Estate of Dillon Blodgett et al. v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC. et al
Filing
91
ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to Dismiss. CHC Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 59 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. Claim 2 is DISMISSED; b. Claim 5 is DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE as to Adrienne Leonard 's claims in her personal capacity for § 1983 violations and negligence; and c. The remainder of the Motion is DENIED. The following claims remain against CHC: Claim 1 (§ 1983 deliberate indifference); Claim 3 (Wrongful Death); and, in part, Claim 5 (the Blodgett Estate's Negligence Claim). Montrose County Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 61 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. All claims brought against "Montrose County, Colorado" are DISMISSED; b. Claim 1 is DISMISSED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all parties in their official capacity and Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, Strait, and Strole, in their personal capacity; c. Claim 2 and Claim 4 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; d. Claim 5 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and e. The Motion is DENIED IN PART as to Claim 1 against Commander Miller in his personal capacity; The stay of discovery (ECF No. 78 ) is LIFTED. SO ORDERED by Judge William J. Martinez on 12/12/2018. (agarc, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 17-cv-2690-WJM-NRN
ESTATE OF DILLON BLODGETT, and
ADRIENNE LEONARD, personally and as personal representative of the Estate of
Dillon Blodgett,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC;
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, LLC. d/b/a “CORRECTIONAL
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC.”;
MONTROSE COUNTY, COLORADO, a government entity;
SHERIFF RICK DUNLAP, sued in his official capacity;
UNDERSHERIFF ADAM MURDIE, sued in his official capacity;
COMMANDER ALAN MILLER, in his individual and official capacities;
SERGEANT ROGELLE STROLE, in her individual and official capacities;
SERGEANT DEAN MCNULTY, in his individual and official capacities;
SERGEANT BOBBY STRAIT, in his individual and official capacities;
SERGEANT GARYN IVERSON, in his individual and official capacities;
NANCY KLIENAPFEL, in her individual capacity;
UNK Counselor, in his/her individual capacity;
UNK LCSW, in his/her individual capacity;
UNK NURSE, in his/her individual capacity; and
UNK NURSE, in his/her individual capacity;
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This lawsuit alleges that Dillon Blodgett received constitutionally deficient
medical care while in pretrial detention at the Montrose County Detention Center
(“MCDC”) in Montrose, Colorado, resulting in Blodgett taking his own life. Adrienne
Leonard (“Plaintiff”), personally and as the personal representative of the Estate of
Blodgett (“the Blodgett Estate”), sues numerous individuals and entities that are
allegedly responsible for Blodgett’s death in some way.
Currently before the Court are two motions to dismiss challenging the First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54). The first motion to dismiss is brought by
Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC, and Correctional Healthcare Com panies, LLC
(collectively, “CHC”). (ECF No. 59.) The second motion is brought by “Montrose
County, Colorado,” Sheriff Rick Dunlap, Undersheriff Adam Murdie, Commander Alan
Miller, and Sergeants Garyn Iverson, Dean McNulty, Bobby Strait, and Rogelle Strole
(collectively, “the Montrose County Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 61 & 70.) Sheriff Dunlap
and Undersheriff Murdie are sued in their official capacities. (ECF No. 54.)
Commander Miller and Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, Strait, and Strole are sued in their
official and individual capacities. (Id.) For the reasons explained below, the motions to
dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a
claim in a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The
Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires the Court to “assume the truth of the plaintiff’s wellpleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling
on such a motion, the dispositive inquiry is “whether the complaint contains ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss “is a harsh remedy
2
which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of
pleading but also to protect the interests of justice.” Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567
F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, ‘a wellpleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
II. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the truth of the following facts pled in the First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 54), documents attached thereto, and documents embraced by the
pleadings for purpose of resolving the motions.1
This case arises from the tragic and untimely death of Blodgett while in MCDC
custody. On November 18, 2015, Blodgett was booked into MCDC. (ECF No. 54
¶ 38.) Blodgett reportedly refused to speak to anyone for two days. (ECF No. 84-1
at 1.) On November 20, 2015, Blodgett completed the intake and screening process
and was placed in solitary confinement in cell C-401. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40.) It is unclear from
the facts before the Court why Blodgett was placed in solitary confinement.
1
The Montrose County Defendants submit two documents attached to their Reply in
Support of Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 84-1 & 84-2.) When a plaintiff does not incorporate
by reference or attach a document to a complaint, but the document is referred to in the
complaint and is central to the claims therein, a defendant can submit an indisputably authentic
copy for consideration on a motion to dismiss. GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). Here, the Montrose County Defendants submit an
intake assessment prepared by Nancy Klienapfel (ECF No. 84-1), excerpts of which are
included in the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54 ¶ 45). In addition, Montrose County
Defendants submit Blodgett’s intake questionnaire (ECF No. 84-2), which is also excerpted in
the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54 ¶ 41). Because these documents are embraced by
the pleadings and central to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court will consider them without converting
Montrose County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
3
The Montrose County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) maintains the “MCSO Justice
Center Detention Facility Standard Operating Procedure,” which contains procedures
for addressing suicidal inmates. (Id. ¶ 92; ECF No. 54-1.) Section 23.107(A) states
When an arrestee is brought into the Detention Facility, the
booking staff will complete a screening form, which includes
asking the arrestee if he/she has ever had a history of
suicide attempts, (Ask only when not intoxicated). Positive
responses and/or unusual behavior are immediately brought
to the attention of all the detention deputies. If the response
or unusual behavior is determined to be enough to warrant
calling the Mental Health Center, the Booking Deputy should
do so.
