Noxon v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Filing 20

ORDER Reversing Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Remanding for an Immediate Award of Benefits. Entered by Judge William J. Martinez on 10/31/2018. (lrobe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 18-cv-0003-WJM
ROBERT J. NOXON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION1,
Defendant.

ORDER REVERSING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION
AND REMANDING FOR AN IMMEDIATE AWARD OF BENEFITS

This is a Social Security Benefits appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff Robert J. Noxon (“Plaintiff”) challenges the final decision of Defendant, the
Social Security Administration (“Administration”), denying his application for period of
disability and disability insurance benefits. After a hearing, the denial was affirmed by
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who ruled that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. This appeal followed.
For the reasons set forth below, the Administration’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s
application for disability insurance benefits is reversed and this matter is remanded for
an immediate award of benefits.

1

The Social Security Administration no longer has a commissioner nor a lawful acting
commissioner. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel of the Government
Accountability Office, to President Donald Trump (Mar. 6, 2018), available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690502.pdf (Last accessed Aug. 8, 2018). Lacking any other
alternative, the Court sua sponte substitutes the Social Security Administration itself as the
proper defendant.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on 1956 and was 59 years old on the date last insured.
(Administrative Record (“R.”) (ECF No. 11) at 347.) Plaintiff grew up in Colorado and
has a bachelor’s degree in education and pastoral ministry, and some vocational
training. (R. at 245, 340.) Plaintiff has held 25 jobs in the last 14 years. (R. at
124–30.) His past relevant work experience includes a broad range of professions,
including school teacher, sales clerk, pharmacy technician, and shuttle bus driver. (R.
at 347.) Plaintiff claims that he has been disabled since Septem ber 1, 2012 due to a
combination of mental health impairments including bipolar disorder (depressed without
psychosis), anxiety disorder, dependent personality disorder, and ADHD. (R. at 339;
ECF No. 15 at 6.)
Plaintiff began treatment with Mr. Ronald Baptist, M.A., LPC in 2004. Mr. Baptist
provided treatment including psychotherapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and eye
movement desensitization and reprocessing. (R. at 824–27.) Plaintiff had regular
sessions with Mr. Baptist from August 18, 2004 through November 9, 2004, July 7,
2005 through April 18, 2006, and from September 2009 to the present. (R. at 185,
824–27.) Plaintiff has had at least 289 one-hour sessions with Mr. Baptist as of the
time of filing this appeal. (R. at 316–17, 824–27.) Mr. Baptist consistently observed
that Plaintiff demonstrated agitation, a tangential and disconnected verbal style, and an
awkward interpersonal style alternating between states of relatively normal presentation
and obvious anxiety and insecurity. (R. at 189.) Mr. Baptist explained that Plaintiff
comes across as very normal, but then he “gets triggered and he starts building stress,
rejection, and struggling with his sense of being [inadequate] and being dependent. . . .
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and then it usually leads to frustration, and the next thing is some kind of anger
outburst.” (R. at 320.)
Mr. Baptist noted that “for most of the time that [Plaintiff] is awake and aware, he
is experiencing a significant amount of anxiety.” (R. at 319.) Plaintiff’s anxiety and
dependent personality disorder impacts all aspects of Plaintiff’s life. (R. at 319.) This
combination of mental health issues leads to a troublesome, ineffective, and
dysfunctional way of relating to people. (R. at 322.) This interferes with his personal
relationships and leads to difficulty with supervisors. (R. at 319, 323–24.) For instance,
Plaintiff plays the saxophone, but cannot work with other musicians because he fails to
maintain those relationships—ultimately Baptist had to stop encouraging him to seek
band mates because these relationships would “end in some kind of trouble.” (R. at
326.)
Mr. Baptist further noted that even on Ritalin, Plaintiff struggled to focus. (R. at
326–27.) This would manifest in conversation, where Plaintiff would get sidetracked,
tangential, and off-focus, “even when he’s doing fairly well.” (Id.) Moreover, Mr. Baptist
observed that changes in a routine work setting cause Plaintiff distress and that some
of Plaintiff’s job losses were directly related to his panic when a policy was changed.
(R. at 328.)
Mr. Baptist opined—after at least 289 sessions with Plaintiff—that as a result of
his mental health impairments, Plaintiff would be precluded from performing the
following functions for at least 20% of the workday:
•

perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be
punctual within customary tolerances, and
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•

