Judd v. Keypoint Government Solutions Incorporated

Filing 225

ORDER. Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Claims of 23 Untimely Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 12(c) (ECF No. 221 ), converted to a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, is GRANTED, by Judge Raymond P. Moore on December 8, 2020. (rvill, )

Case 1:18-cv-00327-RM-STV Document 225 Filed 12/08/20 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00327-RM-STV
ORSON JUDD,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEYPOINT GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Claims of
23 Untimely Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 12(c) (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 221). By Order dated
October 27, 2020 (ECF No. 223), the Court gave notice to the parties that the Motion would be
converted to a motion for summary judgment and allowed the parties to supplement the Motion,
if they wished to do so. Defendant filed a supplement on November 3, 2020 (ECF No. 224). No
further filings have been received and the time to do so has expired. After reviewing the Motion,
the supplement, the court record, and the applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised, the
Court finds and orders as follows.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Orson Judd’s (“Judd”) collective action complaint under the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) was filed March 10, 2017. In the complaint, Judd alleges that
Defendant KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc. (“KeyPoint”) misclassified its investigators as

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independent contractors when they were employees. Accordingly, Judd claims that KeyPoint
owes overtime wages to its investigators.
The Court granted conditional certification of collective action members, notices were
given, and 367 individual consents to join were filed. Of the 367 consents, KeyPoint contends
that 307 of those individuals are subject to arbitration. Moreover, although the parties agreed to
toll the statute of limitations for 468 days, Defendants contend – and Plaintiffs1 do not dispute –
that the statute of limitations nonetheless bars the claims of 23 of the individuals who have
joined this action. At issue now is Defendant’s Motion seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Gutteridge v. Oklahoma, 878 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir.
2018). Applying this standard requires viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and resolving all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in his favor. Cillo
v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013). However, “[t]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to
a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132,

1

By “Plaintiffs,” the Court is referring to Judd and all individuals who have consented to join this action.
2

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1136 (10th Cir. 2000). A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a
factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In a summary judgment context, federal courts, may “take judicial notice, whether
requested or not (Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 201, 28 U.S.C.A.) of its own records and files, and facts
which are part of its public records.” St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169,
1172 (10th Cir. 1979).
III.

DISCUSSION
Under the FLSA, an action must be filed within two years after the action accrues. 29

U.S.C. § 255(a). However, if the defendant’s alleged violation of the FLSA was “willful,” the
statute of limitations is extended to three years. Id. KeyPoint argues that, assuming, arguendo,
the three-year statute of limitations applies, the claims of the following 23 opt-ins are barred
even with the tolling of the statute of limitations. The Court agrees.
In this case, the undisputed material facts show that (1) after applying the maximum
statute of limitations of three years, (2) based on the 23 opt-in Plaintiffs’ last dates of
engagement2 and dates of when their consents to join were filed, and (3) the 468 days of the
tolling of the statute of limitations, (4) the longest possible statute of limitations has run. As aptly
summarized by KeyPoint, those facts are as follows:
No.
1.
2.

2

Last
Name
Aguilar
Akana

First Name
Jose
Legran

Engagement
End Date
3/6/2015
5/7/2015

CTJ Filed
3 Year
(see ECF
Tolling
SOL
Date
No. 179)
Date
8/19/2019 4/20/2018 4/21/2015
9/17/2019 5/19/2018 5/20/2015

This is the last date in which the particular opt-in Plaintiff performed any services for KeyPoint.
3

2 Year
SOL Date
4/20/2016
5/19/2016

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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Alvarez
Amentas
Baird
Baxter
Bernt
Covington
Doyle
Forsythe
Harris
Helms
Henning
Idso
Laskowski
Morris
Opyd
Pastuch
Radtke
Raffray
Rosen
Sherrill
Tyson

Elizabeth A.
Peter
Denise M
Peter
Gustaf C
Jeffrey
James
Nicole
Irvin
Gina C.
Michael P.
Marvin
Jerome
Bruce W.
Sandra
Jason
William
Jeanette S
Gregory
Tommie
Charlie R.