(ECF No. 54-1.) Section 23.107(B) commands that “[i]nmates that are potentially
suicidal shall be searched thoroughly, and then segregated from the general population
for close observation. Necessary measures will be taken to prevent or eliminate any
immediate danger.” (Id.)
On the afternoon of November 20, 2015, Blodgett completed an intake
questionnaire. He answered the following questions about his mental health and
thoughts of suicide:
19. Are you or have you been receiving mental health
counseling? (If yes enter note below.)
No
20. Have you ever thought about committing suicide? (If
yes enter note below.)
Yes
21. Are you thinking about now? (If yes enter note below.)
No
22. Has anyone in your immediate family committed or
attempted suicide? (If yes enter note below.)
No
26. Does the person’s wrist have any scars? (If yes enter
note below.)
No . . .
44. Suicidal? (If yes enter note below.)
4
No
(ECF Nos. 54 ¶ 41; 84-2 at 3.) In addition, the intake f orm beneath the signature line
says “Yes states in ‘alright’ health as of 11/20/15 @ 1350.” (Id.)
On November 21, 2015, Sergeant Strole asked Nancy Klienapfel2 of Midwestern
Colorado Mental Health to talk with Blodgett. (ECF Nos. 54 ¶ 44; 84-1 at 1.) Klienapfel
was at MCDC to assess another inmate, but agreed to examine Blodgett at Sergeant
Strole’s request. (ECF No. 84-1 at 1.) Klienapfel recommended to Sergeant Strole and
Blodgett that Blodgett “be able to see Miranda ASAP.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff construes this
statement as a recommendation that Blodgett receive counseling through Jail Based
Behavioral Services. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 45.) Klienapfel also assessed Blodgett for suicide
risk and stated that he was not a risk. (ECF No. 84-1 at 2.) On the “Pre Test Suicide
Likert” scale and the “Post Test Suicide Likert” scale, Klienapfel rated Blodgett as “0.
No thoughts about suicide. This is how an average person feels about suicide.” (Id. at
1, 9.) She also commented that Blodgett was “at low risk of self harm but in need of SA
counseling and f/u while in the jail.” (Id. at 3.)
Blodgett sent written requests for mental health services on November 24, 2015,
December 15, 2015, and January 11, 2016. (ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 46, 53, 58.) In response
to each request, within one day, an unnamed nurse (identified in the First Amended
Complaint as “UNK Nurse” and a CHC employee) informed Blodgett that he was “on
the list.” (Id. ¶¶ 47, 53, 59; ECF No. 54-4.)
2
Defendant Klienapfel’s name is spelled in different ways throughout the pleadings.
She is identified as “Klienapfel” in the caption, “Kleinapfel” in the First Amended Complaint, and
“Kienapfel” on her evaluation of Blodgett. (ECF No. 54 at 1, ¶ 45; ECF No. 84-1.) Her answer
to the First Amended Complaint uses “Klienapfel,” so the Court will follow suit. (ECF No. 60.)
5
In addition to Blodgett’s own written requests for mental health services, his
public defender Kristen Hindman sent an e-mail to Commander Miller on November 30,
2015, “indicating that Mr. Blodgett had a history [of] being on suicide watch while in
custody and could benefit from counseling.” (ECF No. 54 ¶ 49.) It is unclear exactly
what Hindman conveyed to Commander Miller because the e-mail is merely
summarized in the First Amended Complaint and not in the record before the Court.
Commander Miller responded that same day stating that Blodgett had submitted two
requests: one for mental health treatment and another for medical care. (Id. ¶ 50.) He
told Hindman that Blodgett received medical care that day and was “on the list” to see
the mental health provider. (Id.)
While in custody, MCDC provided Blodgett with three sessions of mental health
services. On December 2, 2015, Blodgett saw a counselor allegedly employed or
contracted by CHC (“CHC Counselor”). (Id. ¶ 51; ECF No. 54-2.) Blodgett reported to
the CHC Counselor that a friend had committed suicide and Blodgett himself was
having occasional thoughts of suicide. (ECF No. 54-2 at 1.) CHC Counselor diagnosed
Blodgett with depression, anxiety, and some suicide ideation but determined not to start
suicide precautions at that time. (Id.)
On January 2, 2016, Blodgett saw another mental health provider, identified in
the First Amended Complaint as “UNK LCSW” and alleged to be a CHC employee.
(ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 54–55; see ECF No. 54-3.) UNK LCSW diagnosed Blodgett with major
depressive disorder and anxiety. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 56.) Under “prior self-harm,” UNK
6
LCSW noted “hanging – 2 mo[ths] ago–while in DOC.” (Id.; ECF No. 54-3 at 1.) UNK
LCSW did not, however, mark “suicidal” under “thought content.” (ECF No. 54-3 at 1.)
On January 14, 2016, Blodgett again saw CHC Counselor, after requesting to
see “Mental Health, Brett if possible, for personal mental health-related issues.” (ECF
Nos. 54 ¶ 60; 54-4; 54-5.) CHC Counselor noted that Blodg ett had escaped prior
custody at Montrose County Community Corrections “because he was feeling suicidal
and needed to get to his parents” and noted that Blodgett had “occasional thoughts” of
suicide. (ECF No. 54-5 at 1; ECF No. 54 ¶ 61.) CHC Counselor diagnosed Blodgett
with depression and anxiety but determined that suicide precautions were “not
applicable at this time.” (ECF No. 54-5 at 1; ECF No. 54 ¶ 62.)
