Estate of Dillon Blodgett et al. v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC. et al

Filing 197

ORDER granting 196 the Motion to Dismiss and Granting 175 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Entered by Judge William J. Martinez on 9/30/2020.(afran)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 17-cv-2690-WJM-NRN
ESTATE OF DILLON BLODGETT, and
ADRIENNE LEONARD, personally and as personal representative of the Estate of
Dillon Blodgett,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, LLC d/b/a “CORRECTIONAL
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC.”,
BRET CORBRIDGE, in his individual capacity,
LYN LAWHEAD, in her individual capacity, and
KRISTIN LAURIE, in her individual capacity.
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This lawsuit alleges that Dillon Blodgett received constitutionally deficient
medical care while in pretrial detention at the Montrose County Detention Center
(“MCDC”) in Montrose, Colorado, resulting in Blodgett taking his own life. Plaintiff
Adrienne Leonard, personally and as the personal representative of the Estate of
Blodgett (the “Blodgett Estate”), sues numerous individuals and entities that are
allegedly responsible for Blodgett’s death.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion for Summary
Judgment”), filed by Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”),Correctional
Healthcare Companies, LLC (“CHC”), Bret Corbridge, Lyn Lawhead, and Kristin Laurie
(collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 175.)

Also before the Court is the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice
Defendants Bret Corbridge, Lyn Lawhead, and Kristin Laurie (“Stipulated Motion to
Dismiss”), filed on September 29, 2020. (ECF No. 196.)
For the reasons explained below, both motions are granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Summary1
This case arises from the tragic and untimely death of Blodgett while in MCDC

custody. Plaintiff is Blodgett’s mother and the personal representative of Blodgett’s
Estate. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 1.) CCS and CHC contracted with Montrose County to provide
medical services to inmates and detainees at MCDC. (Id. ¶ 2.) During the relevant
time period, CHC was responsible for administering health care services, including
mental health services, to inmates and detainees at MCDC. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Bret Corbridge, a licenced professional counselor, and Lyn Lawhead, a licensed
clinical social worker, provided mental health services at MCDC. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.) Kristin
Laurie is a registered nurse and health services administrator at MCDC. (Id. ¶ 5.)
1.

Blodgett’s Booking and Intake Screening

Blodgett was booked into MCDC on November 18, 2015. (Id. ¶ 11.) During his
intake and screening on November 20, 2015, Blodgett denied that he was in special
need of medical or other care, denied that he had been receiv ing mental health

1

The following factual summary is based on the parties’ briefs on the Motion and
documents submitted in support thereof. These facts are undisputed unless attributed to a
party or source. All citations to docketed materials are to the page number in the CM/ECF
header, which sometimes differs from a document’s internal pagination.

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counseling, and stated that he had previously thought about committing suicide but
denied that he was currently thinking about it. (Id. ¶ 12; ECF No. 176-1 at 1–2.)
Blodgett was then placed into a maximum-security cell. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 13; ECF
No. 175-1 ¶¶ 23–24.)
2.

Blodgett’s Mental Healthcare Requests and Treatment

Inmates and pretrial detainees can request medical or mental health care
services by submitting written healthcare requests (known as a “kite” or “kites”). (ECF
No. 175 ¶ 15.)
On November 21, 2015, Blodgett was seen by Nancy Kienapfel, a licensed
mental health care provider at Midwestern Colorado Mental Health Center. (Id.
¶¶ 17–18.) According to Kienapfel’s evaluation, she categorized Blodgett as a “low risk”
of harm, noting that Blodgett has “[n]o current suicidal ideation, plan, intentions, or
severe distress, but may have had transient or passive thoughts recently or in the past.”
(ECF No. 176-3 at 1.) Her session notes state that Blodgett was having “[n]o thoughts
about suicide. This is how an average person feels about suicide.” (Id. at 3.)
Nonetheless, Kienapfel recommended that Blodgett receive “High Intensity Community
Based [Services].” (Id. at 2.)
On November 24, 2015, Blodgett submitted a kite, requesting mental health care
for “[e]xtreme anxiety / [d]epression.” (ECF No. 175 ¶ 21; ECF No. 176-2 at 1.) Laurie
responded, “You are on the list for mental health.” (Id.)
On November 25, 2015, Laurie performed a “Receiving Screening” on Blodgett.
(ECF No. 175 ¶ 22; ECF No. 176-3 at 1.) This section included a “Suicide Potential
Screening” section, in which Blodgett provided the following responses:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

