Valenzuela v. Coleman et al

Filing 95

OPINION and ORDER by Judge Marcia S. Krieger on 10/15/2020. ORDERED Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (#70) is GRANTED IN PART. No party having requested issuance of a partial judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), at the conc lusion of the remaining proceedings, judgment shall enter in favor of all Defendants except Officer Coleman, on all claims except Mr. Valenzuela's claim malicious prosecution-style claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motion is DENIED IN PA RT insofar as the remaining claim against Officer Coleman will proceed to trial. Defendants' Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Opinions of David D. Dusenbury (#71) and Motion for Leave to Amend Dusenbury Declaration (#83) are DENIED AS MO OT. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Opinions of DMV Investigator Scott Greminger (#72) is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Restrict Access to Summary Judgment Exhibits (#91) and Defendants' Unopp osed Motion to Restrict Access to Unredacted Exhibit Attached to Motion for Summary Judgment (#73) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above. The Clerk of the Court shall lift the provisional restrictions on Docket #89-2 and 89-5. (sphil, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Marcia S. Krieger
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00329-MSK-STV
JUAN VALENZUELA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KARL COLEMAN,
LIGEIA CRAVEN,
ANTHONY WILKERSON,
JAMES HAROLD GAVIN, JR.,
JOSEPH CHACON, JR., and
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (# 70); the Plaintiff’s (# 87); and the Defendants’ reply (# 94 ). Also pending are two
motions, one filed by the Plaintiff and one filed by the Defendants, seeking to exclude testimony
from witnesses proffered by the other side pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 (# 71 and # 72), and
two motions to restrict access to certain summary judgment exhibits (# 73 and # 91).
I. JURISDICTION
The Court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
II. FACTS
The pertinent facts in this action are relatively straightforward and disputed only in
degree, not in nature. On February 15, 2017 at approximately 6:00 a.m., Mr. Valenzuela
1

approached a Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) security checkpoint located in
Concourse A at the Denver International Airport (“DIA”) prior to departing on a scheduled
flight. Mr. Valenzuela had been issued a valid driver’s license from the State of California, but
that license had allegedly been confiscated during a traffic stop some months earlier and never
returned. Thus Mr. Valenzuela produced an expired California ID card to establish his identity.
It is undisputed that the ID card Mr. Valenzuela produced was perceptibly damaged – it was
warped, displayed unusual bulges, and portions of the lamination were cracked or broken. Even
Mr. Valenzuela harbored a concern that authorities might not accept the ID card.
Mr. Valenzuela initially presented the ID card to TSA Officer Rebecca Peterson. She
examined it and believed that it might have been altered or cut in some way. She summoned her
supervisor, TSA Officer Clarissa Wright, and over the next few minutes, Ms. Wright and several
other TSA Officers examined the ID card and asked Mr. Valenzuela various questions about the
damage to the card (which Mr. Valenzuela attributed to the card accidentally going through a
washer and dryer on several occasions), about other forms of ID he might have, why he had no
Colorado ID card despite having resided in Colorado for more than a year, among other matters.
Each of the TSA officers was concerned that proffered ID card had been altered, but their
observations differed – some believed that someone had “used an exacto knife to cut around his
picture and cut through the laminate to alter his ID”, others said it felt like a “staple” was
embedded in the card near the bar code, among other tactile defects. It is not clear whether the
TSA officers examined the card’s security features, such as an embedded hologram recreation of
the photo or printing visible under UV light, but it appears to be largely (although not entirely, as
discussed below) undisputed that those security features were intact and consistent with the
photograph shown on the card.
2

A TSA supervisor then took the ID card to Denver Police Officer Dan Dietz, who was
stationed at the DIA checkpoint to provide police support to TSA officials. Officer Dietz
examined the ID card, and observed that “it appeared that it was thick around the picture of the
ID with lamination over [it]” and that there “was a pronounced bump that was around the
picture.” Officer Dietz thought “it was suspicious as far as maybe someone replaced the picture
because it felt like that was too thick compared to the rest of the ID.” Because the police staff at
DIA lack the ability to do direct records checks, Officer Dietz attempted to place a phone call to
the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) to investigate further, but it was too early in
the morning and he did not receive any answer.
Officer Dietz then summoned a superior. Denver Police Corporal Anthony Wilkerson
arrived, along with Denver Police Officer Ligeia Craven. Officer Craven was advised of the
situation by a TSA officer, asked a few questions of Mr. Valenzuela, and then examined the ID
for two to three minutes. She observed that it “was wrinkled, bent up”; that “the picture in itself
was as if it was, you know, pasted in there and it was pushed back”; that “it was like a couple
different levels, because when you feel the top of it, it’s not smooth going across”; and that “one
of the corners the barcode had what felt like a staple in the side, on the backside of it[,] it did not
feel like a smooth surface.” Believing that the ID card “felt to me to be a fraud,” Officer Craven
advised Mr. Valenzuela of his Miranda rights, and Mr. Valenzuela agreed to answer her
questions.1 She then asked him about his employment – Mr. Valenzuela was employed by a

Officer Craven testified that Mr. Valenzuela was no longer free to leave as of this point in
time, suggesting that he had been arrested as of this point in the narrative. However, the actual
sequence of events is somewhat jumbled in all of the officers’ deposition testimonies and it is
possible that this arrest did not occur until Mr. Valenzuela was taken to a holding cell sometime
later.

