Galvez v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Filing 20

ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER entered by Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 5/15/19. (lrobe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Action No. 18-cv-01047-REB
EDWARD GALVEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is plaintiff’s Complaint [#1],1 filed May 4, 2018, seeking
review of the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. I have
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
matter has been fully briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges he is disabled as a result of multiple sclerosis, thoracic scoliosis,
a seizure disorder, obesity, sleep apnea, mononeuritis, and depression. After his
application for disability insurance benefits was denied, plaintiff requested a hearing
before an administrative law judge. That hearing was held on March 8, 2017. At the
time of this hearing, plaintiff was 48 years old. He has a high school education and
1

“[#1]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific
paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this convention
throughout this order.

past relevant work experience as a composite shredder operator, customer service
manager, surveyor helper, and street maintenance worker. He did not engage in
substantial gainful activity between October 4, 2014, his alleged date of onset, and
December 31, 2014, his date last insured. 2
The ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability
insurance benefits. Although the evidence established plaintiff suffered from several
severe impairments, the judge concluded the severity of those impairments did not
meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations. Other alleged
impairments, most specifically obesity and depression, were found to be non-severe.
The ALJ found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range
of sedentary work with certain postural and environmental restrictions. Although that
conclusion precluded plaintiff’s past relevant work, the ALJ found there were other jobs
existing in substantial numbers in the national and local economies he could perform.
She therefore found plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation.
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. T he Council affirmed. Plaintiff
then filed this action in federal court.

2

A claimant such as plaintiff (who is older than 31 at the alleged date of onset and not
considered statutorily blind) must have at least 20 quarters of coverage within the 40 quarters prior to the
date of disability to be entitled to disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). The amount of
wages and self-employment income a claimant must earn in order to qualify for a quarter of coverage is
determined by a formula set forth in the regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2); 20 C.F.R. §
404.143(a)(2). A claimant must have disability insured status during the quarter in which he allegedly
became disabled, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.13, and must establish that he had a disability prior to his date last
insured, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1); Townsend v. Chater, 1996 WL 366207 at *1 (10th Cir. July 1, 1996);
Moore v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 5784590 at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2018).

2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if his
physical and/or mental impairments preclude him from performing both his previous
work and any other “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). “When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social
Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the
impairments in making a disability determination.” Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d
1518, 1521 (10 th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere
existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a
finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To
be disabling, the claimant’s condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any
substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v.
Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10 th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner has established a quinquepartite sequential evaluation
process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:
1.

The ALJ must first ascertain whether the claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is
working is not disabled regardless of the medical findings.

2.

The ALJ must then determine whether the claimed
impairment is “severe.” A “severe impairment” must
significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities.

3.

The ALJ must then determine if the impairment meets or
equals in severity certain impairments described in Appendix
1 of the regulations.

3

4.

If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
can perform his past work despite any limitations.

5.

If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity
to perform his past work, the ALJ must decide whether the
claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial work
in the economy. This determination is made on the basis of
the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). See also Williams v. Bowen 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10 th
Cir. 1988). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four
steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294
n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that
the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive
and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933
F.2d 799, 801 (10 th Cir. 1991).
Review of the Commissioner’s disability decision is limited to determining
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194,
1196 (10th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown, 912 F.2d at 1196. It requires
more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Hedstrom v.
Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D. Colo. 1992). “Evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion.”
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Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10 th Cir. 1992). Further, “if the ALJ failed
to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of
substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10 th Cir. 1993).
Although a reviewing court should meticulously examine the record, it may not reweigh
the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Id.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in (1) failing to consider the combined effect of all
his impairments, both severe and non-severe, in assessing his residual functional
capacity; (2) weighing the medical source opinions of record; and (3) discrediting his
subjective reports of pain and functional limitation. Finding no reversible error in any of
these particulars, I affirm.
At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found obesity and depression,
inter alia, were not severe impairments. (Tr. 19-21.) Plaintiff maintains the ALJ’s failure
to further discuss these non-severe impairments in the context of her residual functional
capacity assessment constitutes reversible error. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523(c) (ALJ
must consider the combined effect of all impairments, both severe and non-severe, in
assessing residual functional capacity).
I cannot agree. Of course, “a finding of non-severity alone would not support a
decision to prepare an RFC assessment omitting any [non-severe] restriction.” Wells v.
Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10 th Cir. 2013). However, the ALJ acknowledged her
responsibility to consider the combined impact of all plaintiff’s impairments (Tr. 18), an
assertion this court credits when the record provides no reason to doubt it, see Hackett
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10 th Cir. 2005); Manning v. Colvin, 182 F.Supp.3d
5