On the evening of January 20, 2016, Blodgett was provided a second towel.
(ECF No. 54 ¶ 65.) Following a security check around 11:00 p.m., Blodgett was found
hanging by his neck from a towel in his cell in solitary confinement. (Id. ¶ 66.) MCDC
staff was unable to revive Blodgett. (Id. ¶ 67.) Three days later, Blodgett was declared
dead at St. Mary’s Hospital in Grand Junction, Colorado. (Id. ¶ 68.)
III. ANALYSIS
Before addressing CHC and Montrose County Defendants’ motions to dismiss,
the Court first clarifies the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims at issue. Claim 1 against all
defendants alleges that CHC and Montrose County Defendants deprived Blodgett of his
rights by their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (ECF No. 54
¶¶ 100–10.) For pretrial detainees such as Blodgett, the source of the constitutional
7
right to adequate medical care is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth. See Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979).
Claim 2 against all defendants states that CHC and Montrose County
Defendants deprived Blodgett of life without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. CHC contends that Claim 2 is duplicative of Plaintiff’s § 1983 deliberate
indifference claim. (ECF No. 59 at 11–12.) Plaintiff appears to concede that her
Fourteenth Amendment claim is premised on deliberate indifference to medical needs.
(ECF No. 73 at 8–9.) Thus, it appears that Claim 2 duplicates Claim 1 and may be
dismissed. Alternatively, Plaintiff could be attempting to assert a procedural or
substantive due process claim. However, there are no allegations or facts to support a
claim that any defendant provided “inadequate process” prior to taking the life of
Blodgett or that any challenged governmental action would “shock the conscience of
federal judges.” See Zwygart v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 483 F.3d 1086, 1093 (10th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159
F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998). Absent any allegations plausibly related to procedural
or substantive due process allegations, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss Claim 2.
Claim 4 against Montrose County Defendants also alleges “Fourteenth
Amendment Violations.” (ECF No. 54 at 27.) That claim appears to challenge
Blodgett’s conditions of confinement and access to medical care while in solitary
confinement. (Id. ¶ 138.) To the extent that Plaintiff challenges Blodgett’s access to
adequate medical care, this claim is part and parcel of Plaintiff’s § 1983 deliberate
indifference claim of Claim 1. However, Plaintiff may also be challenging Blodgett’s
8
conditions of confinement before his death. That challenge is addressed in the analysis
below.
A.
CHC Motion to Dismiss (Claims 1, 2, 3, and 5)
CHC moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and state law claims for
negligence and wrongful death. The Court will address each in turn.
1.
Municipal Liability for § 1983 Claims
CHC is a business entity, not a natural person. In the Tenth Circuit, a business
entity working on the government’s behalf can only be liable through the municipal
liability framework established by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216
(10th Cir. 2003); Smedley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 175 F. App’x 943, 945–46 (10th Cir.
2005). Under Monell, a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 solely because of
the injuries inflicted by employees or agents. 436 U.S. at 694. Instead, a
municipality—or, here, a private entity under contract to provide services to inmates and
detainees at MCDC—can only be liable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages when the
entity’s “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury.” Id.
“A plaintiff alleging a municipal liability claim must therefore identify a government policy
or custom that caused the injury and then demonstrate ‘that the policy was enacted or
maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.’”
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013).
The three elements of a municipal liability claim can be summarized as: (1) official
9
policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind. If Plaintiff establishes these
elements, then CHC may liable, even if its employees are not defendants. See
Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2009).
A municipal policy or custom may be “(1) an officially promulgated policy; (2) an
informal custom amounting to a widespread practice; (3) the decisions of employees
with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by final policymakers of the
decisions of their subordinates; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise
employees.” Estate of Martinez v. Taylor, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1230 (D. Colo. 2016)
(citing Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a widespread practice of CHC providing inadequate
medical care to inmates and ignoring “obvious signs and symptoms to deny inmates
access to necessary medical care.” (ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 69, 72, 79, 83, 88.) In support,
Plaintiff cites multiple instances of CHC and affiliated entities providing substandard
medical care to inmates in Colorado and other states. (Id. ¶¶ 74–90.) In essence,
Plaintiff contends that CHC has such a widespread practice of inadequate medical care
at detention facilities, that “providing inadequate medical care” is, in fact, a custom of
the company. In response, CHC argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify “any specific
practice of inadequate medical and mental health services at the Montrose County Jail.”
(ECF No. 59 at 7.) While Plaintiff’s allegations are limited, at this stage, they are
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. As the Court understands it, Plaintiff has
alleged facts to plausibly support a claim that CHC has a widespread practice of
10
tolerating substandard or delayed medical care which is, in effect, a problem of failure
to train or supervise employees on the provision of adequate medical care.
In addition, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support causation. Plaintiff
claims that UNK Nurse, UNK LCSW, and CHC Counselor all acted in conformity with
CHC’s informal custom or practice of tolerating inadequate medical care, and thus
provided Blodgett with deficient medical care, which led to him taking his own life.