1

3

privately-operated prison facility. At Mr. Valenzuela’s suggestion, she placed a telephone call to
Mr. Valenzuela’s supervisor, who confirmed that Mr. Valenzuela was employed by the prison.2
Officer Craven then presented the ID card to Corporal Wilkerson, along with her opinion that it
was “fake.” Corporal Wilkerson “glanced” at the ID “for less than 15 seconds” and observed
that “it looked kind of recessed around the picture and it looked like . . . somebody had placed
that picture on top of the ID card.”3 He concurred with Officer Craven’s assessment that “it did
not appear to be legitimate.” Corporal Wilkerson, Officer Craven, and Officer Karl Coleman,
who was also on the scene, agreed that Mr. Valenzuela should be detained pending further
investigation. They handcuffed Mr. Valenzuela and escorted him to a nearby office area and
placed him in a holding cell.
By this time, Officer Coleman had contacted NCIC and learned that Mr. Valenzuela had
a valid California driver’s license, but there was no record of the expired ID card. However, the
NCIC record revealed that the California driver’s license bore the same identification number as
the ID card, a situation that Officer Coleman considered “odd.” 4 Officer Coleman and Corporal

Officer Craven testified that the supervisor advised her that Mr. Valenzuela had to
possess a valid Colorado driver’s license in order to work at the prison. Around the time that she
was speaking with the supervisor, other offices had contacted the NCIC and determined that Mr.
Valenzuela did not possess any Colorado license. It is not clear whether any officer followed-up
on this apparent discrepancy.
Mr. Valenzuela either disputes that the supervisor stated that a Colorado license (as
opposed to a valid license from any state) was required, or states that the supervisor was simply
in error. It is not necessary to resolve this discrepancy, and the Court will assume that Officer
Craven was advised that Mr. Valenzuela’s job required him to possess a Colorado driver’s
license and that it is undisputed he did not have one.
2

Mr. Wilkerson testified that he did not actually handle the card and conducted only a
visual examination.
3

In certain states, including California, document identification numbers are unique to an
individual, not a document. Thus, an ID card issued to that individual would bear the same
identification number as a driver’s license that was issued subsequently. This would appear to
4

4

Wilkerson decided to consult with Denver Police Detective James Gavin, who “looked at the ID
and gave [his] opinion” about it as well. There is some dispute among the officers as to who
made the decision, but a decision was made to charge Mr. Valenzuela with felony forgery. No
officer specifically identified any feature of the ID card that had been actually altered, although
most shared the opinion that irregularities with the “feel” around the photograph area raised
suspicions that the original photograph might have been removed and replaced somehow.
Officer Coleman drafted the following probable cause statement:
That on 02-15-2017 at approximately 5:55 a.m. the aforementioned defendant –
Juan Daniel Valenzuela – did knowingly and willfully violate CRS 18-5-102(e)
Forgery of a Government Document in that: he did attempt to access A Concourse
through TSA A Screening checkpoint at DIA at 8500 Pena Blvd Denver, CO
80249 to catch a Spirit Airlines flight using a forged CA ID (CAID # D8674853)
as his government identification.
The above statement is true and believable based upon the personal knowledge
and observations of TSA officer Rebecca Peterson and the investigations of Ofc
Craven and Cpl Wilkerson.
Mr. Valenzuela was transported to the Denver Detention Center and detained for two
days. On February 17, 2017, the District Attorney charged Mr. Valenzuela with forgery. Based
solely on the contents of Officer Coleman’s probable cause statement, a trial court judge found
probable cause to exist and directed that Mr. Valenzuela be detained until he could post bond,
which he did shortly thereafter. In the interim, because of his arrest and pending charges, it
appears that Mr. Valenzuela was fired from his job at the prison. By May 24, 2017, the District

explain why the NCIC check revealed a California driver’s license for Mr. Valenzuela bearing
the same document number as the ID card he proffered. And one can reasonably assume that
California records may have superseded any indication of the existence of the ID card once the
driver’s license was issued. Each of the officers who testified denied having any knowledge of
such a practice.
5

Attorney had determined that Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card was not forged and two days later, the
District Attorney moved to dismiss the charge, which motion was granted.
Mr. Valenzuela then commenced this action, asserting the following claims, all pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a claim for unlawful arrest and detention (akin to the tort of false arrest)
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against Officers Coleman, Craven, Gavin, Corporal
Wilkerson, and Denver Police Sergeant Joseph Chacon, who allegedly supervises the other
police officer defendants, based on either direct participation in the deprivation or a failure to
supervise; (2) what appears to be a second claim against Officer Coleman, in that Officer
Coleman’s omissions of “exculpatory evidence” – namely, evidence that data on Mr.
Valenzuela’s ID card and other information obtained by the officers partially confirmed that he
was who he claimed to be -- from the probable cause statement unreasonably prolonged Mr.
Valenzuela’s detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment (a claim akin to the tort of
malicious prosecution); (3) a Monell claim against the City and County of Denver (“Denver”),
alleging that Denver failed to adequately train and supervise officers regarding investigations of
false/fraudulent identification cards, leading to a high likelihood of Fourth Amendment
violations; and (4) a Monell claim against Denver, alleging that Denver failed to adequately train
and supervised officers regarding the appropriate completion of probable cause statements.
The individual officers move for summary judgment on Mr. Valenzuela’s Fourth
Amendment claim for unlawful arrest and assert the doctrine of qualified immunity. Denver
moves for summary judgment on Mr. Valenzuela’s Monell claims, arguing that he cannot
establish the required prima facie elements.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS