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (R. at 187.)
Mr. Baptist further opined that Plaintiff would be precluded from performing the

following functions for at least 15% of the workday:
•

remember work-like procedures

•

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods,

•

sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision,

•

make simple work-related decisions,

•

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of
breaks, and

•

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Id.)
Plaintiff also saw a psychiatrist, Dr. Stephen Mueller, M.D., about once every one

to three months, beginning in 2010. (R. at 622.) Dr. Mueller diagnosed Plaintiff with
bipolar disorder (depressed, not psychotic), generalized anxiety disorder, attention
deficit disorder, bipolar disorder, and dependent personality disorder. (R. at 232.) Dr.
Mueller also adjusted Plaintiff’s psychiatric medications, which included Depakote,
Celexa, and Ritalin. Dr. Mueller observed that Plaintiff would blow up, throw things, get
angry, yell, hit tables, and had lashed out at his m other and ex-wife—his girlfriend had
to call the police when Plaintiff hit his girlfriend’s window with a stick. (R. at 653–54.)
According to Dr. Mueller, Plaintiff was depressed, extremely lonely, “gets an attitude too
quickly,” never wants to be single, and has suicidal thoughts when rejected. (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff had two emergency room visits for anxiety. (Id.) Between
2011 and 2015, Plaintiff was fired from seven jobs for angry outbursts. (R. at 631–644.)
In 2015, Plaintiff got a new job, which he held until the time of the second hearing in
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2017. (R. at 626.) He managed to sustain this job because he worked part time and
was given significant accommodations, including a flexible schedule. (R. at 538–541.)
In early 2017, Dr. Mueller maintained that Plaintiff was only capable of low stress, part
time work. (R. at 756.)
Dr. Mueller also found that Plaintiff has marked impairments in his ability to do
the following:
•

understand and learn terms, instructions, and procedures,

•

identify and solve problems,

•

sequence multi-step activities,

•

use reason and judgment to make work-related decisions,

•

handle conflicts with others,

•

understand and respond to social cues (physical, verbal, emotional),

•

respond to requests, suggestions, criticism, correction, and challenges,

•

keep social interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity,
argumentativeness, or suspiciousness,

•

work at an appropriate and consistent pace,

•

complete tasks in a timely manner,

•

ignore or avoid distractions while working,

•

change activities or work settings without being disruptive,

•

work close to or with others without interrupting or distracting them,

•

work a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest
periods during the day,

•

respond to demands,
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•

adapt to change,

•

manage his psychologically based symptoms,

•

distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable work performance, and

•

set realistic goals. (R. 657–661.)
The Administration had Plaintiff evaluated by consultative psychologist Brad

Marten, Psy.D., in a one-time visit on October 4, 2013. (R. at 244.) Dr. Marten
reviewed only two of Dr. Mueller’s handwritten notes, and conducted a clinical interview.
(Id.) After this single clinical interview, Dr. Marten opined that Plaintiff’s diagnosis was
major depressive disorder (recurrent, mild), dysthymic disorder (provisional), rule out
bipolar disorder not otherwise specified, anxiety disorder not otherwise specified, rule
out generalized anxiety disorder, and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (inattentive
type). (R. at 250.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s limitations, Dr. Marten noted that Plaintiff had “limited
efficiency” in his ability to respond to directions and/or inquiry in workplace settings. (R.
at 251.) However, Dr. Marten found that Plaintiff had “intact ability to attend to simple
instructions and tasks as well as actively concentrate on more complex directions and
tasks in work place settings. These findings suggest adequate ability to carry out such
instructions and/or activities as well.” (Id.) Dr. Marten observed that Plaintiff displayed
mild-to-moderate difficulty with delayed auditory recall, which, according to Dr. Marten
suggests similar limitations in his ability to consolidate and retrieve pertinent auditory
verbal information in workplace settings. (Id.) Dr. Marten concluded that Plaintiff’s
“apparent chronic characterological difficulties are likely to continue to negatively impact
appropriate interpersonal and social functioning in workplace settings and in general.”
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(R. at 252.)
Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits was originally denied in an
ALJ Decision–Unfavorable dated January 28, 2015. (R. at 374.) Plaintiff appealed to
the Appeals Council which declined review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency
action. (R. at 392.) Plaintiff then filed a complaint in this Court. (R. at 395.) The
Administration responded by filing an Unopposed Motion for Remand to Agency. (R. at
407.) The agency found several issues with the ALJs decision, including:
•

The ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Mr. Baptist solely because Baptist
was, according to the ALJ, not an acceptable medical source, without any
additional analysis. (Id.) While Baptist is not a listed acceptable medical source
under social security regulations, Social Security Ruling 06-3 requires ALJs to
weigh opinions from “other sources” using the factors set forth in 20 CFR §
404.1527. (Id.)

•

The ALJ did not apply the factors in 20 CFR § 404.1527 in evaluating the opinion
of a treating physician, Dr. Mueller. (Id.)

•

The record appeared to be incomplete. (R. at 408.)
On remand, the same ALJ again denied the claim in an October 25, 2017

decision. The Appeals Council declined review and the ALJ’s October 25, 2017
decision (“ALJ’s decision”) became the final agency decision. (ECF No. 15 at 4.)
Plaintiff filed a timely Complaint and Petition.
The ALJ’s decision follows the Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation

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process.2 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful
activity during the period from his alleged onset date of September 1, 2012 through his
date last insured of September 30, 2016. (R. at 339.) At step two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “affective, anxiety and personality
disorders.” (R. at 339.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the following non-severe
impairments: attention deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (R. at
340.) The ALJ found that these impairments were non-severe because Plaintiff “has
been able [to] work in various jobs and was able to obtain two bachelor’s degrees.” (R.
at 340.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id.) In making this
finding, the ALJ considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria were satisfied. (Id.) To
satisfy the paragraph B criteria, the mental impairments must result in at least one
extreme or two marked limitations in one of the following broad areas of functioning: (1)
understanding, remembering or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3)
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or (4) adapting or managing themselves.
(Id.) A marked limitation means “functioning in this area independently, appropriately,

2

The five-step process requires the ALJ to consider whether a claimant: (1) engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment;
(3) had a condition which met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
her past relevant work; and, if not, (5) could perform other work in the national economy. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1988.) The claimant has the burden of proof in steps one through four; the Social Security
Administration has the burden of proof at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2007).

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effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited. An extreme limitation is the
inability to function independently, appropriately or effectively, and on a sustained
basis.” (Id.)
In the first category—understanding, remembering, and applying
information—the ALJ found that Plaintiff has moderate limitations. (Id.) The ALJ noted
that although Plaintiff alleged he has difficulty remembering generally, Plaintiff also
stated that he could prepare meals, go to doctor’s appointments, shop, drive, and read.
(Id.) In the second category—interacting with others—the ALJ found that Plaintiff has
moderate limitations. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he has difficulty getting along with
others and dealing appropriately with others. (Id.) However, the ALJ emphasized that
Plaintiff also takes his mom on errands, sees friends on a regular basis, and only has
social limitations when he is distressed. (R. at 8–9.)
Turning to the third category—concentration, persistence, or maintaining
pace—the ALJ found that Plaintiff has moderate limitations. (R. at 341.) The ALJ
acknowledged that Plaintiff contended that he has limitations in concentrating generally
and completing tasks. (Id.) However, the ALJ also noted that Plaintiff is able to drive,
prepare meals, watch TV, read, play the saxophone, and handle his own medical care.
(Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has mild limitations in the fourth category—adapting or
managing himself. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff did not allege any symptoms or
limitations that relate to this criterion, rather, Plaintiff stated that he is able to handle
self-care and personal hygiene. (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ pointed out that evidence on
the record showed that Plaintiff has “no problem getting along well with providers and