Finally, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that CHC is, or should be, aware of its track
record of providing deficient medical and mental health care at other, comparable
detention facilities. Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners
violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). In
the Court’s view, the continued provision of substandard medical care would, with near
certainty, result in the deprivation of inmates’ constitutional rights. Plaintiff has alleged
that CHC has continuously tolerated substandard care despite knowledge of persistent
and widespread deficiencies in the delivery of such care. Taking these allegations as
true for purposes of the instant Motion, it is plausible that CHC maintained its informal
custom “with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” See
Ernst, 697 F. App’x at 933. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a claim
against CHC for municipal liability under § 1983 and denies CHC’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
While the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts which only just manage to
support a plausible claim against CHC at this stage of the litigation, the Court notes that
11
at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff will have to support these specific claims with
detailed factual assertions and supporting credible evidence.
2.
Negligence Claim (Claim 3)
Plaintiff also asserts a negligence/wrongful death claim against CHC under two
theories of negligence, both of which rest on imputed liability for acts of employees: (1)
direct liability for failure to train or supervise employees, and (2) vicarious liability for the
negligent acts or omissions of its agents. (ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 125–26.) See Ferrer v.
Okbamicael, 390 P.3d 836, 844 (Colo. 2017) as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 27,
2017). For CHC to be liable under either theory of negligence, a CHC employee or
agent must have been negligent in some way. Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 844. The only
argument CHC raises to dismiss the negligence claim is that Plaintiff does not identify
any purportedly deficient training, policy, or practice or “any specific CHC employee.”
(ECF No. 59 at 12.) Essentially, CHC argues that Plaintiff has failed to provide
sufficient information to understand the claim and basis therefor.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only “a short and plain statement
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the
Twombly/Iqbal standard requires “plausibility,” it is still true that to satisfy Rule 8(a), the
statements in the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957). Under the notice pleading standard of Rule 8, Plaintiff must provide sufficient
information to put CHC on notice as to the basis of their negligence claim. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a).
12
“We have noted that the nature and specif icity of the allegations required to state
a plausible claim will vary based on context.” Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 1196
(10th Cir. 2015) (alteration incorporated). “Prisoners claiming constitutional violations
by officers within the prison [ ] rarely suffer information asymmetry . . . [because]
prisoners ordinarily know what has happened to them. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d
1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2010). However, in this case, Blodgett “who was in the best
position to observe what was and was not happening to him, and therefore in the best
position to provide facts . . . is dead.” Estate of Walter v. Corr. Healthcare Companies,
Inc., 232 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1164 (D. Colo. 2017). T here thus exists an “asymmetry of
information” beyond what is typical in similar cases. Id. (citing Tantlinger v. Duchaine,
2015 WL 3941503, at *4 (D. Colo. June 26, 2015)). Given the asymmetry, Plaintiff
need not plead claims with a great level of factual specificity.
While Plaintiff does not identify any CHC employee by name, the First Amended
Complaint provides sufficient information as to the identities of UNK Nurse, UNK
LCSW, and CHC Counselor. The First Amended Complaint contains excerpts of the
relevant records and attaches relevant documents, which include the date of the
document and signature of each individual. (ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 47, 53, 54; ECF Nos. 54-2;
54-3; 54-4; 54-5.) Plaintiff has provided CHC with sufficient information for CHC to
understand the facts on which her claims are premised. Moreover, CHC is in
possession of employee data from which CHC without much effort could determine the
identities of UNK Nurse, UNK LCSW, and CHC Counselor. The Court thus denies
CHC’s motion to dismiss for failure to identify individual CHC employees by name.
13
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has included sufficient factual information as to
the nature of her claim for failure to train or supervise such that CHC has fair notice of
“what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at
47. While the pleading of negligent training or supervision is adequate (if limited) at this
stage of the litigation, by the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff will have had the benefit
of discovery and must be able to articulate the basis for her negligence claim in greater
detail.
3.
Adrienne Leonard’s Claims in Her Personal Capacity
Plaintiff also brings a “survival” claim against the CHC for alleged negligence and
§ 1983 violations. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 139–41.) CHC construes this claim as Plaintiff suing
CHC in her personal capacity for negligence and violations of § 1983, and moves to
dismiss both claims.
a.
Negligence/Wrongful Death Claim
Plaintiff’s state law claims against CHC are not the model of clarity. Plaintiff
styles Claim 3 as “Medical Negligence Causing Wrongful Death” and Claim 5 as
“Survival” for CHC’s alleged negligence brought by Plaintiff as the heir and personal
representative of the Blodgett Estate. Plaintiff does not specify what damages she
seeks under Claim 3, but asks for damages including “funeral expenses, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life” for Claim 5. (ECF No. 54 at
24, 28.) In essence, Claims 3 & 5 assert two separate causes of action: a wrongful
death claim and a survival action for negligence.
14
CHC argues that Plaintiff’s claims in her personal capacity for CHC’s alleged
negligence should be dismissed because “[t]here are no allegations that any action was
negligent, with respect to Plaintiff in her personal capacity.” (ECF No. 59 at 13.)