6

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitates the entry of a judgment only if
no trial is necessary. See White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995).
Summary adjudication is authorized when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law governs
what facts are material and what issues must be determined. It also specifies the elements that
must be proved for a given claim or defense, sets the standard of proof and identifies the party
with the burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer=s Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1989). A factual
dispute is Agenuine@ and summary judgment is precluded if the evidence presented in support of
and opposition to the motion is so contradictory that, if presented at trial, a judgment could enter
for either party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. When considering a summary judgment
motion, a court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, thereby
favoring the right to a trial. See Garrett v. Hewlett Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.
2002).
If the movant has the burden of proof on a claim or defense, the movant must establish
every element of its claim or defense by sufficient, competent evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). Once the moving party has met its burden, to avoid summary judgment the
responding party must present sufficient, competent, contradictory evidence to establish a
genuine factual dispute. See Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th
Cir. 1991); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999). If there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact, a trial is required. If there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, no trial is required. The court then applies the law to the undisputed facts and enters
judgment.
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If the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, it must point to an absence
of sufficient evidence to establish the claim or defense that the non-movant is obligated to prove.
If the respondent comes forward with sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima facie
claim or defense, a trial is required. If the respondent fails to produce sufficient competent
evidence to establish its claim or defense, then the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Qualified immunity protects individual state actors from civil liability if their conduct
“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012). Because of
the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, the Court treats qualified-immunity questions
differently from other questions on summary judgment. See Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d
655, 662 (10th Cir. 2010). After a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff, who must: (1) show facts that “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2)
establish that, at the time of the conduct at issue, it was clearly established under existing law
that the defendant’s conduct breached the constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009). The Court may address these questions in whichever order is best suited to the
case. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong of this inquiry, the Court “must grant the
defendant qualified immunity.” Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1186
(10th Cir. 2001). However, if the plaintiff establishes the violation of a clearly established right,
it becomes the defendant’s burden to prove there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he
or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th
Cir. 2001).

8

For all practical purposes, the question of whether the evidence shows a violation of a
constitutional right is indistinguishable from the inquiry that the Court would make in
determining whether the plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie claim in accordance with Rule 56. The plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence, which if
true, would make a prima facie showing of a cognizable claim. The Court considers the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assesses whether it is sufficient to
demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The “clearly established” inquiry focuses on whether the contours of the constitutional
right were so well-settled in the context of the particular circumstances, that a “reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards,
132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). To satisfy this prong, the burden is on the plaintiff to point to
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent (or the clear weight of other circuit courts) that
recognizes an actionable constitutional violation in the circumstances presented. Schwartz v.
Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 587–88 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas, 607 F.3d at 669 (plaintiff bears
the burden of citing to requisite authority). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to point to a case
with identical facts, but he must identify some authority that considers the issue “not as a broad
general proposition,” but in a “particularized” sense — for example, it is not sufficient to ask
whether it is “clearly established” that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive
force in effecting an arrest; rather, the court examines whether that constitutional principle has
previously been found to prohibit particular conduct. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 198–200 (2004).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Claims against individual officers
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With these legal standards in mind, the Court turns to Mr. Valenzuela’s claims against the
officers – that the arrest was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause to believe that
he had committed a crime. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures … shall
not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A “seizure” for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment occurs when a government actor terminates one’s “freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied.” See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989); Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007); Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 585-86 (2018).
There is no dispute that Mr. Valenzuela was subjected to a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes, as he was detained and arrested as a result of the officers’ belief that the ID card he had
presented was a forgery. C.R.S. §18-5-102(e)(2) states that a forgery occurs when a person,
“with intent to defraud,” “falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument which is
or purports to be…..(e) a written instrument officially issued or created by a public office, public
servant, or government agency.” An instrument is “uttered” when a person offers a forged item
to another with knowledge of its falsity and with an intent to defraud. Id., see Pollock v. People,
443 P.2d 738, 739 (Colo. 1968).
“Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge
and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent
person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” Keylon v. City of
Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008). Here, the central question is whether the
officers had probable cause to believe that Mr. Valenzuela had committed the crime of forgery - by presenting an ID card that he knew had been altered to the TSA with the intent to deceive
TSA.
10

