Trujillo v. Taylor, et al
Filing
65
ORDER granting 46 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Second and Third Claims for Relief, by Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak on 11/1/2019.(jgonz, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00908-STV
JENNIFER TRUJILLO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAY TRUCKING,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant May Trucking Company’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Second and Third Claims for Relief [#46] (the “Motion”). The
parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge for all proceedings, including entry of a final judgment. [##43-45] This Court has
carefully considered the Motion and related briefing, the case file, and the applicable case
law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition
of the Motion. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND 1
On April 3, 2015, Jody Taylor was operating a 2014 Freightliner tractor trailer
owned by Defendant May Trucking Company (“May Trucking”). [#5 at ¶¶ 6-7] At the
1
The facts are drawn from the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint [#5], which must be
taken as true when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 850 n.1
(10th Cir. 2013) (citing Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2011)).
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time, Ms. Taylor was employed by May Trucking and working under her scope of
employment with May Trucking. [Id. at ¶ 8] Ms. Taylor negligently merged onto Interstate
25 causing Wesley Conda, driver of a 1990 Chevrolet pick-up truck, to lose control of his
vehicle and strike Plaintiff’s vehicle. [Id. at ¶ 10] That collision caused Plaintiff to lose
control of her vehicle. [Id. at ¶ 11] Plaintiff’s vehicle was forced under the trailer of Ms.
Taylor’s Freightliner and was dragged for several hundred feet. [Id.] As a result, Plaintiff
suffered various injuries and damages. [Id. at ¶¶ 16-19]
On March 16, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this action in the Adams County District Court.
[#5] The Complaint named May Trucking and Ms. Taylor as Defendants. [Id.] The
Complaint brought three causes of action: (1) negligence against Ms. Taylor and vicarious
liability against May Trucking, (2) negligent hiring, retaining, and/or supervision against
May Trucking, and (3) negligent entrustment of chattel against May Trucking. [Id. at 3-6]
On April 18, 2018, the matter was removed to this Court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.
[#1]
Due to difficulties serving Ms. Taylor [##18, 27, 31, 34], Plaintiff
dismissed Ms. Taylor as a defendant [##39, 41].
On April 25, 2018, May Trucking answered the Complaint. [#9] In its Answer, May
Trucking admits that, at the time of the collision, Ms. Taylor was driving the Freightliner
owned by May Trucking, that May Trucking employed Ms. Taylor, and that Ms. Taylor
was acting within the scope of her employment. [See #5 at ¶¶ 7, 8; #9 at ¶¶ 7, 8] May
Trucking further admits that “if the jury determines that [Ms.] Taylor was negligent, the
principles of vicarious liability would apply.” [#9 at ¶ 28]
On June 12, 2019, May Trucking filed the instant Motion. [#46] May Trucking
argues that because it has admitted vicarious liability for any negligence on the part of
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Ms. Taylor, Plaintiff’s second and third claims for relief, asserting negligent hiring and
negligent entrustment, are duplicative and must be dismissed. [See generally id.] Plaintiff
has responded to the Motion [#48], and May Trucking has filed a reply [#50].
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A motion for judgment on
the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 2
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, in deciding both motions, the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v.
United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nonetheless, a plaintiff may not
rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility refers “to the
scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide
swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,
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Though styled as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [#46 at 1], the Motion,
which relies on both the allegations in the Complaint and May Trucking’s answers, is more
accurately characterized as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
12(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Ferrer v. Okbamicael, 390 P.3d 836, 840 (Colo. 2017).
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1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The burden is on the plaintiff
to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she
is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The ultimate duty of the court
is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the
elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.”
Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
III.
ANALYSIS
May Trucking moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim (“Claim Two”) and
negligent entrustment claim (“Claim Three”), pursuant to the rule articulated in McHaffie
v. Bunch. 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995). [#46] Under the McHaffie Rule, once an employer
admits respondeat superior liability for a driver’s negligence, it is improper to allow a
plaintiff to proceed against the employer on other theories of imputed liability. 891 S.W.2d
at 826. May Trucking argues that because it has admitted respondeat superior liability
here, Plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed on Claims Two and Three. [#46]
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the McHaffie Rule in Ferrer v. Okbamicael.
