Session v. Carson et al

Filing 347

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on June 13, 2022. IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Motion 339 be GRANTED and that Claims 8 and 9, the only claims asserted against Defendant Gribble, be DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judg e to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waiv es appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). (csarr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00239-PAB-KLM
FRANKY L. SESSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
VANESSA CARSON, Health Service Administrator,
LINDSEY E. FISH, Medical Doctor,
TEDDY L. LAURENCE, Physician Assistant,
TEJINDER SINGH, Physician Assistant,
ROBERT L. MANGUSO, Medical Doctor,
TIMOTHY R. BROWN, Medical Doctor,
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH PARTNERS, Insurer, and
GAYLE GRIBBLE,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Gayle Gribble’s (“Gribble”) Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Revised Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 38] Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [#339]1 (the “Motion”), filed on December 23, 2021. Defendant
Gribble included a Certificate of Service in the Motion [#339], indicating service on
Plaintiff, who proceeds as a pro se litigant,2 through his parole officer at a North Broadway

[#339] is an example of the convention the Court uses to identify the docket number assigned
to a specific paper by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF).
This convention is used throughout this Recommendation.
1

The Court must construe liberally the filings of a pro se litigant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). In doing so, the Court should not be the pro se litigant’s advocate, nor should
the Court “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a
legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.
1997) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). In addition, a pro se litigant
2

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address in Denver. Motion [#339] at 9. Plaintiff did not file a Response to the Motion
[#339] and did not seek an extension of time in which to do so. On January 25, 2022,
after the 21-day period permitted for responses had passed, see D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d),
Plaintiff filed a Notification of Change of Address [#341], asking the Court to change his
address to one on Leetsdale Drive in Denver. On February 2, 2022, Defendant Gribble
filed a Notice Regarding Motion to Dismiss [#342], observing that Plaintiff had not timely
responded to her Motion [#338]. This Notice [#342] included a Certificate of Service on
Plaintiff at his new Leetsdale Drive address.
The deadline for Plaintiff to file a Response to the Motion [#339] has long passed.
Plaintiff, although proceeding pro se, is a seasoned litigator in the District of Colorado and
is familiar with the Local Rules. See, e.g., Session v. Clemings, 14-cv-02406-PAB-KLM;
Session v. Wargo, 19-cv-01046-PAB-KLM; Session v. Franco, 19-cv-03161-PAB-KLM.
There is no indication that Plaintiff did not receive the Motion [#339] or the Notice [#342],
and no Court filings have been returned as undeliverable from the addresses he provided.
Thus, the Court proceeds to adjudicate the Motion [#339] without the benefit of a
Response from Plaintiff.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1(c), the Motion
[#339] has been referred to the undersigned for a recommendation regarding disposition.
See [#340]. The Court has reviewed the Motion [#339], the entire case file, and the
applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#339] be GRANTED.

must follow the same procedural rules that govern other litigants. Nielson v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276,
1277 (10th Cir. 1994).

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I. Background3
At all times relevant to the events underlying this lawsuit, Defendant Gribble
worked as a correctional officer at the Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility (“AVCF”) of
the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), where Plaintiff was incarcerated. See
Second Am. Compl. [#38]. Plaintiff asserts that he suffered from various medical issues
while held at AVCF. See id. In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gribble failed to
timely scan, log, route, or forward two grievances concerning his serious medical issues.4
Id. at 22-24.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to CDOC AR 850-04(IV)(C)(9),
(IV(C)(7), and (IV)(F)(1)(b), Defendant Gribble:
was responsible for ‘ensuring the she/he utilize the electronic grievance
datebase available on PCDCIS to scan and input required information daily
upon receipt of each Step 1, 2, and 3 grievance[,] . . . ensuring all offenders
step 1, 2, 3 grievances receive are scanned and logged into CDOC’s
electronic grievance database[,] . . . ensuring all offenders step 1, 2, 3
grievances are routed and forwarded in a timely manner to the places they
need to go[,] . . . [and] ensuring all offenders step 1, 2, 3 grievance written
responses with electronic signature be returned to the offender within 25
Calendar days.
Id. at 22 (all grammar and spelling as in original). Between November of 2015 and
December of 2016, Plaintiff alleges that he “timely submitted multiple step 1 and 2

All well-pled facts from the Second Amended Complaint [#38] are accepted as true and viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmovant. Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 119192 (10th Cir. 2015).
3

In the Second Amended Complaint [#38], Plaintiff makes these allegations against “Jane Doe
1.” The Court has since ordered that all references to “Jane Doe 1” in the Second Amended
Complaint [#38] shall be deemed to refer to “Gayle Gribble.” See Order [#336].
4

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grievances to his case manager at AVCF.”5 Id. Plaintiff alleges that “Grievance CAV15/16-00095086-2, was not timely scanned and logged into CDOC’s electronic
grievance database.”6

Id. at 23.