The parties devote considerable argument as to whether the individual officers’
observations regarding the tactile and other defects in Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card suffice to
support a reasonable inference that Mr. Valenzuela had knowingly altered the ID, but the Court
need not reach that question in order to resolve the Defendants’ motion. For purposes of this
Order, the Court will assume that Mr. Valenzuela has demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to as
to the reasonableness of the Defendants’ belief that the ID card had been altered. But that is all.
None of the officers focused on the purpose of the card – to establish identity – or
whether it was altered in a way to misrepresent Mr. Valenzuela’s identity. Because the crime of
forgery requires proof that Mr. Valenzuela uttered the card with the specific intent to deceive, it
is important to consider the purpose for which Mr. Valenzuela presented the card to TSA
officials: to establish his identity. Thus, it would seem that, to constitute the crime of forgery,
Mr. Valenzuela must have altered the card in a way that changed the identity features on the card
(i.e. changing a card issued to someone else to appear that it was issued to Mr. Valenzuela), and
that Mr. Valenzuela proffered the card to establish his identity even though he knew that it had
been altered.
The beliefs of the officers as to alteration are insufficient to satisfy probable cause as to
Mr. Valenzuela’s knowledge or intent. First, it is fair to say that all of the officers found the card
to be damaged and warped, but they did not agree on the nature of the alteration. Some suspected
the photograph on the card might have been changed, others thought a foreign object, such as a
staple, was embedded in the card. Second, they did not go beyond the suspicion that the card had
been altered to form a reasonable belief that it had been altered with regard to Mr. Valenzuela’s
identity. Indeed, it is undisputed that every effort to corroborate the identity information on the
card – by comparing it with Mr. Valenzuela’s other identification or with information found in
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the NCIC database – suggested that Mr. Valenzuela was indeed who he purported to be. There is
no evidence in the record suggesting that the card was issued to any person other than Mr.
Valenzuela. If the card did not misrepresent Mr. Valenzuela’s identity, it was not false and he
could not have proffered it with an intent to deceive. Put another way, why would Mr.
Valenzuela would alter an ID card that had already been issued to him and which contained
entirely correct identifying information about him? In short, the officers stopped at the first level
of inquiry – was the Identification Card altered? – and failed to form a reasonable belief that it
had been altered in a way that affected the identity of the person represented on it and that Mr.
Valenzuela had proffered it to establish his identity when it had been issued to another person.
Without a probable cause showing as to all elements of the charge brought against Mr.
Valenzuela (or any other crime for which he was arrested but not charged), a jury could
reasonably find a 4th Amendment violation.
Despite this showing, however, to defeat the officers’ invocation of the defense of
qualified immunity, Mr. Valenzuela must also show that the law was “clearly established” in
2017 that the officers’ conduct in this case would be unconstitutional. Cox v. Wilson, 971 F.3d
1159, 1171 (10th Cir. 2020). To do so, Mr. Valenzuela must point to “a factually similar
Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision” (or by demonstrating “the clearly
established weight of authority from other courts”) in existence at the time of the conduct that
recognizes it as unconstitutional. Brown v. Flowers, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 5509683 (10th Cir.
Sept. 14, 2020), citing Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018). The
supporting case need not be “directly on point,” but at the same time, it is not sufficient to cite to
cases that, for example, recognize Fourth Amendment rights at “a high level of generality.” What
is necessary is a caselaw that is sufficiently similar to the facts involving Mr. Valenzuela that a
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reasonable police officer, aware of the existing precedent, would understand that what he or she
was doing in Mr. Valenzuela’s case would violate the rights recognized in the earlier case. Id.
Mr. Valenzuela has not carried this burden. Rather than attempting to point to a
sufficiently-analogous case, Mr. Valenzuela instead rejects the fundamental principles of the
“clearly established” adopted in this circuit. He argues that he is not required to “find another
unlawful arrest case with the same facts as this one in order to overcome qualified immunity,”
and that the Court should simply “ask[ ] whether there was arguable probable cause for the
challenged conduct.” But in his argument, Mr. Valenzuela ignores the well-settled caselaw, such
as Brown, requiring him to show not only a prima facie violation of 4th Amendment violation but
also that some precedent recognizes the unconstitutional character of the conduct.
There is no doubt that probable cause is required for a lawful arrest, and in the context of
a criminal case, an absence of probable cause might result in suppression of evidence obtained as
a result of the arrest. But this is not a criminal case, and it is insufficient to rely on general
statements of the law to hold individual officers individually liable for unconstitutional conduct.
As noted in Brown, to impose individual liability on officers for a constitutional violation
requires identification of precedent that if know to a reasonable officer would be sufficient to
alert the officer that such conduct was unconstitutional. Mr. Valenzuela offers no caselaw that
purports to establish a Fourth Amendment violation based on facts similar to those presented
here – an individual is arrested on charges of forgery after presenting a visibly-damaged
identification document (such as a driver’s license, ID card, or passport) that police believe has
been altered based upon cursory inspection, but without any specific evidence that the alteration
affects the representation of identity. The Court has conducted its own independent research to
determine whether such caselaw exists, but has found none. Furthermore, the Court is
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unpersuaded that the facts reflected in this record are so “obviously egregious” that any
reasonable person would understand the officers’ conduct to be unconstitutional. Citing Casey
v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007). Rather, this is precisely the
sort of case where the particular factual scenario is important in defining the boundaries of what
constitutes reasonable police conduct, such that a factually-similar case is necessary to clearly
establish the existence of constitutional liability.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the individual officers are entitled to qualified
immunity and judgment in their favor on the claims against them.5
B. Claim against Officer Coleman
Separately, Mr. Valenzuela alleges that Officer Coleman violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by preparing a probable cause statement that omitted relevant information that, if
disclosed, would have revealed that probable cause for Mr. Valenzuela’s arrest and detention
was lacking. Claims of this type are generally analogized to common-law malicious prosecution
claims, requiring Mr. Valenzuela to show that: (i) through a misstatement or omission, Officer
Coleman caused Mr. Valenzuela’s continued confinement or prosecution; (ii) that prosecution
terminated in Mr. Valenzuela’s favor; (iii) no probable cause supported the original arrest or
continuing prosecution; (iv) Officer Coleman acted with malice; and (v) Mr. Valenzuela
sustained injuries as a result. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008).

The same logic disposes of Mr. Valenzuela’s false arrest-style claims against Corporal
Wilkerson, Officer Gavin, and Mr. Chacon. These defendants are named under a “failure to
supervise” theory, in that they failed to adequately supervise officers like Officer Coleman who
decided to bring forgery charges based on the facts at hand. Assuming, without necessarily
finding, that Mr. Valenzuela has demonstrated a triable question as to whether these officers’
conduct suffices to establish a colorable claim for failure to supervise, Mr. Valenzuela is still
required to satisfy the “clearly established’ prong on the failure to supervise claim as well. See
e.g. Sutton v. Utah State School for Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
5