Arresting or transporting officer believes subject may
be a suicide risk: NO
Lacks close family/friends in community: NO
Worried about major problems other than legal
situation (terminal illness): NO
Family member or significant other has attempted or
committed suicide (spouse/parent/sibling/close
friend/lover): NO
Has psychiatric history (psychotropic medication or
treatment): NO
Holds position of respect in community
(professional/public official) and/or alleged crime is
shocking in nature. Expresses feelings of
embarrassment/shame: NO
Expresses thoughts about killing self: NO
Has a suicide plan and/or suicide instrument in
possession: NO
Has previous suicide attempt: YES (a few months
ago)
Expresses feelings there is nothing to look forward to
in the future (feelings of helplessness and
hopelessness): NO
Shows signs of depression (crying or emotional
flatness): NO
Appears overly anxious, afraid or angry: NO
Appears to feel unusually embarrassed or ashamed:
NO
Is acting and/or talking in a strange manner (cannot
focus attention/hearing or seeing things not there):
NO
Is apparently under the influence of alcohol or drugs:
NO
If YES to #15, is individual incoherent or showing
signs of withdrawal or mental illness: NO
Is this individual’s first arrest: NO
Detainee’s charges include Murder, Kidnapping
and/or Sexual Offense: NO

(ECF No. 175 ¶ 22; ECF No. 176-4 at 2–3.) To the extent an detainee or inmate
answers YES to eight or more questions or answers YES to questions (1), (6), (7), (8),
(10), or (16), Laurie was instructed to notify the shift commander and immediately refer
the individual for mental health evaluation. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 23; ECF No. 176-4 at 3.)
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She was also instructed to notify mental health of any positive response to the suicide
screen that did not meet the above criteria for immediate referral. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 23;
ECF No. 176-4 at 3.)
On December 2, 2015, Corbridge saw Blodgett in response to his November 24,
2015 kite. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 25.) He found Blodgett to have an appropriate appearance,
a depressed mood, and a tearful affect. (Id.; ECF No. 176-2 at 2.) During that
appointment, Blodgett informed Corbridge that his friend had committed suicide and
that it was bringing up some sad feelings and thoughts of wanting to die. (ECF No.
176-2 at 2.) Corbridge diagnosed Blodgett as having depression, anxiety, and some
suicidal ideation but determined that Blodgett did not need to start suicide precautions.
(Id.)
On December 3, 2015, Blodgett was seen by Lydia Storey-Lopez, a
representative from Midwestern Colorado Mental Health Center Services. (ECF No.
175 ¶ 27; ECF No. 176-2 at 3–4.) According to her session notes, she “spoke with jail
nurse [Laurie] who reports concerns about [Blodgett]. [Blodgett] has been speaking
with [Corbridge] . . . he is a therapist who comes in to the jail periodically to see high
acuity clients.” (ECF No. 176-2 at 3.)
On December 15, 2015, Blodgett submitted a second kite requesting mental
health care. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 28; ECF No. 176-2 at 5.) Laurie responded, “Y ou are on
the list.” (Id.)
On January 2, 2016, Blodgett was seen by Lawhead. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 29; ECF
No. 176-2 at 6.) She diagnosed Blodgett as having major depression and anxiety.
During that meeting, Blodgett had informed Lawhead that he had attempted to hang
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himself two months prior while in the department of corrections. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 29;
ECF No. 176-2 at 6.)
On January 11, 2016, Blodgett submitted a third kite requesting mental health
care. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 30; ECF No. 176-2 at 8.) Laurie responded, “Y ou are on the
mental health list.” (Id.)
On January 14, 2016, Blodgett was seen by Corbridge. (ECF No. 175 ¶ 31; ECF
No. 176-2 at 9.) Corbridge found Blodgett to have a depressed mood, a flat affect, and
occasional suicidal thought content. (Id.; ECF No. 176-2 at 9.) He diagnosed Blodgett
as having depression and anxiety. (ECF No. 176-2 at 9.) Corbridge wrote that during
that session, Blodgett was more stable and was communicating better. (Id.) However,
during their discussion of Blodgett’s pending escape charge, Blodgett conveyed that he
ran because “he was feeling suicidal and needed to get to his parents. Now everything
[is] worse.” (Id.) Nonetheless, Corbridge determined that Blodgett did not need to start
suicide precautions. (Id.)
On January 20, 2016, at 11:07 p.m., a security check of Blodgett’s cell indicated
that he was “OK.” (ECF No. 175 ¶ 35.) At approximately 11:34 p.m. during another
security check, Blodgett was found hanging from his top bunk and was found
unresponsive to life-saving attempts. (Id. ¶ 36.) He was pronounced dead on January
23, 2016. (Id. ¶ 37.)
B.

Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this action on November 10, 2017 (ECF No. 1) and filed the First

Amended Complaint on March 2, 2018 (ECF No. 54).

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On December 12, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motions
to dismiss filed by the then-defendants and granted Plaintiff leave to file a second
amended complaint. (ECF No. 91.)
On April 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, which asserts
the following claims against Defendants: (1) deliberate indifference to Blodgett’s serious
medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants
(“Claim 1”) (¶¶ 87–97); (2) medical negligence causing Blodgett’s wrongful death
against CHC, CCS, and Kienapfel (“Claim 2”) (¶¶ 98–118); (3) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Defendant Allan Miller (“Claim 3") (¶ 119); and (4) a survival
claim against all Defendants (“Claim 4”) (¶¶ 120–22).
After the Second Amendment Complaint was filed, Kienapfel was dismissed with
prejudice as a Defendant on October 22, 2019 (ECF No. 152) and Miller was dismissed
with prejudice as a Defendant on November 7, 2019 (ECF No. 156).
On January 31, 2020, Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 175.) Plaintiff responded on March 10, 2020 (ECF No. 187), and Def endants
replied on March 20, 2020 (ECF No. 190).
On September 29, 2020, the parties filed the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual (non-corporate) Defendants. (ECF No. 196.)
II. STIPULATED MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 196)
In the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, the parties jointly move to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against Corbridge, Lawhead, and Laurie without prejudice, with each party to
pay its own costs and attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 196 at 1.) The Court grants the
Stipulated Motion to Dismiss for good cause shown.
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III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 175)
A.

Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the
relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). An issue is “g enuine” if
the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In
addition, the Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus
favoring the right to a trial. See Houston v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th
Cir. 1987).
B.

Claim 1—Deliberate Indifference
CHC and CCS are business entities, not natural persons. In the T enth Circuit, a