The heir of a decedent may bring a wrongful death claim when the decedent’s
death is “caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default of another.” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 13-21-201 & -202. A plaintiff in such a wrongful death action may recover damages,
including, with some limitation, damages for “grief, loss of companionship, pain and
suffering, and emotional stress.” Id. § 13-21-203. By contrast, a negligence action
survives death and must be brought by the personal representative of the decedent’s
estate. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-101 (“All causes of action . . . shall survive and may be
brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person . . . Any action under this
section may be brought . . . by or against the personal representative of the
deceased.”). In such a survival action based on negligence, damages are limited to
“loss of earnings and expenses sustained or incurred prior to death and shall not
include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement, nor prospective profits or
earnings after date of death.” Id. A survival claim brought by the personal
representative of decedent’s estate does not preclude a separate w rongful death action
by an heir (or other proper plaintiff under the statute). Id. § 13-20-101.
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to bring a negligence survival claim against
CHC in her personal capacity, she cannot do so. See id. § 13-20-101. Any survival
claim must be brought by Plaintiff as the personal representative of the Blodgett Estate.
See id. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts the negligence claim as a survival
15
action in her personal capacity, CHC’s motion is granted and such claim is dismissed.
However, Plaintiff may maintain a negligence claim as the personal representative of
the Blodgett Estate.
Plaintiff also appears to assert a wrongful death claim arising out of CHC’s
alleged negligence, as evidenced by the styling of Claim 3 and request for damages
only available under the wrongful death statute. (ECF No. 54 at 24, 28.) Such a claim
is properly brought by Plaintiff in her personal capacity as heir to the Blodgett Estate.
To the extent CHC moves to dismiss Leonard’s negligence/wrongful death claim
brought in her personal capacity as heir to the Blodgett Estate, the motion is denied.
The pleading of the state law claims is not entirely clear and would greatly
benefit from a clearer and more organized recitation of the factual allegations which
plausibly support the legal elements of the claim. Thus, the Court will permit Plaintiff to
amend her complaint to clarify her state law claims and damages sought pursuant to
those claims.
b.
Section 1983 Claim
A § 1983 claim “must be based upon the violation of plaintiff’s personal rights,
and not the rights of someone else.” Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir.
1990). When a § 1983 violation results in death, the Tenth Circuit permits a survival
action by the estate of the deceased victim, but not a wrongful death action. Berry v.
City of Muskogee, Okla., 900 F.2d 1489, 1506–07 (10th Cir. 1990). T herefore, the
proper plaintiff is the decedent’s estate, here the Blodgett Estate, and not any heir or
representative personally. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-101; id. § 13-21-201.
16
Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to bring a § 1983 claim in her personal
capacity, any such claim is dismissed with prejudice.
B.
Montrose County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5)
Before discussing the § 1983 claims against Montrose County Defendants in
their official and individual capacities, the Court first addresses two preliminary issues.
1.
Plaintiff’s Personal Claims Against Montrose County Defendants
As discussed above, Plaintiff may not bring claims in her personal capacity for
§ 1983 violations. See Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506–07. W hen a § 1983 violation results in
death, only a survival action may be brought. In Colorado, such a claim is properly
brought by the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Id. Thus, to the extent
that Plaintiff attempts to bring such a claim in her personal capacity, that claim is
dismissed.
2.
Claims Against “Montrose County, Colorado”
Montrose County Defendants argue that “Montrose County, Colorado” should be
dismissed because it is an improperly named party and there are no allegations in the
First Amended Complaint against the Board of County Commissioners for the County of
Montrose. (ECF No. 61 at 13–14.) Plaintiff does not respond to this argument, and so
the Court deems it conceded. (ECF No. 84 at 10; see generally ECF No. 74.)
Moreover, the argument is well-founded. See Doe v. DiStefano, 2018 WL 2096347 (D.
Colo. May 7, 2018) (deeming an argument conceded where the plaintiff failed to
respond and the defendant’s argument was well-founded).
17
Under Colorado law, any suit against a county must be brought in the name of
the “board of county commissioners of the county” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-105. “An
action attempted to be brought under any other designation is a nullity, and no valid
judgment can enter in such a case.” Calahan v. Jefferson Cnty., 429 P.2d 301, 302
(Colo. 1967). The Tenth Circuit views this statutory provision as jurisdictional.
Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005). T herefore, Plaintiff’s
failure to properly name the board of county commissioners of Montrose County alone
is grounds for dismissal. See Hand v. Cummings, 2012 WL 4442752 at *2 (D. Colo.
Aug. 8, 2012).
Even if Plaintiff had used the proper name, the First Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim against the county or board of county commissioners. Under Colorado
law, a board of county commissioners and a sheriff in the same county are distinct
public entities. Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Clear Creek, 312 F.3d 1213,
1219 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus, a board of county commissioners has no control over the
sheriff’s employees and is not liable for negligent acts of the sheriff’s employees. Id.
(citing Tunget v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 992 P.2d 650, 652 (Colo. App. 2000)). T hus,
“Montrose County, Colorado,” even through its board of county commissioners has no
control or liability for acts of the Montrose County Sheriff’s Office. Id.
Plaintiff does not allege any involvement of a member of the board of county
commissioners of Montrose County, any policy of the board, or any act by a
decisionmaker of Montrose County in the First Amended Complaint. In short, Plaintiff
fails to state any facts to support a claim against “Montrose County, Colorado” or its
18
board of county commissioners. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court thus
dismisses all claims (Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5) against “Montrose County, Colorado.”
3.
§ 1983 Official Capacity Claims Against Montrose County Defendants
Montrose County Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them in their
official capacities. “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(citation omitted). Thus, the official capacity claims against Montrose County
Defendants are, in effect, claims against their employer, MCSO. Claims against a
municipal entity, such as MCSO, are subject to the municipal liability standard
discussed in Part III.A.1. For convenience, the Court repeats the standard here: “A
plaintiff alleging a municipal liability claim must therefore identify a government policy or
custom that caused the injury and then demonstrate ‘that the policy was enacted or
maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.’”