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staff.” (Id.)
Thus, at step three, the ALJ concluded that “[b]ecause [Plaintif f’s] mental
impairments did not cause at least two ‘marked’ limitations or one ‘extreme’ limitation,
the ‘paragraph B’ criteria were not satisfied.” (Id.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s
condition does not satisfy the paragraph C criteria. (Id.) To fulfill the paragraph C
criteria, an individual must demonstrate a medically documented history of a mental
disorder that has lasted for at least two years. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
impairments have persisted for more than two years. (Id.) However, the ALJ noted that
“it is clear from the record that [Plaintiff] is able to live independently and maintain a
part-time job since November 2015, working 24 hours a week.” (Id.)
Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments, considered singly or in
combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, and
12.08.” (R. at 340.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s testimony
at the hearing and Dr. Marten’s notes from his one-time consultation with Plaintiff. The
ALJ assigned significant weight to Dr. Marten’s opinion “because it coincides with other
evidence and testimony that shows [Plaintiff] is capable of being around others.” (R. at
344–345.)
Notably, however, the ALJ assigned little weight to the opinion of Dr. Mueller,
who has seen Plaintiff at least 24 times over the seven years before the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ’s 2016 decision had been voluntarily remanded by the Administration for
assigning little weight to Dr. Mueller’s opinion without explanation. (R. at 407.) In his
present decision, the ALJ explains, “[a]lthough Dr. Mueller is an acceptable treating

10

source, the undersigned gives his opinion little weight. His marked social and
concentration/ persistence and pace limitations are inconsistent with his own treatment
notes, which show [Plaintiff] engages in frequent social situations. . . . Moreover, Dr.
Mueller is a psychiatrist and only provided medication management, not therapy.” (R.
at 345.) Finally, the ALJ assigned little weight to Mr. Baptist’s opinions regarding
Plaintiff’s limitations, even though they were based on over 289 sessions with Plaintiff.
(R. at 346.)
The ALJ’s 2016 decision had also been remanded because he “gave Mr.
Baptist’s opinions little weight solely because Mr. Baptist was not an acceptable
medical source, without any additional analysis.” (R. at 407.) In his present decision,
the ALJ found that Mr. Baptist’s “opinions are inconsistent with [] Dr. Mueller’s treatment
notes and the record as a whole, which [] show that the claimant socializes with others
and is able to follow written and spoken directions. . . . the undersigned notes that a
counselor is not an acceptable medical source.” (R. at 346.)
Before reaching step four, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional
Capacity (“RFC”) and found that Plaintiff had the RFC to “perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels. However, [Plaintiff] is only able to perform non-complex tasks,
defined as unskilled tasks requiring a specific vocational preparation (SVP) or 2 or less.
The claimant can only occasionally deal with the general public and coworkers and
cannot tolerate more than minimal supervision.” (R. at 342.) At step four, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. at 347.) After
considering the RFC assessment described above, along with Plaintiff’s age, education,
and work experience, at step five the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in
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significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (Id.) These jobs
include dining room attendant, landscape laborer, and night cleaner. (R. at 348.)
Plaintiff initiated this action on January 2, 2018, challenging the ALJ’s October
25, 2017 decision, which is now before the Court. (ECF No. 15.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine whether substantial
evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. Evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257,
1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the Administration’s decision, the Court may
neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Salazar
v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006). “On the other hand, if the ALJ failed to
apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of
substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding at step 3 on three main bases: (1) the ALJ’s
assessment of medical opinion evidence, (2) the ALJ’s assessment of lay witnesses’
statements, and (3) the ALJ’s findings regarding the consistency of Plaintiff’s
allegations. (ECF No. 15 at 5.)