1156, 1164 (D. Colo. 2016). Here, although the ALJ’s discussion of the impact of these
non-severe impairments could have been more thorough-going, I cannot say any error
in that regard merits remand. Because the opinion as a whole substantiates the ALJ’s
decision to omit additional functional limitations associated with these non-severe
impairments from her residual functional capacity assessment, see Best-Willie v.
Colvin, 514 Fed. Appx. 728, 733 (10 th Cir. March 26, 2013), the ALJ’s failure to more
specifically address them ultimately was harmless, see Williams v. Chater, 1995 WL
490280 at *2 (10 th Cir. Aug.16, 1995); Lumpkin v. Colvin, 112 F.Supp.3d 1169, 1174
(D. Colo. 2015).
With respect to the ALJ’s consideration of obesity,3 “there is no requirement that
[obesity] be discussed in a particular manner or at a particular time in a disability
decision[;] the ALJ is required only to consider it.” Medina v. Berryhill, 2017 WL
1862279 at *10 (D. Colo. May 8, 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ acknowledged plaintiff was
overweight, with a very high Body Mass Index. However, she noted plaintiff was
described as “very muscular and stocky” despite his weight. (See Tr. 270.) She also
pointed out that despite his weight, plaintiff’s physical examinations were consistently
normal and that he rarely reported problems or complaints of any kind, whether related
to his weight or otherwise. (See Tr. 19-20.) Although thereafter she did not discuss
obesity in particular, the ALJ repeatedly referenced these same normal physical

3

Although no longer a separately listed impairment, obesity still must be considered insofar as it
impacts other impairments of the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. See Social
Security Ruling 02-1p, 2000 WL 34686281 at *1 (SSA Sept. 12, 2002).

6

examination findings throughout her step four residual functional capacity assessment.
(Tr. 24-27.)
Thus, what is notable about plaintiff’s obesity is the utter lack of any evidence
that it imposed functional restrictions beyond those assessed by the ALJ. Plaintiff
himself points to no evidence suggesting otherwise. The Tenth Circuit has rejected any
suggestion that “in formulating [a residual functional capacity] . . . [the ALJ is] also
required to note the absence of any evidence that [plaintiff’s] obesity resulted in
additional functional limitations or exacerbated any other impairment,” Smith v. Colvin,
625 Fed. Appx. 896, 899 (10 th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015), and in similar circumstances, courts
in this circuit routinely have refused to remand, see id.; Rose v. Colvin, 634 Fed. Appx.
632, 637 (10 th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015); Gonzales v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1136073 at *9
(D.N.M. Feb. 26, 2018); Medina, 2017 WL 1862279 at *10. See also Munoz v.
Colvin, 2014 WL 12796775 at *9 (D.N.M. March 11, 2014) (citing cases). I thus cannot
find any reversible error in this regard.
As for consideration of plaintiff’s depression, plaintiff cites the Tenth Circuit’s
opinion in Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061 (10 th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that “even
if the ALJ determines that a claimant's medically determinable mental impairments are
‘not severe,’ he must further consider and discuss them as part of his residual
functional capacity (RFC) analysis at step four.” Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
However, plaintiff elides that the issue before the court was “how much further
discussion of a non-severe impairment is required at step four?” Id. (emphasis added).
In analyzing that question, the court noted that although “a conclusion that the