14

Mr. Valenzuela identifies several facts that, he contends, Officer Coleman was obligated
to include in the probable cause statement in order to prevent that statement from being
misleading: (i) the fact that the photograph in the ID was not identified as being false; (ii) that the
photograph of Mr. Valenzuela on the card matched the security hologram on the card; (iii) that
the other security features on the card were intact; (iv) that the NCIC and California DMV
confirmed a “hit” based on the card number; (v) that the NCIC and other records confirmed the
biographical and address data on the ID card; (vi) that Mr. Valenzuela had other forms of
identification that confirmed his identity; and (vii) that officers contacted a supervisor at Mr.
Valenzuela’s work who confirmed his employment status. Thus, to establish the first element of
the claim, Mr. Valenzuela must show that, had Officer Coleman included one or more of these
allegedly-exculpatory facts in his probable cause statement, the trial court would have found no
probable cause for Mr. Valenzuela’s continued confinement. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279,
1293 (10th Cir. 2004) (“the existence of probable cause is determined by examining the evidence
as if the omitted information had been included and inquiring whether probable cause existed in
light of all the evidence, including the omitted information).
This Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether probable cause would
have existed had Officer Coleman disclosed one or more of the omitted facts listed above as part
of his probable cause statement. This conclusion is largely driven by the fact that Officer
Coleman’s probable cause statement in its original form lacked any facts to demonstrate
sufficient probable cause to support a charge of forgery. Officer Coleman’s statement is entirely
conclusory: it merely stated that Mr. Valenzuela “us[ed] a forged CA ID.” It does not describe
the condition of the ID card, specify how it was allegedly altered, relate any facts that police
officers relied upon in deciding that the card was altered, or disclose any other information that
15

would have allowed a neutral and detached court to determine that Mr. Valenzuela had indeed
committed the crime of forgery (including the mens rea element).6 Because the probable cause
statement was insufficiently specific to establish probable cause in and of itself, the question of
whether additional “exculpatory” evidence would have vitiated probable cause is largely
academic. Thus, Mr. Valenzuela has stated a colorable Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution-type claim against Officer Coleman.
Officer Coleman also argues that Mr. Valenzuela cannot establish that he acted with the
requisite state of mind, namely, malice. In a malicious prosecution-type action, malice may be
inferred if the defendant “causes the prosecution without arguable probable cause.” Stonecipher
v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014). As noted above, there is sufficient evidence to
present a triable question of fact as to whether Officer Coleman – or any of the defendant
officers – had probable cause to believe that Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card had been deliberately
altered. No officer ever identified anything more than a suspicion that the card had been altered
in some often-undefined way. Of the officers who engaged in anything more than a cursory
review of the ID card – i.e. Officer Dietz and Officer Craven – both testified the card looked or
felt like the photo might have been cut out and replaced, but neither officer testified that they
inspected the card further to verify that the photo portion was detached from the rest of the card
or investigated the security features that exist to indicate whether a photo had been replaced. In

The fact that the trial court accepted Officer Coleman’s conclusory statement and found
probable cause to exist to detain Mr. Valenzuela does not insulate Officer Coleman from liability
for having tendered a patently-deficient probable cause statement for the court to (mistakenly)
rely upon. Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 656 (10th Cir. 1990) (police officers “cannot
escape liability by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to
confine or prosecute a defendant. They cannot hide behind the officials whom they have
defrauded”).
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such circumstances, there is at least a genuine dispute of fact as to whether any officer had
probable cause to believe that the document had been deliberately altered in any way. For the
same reasons, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether an inference of malice can be drawn
from Officer Coleman’s decision to charge Mr. Valenzuela with fraud despite lacking probable
cause to do so.
The remaining question is whether the contours of Mr. Valenzuela’s claim against
Officer Coleman were “clearly established” as unconstitutional as of 2017. Again, Mr.
Valenzuela has not identified any specific case that recognizes the existence of a constitutional
claim in similar factual circumstances, but the Court agrees with him that, with regard to this
claim, Officer Coleman’s conduct is so fundamentally inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s “probable cause” requirement that no corresponding caselaw is necessary. It is
axiomatic that an arrest and the initiation of a prosecution must be supported by probable cause.
The 10th Circuit has recognized that a person who causes the initiation or continuation of a
prosecution by means of a statement that (whether organically or through misrepresentations of
omissions) fails to provide sufficient probable cause for such prosecution can be held liable
under § 1983. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1292. Officer Coleman’s probable cause statement is
inherently insufficient to establish probable cause on the issue of whether Mr. Valenzuela’s
tendered ID card was forged because it contains no facts whatsoever addressing alteration in any
way. For all practical purposes, Officer Coleman’s statement regarding the existence of a forged
instrument was nothing more than “trust me, it was.” Even in the absence of on-point caselaw,
no reasonable police officer would believe that a completely conclusory statement charging a
defendant with a crime would suffice to establish probable cause, and thus, the Court finds that

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Mr. Valenzuela’s malicious prosecution-style § 1983 claim against Officer Coleman arising from
the defects in Officer Coleman’s probable cause statement may proceed to trial.
C. Monell claims against Denver
Finally, Mr. Valenzuela alleges that Denver’s own customs and policies resulted in a
failure to train or a failure to supervise its police officers regarding the evaluation of ID cards
and the preparation of probable cause statements, leading to unconstitutional actions such as the
one suffered by Mr. Valenzuela here.
To establish a Monell claim for municipal liability, Mr. Valenzuela must show: (i) an
official policy or custom by Denver relating to the training or supervision of police officers; (ii)
that the challenged policy or custom – and not the actions of an individual or group of employees
-- was “the moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation that Mr. Valenzuela suffered;
and (iii) that Denver had actual or constructive notice that its actions or failures were
substantially certain to result in constitutional violations, but that it consciously and deliberately
chose to disregard that risk – an element typically proven by showing either a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct by officers or by a showing that a constitutional deprivation is a “highly
predictable or plainly obvious consequence” of Denver’s policies or customs. Schneider v. City
of Grand Junction Police Dept., 717 F.3d 760, 769-70 (10th Cir. 2013).
The parties agree that section 303.15 of the Denver Police Department Operations
Manual constitutes the primary policy that Denver maintains regarding false identification. That
policy provides that police officers “shall make every attempt to establish if the ID is legitimate”
before taking any action. It instructs that suspicious ID cards should be “transported to
headquarters [ ] for verification” during normal business hours. Outside of normal business