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Plaintiff raises two arguments under the first basis. Plaintiff first argues that the
ALJ assigned little weight to the medical opinions of Mr. Baptist and Dr. Mueller, when
they were entitled to controlling or significant weight under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)
and (f). (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate
reasons for doing so. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave significant
weight to the opinion of a consultative examiner. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that this
opinion was not entitled to any weight.
The Administration responds that the ALJ provided good reasons for the weight
he assigned to the various opinions of record. (ECF No. 17 at 8.) The Administration
argues that little weight was assigned to Dr. Mueller and Mr. Baptist’s opinions because
they contained “few if any clinical findings and demonstrated that Plaintiff improved with
treatment.” (Id. at 11.) The Administration argues that the ALJ “found those sources’
opinions were inconsistent with the record as a whole, which showed that Plaintiff
maintained an active social life despite complaints of marked social limitations and that
he improved enough to hold the same job for more than two years.” (Id.)
According to the Administration, “[t]hat evidence conflicted sharply with the
opinions of Dr. Mueller and Mr. Baptist that Plaintiff had impairments that precluded him
from performing most work-related activities for up to 20% of the workday and that he
was incapable of handling work stress.” (Id.) The Administration argues that “[t]he ALJ
assigned Dr. Marten’s opinion significant weight because it was consistent with the
evidence of record and with Plaintiff’s testimony about his very broad range of social
activities and his ability to independently run his own life (other than some help with

13

finances). . . . Dr. Marten’s opinion is consistent with treatment notes from Dr. Mueller
and Mr. Baptist showing consistently significant social interaction and improvement with
treatment.” (Id.)
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the Administration is required to consider the
following factors in deciding the weight assigned to any medical opinion:
1.

The examining relationship: generally more weight is assigned to the medical
opinion of a source who has examined the Plaintiff.

2.

Treatment relationship: generally more weight is assigned to medical opinions
from treating sources, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [Plaintiff’s]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or
from reports of individual examinations such as consultative examinations or
brief hospitalizations.” Under this factor, the Administration is also required to
consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination as well as the nature and extent of the treatment relationship.

3.

Supportability: the Administration is supposed to assign more weight to a
medical source who presents relevant evidence to support the medical opinion,
particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.

4.

Consistency: generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record
as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.

5.

Specialization: the Administration generally assigns more weight to the medical
opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty
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than to the medical opinion of a source who is not a specialist.
Moreover, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(f) provides:
Consideration. Opinions from medical sources who are not
acceptable medical sources and from nonmedical sources
may reflect the source’s judgment about some of the same
issues addressed in medical opinions from acceptable
medical sources. Although we will consider these opinions
using the same factors as listed in paragraph (c)(1) through
(c)(6) in this section, not every factor for weighing opinion
evidence will apply in every case because the evaluation of
an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable
medical source or from a nonmedical source depends on the
particular facts in each case. Depending on the particular
facts in a case, and after applying the factors for weighing
opinion evidence, an opinion from a medical source who is
not an acceptable medical source or from a nonmedical
source may outweigh the medical opinion of an acceptable
medical source, including the medical opinion of a treating
source. For example, it may be appropriate to give more
weight to the opinion of a medical source who is not an
acceptable medical source if he or she has seen the
individual more often than the treating source, has provided
better supporting evidence and a better explanation for the
opinion, and the opinion is more consistent with the
evidence as a whole.
Dr. Mueller has seen Plaintiff since 2010, at a frequency of once every one to
three months, and Mr. Baptist has had at least 289 sessions w ith Plaintiff. Although Mr.
Baptist is a non-medical source, his relationship with Plaintiff is precisely the kind of
relationship 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) was meant to include. The Court notes that
Plaintiff’s relationships with Mr. Baptist and Dr. Mueller are some of the longest
treatment relationships it has ever seen when reviewing social security appeals. Thus,
under the first two factors, Dr. Mueller and Mr, Baptist’s opinions should have been
assigned significant weight. Their medical opinions were entitled to more weight under
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the third factor as well.
The ALJ stated that he assigned little weight to both Mr. Baptist and Dr. Mueller’s
opinions because they were inconsistent. As an initial matter, it is important to note that
both of Plaintiff’s long-term treatment providers, Mr. Baptist and Dr. Mueller, had almost
identical findings regarding Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations. Additionally, after
studying the record and the medical opinions, the Court finds that the ALJ specifically
mischaracterized this evidence in his decision. The Administration repeatedly points
out that Plaintiff was volunteering once a week at a pet shelter, playing in two bands,
and had kept the same job for more than one year. (ECF No. 17 at 10.) What the
Administration overlooks is that while Plaintiff does attempt to participate in social
activities, these attempts are unsuccessful and exacerbate Plaintiff’s stress such that
Mr. Baptist stopped encouraging Plaintiff to participate in social activity. (R. at 319–26,
631–44, 653–54.) W hile Plaintiff did maintain the same job for over a year, it was a
part time job in which Plaintiff was given various accommodations, like flexible hours.
(R. at 631–44.) Both of his treatment providers note that he will have significant
difficulty functioning in a typical workplace atmosphere. (R. at 538–41, 756.)
The Court concludes that because the ALJ did not properly consider the medical
opinion evidence provided by Dr. Mueller and Mr. Baptist, his factual findings are not
supported by the substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ’s findings are
overwhelmed by the remaining record evidence and, moreover, the ALJ also failed to
properly resolve the problems raised in the Administration’s motion for remand. “In the
substantial evidence analysis, the denominator (all available evidence) is as important