Ernst, 697 F. App’x at 933 (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769).
To state a claim against MCSO, Plaintiff must identify a custom, policy, or
practice that was the moving force behind Blodgett’s injuries. Id. Plaintiff fails to do so.
As Montrose County Defendants note, the only MCSO policy referred to in the First
Amended Complaint is the MCSO Justice Center Detention Facility Standard Operating
Procedure. (ECF No. 61 at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that individuals at MCDC failed to
follow the provisions of this policy for suicidal inmates. (ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 42, 52, 57, 63.)
“[U]nder Monell[,] subordinate employees impose liability by following policy, not when
they disregard it.” Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 1286
19
(10th Cir. 2007). Thus, generally, an individual’s failure to follow a municipal policy is
obviously not caused by a municipal policy. S.D. v. Lajeunesse, 2017 WL 262692, at
*5 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2017). The only individual whom Plaintiff alleges failed to abide by
the policy is “the deputy who completed the intake form.” (ECF No. 54 ¶ 42.) All other
potential allegations that someone failed to follow the policy are stated in the passive
voice3 or merely implied.4 (ECF No. ¶¶ 52, 57, 63.) Under the facts alleged, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a municipal liability claim against Montrose County
Defendants because Plaintiff has not alleged that Blodgett’s injury and death was
caused by a municipal policy. The Court thus dismisses the claim without prejudice. 5
Plaintiff also posits that Montrose County Defendants “have a policy and practice
of providing inadequate medical and mental health services to the inmates.” (ECF No.
54 ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs provide no facts to support this conclusory allegation. While Plaintiff
3
E.g., ECF No. 54 ¶ 63 (“Despite a history of specific prior suicide attempts in custody
and presenting suicidal ideations, Mr. Blodgett was not properly evaluated for risk of suicide,
placed on a suicide watch, or provided proper mental health treatment.”).
4
Plaintiff states that Hindman notified Commander Miller of Blodgett’s “history of being
on suicide watch while in custody.” (ECF No. 54 ¶ 49.) Plaintiff does not state that this e-mail
should have prompted action by Commander Miller under the policy, but seemingly implies that
Commander Miller should have taken some action. While an action by a final policymaker,
even one in defiance of a municipal policy, can be “described as the ‘official policy’ of a
municipality,” see Simmons, 506 F.3d at 1286, there is no allegation that Commander Miller
was under any obligation to act after receiving the e-mail from Hindman.
5
The parties appear to talk past one another with respect to the Monell claim against
MCSO. Plaintiff alleges that individuals at MCDC failed to follow the policy. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 42.)
Montrose County Defendants respond that those individuals did indeed follow the policy
because no defendant or deputy was aware of Blodgett’s history of suicide attempts. (ECF No.
61 at 12). Just the opposite is required to sustain a Monell claim; Plaintiff would need to allege
that defendants acted pursuant to a policy, and that doing so resulted in the deprivation of
constitutional rights.
20
includes specific factual allegations as to CHC’s widespread custom of providing
deficient medical care at various detention centers, Plaintiff does not make any
allegations specific to MCDC. Absent any factual allegations related to deficient
provision of mental health services at MCDC, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a
widespread practice at MCDC.
Finally, with respect to Claim 4 challenging the conditions of Blodgett’s
confinement, Plaintiff has not alleged any relevant policy of MCSO or MCDC.
In sum, Plaintiff has not identified a municipal custom, policy, or practice that
caused Blodgett’s injury or death as required to state a § 1983 claim against Montrose
County Defendants in their official capacity. The Court thus grants Montrose County
Defendants’ motion with respect to the § 1983 claims against the named individuals in
their official capacity, and dismisses those claims without prejudice.
4.
§ 1983 Individual Capacity Claims Against Montrose County Defendants
& Qualified Immunity
Montrose County Defendants sued in their individual capacity—namely
Commander Miller and Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, Strait, and Strole—assert qualified
immunity from the individual capacity claims against them. They argue that Plaintiff has
failed to allege a constitutional violation by any individual under a theory of direct or
supervisory liability.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To resolve a
21
claim of qualified immunity, the Court must consider two elements: (1) whether Plaintiff
has alleged a constitutional violation, and (2) whether the violated right was “clearly
established” at the time of the violation. Id. at 230–31. “The judges of the district courts
. . . [may] exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.” Id. at 236. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the plaintiff
can satisfy both prongs of the inquiry. Id. at 232. When a defendant asserts the
defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to overcome the asserted
immunity. Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009).
Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability.
Estate of Reat v. Rodriguez, 824 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). If a court finds that a defendant is subject to
qualified immunity, the court may dismiss with or without prejudice. Breidenbach v.
Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1294 (10th Cir. 1997); Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff alleges that Montrose County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Blodgett’s serious medical needs in violation of § 1983. Claims based on suicide while
in jail are “considered and treated as claims based on the failure of jail officials to
provide medical care for those in their custody.” Barrie v. Grand Cnty., Utah, 119 F.3d
862, 866 (10th Cir. 1997). Such claims are judged under the “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs” test established by the Supreme Court in Estelle, 429 U.S. at
22
104.6 The “deliberate indifference” test has an objective and subjective component: (1)
the harm suffered must be sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must know of
and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. DuBois v. Payne Cnty. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 543 F. App’x 841, 846 (10th Cir. 2013). In the context of liability for
prison suicide, “the risk of, or potential for, suicide involves a sufficiently serious medical
need and/or harm such that the objective prong . . . is met.” Id. The subjective
component requires the defendant to have knowledge that the specific inmate in
question presented a substantial risk of suicide. Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1250
(10th Cir. 2015). The main inquiry on this motion to dismiss is whether Plaintiff
adequately alleges facts to support the subjective prong and the mental state of each
Montrose County Defendant.
Supervisory officials may also be held liable in their individual capacity. Section
1983 does not allow claims against supervisors under a theory of respondeat superior
liability. Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248 n.9. A § 1983 claim against a defendant is his personal
6
In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of a prison constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The legal standards governing a prisoner’s right to constitutionally
adequate medical care have been developed almost entirely under the Eighth Amendment’s
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause. But “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only
after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with
criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 702 n.40 (1977). Thus, for pretrial
detainees, the source of the constitutional right to adequate medical care is the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Eighth. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 & n.16. This distinction between the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has long been treated as one without a difference. See,
e.g., Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting the distinction but
stating that a “claim for denial of medical attention” in pretrial custody proceeds under “an
analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases”). No party raises any issue of
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015),
changed the standard for Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the denial of medical care.
23
capacity for supervisory liability “allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendantsupervisor who creates, promulgates, or implements a policy which subjects, or causes
to be subjected that plaintiff to the deprivation of any rights secured by the
Constitution.” Id. at 1248 (alterations incorporated). Thus, a plaintiff must show that a
subordinate violated the Constitution and an affirmative link between the supervisor and
the constitutional violation. Id. An “affirmative link” requires “(1) personal involvement,
(2) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of mind.” Dodds v. Richardson,
614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010).
As for the second element of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the law was clearly established at the relevant time. Lybrook, 232
F.3d at 1337. “A plaintiff may show clearly established law by pointing to either a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision, or the weight of authority from other courts,
existing at the time of the alleged violation.” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th
Cir. 2017). To be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551
(2017). “Although there need not be a case directly on point, an officer cannot be said
to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently
definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.” Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 2018) (alterations
incorporated and citations omitted).
24
a.
Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, and Strait
Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation by Sergeants Iverson, McNulty,
and Strait under either direct or supervisory liability. The First Amended Complaint
does not identify any action (or inaction) by Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, and Strait.
These sergeants are never mentioned by name, apart from being identified as
defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 30–32.) Conclusory allegations which lump
together all “Montrose County Defendants” are not a sufficient basis to state sufficient
to state a claim against each sergeant for deliberate indifference. The total lack of
allegations as to their individual conduct fails to provide these defendants notice of the
claims against them. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a complaint raising § 1983 claims failed “to isolate the allegedly
unconstitutional acts of each defendant, and thereby [did] not provide adequate notice
as to the nature of the claims against each”).
In addition, the First Amended Complaint is also devoid of any allegation that
these sergeants were the supervisors of the “jail staff” or other unidentified actors in the
First Amended Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff merely pleads that “Montrose Defendant
Sergeants . . . were employed in supervisory capacities of all MCDC deputies.” (ECF
No. 54 ¶ 94.) However, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that these sergeants
personally participated, exercised control, or failed to supervise “jail staff” or others at
MCDC. Absent allegations that these sergeants supervised the unnamed staff who
allegedly committed a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an
affirmative link between the supervisors and a constitutional violation.
25
Under the facts alleged, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a constitutional
violation by these three sergeants and has not overcome their assertion of qualified
immunity. The Court thus dismisses the individual claims against Sergeants Iverson,
McNulty, and Strait without prejudice.
b.
Sergeant Strole
To allege a constitutional violation for deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must
plausibly plead that Sergeant Strole knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
Blodgett’s health or safety. See DuBois, 543 F. App’x at 846. Plaintiff fails to do so.
Unlike the allegations against the other sergeants, Plaintiff identifies Sergeant
Strole by name in the First Amended Complaint and states specific actions taken her.
(ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 44–45.) Sergeant Strole asked Klienapfel to evaluate Blodgett after
intake and received a recommendation from Klienapfel that Blodgett receive mental
health services. (Id.; ECF No. 84-1 at 1.) Notably, Klienapfel’s recommendation did not
indicate to Sergeant Strole that Blodgett harbored any suicidal tendencies. While
Sergeant Strole should have been aware that Blodgett should receive some mental
health services in the future, Plaintiff cannot extrapolate Klienapfel’s recommendation to
support a claim that Sergeant Strole knew Blodgett was suicidal and disregarded that
risk. Under the circumstances, the allegations against Sergeant Strole do not rise to
the level of deliberate indifference.
Nor does Plaintiff allege any claim of supervisory liability against Sergeant Strole.
For the reasons discussed above regarding the supervisory claims against the other
sergeants in Part III.B.4.a, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for
26
supervisory liability against Sergeant Strole.
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation by
Sergeant Strole, and Plaintiff has not overcome the assertion of qualified immunity.
The Court thus dismisses the claims against Sergeant Strole without prejudice.
c.