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hours, “a night-shift detective or an Identification Bureau technician shall review the ID for
legitimacy.”
John Coppedge, Denver’s designated representative who testified about Denver’s police
training, testified that the first step of this policy requires officers to “assess the ID,” meaning
“Look, feel, touch . . . what does the ID appear, does it appear to have been manipulated, does it
appear to have been forged?” He acknowledged that Denver does not provide officers with a
checklist or other guidance in performing this assessment, instead stating that an officer’s
evaluation is “more based on common sense.” Mr. Coppedge testified that “if something doesn’t
feel right, doesn’t look right, you need to dig, see if you can verify that this person is who they’re
presenting themselves to be.” (Emphasis added.) Once again, no particular guidance is provided
to officers. Instead, they are “trained to critically think and analyze the situation, so it’s taking in
information from whatever resource you can access to make that assessment,” although he
suggests that officers evaluate “who issued the ID, where did the ID come from, is there a record
of that ID within that jurisdiction.”
Having identified Denver’s policy governing the investigation of ID cards, the next
question is whether the policy itself was the “moving force” behind a violation of Mr.
Valenzuela’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court discussed the “moving force” element in
Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Brown differentiated between
two scenarios: one where “a particular municipal action itself violates federal law or directs an
employee to do so” and one where the municipality engaged in a lawful action that did not
directly injure the plaintiff but “nonetheless caused an employee to do so.” In the latter case –
which is what is presented here – “rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be
applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”
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As the Court explained “[t]hat a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands
of a municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and
causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the employee acted culpably.” The Court
acknowledged that an allegation of “inadequate training” “could be the basis for § 1983 liability
in limited circumstances,” but emphasized that such claims typically will require proof of “the
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees . . ., rather than a
one-time negligent administration of the [policy] peculiar to the officer[s] involved in a
particular incident.” But it also acknowledged the possibility that a plaintiff could show “a
single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to
train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation.” 502 U.S. at 404-409.
Mr. Valenzuela’s claim against Denver invokes such a “failure to train” concept. Because
Mr. Valenzuela does not purport to identify multiple instances of these or other Denver police
officers violating the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals with damaged ID cards, Mr.
Valenzuela is left to proceed under the theory that the incident involving him was a “recurring
situation[ ] presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.”
In broad terms, it is true that officers staffing an airport security checkpoint will face the
recurring situation of being asked to assess the validity of an individual’s ID documents, and if
improperly-handled by officers, such situations could present the likelihood of a constitutional
violation. But Mr. Valenzuela’s Monell claim against Denver for failure to train officers in the
evaluation of ID cards fails because the record reflects that the officers knew of the correct
process to follow, but nevertheless failed to follow it. In other words, the cause of Mr.
Valenzuela’s constitutional deprivation was not a defect in the policy itself, but a defect in how
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the individual officers carried that policy out. To repeat, Denver’s policy essentially calls for
officers to perform three steps: (i) examine the ID document and determine whether, based on its
look and feel, it is genuine or altered; (ii) if the officer remains suspicious, the officer should
“dig” for more information, using available resources to determine whether the ID is authentic;
and (iii) if questions remain, the ID (and the suspect) should be produced to designated
individuals within the police department for final evaluation. There is no dispute among the
parties that each officer examined the look and feel of Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card and deemed it
suspicious –indeed, Mr. Valenzuela concedes that the card was misshapen and irregular.
As to the next step, availing themselves of alternative sources of information to compare
to the proffered ID, the major participants in the examination of Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card and
the decision to charge him criminally – Officer Coleman and Officer Craven – both testified to
understanding what this step of the policy entailed. Officer Craven testified that she “would also
look at [irregularities] a little further and deeper to see if that’s actually legit or not, if it all
matches,” using steps such as matching signatures between the ID and exemplars and confirming
“the description, the address, the numbers, the dates, the expiration, stuff like that.” Officer
Coleman testified that, after examining the ID and concluding it was suspicious, he “got on the
computer and got on NCIC,” the only database he was permitted to access. He also examined
some of the security features on the card to attempt to confirm whether the photo had been
altered (although not all of them). Even Detective Gavin, ostensibly a detective that could make
a final call on the validity of the ID card according to Section 300.15, testified that she was
aware of the existence of Denver’s policy, although he could not remember what the policy
required and chose not to look it up. Detective Gavin conceded at his deposition that “I don’t
know if I conformed my behavior to the policy.” Thus, the record reflects that these officers
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knew what they were supposed to do to attempt to verify the validity of the ID, but they simply
went about it in an incomplete or careless way.
Officer Craven acknowledged that there were several steps that she could have taken to
verify that Mr. Valenzuela was who he claimed to be – that is, ways in which she could “dig” for
additional proof that would either confirm that Mr. Valenzuela was who he claimed to be or not - but that she did not take those steps. Officer Craven did not attempt to compare the photograph
on the card with the security hologram, did not request that the NCIC retrieve a known photo of
Mr. Valenzuela to compare him to, did not seek to take fingerprints to verify his identity, did not
check with the California DMV or any other database or source to attempt to verify any matters
about the ID card, and did not attempt to obtain exemplars of California ID cards to compare
with Mr. Valenzuela’s. She acknowledged that if a proffered ID has a signature on it, “you can
see if that signature matches any of their information or if they’ve signed anything or if they
have anything on that that could possibly, you know, match the IDs to their signature.” Docket
#87-6 contains a photograph of Mr. Valenzuela’s ID card, which appears to include a signature
element, but nothing in the record indicates that Officer Craven or any other officer attempted to
compare that signature with any other exemplar of Mr. Valenzuela’s signature. Had Officer
Craven fully complied with the requirements of Section 300.15 – had she “dug” as deeply as
Denver trained her to do – she could have unearthed evidence that confirmed that Mr.
Valenzuela was indeed the person depicted on the ID card and that the ID card had not been
altered.
Only after Mr. Valenzuela had already been arreste, did Officer Coleman contact the
NCIC, finding that Mr. Valenzuela had been issued a California Driver’s License under the same
document number as the ID card he had proffered. Although Officer Coleman found this
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situation “odd,” he did no further digging on that subject. Officer Coleman also testified that he
examined the security hologram on the ID card and decided that the hologram version of the
photo and the photo itself “didn’t look anything alike.” Once again, docket #87-6 contains
photographs of the ID card that depict the photo, a visible miniature image of the photograph,
and a security hologram of the photo that appears only under UV light. The Court finds that the
three versions of the photograph are sufficiently visually-similar that a jury should be permitted
to evaluate the reasonableness of Officer Coleman’s conclusion on this point. Officer Coleman
testified that he did not examine any other security features on the card.
Detective Gavin also conceded that he did not perform several actions that could have
assisted in ascertaining Mr. Valenzuela’s identity. He acknowledged that, after receiving the
NCIC report, he compared certain reported information obtained from the California DMV
regarding Mr. Valenzuela’s missing driver’s license with the information shown on the proffered
ID card, observing that the name, date of birth, driver’s license number, height, eye color, and
hair color reported by California matched the data on the ID card. (Detective Gavin states that
the weight data did not match, but did not testify as to the extent of any discrepancy.) He did not
contact the California DMV to inquire about the discrepancy between the ID card and reported
driver’s license, nor did he contact any other databases or other sources of information before
concluding that the ID card had been forged.
Thus, the record reflects that none of the key officers engaged in the sort of “digging”
that they knew they were supposed to undertake. The Denver policy focuses on affirmatively
identifying the person proffering the ID for an obvious reason: there are few circumstances
where a person will alter and then attempt to utter an identification card that otherwise properly