16

as the numerator (the evidence relied upon to reach a decision).” Lamont v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1080 (D. Colo 2016.) Here, the
ALJ relied heavily on Dr. Marten’s opinion, and in the process assigned significant
weight to a consultative examiner, and mischaracterized and discarded the opinions of
Plaintiff’s long-term treatment providers. When the opinions of Dr. Mueller and Mr.
Baptist are accorded their appropriate weight, it is clear that Plaintiff’s impairments
satisfy the paragraph B criteria. The Court holds, therefore, that Plaintiff is disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act at step three of the five-step analysis.
The Court has reached this conclusion after considering the record as a whole,
the ALJ’s decision, and the history of this case. It is abundantly clear to the Court that
any additional fact finding would not serve a useful purpose here. Sorenson v. Brown,
888 F.2d 706, 713 (D. Colo. 1989). “The decision to direct an award of benefits should
be made only when the administrative record has been fully developed and when
substantial and uncontradicted evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the
claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Moore v. Astrue, 2009 WL 215356, at *4
(D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2009). Such is the case here. T he medical opinions of Plaintiff’s
treatment providers clearly establish that Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits he seeks.
There is no additional evidence that Administration can point to which would suggest
that Dr. Marten’s opinions, derived solely from his single consultative examination of
Plaintiff, should outweigh the opinions of Plaintiff’s treatment providers.
But even if the case were otherwise, the Court must also consider more practical
concerns. One factor deemed relevant by the Tenth Circuit is the length of time the

17

matter has been pending. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 626 (10th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of September 1, 2012, and he filed his
application for disability benefits on April 10, 2013. (R. at 339; ECF No. 15 at 4.) T his
matter has therefore been pending, either before the ALJ or in this Court, for over five
and one-half years.
The Court also already remanded this case once per the Administration’s own
request, in August 2013, for further consideration of the exact same grounds on which
the Court now bases its disability determination. (R. at 402–408.) Remanding this
matter for yet another administrative hearing would only serve to significantly delay final
resolution of this appeal, without the possibility of any meaningful change in the factual
record. “The Secretary is not entitled to adjudicate a case ad infinitum until it correctly
applies the proper legal standard and gathers evidence to support its conclusion.”
Sisco v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 746 (10th Cir. 1993); see
also Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In light of the
Secretary’s patent failure to satisfy the burden of proof at step five, and the long delay
that has already occurred as a result of the Secretary’s erroneous disposition of the
proceedings, we exercise our discretionary authority to remand for an immediate award
of benefits.”).
Given all of the above, the Court is of the view that this is one of those rare
appeals in which the governing law, as well the equities involved, support the
conclusion that an immediate award of benefits is the proper and just disposition of this
appeal.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that the Administration’s
determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is REVERSED. The Court hereby further
ORDERS that this matter be REMANDED to the Administration for an immediate award
of benefits as of September 1, 2012, Plaintiff’s disability onset date.
Dated this 31st day of October 2018.
BY THE COURT

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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