Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Filing 21

ORDER Plaintiff Scott Tyler Jones appeals from the Social Security Administration ("SSA") Commissioner's final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits, filed pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Ac t, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401433. Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Oral argument would not materially assist me in the determination of this appeal. After consideration of the parties' briefs, as well as the administrative record, I AFFIRM the Commissioner's final order. By Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 12/21/2018. (evana, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-02621-LTB
SCOTT TYLER JONES,
v.

Plaintiff,

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Scott Tyler Jones appeals from the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for disability
insurance benefits, filed pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401–433. Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Oral argument would not
materially assist me in the determination of this appeal.
After consideration of the parties’ briefs, as well as the administrative record,
I AFFIRM the Commissioner’s final order.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff is a 49 year-old man with a master’s degree in counseling and an
associate’s degree in applied electronic technology. [Administrative Record (“AR”)
66, 262, 319] He seeks judicial review of SSA’s decision denying his application for
disability insurance benefits. Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff filed his
application in July 2015 alleging that his disability began in August 2014. [AR 262]
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The application was initially denied on November 5, 2015. [AR 138] After
Plaintiff’s request for review, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted an
evidentiary hearing and issued a written ruling on July 5, 2016. [AR 62–100, 116–
28, 144] In that ruling, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application on the basis that he
was not disabled because, considering his age, education, and work experience, he
had acquired skills from past relevant work that were transferrable to jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy. [AR 127] After a request to
review this decision from Plaintiff, the SSA Appeals Council remanded the case
back to the ALJ. [AR 132–35] The ALJ held another hearing and issued a written
ruling on April 5, 2017. [AR 9–23, 32–58] The ALJ again found that there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. [AR 22]
The SSA Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff’s administrative
request for review of the ALJ’s determination, making SSA’s denial final for the
purpose of judicial review. [AR 1–3]; see 20 C.F.R. §404.981. Plaintiff timely filed
his Complaint with this court seeking review of SSA’s final decision. ECF No. 1.
II.

RELEVANT MEDICAL HISTORY

Plaintiff’s claims on appeal relate to his mental health. In September 2013,
Plaintiff, living in Arizona, saw Sami Victor, M.D. for a mental health follow up.
[AR 522] Dr. Victor explained that Plaintiff had a “past psychiatric history of
[traumatic brain injury], mood disorder and anxiety . . . .” [Id.] His current problem
list included bipolar disorder. [AR 523] Plaintiff had an unremarkable mental

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status exam, with Dr. Victor noting that Plaintiff: appeared appropriately dressed;
was awake and alert, cooperative, and euthymic; had appropriate affect, speech,
thought content, thought process, perception, orientation, memory, and had no
judgment impairment. [AR 522–23] Plaintiff denied anxiety and had an improved
mood with no stressors noted. [AR 522] Plaintiff was instructed to continue a
medication regime that included Cymbalta and Lamictal. [AR 523]
A month later, Plaintiff presented to Timothy Baker, M.D. as depressed,
tired, and lacking motivation. [AR 598] Four days later, Plaintiff saw Dr. Victor who
noted an unremarkable mental status exam. [AR 525–27] A few weeks later,
Plaintiff reported to Dr. Victor increased anxiety and appeared anxious, but
otherwise had an unremarkable mental status exam. [AR 528–29] Dr. Victor
prescribed Klonopin and added an anxiety disorder to Plaintiff’s current problem
list. [AR 529–30] Dr. Baker noted Plaintiff was doing better in a follow up after his
appointment with Dr. Victor. [AR 593–94]
Dr. Victor did not note anything remarkable in the next appointments in
November 2013 and February, June, and September 2014. [AR 532–45] In the
September appointment, Dr. Victor noted that Plaintiff lost his job three days prior.
[AR 542] In January 2015, Dr. Victor noted that Plaintiff had bouts of anxiety, but
was doing well on his medication regimen. [AR 546]
In May, Plaintiff’s wife was present with Plaintiff at his appointment with
Dr. Victor. [AR 552] His wife reported that Plaintiff had slight paranoid delusions
regarding the September 11 attacks and the illuminati. [Id.] Dr. Victor increased