business entity working on the government’s behalf can only be liable under § 1983
through the municipal liability framework established by the Supreme Court in Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Dubbs v.
Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Under Monell, a municipality—or, here, a private entity under contract to provide
services to inmates and detainees at MCDC—can only be liable under § 1983 for
damages when the entity’s “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
[constitutional] injury.” 436 U.S. at 694. A plaintiff alleging a municipal liability claim
must therefore identify a “government’s policy or custom” that caused the injury and
then demonstrate ‘that the policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate
indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.’” Schneider v. City of Grand
Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013). A municipal policy or custom
may be “(1) an officially promulgated policy; (2) an informal custom amounting to a
widespread practice; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority;
(4) the ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of their subordinates; or (5) the
failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Estate of Martinez v. Taylor, 176 F.
Supp. 3d 1217, 1230 (D. Colo. 2016) (citing Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784,
788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is not a model of clarity. However, the
Court construes the Second Amended Complaint as alleging a Monell claim against
CHC and CCS based on a “policy and practice of providing inadequate medical and
mental health services to the inmates at [MCDC],” as well as their failure to adequately
train their employees to meet inmates’ serious medical needs. (¶¶ 59–80.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie Monell claim
because she has failed to provide evidence suggesting that CHC and CCS had a policy
or custom of providing inadequate medical care or failing to train or supervise their
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employees.2 (ECF No. 175 at 31.) In response, Plaintiff argues “there was virtually no
treatment provided to [Blodgett] to address his substantial risk of suicide” and contends
that Defendants’ “deficient supervision” of mental health services can be inferred from
Lawhead’s testimony that she was not sure that she had ever seen the MCDC jail
policies on procedures for evaluating risk of suicide. (ECF No. 187 at 16–17.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material
fact relating to whether CHC and CCS maintained a policy or custom of providing
inadequate medical care or failing to train or supervise their employees. On a broad
level, because Plaintiff has not provided evidence about the medical standards of care
applicable to CHC and CCS’s staff, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants
maintained a policy or custom of providing inadequate medical care or failing to train its
medical staff. Moreover, what constitutes adequate medical care or adequate medical
training for counselors, nurses, and social workers is beyond the common knowledge of
a lay jury, and Plaintiff has not retained an expert witness to testify about these topics.
To be clear, the expert report created by Dr. Gutierrez, Plaintiff’s sole expert
witness, includes the following conclusory statement:
Appropriate care for individuals at risk of suicide requires ongoing assessment and tailoring the interventions offered to

2

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Peter M. Gutierrez, is not qualified to
render opinions against Laurie, Corbridge, or Lawhead because he has no experience in
nursing or experience with mental health care or suicide in the correctional setting. (ECF No.
175 at 22–30.) The Court need not resolve this dispute at this juncture because Defendants
have not filed a motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to exclude Dr. Gutierrez’s
testimony. At any rate, the Court notes that Dr. Gutierrez’s expert report seems to be focused
on general warning signs of suicide, not the specific standards of medical care applicable to
nurses, counselors, or social workers. (ECF No. 175-18; see also ECF No. 187 at 15 (Plaintiff
recognizes that “Dr. Gutierrez is being offered as an expert witness to discuss risk for suicide
among humans in general.”).)

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the current risk status. There are multiple approaches that
can be taken to assess risk, but single yes/no questions with
no follow-up are not sufficient. . . . Offering an inmate a
follow-up appointment in four weeks or responding to a
request for mental health counseling with ‘you’re on the list’,
. . . do not meet that standard.
(ECF No. 175-18 at 7 (internal citations omitted).) This analysis, however, does not
explicitly identify Defendants’ specific mental health care policies or procedures, does
not discuss the relevant medical standards applicable to nurses, counselors, or social
workers, does not explain why the medical and mental health services provided by CHC
or CCS staff to inmates is inadequate, and does not discuss how CHC and CCS’s
training or supervision of staff is inadequate. In short, Plaintiff has not established a
genuine issue of material fact that CHC and CCS had a maintained a policy or custom
of providing inadequate medical and mental health services to MCDC inmates and/or
failing to train or supervise their employees to meet inmates’ medical needs.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff could establish that CHC and CCS maintained such a
policy or custom, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence demonstrating a direct causal
connection between Blodgett’s suicide and CHC or CCS’s specific policies or customs.3
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide a genuine issue of

3

The Court notes that Plaintiff has also not provided evidence suggesting that CHC
and CCS’s purported failure to train its employees evidences deliberate indifference. See
Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that claims
of inadequate training and supervision require a plaintiff to “demonstrate that the municipal
action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences”).
Plaintiff contends “[w]hile[ ] there has been evidence of training in the record, the failure of
[CHC and CCS] to adequately supervise the provision of mental health care is obvious as are
the results.” (ECF No. 187 at 18.) Plaintiff does not, however, provide any evidence to support
this contention.

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material fact supporting its Monell claim against CHC and CCS. The Court will
therefore grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim.
C.