Plaintiff also alleges that “Grievance C-AV15/16-

00095086-3 was not (1.) timely scanned and logged into CDOC’s electronic grievance
database, (2.) routed and forwarded in a timely manner to CDOC’s Step 3 Grievance
Officer for investigation, response and possible remedy.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of Defendant Gribble’s purported failure to
comport with CDOC AR 850-04(IV)(C)(9), (IV)(C)(7), and (IV)(F)(1)(b), he was:
procedural deprived of (1). respectfully express his views and complaints
through all (three) levels of CDOC’s Institutional Grievance Policy without
obstruction and impediment, (2). ensured that she/he utilize the electronic
grievance datebase available on PCDCIS to scan and input required
information daily upon receipt of each Step 1, 2, and 3 grievance, (3).
ensured all Plaintiff step 1, 2, 3, grievances receive are scanned and logged
into CDOC’s electronic grievance database, (4). ensured all Plaintiff’s step
1, 2, 3 grievances are routed and forwarded in a timely manner to the places
they need to go, (5). ensured all Plaintiff’s step 1, 2, 3 grievance written
responses with electronic signature be returned to the offender within 25
Calendar days.
Id. (all grammar and spelling as in original).
On January 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. See [#1]. On August 23, 2018,
Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint [#38], asserting a § 1983 action. Plaintiff
contends that Defendant Gribble’s conduct constituted a violation of the First and

Plaintiff lists at least nine separate grievances he submitted concerning alleged serious medical
issues, stating that they were all “returned to Plaintiff after the allotted 25 Calendar days.” Second
Am. Compl. [#38] at 23.
5

Plaintiff includes Grievance C-AV15/16-00095086-2 in the list of grievances he states were all
returned after 25 calendar days. It appears Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely internally
consistent, but viewing the allegations most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court construes Plaintiff’s
allegations to be that Grievance C-AV15/16-00095086-2 was returned to Plaintiff but not logged
into CDOC’s electronic grievance database.
6

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Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
in Claim 8 that “Defendant [Gribble] violated Plaintiffs [sic] 14th Amendment rights of the
United States Constitution.” Second Am. Compl. [#38] at 22. Plaintiff also asserts in
Claim 8 that Defendant Gribble violated “Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment United States
Constitutional Right to Free Speech and to freely Petition the Government for Redress of
Grievances.” Id. at 23. Plaintiff asserts in Claim 9 that “Defendant [Gribble] violated
Plaintiffs [sic] 1st Amendment rights of the United States Constitution to free speech and
to freely Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances.” Id. at 23.
In the present Motion [#339], Defendant Gribble contends that (1) Claim 8 should
be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because “Plaintiff has no liberty interest
in filing a grievance,” (2) Claim 9 should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
because “Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his right to access to the courts and
cannot state an actual injury,” and (3) Defendant Gribble is “entitled to qualified immunity.”
Motion [#339] at 2.
II. Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test “the
sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those
allegations as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.”). “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess
whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 17 F.3d 1226, 1236

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(10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact ‘to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Shero v. City of
Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The complaint must plead sufficient
facts, taken as true, to provide ‘plausible grounds’ that discovery will reveal evidence to
support the plaintiff’s allegations.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in
the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct,” a factual allegation has been stated, “but it has not show[n] [ ]
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679 (second brackets added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Gribble stem from the same set of facts,
presenting nearly identical allegations in Claims 8 and 9. In Claim 8, however, Plaintiff