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Plaintiff’s dosage of Lamictal and added Seroquel to stabilize his mood. [Id.] Dr.
Victor noted that Plaintiff was irritable and had paranoid ideation, but otherwise
had an unremarkable mental status exam. [AR 554] A few weeks later, Plaintiff
returned with his wife and Dr. Victor noted “drastic improvement” with the
increased medication and “[l]ess discussion about delusions.” [AR 559] Dr. Victor
added insomnia to Plaintiff’s problem list and noted Plaintiff would begin seeing a
therapist. [AR 559–60]
In June, Plaintiff’s mental state had degraded as Dr. Victor wrote that
Plaintiff had “[c]ontinued delusional thought disorder[,] reported that I was trying
to trick him into taking more medications and that I was fooled by them
(illuminati).” [AR 565] Dr. Victor continued that it was “[u]nknown if patient is
adherent to his medications” and Plaintiff would not allow his wife to administer
them. [Id.] Dr. Victor noted paranoid ideation and paranoid delusion. [AR 568]
Soon after, Plaintiff was involuntarily taken to a mental hospital. [AR 408,
412] Plaintiff’s wife indicated that Plaintiff had threatened suicide in front of their
children; had been forcing his children to watch conspiracy videos; had been
physical with her and their children; threatened her; believed he saw a ghost in the
house; and that she was concerned for her and their children’s safety and had been
speaking to a divorce lawyer. [AR 412] Plaintiff was nonresponsive and
uncooperative with staff. [AR 411–22] Plaintiff was hospitalized for 12 days. [AR
482]
Dennis Michael Hughes, M.D. performed Plaintiff’s psychiatric discharge

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summary. [AR 482–90] Dr. Hughes noted that Plaintiff’s dose of Seroquel was
significantly increased, to which Plaintiff responded well “with resolution of
psychotic symptoms and significant reduction of manic symptoms within a few
days.” [AR 482] In his interview, Plaintiff presented as pleasant, cooperative,
verbose, circumstantial, and over inclusive and was “near his psychiatric baseline,
with no overt manic or psychotic symptoms noted currently.” [AR 482–83] The
doctor noted that Plaintiff’s wife had filed for an order of protection and Plaintiff
would be discharged under the care of his mother, brother, and sister-in-law in
Colorado. [AR 482–83, 490]
In July, Plaintiff saw Dana Jean Lahaie, MD in Arizona. Dr. Lahaie noted
Plaintiff’s constricted affect, circumstantial speech, and anxious mood, but
otherwise noted Plaintiff’s casual appearance, good concentration, denial of
delusions and hallucinations, appropriate orientation, fair insight, and fair
judgment. [AR 452] She recommended Plaintiff stay on his medication regimen and
that he find mental health care in Colorado. [AR 453]
In August, Plaintiff saw Dr. Baker to get refills for medication and for a
referral to a new primary doctor in Colorado. Plaintiff noted that he felt “like things
are stable” and Dr. Baker noted an unremarkable psychological exam. [AR 578–79]
A few weeks later, Plaintiff saw Mitchell J. Janasek, M.D. for a preventative exam,
where Dr. Janasek referred Plaintiff to a psychiatrist and noted that Plaintiff had a
normal psychiatric exam with appropriate mood and affect. [AR 671–75]
In October, Plaintiff had a consultative exam performed by David A.