7

claimant's mental impairments are non-severe at step two does not permit the ALJ
simply to disregard those impairments when assessing a claimant's RFC and making
conclusions at steps four and five,” the ALJ’s subsequent discussion of the plaintiff’s
mental impairments in assessing her credibility, “though far from comprehensive,” might
have been sufficient to satisfy this duty but for the fact that his conclusions in that
regard were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1068-69.
Thus, Wells is not nearly as compelling on this point as plaintiff implies. The
decision certainly does not support a contention that the ALJ m ust discuss a plaintiff’s
mental impairments specifically in connection with her residual functional capacity
assessment, and nothing in the regulations provides otherwise.4 See Manning, 182
F.Supp.3d at 1164 (“[W]hile the regulations obligate the ALJ to consider whether a
claimant’s severe and non-severe impairments in combination are severe, they do not
require her to specifically address all such factors.”) (internal citations omitted;
emphases in original). Instead, it seems clear the Wells court would have found the
ALJ complied with his duty to consider all impairments in combination if his disability
determination had otherwise been supportable. See Wells, 727 F.3d at 1069. Coupled
with the fact that the ALJ's findings at steps two and three of the sequential evaluation
need not necessarily be translated into work-related functional limitations at step four,
see Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10 th Cir. 2015); Manning, 182 F.Supp.3d
1164, Wells does not exempt this situation from the realm of harmless error analysis.

4

Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (SSA July 2, 1996), is not to the contrary. The
narrative contemplated by that interpretive ruling requires only that in making her residual functional
capacity assessment, the ALJ provide “a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily
activities, observations).” Id. at *7. Whether that discussion must include any particular reference to nonsevere impairments is not addressed by the ruling.

8

Applying that rubric here, the ALJ’s ultimate determination of plaintiff’s mental
functional capacity is eminently substantiated in this case. Her discussion of the
medical evidence showed that plaintiff received minimal treatment for depreseeion and
that his medications were effective in treating it. (Tr. 20, 68-69, 392.) See Pacheco v.
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 695, 698 (10 th Cir. 1991) (condition which can be controlled or
mitigated by treatment is not disabling); Manning, 182 F.Supp.3d at 1161 (same).
Plaintiff’s mental status was regularly assessed as normal (see, e.g., Tr. 272, 319,
394), and he continued to work despite his depression for at least five years after his
initial diagnosis in 2009, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (claimant who is performing
substantial gainful activity is not disabled regardless of medical condition, age,
education, or work experience); Arguello v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 514058 at *6 (D. Colo.
Feb. 8, 2017). Plaintiff points to nothing in the record which would suggest additional
functional limitations related to his depression. Accordingly, remand is not warranted
on this basis.
Plaintiff next faults the ALJ for her alleged failure to properly evaluate the
medical source opinions of record. Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS)
in 2007. (See Tr. 43-44, 288, 315.) This condition was largely untreated, as plaintiff
declined interferon infusions and refused to try other, newer drugs.5 (See Tr. 43, 288,
307.) Nevertheless, Dr. Richard Gamuac, a neurologist who began treating plaintiff in

5

Plaintiff was prescribed Levetiracetam, known by the brand name Keppra, an anti-convulsant, to
treat seizures, just a few weeks prior to his date last insured. (Tr. 288-289.) (See WebMD, Drugs &
Medications, Levetiracetam Tablet For Suspension (available at: https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/
drug-17855-1750/levetiracetam-oral/levetiracetam-tablet-for-oral-suspension/details) (last accessed May
9, 2019).) Six weeks later, although noting some more recent fatigue, plaintiff reported “not feeling as
foggy during the day.” (Tr. 286.) Six months afterward, the dosage of this medication was increased after
plaintiff reported issues with emotional control and disinhibition. (Tr. 341-342.) At his next appointment,
he said the increased dosage “seems to be working well.” (Tr. 339.)

9

December 2014, just prior to plaintiff’s date last insured, submitted a letter in July 2015
(seven months after the date last insured) opining that plaintiff “would not be able to
maintain gainful employment” due to “extreme fatigue,” and would need to elevate his
legs, take “many breaks throughout the day,” and miss work “several days of each
month.” (Tr. 362.) Similarly, Dr. Robert Bliss, who became plaintiff’s primary care
physician in April 2015 (four months after his date last insured), suggested in January
2017 (more than two years past plaintiff’s date last insured) that plaintiff could sit or
stand for no more than two hours in an eight-hour day, lift ten pounds or less frequently,
and would be absent “Waaay more”6 than four days per month, among other
substantial functional limitations. (Tr. 420-424.)
The opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight when it is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2); see also Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10 th Cir. 2003).
A treating source opinion cannot be rejected absent good cause for specific and
legitimate reasons clearly articulated in the hearing decision. Watkins, 350 F.3d at
1301. Good cause may be found where the treating source's opinion is brief,
conclusory, or unsupported by the medical evidence. Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508,
513 (10th Cir. 1987). The ALJ gave “little weight” to either of these treating source
opinions because she found them inconsistent with the doctors’ own largely

