Estate of Marciano Briones et al v. Adams County et al

Filing 213

ORDER by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 9/14/2021, re: 199 Defendant's Motion in Limine Re Disciplinary History is GRANTED. (sphil, )

Case 1:18-cv-00865-PAB-MEH Document 213 Filed 09/14/21 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00865-PAB-MEH
ESTATE OF MARCIANO BRIONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DARIUS ARDREY, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion in Limine Re
Disciplinary History [Docket No. 199].
On September 9, 2016, Marciano Briones was booked into the Adams County
Detention Facility in Adams County, Colorado after being found guilty of driving under
the influence. Docket No. 171 at 2, ¶¶ 1-2. On Decem ber 25, 2016, Mr. Briones felt ill
and was seen by a nurse in the medical unit. Id. at 3, ¶ 8. On December 27, 2016, Mr.
Briones’s condition worsened to the point where a medical unit was called in the early
hours of the morning. Docket No. 171 at 5, ¶ 34. Mr. Briones was pronounced dead
that night. Id. at 7, ¶ 38
Plaintiffs, who are the estate of Mr. Briones and the estate’s representatives,
filed this lawsuit on April 12, 2018. See Docket No. 1. In their fourth amended
complaint, plaintiffs brought claims against several defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deliberate indifference to Mr. Briones’s medical needs. Docket No. 128 at

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48. On October 29, 2020, the Court dismissed all claims except that against defendant
in his individual capacity. See Docket No. 196.
Defendant seeks to preclude plaintiffs from introducing evidence regarding
defendant’s Sheriff’s Office disciplinary history, which includes a disciplinary report
regarding Mr. Briones’s death. See Docket No. 199. Specifically, defendant seeks to
exclude unrelated internal affairs investigations regarding inappropriate contact with an
inmate and an allegation of excessive force, as well as the results of an internal affairs
investigation that found that defendant violated three internal policies in failing to check
on Mr. Briones. See id. at 3.
First, plaintiffs have agreed not to introduce evidence regarding disciplinary
history unrelated to Mr. Briones’s death, unless defendant denies having ever been
disciplined. Docket No. 202 at 8 n.3. Moreover, the Court rules that plaintiffs may not
ask defendant whether he has ever been disciplined in an attempt to open the door to
impeaching him with these incidents.
Second, as to the disciplinary report following Mr. Briones’s death, the Court
agrees that introduction of the disciplinary report should be excluded pursuant to Rule
403. Rule 403 permits a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Were plaintiffs permitted to
introduce the internal investigative report, which found that defendant violated Sheriff’s
office policies, the jury may make a decision based “on an improper basis,” that is, that
violation of the county’s internal policy has some bearing on whether defendant
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committed a constitutional violation. United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1163-65 (10th Cir.
2005), is instructive. There, the trial court excluded evidence of a police department’s
standard operating procedures and an internal report that the def endant violated those
procedures, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that local
police regulations should not be used “as a standard f or evaluating constitutionality of
police conduct,” because that a particular police action “violated police department
procedures does not make it more or less likely” that the action was unconstitutional,
therefore rendering it irrelevant. See id. at 1163-64. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit
determined that explaining internal procedures, and the relevant standards for those
procedures, would be confusing and time consuming, particularly where those
standards are nearly identical to the constitutional standard. Id. at 1164-65.
The internal affairs investigation found that defendant violated several policies
regarding checking on Mr. Briones. See Docket No. 202 at 5; Docket No. 203-2. But
whether defendant violated Sheriff office’s policy would be either irrelevant or confusing
to the jury’s determination of whether defendant violated Mr. Briones’s constitutional
rights. If the internal standard is different from the constitutional standard, the fact that
defendant violated that standard “does not make it more or less likely” that he also
violated the constitution. Tanberg, 401 F.3d at 1164. And, if the standards are similar
or identical, explanation and introduction of those standards would insert confusion into
the trial, “tempting the jury to concluded that if experienced police officers” believed
defendant violated standards that are “the same standards as the law,” then defendant

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“must also have violated legal requirements.” Id. at 1165, This is particularly true given
that “[d]efendant Ardrey acknowledges that he did not go check on Mr. Briones.”
Docket No. 204 at 4. Thus, an internal affairs investigation, which concludes that
defendant violated Sheriff’s office policy and that defendant failed to check on Mr.
Briones, has a substantial risk of leading the jury to resolve the constitutional question
here based on an improper purpose, and could confuse the jury into thinking that the
violation of the policy is somehow relevant to the constitutional claim.1 Accordingly, the
Court will preclude plaintiffs from introducing or asking defendant about the internal
affairs investigation regarding Mr. Briones, except to the extent defendant made
statements or admissions regarding factual matters.
It is therefore

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Plaintiff also argues that the report is necessary for the jury to consider punitive
damages. See Docket No. 202 at 7 n.2. However, plaintiff cites a decision on Florida
state law for the proposition that courts “regularly consider[] acts other than the acts
giving rise to the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff,” which has no bearing on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. (quoting Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536,
1557-58 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). While “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights,
as well as intentional violations of federal law” may trigger the consideration of punitive
damages, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983), the violation of Sheriff office’s
policy should still be excluded for punitive damages for the same reason it is for the
substantive claim: it either would be irrelevant to the constitutional standard if it was
different and confusing if it was the same.
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ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine Re Disciplinary History [Docket
No. 199] is GRANTED.

DATED September 14, 2021.
BY THE COURT:

PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge

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