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Fohrman, M.D. [AR 683] Plaintiff noted his level of depression over the last two
weeks was an eight and anxiety a nine on a scale of ten. [Id.] This was related to his
pending divorce and his lack of a job and a home. [Id.] He noted that he had recent
manic episodes and he saw a “shimmering curtain” at night due to him taking
Seroquel. [AR 684] He stated he was not as focused on conspiracy theories as before
his hospitalization and that he enjoyed bike riding and working on the model rocket
kit his brother purchased for him. [Id.] He felt his medication had helped him “for
the most part.” [Id.]
Dr. Fohrman wrote that Plaintiff “was alert and oriented times four. He was
overall cooperative for the examination. His mood was subdued, congruent. He had
no evidence of audio or visual hallucinations.” [AR 686] Plaintiff knew his Social
Security number, could recall three of three unrelated words immediately and two
of three in five minutes, could spell “world” backwards, and responded
appropriately to questions regarding his fund of general information. [Id.] Plaintiff
had issues performing “serial sevens” where he was to count back from 100 by
seven. [Id.] Under a section titled “abstract thinking”, Dr. Fohrman wrote that
Plaintiff “thought the similarity [between] the words apples and bananas was they
are both ‘well ... an apple is a fruit and a banana is not- I guess they both grow on
trees’ and the similarity between the words north and west was they are both
‘directions.’” [AR 687]
Dr. Fohrman wrote that Plaintiff had
[P]rominent suspiciousness and “lack of trust” of others (as evidenced by
his own statements and difficulty directly answering the abstract
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thinking questions (due to feelings of suspiciousness regarding the
“motive” for asking the question) that is not infrequently associated with
residual, long term PTSD symptoms. These psychiatric conditions,
taken together are associated with marked global impairment in social
and occupational functioning.
[Id.] In his medical source statement, Dr. Fohrman opined that Plaintiff had
[M]ild impairment in his capacity to do one or two-step tasks as well as
has marked impairment in his ability to due complex tasks and with
sustained attention based on clinical history and results of
concentration and memory evaluation (above). The claimant appears to
have moderate impairment with consistently putting forth effort in
work-related activities and the claimant appears to have mild
impairment in social interactions, as evidenced by interactions with
myself and self-report.
[AR 687–88]
In November, Catherine Corsello, M.D. performed a mental RFC assessment.
[AR 110–13] Dr. Corsello reviewed Dr. Fohrman’s exam in her evaluation. [AR 110]
Dr. Corsello found that Dr. Fohrman’s opinion overestimated the severity of
Plaintiff’s limitations. [AR 113] She found Plaintiff was moderately limited in his
ability to: (1) understand and remember detailed instructions; (2) carry out detailed
instructions; (3) maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (4)
“complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods”; and (5) interact appropriately
with the general public. [AR 111–12]
A few weeks later, Plaintiff saw therapist Andrea Caggiano. [AR 702–22]
Plaintiff stated that his medication was “doing a great job working for him, [his]
psychiatrist was fantastic, but [he was] still having trouble with anxiety and
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occasional panic attacks.” [AR 702] Ms. Caggiano noted an unremarkable mental
status exam and recommended that Plaintiff attend therapy. [AR 713–20] Plaintiff
signed off on a treatment plan. [AR 733]
In May 2016, Pamela McGill, NP performed a psychiatric initial assessment
with Plaintiff. In October, Plaintiff noted that his medications had done a good job
until he had to evict a homeless person from his home, which was giving him
anxiety. [AR 743] His mental status assessment was unremarkable and Ms. McGill
noted he was “functioning well in home and community.” [AR 744] A month later,
Ms. McGill noted that Plaintiff still thought medication was helpful and that he was
working on a “ministry for the homeless.” [AR 746] Again, his mental status
assessment was unremarkable. [AR 747] The final treatment note was from
February 2017, where Plaintiff said that his anxiety was “quite bothersome in close
personal social situations” and that he planned to play and sing in a spiritual band.
[AR 749] Ms. McGill noted an unremarkable mental status assessment. [AR 750]
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. SSA’s Five-Step Process for Determining Disability
A claimant is “disabled” under Title II of the Social Security Act if he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
140 (1987). SSA has established a five-step sequential evaluation for determining
whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
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At step one, SSA asks whether the claimant is presently engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” If he is, benefits are denied and the inquiry stops.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, SSA asks whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment”—that is, an impairment or combination of impairments that
“significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If he does not, benefits are denied and the inquiry stops. If
he does, SSA moves on to step three, where it determines whether the claimant’s
impairments “meet or equal” one of the “listed impairments”—impairments so
severe that SSA has determined that a claimant who has them is conclusively
disabled without regard to the claimant’s age, education, or work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If not, SSA goes to step four.
At step four, SSA determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”)—that is, what he is still able to do despite his impairments—and asks
whether the claimant can do any of his “past relevant work” given that RFC.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If not, SSA goes to the fifth and final step, where it has the
burden of showing that the claimant’s RFC allows him to do other work in the
national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
In contrast with step five, the claimant has “the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disability at steps one through four.” Doyal v. Barnhart, 331
F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003).
B. Standard of Review
My review concerns only whether SSA’s factual findings are supported by
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substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Vigil v.

Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015). With regard to the law, reversal may
be appropriate when SSA fails to apply proper legal standards. Hendron v. Colvin,
767 F.3d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395
(10th Cir. 1994)). With regard to the evidence, I must “determine whether the
findings of fact . . . are based upon substantial evidence, and inferences reasonably
drawn therefrom. If they are so supported, they are conclusive upon the reviewing
court and may not be disturbed.” Trujillo v. Richardson, 429 F.2d 1149, 1150 (10th
Cir. 1970).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007). The record must
demonstrate that the ALJ considered all the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to
discuss every piece of evidence. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (10th Cir.
1996). I examine the record as a whole and may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute my judgment for that of the ALJ. Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d at 1070.
IV.

THE ALJ’S RULING

In his ruling, the ALJ followed the five-step analysis outlined supra. The ALJ
concluded under the first step that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since his alleged onset date of August 23, 2014. [AR 14] Under step two, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar disorder and
PTSD. [Id.]

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The ALJ concluded under step three that the enumerated severe
impairments did not meet or medically equal an impairment in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1 (the “Listing”). [AR 15] The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels except that he was limited in
that he could “understand, remember and carry out the type of instructions that can
be learned on the job in no more than 6 months, tolerate occasional public contact
and cannot perform production paced work.” [AR 17]
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work,
fulfilling step four. [AR 21] In the fifth and final step, the ALJ found that jobs
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
[AR 22] The ALJ supported his decision based in part by the testimony of the
vocational expert and related hypotheticals, and found that Plaintiff could be a
laundry worker, floor wax technician, and food preparer. [Id.] Thus, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. [Id.]
V.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

In appealing the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by
improperly weighing opinion evidence and improperly assessing the consistency of
Plaintiff’s statements.
A. Weighing opinion evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded consultative examiner
Dr. Fohrman’s opinion. ECF No. 13 at 6. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Fohrman’s opinion
was consistent with medical evidence and Dr. Fohrman’s own observations which
established Plaintiff’s severe psychological impairment. Id. at 7. Plaintiff adds that
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similar considerations necessitated the ALJ to afford less weight to the opinions of
Drs. Hughes, Lahaie, and Corsello. Id. at 9. Plaintiff argues that if the ALJ would
have properly weighed the opinion evidence, Plaintiff would equal the impairment
of Listing 12.03. Id. at 9–10.
An ALJ must consider every medical opinion and discuss the weight he
assigns to the opinion. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir.
2012). Specific factors to consider include: (1) the length of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of
examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record
as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which
an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which
tend to support or contradict the opinion. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297,
1300–01 (10th Cir. 2003); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
While the ALJ need not explicitly discuss each individual factor, Oldham v.

Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007), the ALJ must “give good reasons in
the notice of determination or decision for the weight he ultimately assigns the
opinion.” Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d at 1301.
In his decision, the ALJ accurately recounted Dr. Fohrman’s consultative
exam, although did not mention Plaintiff’s difficulty with serial sevens nor that
Plaintiff questioned the motive of Dr. Fohrman’s questioning. [AR 20, 683–88] The