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identifies them.7 Ultimately, that is where the officers here departed from Denver’s stated
policy: instead of focusing on identifying Mr. Valenzuela, and then asking themselves why he
would have sought to alter the photograph of himself on an ID card that otherwise indisputably
belonged to and described him, the defendant officers effectively stopped after the first step,
deciding that because the ID card looked and felt altered, it must have been altered, and
implicitly the alteration must have been as to Mr. Valenzuela’s identity. Because the
constitutional deprivation in this case was not caused by Denver’s policy, but by the improper
execution of that policy by officers who knew how they should have applied it, Mr. Valenzuela’s
Monell claim against Denver fails at the causation stage.
Mr. Valenzuela’s second Monell claim against Denver is that Denver failed to adequately
train officers like Officer Coleman to include known exculpatory evidence in probable cause
statements. The Court need not explore this claim in great detail because it is apparent that any
defects in Denver’s training of police officers as it relates to the exclusion of exculpatory
evidence in a probable cause statement was not the cause of Officer Coleman arguably violating
Mr. Valenzuela’s constitutional rights. According to Officer Coleman’s belief, Mr. Valenzuela’s
ID card was altered by replacement of the original photograph with a different one. The fact that
the remaining information on the ID card conformed to information contained in NCIC and other
databases would not be exculpatory information because Officer Coleman was not contending
that Mr. Valenzuela altered those parts of the ID card, just the photo. Thus, even proper training

The primary exception to this observation might be a minor who alters his or her own
identification card in order to misrepresent his or her date of birth, attempting to appear older
than they actually are. But Mr. Valenzuela was 30 years old at the time of the incident and no
officer believed that the date of birth on his ID card was altered. Indeed, Detective Gavin noted
that that date of birth on the ID card matched that on file with the California DMV.
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of Officer Coleman would not have resulted in that information being disclosed in the probable
cause statement.
The only arguably “exculpatory” evidence that would relate to the alleged replacement of
the photograph would be if security features relating to that photograph were nevertheless
consistent with the photograph actually shown on the ID card. But Officer Coleman testified
that, in his opinion, the photograph on the card did not match the security features relating to the
photograph. Officer Coleman testified that he examined “a little picture at the bottom right-hand
portion . . . that’s kind of a holographic image of what the main picture would look like” and
decided that “it didn’t look anything like [the main photograph]. The one that he had pasted on
there was all smeared, like erased or something.” Thus, as far as Officer Coleman was
concerned, there was no exculpatory evidence that suggested that, contrary to the probable cause
statement, the ID card had not been altered. Thus, even if Mr. Valenzuela is correct in that
Denver’s training of officers regarding the inclusion of exculpatory facts in probable cause
statements is defective, that defect was not the cause of Officer Coleman’s insufficient probable
cause statement. Rather, the insufficiency of the probable cause statement occurred because
Officer Coleman (and the other officers) failed to conduct a sufficient examination of the ID card
before concluding that it had been forged and that the forgery pertained to Mr. Valenzuela’s
identity.8

Mr. Valenzuela also appears to allege more generally that Denver failed to train officers
to provide sufficient information generally in probable cause statements. During his deposition,
Officer Coleman appeared to be uncertain about precisely what he was trained to include in such
statements, apparently believing that it involved an acronym of LEVIT or the like that required
“location, action name” and perhaps other information. Mr. Coppedge testified that officers are
trained to “put in the facts of the case relevant to the elements of the crime that is being alleged.”
Assuming that Officer Coleman lacked a proper understanding of how to complete a probable
cause statement, this appears to be an instance of a single individual officer failing to understand