6

As the ALJ noted, it appears as if at least two people entered information on this form. (See Tr.
420-424.) At the hearing, counsel for plaintiff acknowledged plaintiff’s wife and a nurse filled out the form,
which Dr. Bliss then signed. (Tr. 26, 38-39.)

10

unremarkable physical examination findings, plaintiff’s consistent reports that he
generally was doing well, and that evidence showing plaintiff’s symptoms improved with
medication. (Tr. 26-27.)
Plaintiff protests this finding takes inadequate consideration of the doctors’
assessment of the effect of fatigue on his functional capacity. Although plaintiff cites
various sources confirming that fatigue is a common symptom of MS, he fails to
acknowledge that the record in this case shows he rarely reported fatigue, let alone
extreme fatigue, to his treating doctors during or reasonably near the time of his alleged
period of disability. Although plaintiff said he was suffering from fatigue when he first
established care with Dr. Gamuac in September 2014, six weeks prior to his alleged
date of onset (Tr. 292), he did not complain of fatigue at all during his subsequent two
visits to, the only two which occurred during his alleged period of disability. (See Tr.
288-291.)7 Moreover, and despite reporting a number of other symptoms, he did not
complain of fatigue to Dr. Gamuac at all from July to August 2015. (Tr. 330-341.)
Likewise, when plaintiff first saw Dr. Bliss, he reported that, aside from “minor motor
seizures,” he had “no problems or any complaints [] that need[ed] attention.” (Tr. 307,
351.) Between that visit, in April 2015, and September 2016, plaintiff complained to Dr.
Bliss of fatigue only once. (Tr. 350; cf. Tr. 346, 348-349.)
Moreover, as the ALJ set forth, despite all plaintiff’s various symptoms, including
fatigue, he consistently had normal physical examinations. Dr. Gamuac regularly

7

One month after his date last insured, although plaintiff said he had been “more tired than
normal” over the prior week and a half, he reportedly felt “less foggy” since starting Keppra. (Tr. 286.)

11

reported plaintiff to be alert and oriented, with normal motor strength and sensation in
both upper and lower extremities, no joint pain or swelling, and a steady gait. (See Tr.
286-293, 331, 333, 335, 337.) Dr. Bliss’s notes show plaintiff routinely said he was
“doing well,” had “[n]o other complaints” and/or “desire[d] no other care at this time.”
(See Tr. 345, 348, 349.)

8

Thus, even granting that Drs. Gamuac and Bliss would know that a patient
suffering from MS could be expected to experience disabling fatigue, it is not apparent
that such conclusions were based on their assessment of the objective medical signs
and symptoms reported in their own treatment notes. This is an appropriate
consideration in the weighing of medical source opinions, see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(3), and one on which the ALJ here relied (Tr. 26-27). Although plaintiff
suggests his doctors plainly credited his subjective manifestations of fatigue, the ALJ
was not required to do likewise wehn her own estimation of the plaintiff’s credibility
(discussed in more depth infra) is to the contrary. Manning, 182 F.Supp.3d at 1162
(“[W]hen the ALJ has properly discredited a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, he
need not accept a medical source opinion premised on a contrary estimation of the
claimant's credibility regarding her own functional and other limitations.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ therefore did not err in discounting these
opinions.

8

Dr. Bliss’s notes appear to be mere summaries of the reasons for and results of plaintiff’s visits,
with nothing to suggest the doctor undertook any physical examination of plaintiff during those visits. (See
Tr. 345-351.)