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ALJ stated that
Dr. Fohrman diagnosed a bipolar disorder and PTSD and concluded
that, “These psychiatric conditions, taken together, are associated with
marked global impairment in social and occupational functioning” (Ex.
7F, p. 5). However, such a conclusion is not supported by his objective
medical signs and findings, which contain an essentially normal mental
status exam. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge gives no weight
to this portion of Dr. Fohrman’s opinion (20 CFR 404.1527(c)).
[AR 20]
The ALJ gave some weight to Dr. Fohrman’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s
marked impairment in his ability to do complex tasks, mild impairment in his
ability to do one-to-two step tasks, and mild impairment in social interactions. [Id.]
The ALJ based his weight on the objective medical signs and findings and Plaintiff’s
statements about his daily activities. [Id.] The ALJ rejected the portion of Dr.
Fohrman’s opinion where he stated that Plaintiff had a “moderate impairment in
consistently putting forth effort in work related activities” as it was not based on
available evidence. [Id.]
I find that the ALJ accurately weighed the medical opinion of Dr. Fohrman.
The ALJ was correct to state that the objective findings in the record did not
correlate with Dr. Fohrman’s findings that Plaintiff had “marked global impairment
in social and occupational functioning.” [AR 20] It was appropriate for the ALJ to
compare Dr. Fohrman’s opinion to the objective findings in the record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record
as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”). As recounted

supra, Plaintiff consistently had unremarkable mental status exams. [See, e.g. AR
452, 522–23, 525–29, 532–45, 713–720, 744, 746, 750] Defendant appropriately
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argues that the ALJ accurately described the discrepancies between Dr. Fohrman’s
own observations and Dr. Fohrman’s conclusions. Def.’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 12; [AR
20]
For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff said his ability to concentrate was
“good.” [AR 20] Dr. Fohrman wrote in his exam that Plaintiff’s
[A]bility to concentrate is “good[.]” It [is] only difficult because he has so
many different things to do. In addition, he reported having the
following problems with his memory. “I just forget things. It is hard to
get things from my short term memory into my long term memory.” “It
is probably due to stress and the result of two major head injuries.”
[AR 684] Dr. Fohrman then wrote that Plaintiff had a “marked impairment in his
ability to [do] complex tasks and with sustained attention based on clinical history
and results of concentration and memory evaluation (above).” [AR 687]
Coupled with Plaintiff’s moderate performance in the memory and
concentration portion of the exam, it is reasonable to see why the ALJ questioned
the consistency of Dr. Fohrman’s opinion. [AR 20, 686] There exists at least a
scintilla of evidence upon which the ALJ based his opinion of Dr. Fohrman.

Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the ALJ
appropriately weighed the doctor’s opinion when he found that opinion inconsistent
with the doctor’s own report); cf. Razo v. Colvin, 663 F. App’x 710, 715 (10th Cir.
2016) (holding that the ALJ followed the proper procedure for weighing medical
opinions when he found an opinion inconsistent with the other medical opinions and
with the evidence as a whole) (unpublished).
Additionally, the ALJ accurately recounted Dr. Corsello’s opinion and gave it
great weight. [AR 21, 110–13] The ALJ explained that it was “consistent with the
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medical evidence as a whole, including the exam findings of Drs. Lahaie and
Hughes and with the objective medical signs and findings of Dr. Fohrman.” [AR 21]
As Defendant points out, the ALJ noted that Drs. Lahaie and Hughes did not give
Plaintiff any functional restrictions, and as such they were not considered medical
source opinions that the ALJ needed to weigh. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), (c), (f);

Welch v. Colvin, 566 F. App’x 691, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that the ALJ
was not required to weigh medical opinions where “each physician simply diagnosed
[the plaintiff’s] impairments and in some cases recommended treatment for them.”)
(unpublished).
The ALJ appropriately weighed the opinion of Dr. Corsello. The opinions of
Drs. Lahaie and Hughes, discussed supra, are relied upon by the ALJ to support the
weight given to Dr. Corsello’s opinion, and indeed closely comport with her opinion.
[AR 21] The parts of Dr. Fohrman’s opinion upon which the ALJ relied do the same.
[Id.] Dr. Lahaie did note “constricted affect, circumstantial speech, and anxious
mood,” but otherwise both doctors noted generally unremarkable mental exams.
[AR 452–53, 482–90]
The ALJ was brief in his specific reasoning explaining Dr. Corsello’s weight,
but the explanations given elsewhere in his opinion were sufficient to justify his
conclusion. Gonzales v. Colvin, 515 F. App’x 716, 719 (10th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
ALJ’s decision when he found that the same record evidence undermining one
doctor’s opinion supported another doctor’s opinion, and thus gave greater weight to
the latter’s opinion) (unpublished); Endriss v. Astrue, 506 F. App’x 772, 777 (10th