8

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Thus, Denver is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Valenzuela’s Monell claims.
D. Rule 702 Motions to Exclude Evidence
Both sides have designated various witnesses to provide opinion testimony at trial
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. Each side has filed a motion seeking to exclude some or all of the
designated witnesses’ opinions. However, given the Court grants summary judgment to the
Defendants on all claims except Mr. Valenzuela’s claim that Officer Coleman’s probable cause
statement lacked adequate factual support, the parties’ proffered opinion testimony is no longer
germane to the case. Thus, both Rule 702 motions are denied as moot.
E. Motions to Restrict Access
Both sides move to restrict public access to several exhibits filed in support of the
summary judgment briefing pursuant to D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.2. “Courts have long recognized
a common-law right of access to judicial records.” United States v. Bacon, 950 F.3d 1286, 1292
(10th Cir. 2020) (citing Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2012)).
“Although this common law right is not absolute, there is a strong presumption in favor of public
access. However, this strong presumption of openness can “be overcome where countervailing
interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access” to the judicial record. Thus, in
exercising their discretion to restrict access to judicial records, courts must “weigh the interests
of the public, which are presumptively paramount, against those advanced by the parties.” Id.
Additionally, Local Rule 7.2 requires a party seeking to restrict access to make several
specific showings, including: (i) demonstrating why the private interest outweighs the public

Denver’s training, not a systemic failure that would have put Denver on notice that its training
was deficient. Notably, Mr. Valenzuela has not identified any other individual who was detained
as a result of a defective probable cause statement completed by Officer Coleman or any other
officer.
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one, (ii) identifying a “clearly defined and serious injury that would result if access is not
restricted,” and (iii) showing why alternatives to restriction, such as redaction or summarization,
would not be effective in avoiding the need for outright restriction. D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R.
7.2(c)(2)-(4). With these principles in mind, the Court notes that the parties’ motions seek to
restrict the same exhibits filed in support of both the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and the Plaintiff’s Response. Thus, the Court addresses the motions collectively.
Mr. Valenzuela moves (# 91) to restrict public access to five exhibits attached to the
response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The exhibits consist of (i) photographs
of his driver’s licenses and ID cards, (ii) his state DMV records including dossier information
and driving record, and (iii) police officer NCIC/CCIC search information. Defendants move (#
73) to restrict public access to photographs of the same forms of ID and a video of an individual
viewing the ID card at various angles. All of these exhibits contain Mr. Valenzuela’s personal
information such as his social security number, date of birth, personal identification numbers,
biographical information, and addresses.
The Court grants the motions in part. Some of the materials in question, such as Mr.
Valenzuela’s driving record and application for a driver’s license and related documents, e.g.
Docket # 89-1 at 5-17, are simply irrelevant to the issues before the court. There is no particular
public interest in having access to documents that are not relevant and thus were not considered
by the Court. See Riker v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 315 Fed. Appx. 752, 754 (10th Cir. 2009).
Other materials disclose private identifying information regarding Mr. Valenzuela, such as his
address and date of birth. However, many of the documents sought to be restricted are
photographs of various aspects of the ID card in question here, and because one of the central
issues in this case involves the physical state and appearance of that item, the public has a
27

substantial interest in having access to those photographs. (Moreover, the Court notes that
Docket # 89-2, for which restriction is sought, appears to be identical to Docket # 87-6, which
has been filed publicly and which is not the subject of any motion to restrict.) The Court is
mindful of Mr. Valenzuela’s possible privacy interest in concealing his date of birth and address,
both of which are prominently shown in each photo. However, the record appears to suggest that
the address shown on the card is no longer Mr. Valenzuela’s current address, so he has a limited
privacy interest in that address’ disclosure. That leaves only Mr. Valenzuela’s date of birth, and
although the Court finds that he has some privacy interest in concealing that fact, that interest
fails to overcome the public interest in having access to a critical piece of evidence in this case.9
Accordingly, the motions at Docket #89 and 91 are granted in part, insofar as the documents at
Docket #89-1, 89-3, and 89-4 shall remain under a Level 1 restriction, and denied in part, insofar
as the Clerk of the Court shall lift the provisional restrictions on Docket #89-2 and 89-5.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (# 70) is GRANTED IN PART. No party
having requested issuance of a partial judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), at the
conclusion of the remaining proceedings, judgment shall enter in favor of all Defendants
except Officer Coleman, on all claims except Mr. Valenzuela’s claim malicious
prosecution-style claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motion is DENIED IN PART
insofar as the remaining claim against Officer Coleman will proceed to trial.

If the parties so desire, within 14 days of the date of this Order, they may file redacted
versions of Docket #89-2 and 89-5 that redact only Mr. Valenzuela’s date of birth, along with a
renewed motion to substitute those redacted versions for the publicly-available ones.
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2. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Opinions of David D. Dusenbury (# 71)
and Motion for Leave to Amend Dusenbury Declaration (# 83) are DENIED AS MOOT.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Opinions of DMV Investigator Scott
Greminger (# 72) is DENIED AS MOOT.
4. Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Restrict Access to Summary Judgment Exhibits (# 91)
and Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Restrict Access to Unredacted Exhibit Attached
to Motion for Summary Judgment (# 73) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as set forth above. The Clerk of the Court shall lift the provisional restrictions on
Docket #89-2 and 89-5.
Dated this 15th day of October, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger
Senior United States District Judge

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