390 P.3d 836 (Colo. 2017). 3 The Ferrer Court provided several rationales for adopting
the rule. First, the Ferrer Court explained that “where the employer has already conceded
it is subject to respondeat superior liability for any negligence of its employee, direct
negligence claims become superfluous.” Id. at 844. “Stated differently, both vicarious
liability and direct negligence claims are tethered to the employee’s tortious acts” and, as
a result, “[o]nce the principal has admitted its liability under a respondeat superior
3
Colorado law applies in this diversity case. Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ. Ctr.,
715 F.3d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 2013).
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theory . . . the [direct] cause of action . . . is duplicative and unnecessary.” Id. at 845
(quotation omitted). Second, the Ferrer Court explained that allowing both the direct and
respondeat superior causes of action to proceed to a jury could cause the jury to assess
or apportion a principal’s liability twice. Id. Finally, the Ferrer Court expressed concern
that allowing the direct negligence claim to proceed to a jury could be unfairly prejudicial
to a defendant employee because evidence of the employer’s negligent hiring could lead
to the admission of evidence about the employee’s past conduct. Id. The Ferrer Court
explicitly used negligent hiring and negligent entrustment as examples of improper claims
once the employer admits vicarious liability. Id. at 844, 845.
The McHaffie Rule, as articulated by the Ferrer Court, applies to Plaintiff’s Second
and Third claims. May Trucking has already admitted respondeat superior liability. [#9,
¶ 28] As a result, Claims Two and Three, which seek to establish direct liability against
May Trucking, cannot stand. See Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 848-49.
Plaintiff makes two arguments against dismissal. First, Plaintiff argues that the
Ferrer Court’s concern about the prejudice to the employee is inapplicable here given Ms.
Taylor’s dismissal from the suit. [#48 at 2] But concern over prejudice to the employee
was only one of three rationales given by the Ferrer Court for adopting the McHaffie Rule.
390 P.3d at 844-45.
The other two rationales—avoiding duplicative claims and
eliminating any danger of the jury awarding duplicative damages—still apply. And while
Plaintiff argues that the danger of duplicative damages can be avoided with a clearly
worded verdict form and jury instruction [#48 at 2], this Court, sitting in diversity, cannot
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court. Squires v.
Breckenridge Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 715 F.3d 867, 875 (10th Cir. 2013); Haffner v. Stryker
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Corp., No. 14-cv-00186-RBJ, 2014 WL 4821107, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014) (“Sitting
in diversity, I am bound to apply the law I believe the Colorado Supreme Court would
apply.”).
Second, Plaintiff argues that May Trucking is independently liable to Plaintiff due
to its negligence in hiring Ms. Taylor despite many purported red flags in Ms. Taylor’s
background. [#48 at 3-4] This argument, however, is simply an argument against the
adoption of the McHaffie Rule. But because the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the
McHaffie Rule in Ferrer, this Court cannot refuse to apply the rule here. Squires, 715
F.3d at 875; Haffner, 2014 WL 4821107, at *2.
Presumably, Plaintiff wishes to continue pursuing Claims Two and Three in an
attempt to seek exemplary damages based upon May Trucking’s decision to employ Ms.
Taylor. And, indeed, many courts have created a punitive damages exception to the
McHaffie Rule. Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 847-48 (collecting cases); see also Frederick v. Swift
Transp. Co., 616 F.3d 1074, 1081 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourts that have adopted [the
McHaffie Rule] have also generally recognized an exception to the rule whereby a plaintiff
may bring a claim based on negligent hiring or retention along with its claims under
respondeat superior when the plaintiff has a valid claim for punitive damages against the
employer based on its independent negligence in hiring and retaining the employee.”
(quotation omitted)). But the Ferrer Court explicitly rejected this exception. 390 P.3d at
848. And, once again, this Court cannot ignore the Colorado Supreme Court’s mandate.
Squires, 715 F.3d at 875; Haffner, 2014 WL 4821107, at *2.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant May Trucking Company’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Second and Third Claims for Relief [#46] is GRANTED and Claims Two and
Three are DISMISSED.
DATED: November 1, 2019
BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
United States Magistrate Judge
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