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first asserts that Defendant Gribble “violated Plaintiffs [sic] 14th Amendment rights of the
United States Constitution,” and shortly thereafter asserts that Defendant Gribble violated
“Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment United States Constitutional Right to Free Speech and to
freely Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances.” Second Am. Compl. [#38] at
22-23. In Claim 9, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Gribble “violated Plaintiffs [sic] 1st
Amendment rights of the United States Constitution to free speech and to freely Petition
the Government for Redress of Grievances.” Id. at 23. The Court is unable to discern
whether Plaintiff made a typographical error and intended to assert a due process
violation rather than a free speech and petition violation in Claim 8. Thus, the Court
evaluates Claim 8 under both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because Plaintiff uses a duplicate set of facts to support Claims 8 and 9, the Court
addresses the claims together in the First Amendment analysis.
Defendant Gribble contends that she is entitled to qualified immunity regarding
Claims 8 and 9. Qualified immunity, in certain circumstances, protects government
officials from litigation when they are sued in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-18 (1982). A government official is entitled to qualified
immunity from liability for civil damages when her allegedly unlawful conduct did not
violate any of the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights that (1) were “clearly
established” at the time of the conduct, and (2) would have been known to a reasonable
person in the official’s position. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. A government official is entitled
to qualified immunity in “[a]ll but the most exceptional cases.” Harris v. Bd. of Educ. of
Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997).

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The threshold inquiry is whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff sufficiently allege a constitutional violation. Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 201
(2001).

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.
However, “if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’
submissions,” a court must “ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id.; see also
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that although qualified immunity
determination involves a two-part inquiry, if plaintiff fails either inquiry reviewed in any
order, no further analysis need be undertaken and qualified immunity is appropriate).
A.

Claims 8 and 9: First Amendment
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Gribble stem from her failure to timely scan,

log, route, or forward two grievances concerning Plaintiff’s medical issues. According to
Plaintiff, Defendant Gribble impeded his ability to express his views and complaints,
violating his right to free speech and to freely petition the government for a redress of
grievances under the First Amendment.
In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [#38], Plaintiff does not make clear
whether he is asserting a violation of his right to free speech separate from a violation of
his right to freely petition the government for a redress of grievances. Plaintiff also does
not reference any violation of his right to free speech apart from any violation of his right
to petition the government for redress of grievances. Read plainly, “the First Amendment
separates the Petition Clause from the Free Speech Clause.” Martin v. City of Del City,
179 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1999). However, “[t]he right to petition is cut from the same
cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular

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freedom of expression.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). Because the
Court is not aware of any legal authority that requires a separate analysis, the Court
examines Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim according to the alleged violation of his right
to freely petition the government for redress of grievances.
The Tenth Circuit has held that a “prisoner’s right to petition the government for
redress is the right of access to the courts,” rather than the right to participate in state
grievance procedures. Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 F. App’x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). The right of access to the courts “requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). “Any alleged deprivation
of the prison grievance process . . . fail[s] to implicate [a plaintiff’s] right of access to the
courts.” Boyd, 443 F. App’x at 332.
Defendant Gribble argues that “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were
not implicated by [her] alleged failure to timely scan, log, forward, or route his grievances,
his claim fails.” Motion [#339] at 6. In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [#38],
Plaintiff does not allege any facts that could support a theory that Defendant Gribble
violated his right of access to the courts. Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that
Defendant Gribble “obstructed and impeded Plaintiff’s good-faith efforts to timely
participate in CDOC Offender Grievance Procedure . . . to allow Plaintiff to respectfully
express his views and complaints.” Second Am. Compl. [#38] at 23. Although unclear,
Plaintiff appears to also conclusorily allege that he was deprived of the assurance that

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Defendant Gribble would fulfill her job responsibilities. Id. at 23-24. These allegations do
not implicate Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts.
Moreover, “[w]hen prison officials block a prisoner’s access to the grievance
process, the administrative remedies are not ‘available’ to the prisoner and, therefore, do
not need to be exhausted” prior to initiating a § 1983 action. Fogle v. Infante, No. 14-cv01021-BNB, 2014 WL 11878136, at *1 (D. Colo. May 14, 2014) (internal citation omitted).
It is unclear whether Defendant Gribble’s alleged mishandlings of the two grievances
effectively blocked Plaintiff’s access to the grievance process as it relates to the medical
concerns addressed in those grievances. It is also unclear whether Plaintiff could have
proceeded to the next step in the grievance process pursuant to CDOC AR 85004(IV)(F)(1)(e) after the time limit expired for the case manager to respond. Nonetheless,
even viewing the administrative remedies as unavailable, Plaintiff does not include in his
Second Amended Complaint [#38] any mention of how Defendant Gribble’s alleged
mishandling of the grievances could have impeded his access to the courts. Because
Plaintiff does not explain whether Defendant Gribble blocked his access to the grievance
process or how her purported actions have impeded his access to the courts, Plaintiff has
not adequately alleged a First Amendment violation. See Fogle, 2014 WL 11878136, at
*1.
Even assuming Plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of a constitutional right,
Plaintiff still does not demonstrate an actual injury stemming from that violation. “[A]
prisoner must demonstrate actual injury from interference with his access to the courts—
that is, that the prisoner was frustrated or impeded in his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
legal claim concerning his conviction or his conditions of confinement.” Gee v. Pacheco,

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627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff does not assert an actual injury in his
Second Amended Complaint [#38]. Plaintiff makes only conclusory statements regarding
Defendant Gribble’s failure to adhere to the prison grievance procedures, arguing that he
was procedurally deprived of his ability to express his views and complaints, and the
assurance that Defendant Gribble would fulfill her job responsibilities.