12

The ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr.
Robert Maisel, who suggested a variety of limitations, most of which the ALJ adopted.
(Tr. 319-320.) However, the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Maisel’s recommendation that
plaintiff would need to change positions frequently while sitting. Although plaintiff
argues the vocational expert testified at the hearing that this limitation would eliminate
all the alternative jobs identified at step five, that was not his testimony. Instead, the
expert said such jobs would be eliminated “[i]f someone’s constantly switching between
sitting, standing, and walking every 15 minutes[.]” (Tr. 60.) While Dr. Maisel suggested
plaintiff would be unable to stand for more than fifteen minutes at a time, his opinion
that plaintiff must change position while sitting is not equivalent to a determination that
he would need to alternate between sitting, standing, and walking at regular intervals.
(See Tr. 319.)9
Even if Dr. Maisel’s opinion could be interpreted in the way plaintiff suggests,
however, I cannot find the ALJ erred in failing to adopt this aspect of his opinion. Here
again, and as discussed fully above, the largely normal physical examination findings
and responsiveness of plaintiff’s condition to medication are more than adequate to
support the ALJ’s decision not to include such limitations in plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity. Indeed, Dr. Maisel’s own examination showed plaintiff was able to sit and
stand without difficulty, walk normally and without pain, had full strength in his upper
and lower extremities, and overall showed “no significant deficits or abnormalities” apart
from “moderate obesity.” (Tr. 318-219.)

9

In fact, the vocational expert testified that a restriction to standing for no more than fifteen
minutes would not eliminate the alternative jobs. (Tr. 58-59.)

13

Nor did the ALJ impermissibly substitute her own lay opinion for the medical
opinion of Dr. Maisel, as plaintiff contends. See Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208,
1221 (10th Cir. 2004). The ALJ was not purporting to assert a medical opinion but to
craft a residual functional capacity assessment, which is not a medical determination
but an administrative one, and thus reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1546(c); Lumpkin, 112 F.Supp.3d at 1173. The ALJ here merely evaluated Dr.
Maisel’s opinion in the context of the record as a whole, which is entirely within her
legitimate purview. See Lopez v. Barnhart, 183 Fed. Appx. 825, 829 (10 th Cir. June
13, 2006). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (supportability of medical source
opinion proper consideration in determining weight it should be given). In short, no
reversible error occurred in this regard.
Lastly, plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred in discrediting his subjective complaints
of pain and functional limitation. In general, “credibility determinations ‘are peculiarly
the province of the finder of fact, and should not be upset if supported by substantial
evidence.” White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10 th Cir. 2001) (citing Kepler v.
Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10 th Cir. 1995)). So long as the ALJ expressly links her
credibility assessment to specific evidence in the record, her conclusion should not be
disturbed. Id. at 910; see also Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10 th Cir. 2000).
Such is the case here. Although plaintiff suggests the ALJ improperly relied on
his activities of daily living in making this determination (Plf. Br. at 10), her credibility
finding instead was based on the well-substantiated conclusions, discussed previously,
that plaintiff’s complaints did not square with the mostly benign physical findings and

14

the evidence that plaintiff’s medications were efficacious. (Tr. 24.) His arguments
therefore are inapposite. 10
The court is fully aware that MS is a progressive disease, see Moomy v. Colvin,
106 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1226 (D. Colo. 2015), and indeed, the ev idence in this case could
well be viewed as showing plaintiff’s condition has deteriorated in more recent years.
Nevertheless, the issue before the ALJ was an exceedingly narrow one, focused solely
on the brief window in the last two months of 2014 between when plaintiff stopped
working entirely and when his eligibility for disability benefits expired. Yet even
considering, appropriately, evidence prior to and within a reasonable time after that
period, see White v. Berryhill, 704 Fed. Appx 774, 779 (10 th Cir. Oct. 4, 2017); Moore
v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 5784590 at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2018), the record fully supports
the ALJ’s disability determination here.
IV. ORDERS
For these reasons, I find no reversible error in the ALJ’s disability determination,
which accordingly must be affirmed.
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the conclusion of the Commissioner through
the Administrative Law Judge that plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed.
Dated May 14, 2019, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

10

Even if they were not, a plaintiff’s activities of daily living “do bear on a plaintiff's credibility to
the extent that the level of activity is in fact inconsistent with the claimed limitations.” Deegan v. Colvin,
2013 WL 1827747 at *5 (D. Colo. April 30, 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

15