2/9/2015
3/10/2015
3/16/2015
3/24/2015
4/20/2015
3/4/2015
3/17/2015
2/11/2015
6/17/2014
3/5/2015
4/28/2015
3/15/2015
2/18/2015
4/7/2015
2/17/2015
2/26/2015
3/30/2015
3/24/2015
3/12/2015
3/27/2015
2/15/2015

9/3/2019
7/31/2019
9/23/2019
8/9/2019
9/23/2019
8/2/2019
8/19/2019
8/26/2019
9/17/2019
9/3/2019
9/17/2019
9/17/2019
8/2/2019
9/30/2019
9/30/2019
8/19/2019
8/9/2019
9/23/2019
8/9/2019
9/17/2019
9/17/2019

5/5/2018
4/1/2018
5/25/2018
4/10/2018
5/25/2018
4/3/2018
4/20/2018
4/27/2018
5/19/2018
5/5/2018
5/19/2018
5/19/2018
4/3/2018
6/1/2018
6/1/2018
4/20/2018
4/10/2018
5/25/2018
4/10/2018
5/19/2018
5/19/2018

5/6/2015
4/2/2015
5/26/2015
4/11/2015
5/26/2015
4/4/2015
4/21/2015
4/28/2015
5/20/2015
5/6/2015
5/20/2015
5/20/2015
4/4/2015
6/2/2015
6/2/2015
4/21/2015
4/11/2015
5/26/2015
4/11/2015
5/20/2015
5/20/2015

5/5/2016
4/1/2016
5/25/2016
4/10/2016
5/25/2016
4/3/2016
4/20/2016
4/27/2016
5/19/2016
5/5/2016
5/19/2016
5/19/2016
4/3/2016
6/1/2016
6/1/2016
4/20/2016
4/10/2016
5/25/2016
4/10/2016
5/19/2016
5/19/2016

(ECF No. 221, p. 5.) Accordingly, the Court finds summary judgment should be granted in favor
of KeyPoint. See United Gov’t Sec. Officers of Am. Int’l Union v. Am. Eagle Protective Serv.
Corp., 956 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of employers as plaintiffs’ claims were barred by statute of limitations).
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing it is ORDERED
(1) That Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Claims of 23 Untimely Plaintiffs
pursuant to Rule 12(c) (ECF No. 221), converted to a motion for summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, is GRANTED; and

4

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(2) That the following 23 opt-in Plaintiffs are hereby dismissed with prejudice as their
claims are barred by the statute of limitations:
(a) Jose Aguilar (Dkt. No. 155-2 pp. 11-12);
(b) Legran Akana (Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 91);
(c) Elizabeth Alvarez (Dkt. No. 158-1, p. 8);
(d) Peter Amentas (Dkt. No. 141-2, pp. 31-32);
(e) Denise Baird (Dkt. No. 168-1, p. 25);
(f) Peter Baxter (Dkt. No. 153-3, pp. 13-15);
(g) Gustaf Bernt (Dkt. No. 168-1, p. 37);
(h) Jeffrey Covington (Dkt. No. 145-1, pp. 35-36);
(i) James Doyle (Dkt. No. 155-1, pp. 59-60);
(j) Nicole Forsythe (Dkt. No. 157-1, pp. 71-72);
(k) Irvin Harris (Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 56);
(l) Gina Helms (Dkt. No. 158-1, pp. 16-17);
(m) Michael Henning (Dkt No. 163-1, p. 99);
(n) Marvin Idso (Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 97);
(o) Jerome Laskowski (Dkt. No. 145-1, pp. 38-39);
(p) Bruce Morris (Dkt. No. 173-1, p. 15);
(q) Sandra Opyd (Dkt. No. 173-2, pp. 36-37);
(r) Jason Pastuch (Dkt. No. 155-2, pp. 5-6);
(s) William Radtke (Dkt. No. 153-3, pp. 49-51);
(t) Jeanette Raffray (Dkt. No. 168- 1, p. 47);
5

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(u) Gregory Rosen (Dkt. No. 153-1, pp. 28-30);
(v) Tommie Sherrill (Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 137); and
(w) Charlie Tyson (Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 32).
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
RAYMOND P. MOORE
United States District Judge

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