Claim 2—Medical Negligence Causing Wrongful Death
Plaintiff also asserts a negligence/wrongful death claim against CHC and CCS

under two theories of negligence, both of which rest on imputed liability for acts of
employees: (1) direct liability for failure to train or supervise employees; and
(2) vicarious liability for the negligent acts or omissions of its agents. (¶¶ 98–118.)
Defendants argue that because “[t]his case involves complex medical and
mental health issues that are outside the realm of lay knowledge,” “expert testimony is
required.” (ECF No. 175 at 38.) In particular, they argue that Plaintiff’s sole expert,
Dr. Gutierrez, has not “offer[ed] any opinions in his report that any of the [individuals
involved] violated their respective standards of care.” (Id. at 37.)
In a negligence action against a licensed professional in Colorado, a “practicing
professional is generally entitled to be judged according to the tenants of the school of
practice which the practitioner professes follows.” United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827
P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). Because the applicable standard of care in most
professional negligence cases is not within the common knowledge and experience of
members of the jury, the applicable standard of care must be established by expert
testimony. Id.; Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 397 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[e]xpert
testimony is required to establish a prima facie case of professional negligence in the
great majority of cases”); Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383, 387 (Colo. 1990) (en
banc) (recognizing that medical malpractice cases generally require expert testimony
because “matters relating to medical diagnosis and treatment ordinarily involve a level
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of technical knowledge and skill beyond the realm of lay knowledge and experience”).
“Without expert opinion testimony in such cases, the trier of fact would be left with no
standard at all against which to evaluate the defendant’s conduct.” United Blood
Servs., 827 P.2d at 520 (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s negligence claims relate to the CHC and CCS’s alleged failure train or
supervise and alleged vicarious liability for the acts of its agents, i.e., Corbridge (a
licensed counselor), Lawhead (a licensed social worker), and Laurie (a licensed nurse).
Plaintiff will need to establish that CHC and CCS’s medical staff received insufficient
training or failed to exercise the requisite standard care in treating Blodgett.4 The
standard of care for each of these medical professionals is beyond the competence of a
lay jury and, as explained in Part III.B, Plaintiff has no expert witness on the subject. 5
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie
clam of medical negligence causing wrongful death. The Court will therefore grant
Defendants’ Motion as to this claim as well.

4

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants’ duties are informed by
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-40[1(2)], which provides that “[p]ersons arrested or in custody shall be
treated humanely and provided with adequate food, shelter, and, if required, medical
treatment.” (¶ 108.) This statute, which is part of Colorado’s Code of Criminal Procedure, does
not establish a specific standard of care that nurses, counselors, or social workers must utilize
in treating patients.
5

Dr. Gutierrez’s expert report broadly states that the “[a]ppropriate care for individuals
at risk of suicide requires on-going assessment and tailoring interventions offered to the current
risk status.” (ECF No. 175-18 at 7.) Dr. Gutierrez does not, however, provide any evidence
about the requisite standard of care applicable to nurses, counselors, or social workers. Nor is
there any evidence that he is qualified to do so.

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D.

Claim 3—Survival Claim
Plaintiff’s survival claim is premised on a wrongful act of the Defendants. (See

¶ 122 (“Because of the deliberate indifference and/or negligence of Defendants as
described above, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, including, but not limited
to expenses.”).)
Because Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie claim against Defendants,
Plaintiff’s survival claim also fails as a matter of law. See Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 289 (D. Colo. 1982) (recognizing that “a § 1983 survival action
. . . is essentially the assertion of the cause of action that the deceased would have had
had he lived, requesting damages for violation of the decedent’s rights”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice Defendants Bret
Corbridge, Lyn Lawhead, and Kristin Laurie (ECF No. 196) is GRANTED;

2.

Defendants Bret Corbridge, Lyn Lawhead, and Kristin Laurie are hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE from this action, with each party to
pay his or her own attorney’s fees and costs;

3.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 175) is GRANTED;

4.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Correct Care
Solutions, LLC and Correctional Healthcare Companies, LLC and against
Plaintiffs and shall terminate this case; and

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5.

Plaintiffs and Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC and Correctional
Healthcare Companies, LLC shall bear their own costs with respect to the
claims asserted against these Defendants.

Dated this 30th day of September, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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