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Cir. 2012) (“The ALJ set forth a summary of the relevant objective medical evidence
earlier in his decision and he is not required to continue to recite the same evidence
again in rejecting [the doctor’s] opinion.”) (unpublished).
As such, the ALJ properly weighed the doctors’ opinions and I do not evaluate
what could have been under Listing 12.03. Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d at 1257 (“We
review only the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight.” (emphasis in original)).
B. Plaintiff’s credibility determination
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly assessed the consistency of
Plaintiff’s statements as compared to the record. ECF No. 13 at 10. He argues that
the ALJ focused on isolated incidents where Plaintiff was having fewer symptoms
and did not examine all the evidence in the record. Id. at 13.
Credibility determinations are particularly suited to the finder of fact and
must be supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1144
(10th Cir. 2010). “An ALJ must consider such factors as a claimant’s daily activities;
attempts to find relief; the type, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and
factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms.” Watts v. Berryhill, 705 F.
App’x 759, 763 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1220
(10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
Under SSR 16-3p, the ALJ should consider objective medical evidence and
other evidence including the individual’s statements, medical and non-medical
sources, and a variety of factors to consider the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of the claimant’s symptoms. 2016 WL 1119029, at *4–7 (Mar. 16, 2016). The
ALJ need not recite a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence, but
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must merely set forth the specific evidence he relies upon in evaluating the
claimant’s credibility. Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).
Here, the ALJ spoke at length of Plaintiff’s allegations and analyzed those
allegations with the evidence. He noted Plaintiff’s daily activities and Plaintiff’s
testimony regarding his concentration, memory, and social functioning. [AR 18] The
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of [his] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in [the ALJ’s]
decision.” [Id.]
The ALJ accurately recounted that Plaintiff’s mental symptoms, by his own
and his doctors’ accounts, were adequately treated by medicine. [Id.] As I noted,
Plaintiff had severe psychological issues that appeared to stabilize when he took
medicine. [AR 482–83] It was indeed repeatedly noted that medicine helped him.
[See, e.g. AR 453, 482, 546, 559, 593–94, 702, 743] The ALJ added that Plaintiff’s
explanation of his daily activities to Dr. Fohrman indicated that his symptoms were
well controlled on his medications. [AR 18]
The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s concentration and attention and found that,
along with his performance in Dr. Fohrman’s tests, his ability to “keep track of his
medications by using a pill box, to make simple meals 3-4 times a week and to do
household chores such as laundry, sweeping and mopping” indicated the capacity
for unskilled work. [AR 18–19] The ALJ added that Plaintiff “stated that he drives,
shops in stores and [was on a] computer and interacts with friends on Facebook[],

17

tasks that require concentration and attention.” [AR 19]
The ALJ supported his finding that Plaintiff appeared capable of tolerating
occasional social interaction by noting that Plaintiff “spent several hours a day
using his computer in fast food restaurants” and interacted occasionally with his
family. [Id.]
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ merely recited boilerplate explanations of his
credibility determination and did not recognize “extensive evidence of [his]
delusions, hallucinations, and other severe psychological symptoms.” ECF No. 13 at
12–13. However, explained supra, “the ALJ properly considered the relevant factors
and specifically set forth record evidence relied upon in making his credibility
determination.” Watts v. Berryhill, 705 F. App’x at 764 (the ALJ did not err when
he, in relevant part, described inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s complaints
and her daily activities and her use of psychiatric medicine).
VI.

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, for the preceding reasons, I AFFIRM the Commissioner’s
final order.
Dated: December 21, 2018, in Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

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