’s state law trespass claim and injunction request. Although such
arguments may undermine the merits of MPC’s case, they do not provide reasons to
support federal jurisdiction. Likewise, the Court rejects Defendants’ contention that the

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Amended Complaint’s reference to MPC’s cease and desist letter shows that MPC is
truly pursuing its tortious interference with contract allegations. MPC wrote the cease
and desist letter well before it commenced this litigation and it is not, therefore, an
accurate reflection of MPC’s true intentions with respect to this lawsuit, particularly
considering that the Amended Complaint does not contain any tortious interference with
contract allegations. To the extent Defendants are arguing that the letter is irrelevant or
otherwise excludable, that is an evidentiary matter of no import at this stage in the
litigation.
Accordingly, construed as a whole, the Court finds that the true intent and import
of MPC’s Amended Complaint is to stop Defendants’ alleged trespass on the subject
property. This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction has accordingly been stripped and the
case must be remanded to state court.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS MPC’s Renewed Motion to
Remand (Doc. # 32) and REMANDS this case to the Denver District Court.
DATED: December 20, 2017

BY THE COURT:

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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