Commander Miller
Plaintiff has plausibly pled that, at a minimum, Commander Miller knew that
Blodgett could be a serious medical risk and disregarded that risk. Commander Miller
received the e-mail from Blodgett’s public defender notifying him that Blodgett had
previously been on suicide watch. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 49.) While the exact contents of this
e-mail are presently unknown, this allegation raises a question of material fact of
whether Commander Miller had notice of previous suicide attempts by Blodgett, or
whether he should have taken further steps to inform other prison officials, consistent
with MCSO policy.
Viewing this allegation in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Commander Miller
knew of a serious risk to Blodgett’s health given his mental health and suicide watch
history, and his only response was to confirm that Blodgett was “on the list” for mental
health services. Arguably, such knowledge should have triggered an obligation to
further report Blodgett’s mental health and suicide watch history to all deputies, and to
search, segregate, and take “necessary measures” to prevent or eliminate any
immediate danger. (ECF No. 54-1.)
Thus, Plaintiff has plausibly pled a factual dispute which, if resolved in his favor,
would establish a constitutional violation. In other words, in her First Amended
27
Complaint Plaintiff has set forth facts which plausibly allege that Miller knew of a serious
medical risk to Plaintiff and disregarded it—and in so doing violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s injunction against deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
Mr. Blodgett.
As to the second element of qualified immunity, other than briefly stating the
qualified immunity standard (see ECF No. 61 at 4, 8), neither party fully addresses
whether Commander Miller’s alleged violation of Blodgett’s constitutional rights was
“clearly established” in November 2015. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Typically,
once a defendant raises the possibility of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional
right. See Cox, 800 F.3d at 1254 (holding that, where a defendant asserted a qualified
immunity defense but did not brief whether the right was clearly established, the plaintiff
nonetheless must show that the constitutional violation was grounded in clearly
established law). However, it would be overly formalistic for the Court to dismiss
Commander Miller because Plaintiff failed to cite to the clearly established law in her
response brief, only for Plaintiff to amend her complaint and adequately address the
clearly established law prong of qualified immunity. Thus, the Court addresses the
issue here.
A review of Tenth Circuit cases shows that, since the mid-1990s, to succeed on
a prison suicide deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must present facts to suggest
that facility staff “had knowledge of the specific risk that [the deceased] would commit
suicide.” Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Cox,
28
800 F.3d at 1249–50 (describing the “law in our circuit” as requiring “prison officials to
possess knowledge that a specific inmate presents a substantial risk of suicide”). As
discussed above, based on the e-mail from Hindman, Commander Miller plausibly had
knowledge that a specific individual in MCDC custody (here, Blodgett) presented a
“substantial risk” of suicide, and disregarded that risk. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
pled facts sufficient to support a claim that Commander Miller violated Blodgett’s clearly
established constitutional rights. Thus, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the
claims against Commander Miller in his personal capacity.
d.
Claim 4
Plaintiff seemingly challenges the conditions of Blodgett’s solitary confinement.
Plaintiff does not identify any officer who allegedly committed a constitutional violation
by holding Blodgett in solitary confinement. Instead, Plaintiff simply claims “Defendants
placed and held” Blodgett in solitary confinement. (ECF No. 54 ¶ 138.). As discussed
above, such a sweeping accusation against all Montrose County Defendants does not
give the individuals actually responsible notice of the claims against them.7 See
7
Even if had Plaintiff identified the individual(s) allegedly responsible, Plaintiff fails to
state sufficient facts to plausibly assert a claim against Montrose County Defendants for holding
Blodgett in solitary confinement. To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff would have to provide some
facts related to the conditions of Blodgett’s confinement beyond some “deprivation of access to
programs, recreational time, [and] contact with staff and inmates.” (ECF No. 54 ¶ 138.)
Moreover, as of 2014, the Tenth Circuit observed that the circuit had “not definitely determined
whether a lack of social contact and environmental stimulation rises to an Eighth Amendment
violation,” and presumably the result is the same under the Fourteenth Amendment. Silverstein
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 559 F. App’x 739, 755 (10th Cir. 2014).
29
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1250. Therefore, the Court dismisses individual
capacity claims against Montrose Defendants under Claim 4.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
CHC Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 59) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as follows:
a.
Claim 2 is DISMISSED;
b.
Claim 5 is DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE as to Adrienne
Leonard’s claims in her personal capacity for § 1983 violations and
negligence; and
c.
The remainder of the Motion is DENIED. The following claims remain
against CHC: Claim 1 (§ 1983 deliberate indifference); Claim 3 (Wrongful
Death); and, in part, Claim 5 (the Blodgett Estate’s Negligence Claim).
2.
Montrose County Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 61) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART as follows:
a.
All claims brought against “Montrose County, Colorado” are DISMISSED;
b.
Claim 1 is DISMISSED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all parties
in their official capacity and Sergeants Iverson, McNulty, Strait, and Strole,
in their personal capacity;
c.
Claim 2 and Claim 4 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
d.
Claim 5 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
30
e.
The Motion is DENIED IN PART as to Claim 1 against Commander Miller
in his personal capacity;
3.
The stay of discovery (ECF No. 78) is LIFTED;
4.
Parties are instructed to contact U.S. Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter for the
purpose of preparing and entering an amended scheduling order with a deadline
for amending the pleadings sufficiently in the future to accommodate discovery
of the identities of the parties currently named only by their titles; and
5.
Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second amended complaint within a
reasonable time as determined by Judge Neureiter.
Dated this 12th day of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
31
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