Second Am.

Compl. [#38] at 23-24. Plaintiff does not attribute any alleged injuries from his other
claims in the Second Amended Complaint [#38] to Defendant Gribble’s alleged
mishandlings.
Finding that no constitutional violation has sufficiently been alleged, the Court
concludes that Defendant Gribble is entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Motion [#339] be granted and that
Plaintiff’s Claims 8 and 9 be dismissed with prejudice to the extent they are asserted
under the First Amendment. See Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 127 (10th Cir.
1990) (stating that prejudice should attach to a dismissal when plaintiff has not made
allegations “which upon further investigation and development, could raise substantial
issues”).
B.

Claim 8: Fourteenth Amendment
Under the same set of facts as the First Amendment claims, Plaintiff asserts that

Defendant Gribble “refused and failed to strictly adhere to” the grievance procedures and
their “explicit mandatory procedural language,” arguing that Defendant Gribble violated
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due

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process “encompasses two distinct forms of protection: (1) procedural due process, which
requires a state to employ fair procedures when depriving a person of a protected interest;
and (2) substantive due process, which guarantees that a state cannot deprive a person
of a protected interest for certain reasons.” Harjo v. City of Albuquerque, 326 F. Supp.
3d 1145, 1185 (D.N.M. 2018).
Although Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Gribble violated the procedural language
of the grievance procedures, the Court cannot discern whether Plaintiff may be attempting
to assert both procedural and substantive due process claims, given that Plaintiff does
not reference due process throughout Claim 8.

However, both procedural and

substantive due process claims require that the plaintiff assert a legally protected interest;
here, a liberty interest as alleged by Plaintiff. Thus, “[i]n order to determine whether a
due process violation has occurred, the Court must first address whether [the] allegations
establish that [the plaintiff has] a protected liberty interest.” Allen v. Clements, 930 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1264 (D. Colo. 2013). “In the prison context, the due process clause
safeguards ‘only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Rezaq v.
Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in a grievance procedure. “There
is no independent constitutional right to state administrative grievance procedures . . .
[n]or does the state’s voluntary provision of an administrative grievance process create a
liberty interest in that process.” Boyd, 443 F. App’x at 332. See Anderson v. Colo. Dep’t
of Corr., No. 98-1477, 1999 WL 387163, at *2 (10th Cir. June 14, 1999) (“Allegations
relating to the requirements of the Department of Corrections grievance procedure do not
support a due process claim because those procedures do not create any liberty interest

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in the incarcerated petitioner.”); see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that a prison grievance procedure is a procedural right only and does not
give rise to a protected liberty interest). Thus, the Court does not reach whether Plaintiff
intended to assert either procedural or substantive due process claims, or both, because
Defendant Gribble’s alleged mishandling of Plaintiff’s grievances does not give rise to a
constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails to establish a protected liberty interest, and therefore
fails to state a claim related to a violation of due process. Because Plaintiff does not
assert any other explanation for how his right to due process has been violated, Plaintiff
has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted. See Chand v. Corazon Med., No.
CIV 18-0726, 2019 WL 1239310, at *7 (D.N.M. Mar. 18, 2019) (“To the extent, therefore,
that [plaintiff] complains that his grievances were improperly handed in violation of his
right to due process, he has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.”).
Therefore, the Court concludes that has Plaintiff failed to state a due process claim,
and that Defendant Gribble is entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Motion [#339] be granted and that Plaintiff’s
Claim 8 be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it is asserted under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Reynoldson, 907 F.2d at 127.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Motion [#339] be GRANTED and that
Claims 8 and 9, the only claims asserted against Defendant Gribble, be DISMISSED with
prejudice.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties shall
have fourteen (14) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written
objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is
assigned. A party’s failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo
review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and
legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999);
Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party’s objections to this
Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo
review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real
Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).

Dated: June 13, 2022

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