Rasch v. Fox et al
Filing
96
ORDER by Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak on 1/29/2025, re: 80 Defendants Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (sphil, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 22-cv-01748-STV
KYLE RASCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES J. FOX, M.D., and
YAMPA VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, D/B/A UCHEALTH YAMPA VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant UCHealth Yampa Valley
Medical Center’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment ( the “Motion”) [#80]. The Motion
is before the Court on the parties’ consent to have a United States magistrate judge
conduct all proceedings in this action and to order the entry of a final judgment. [## 27,
31] This Court has carefully considered the Motion and related briefing, the entire case
file, and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument would not
materially assist in the disposition of the Motion. For the following reasons, the Motion is
DENIED.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
On July 19, 2020, Plaintiff Kyle Rasch presented to Defendant UCHealth Yampa
Valley Medical Center (“YVMC”) for medical care. [#94-5, SOF16] Plaintiff ultimately
underwent an appendectomy, and on July 31, 2020, he presented to University of
Colorado Hospital for complications from his surgery. [Id., SOF17-18]
University of Colorado Health (“UCHealth”)—a 501(c)(3) nonprofit company—
performs the billing services for medical care rendered to patients at both Defendant
YVMC and University of Colorado Hospital. [Id., SOF1, 3, 5] UCHealth maintains a single
financial assistance policy (the “Financial Assistance Policy”) for uninsured and
underinsured patients, and this policy establishes that patients eligible for financial
assistance receive a discount on gross charges for the care they receive at UCHealth
facilities, including Defendant YVMC and University of Colorado Hospital. [Id., SOF 7-9]
On December 8, 2021 Plaintiff submitted an application, pursuant to the Financial
Assistance Policy, to reduce his personal obligation for medical bills. 2 [Id, SOF19-20] On
December 15, 2021, UCHealth granted Plaintiff’s application and applied a 34% discount
for the medical care rendered to Plaintiff at Defendant YVMC and a 72% discount for the
care rendered at University of Colorado Hospital. [Id., SOF22-24] The discounts Plaintiff
received through the Financial Assistance Policy totaled $193,292.47. [Id., SOF26]
The undisputed facts are drawn from the Separate Statement of Facts filed with
Plaintiff’s reply brief. [#94-5] The Court refers to the sequentially numbered facts set forth
in the Separate Statement of Facts associated with the Motion as “SOF#.” The Court
periodically cites directly to the exhibits cited by the parties to provide additional context.
Disputed facts are identified as such.
2 While the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff applied for financial assistance, Plaintiff
disputes Defendant’s representation that the financial assistance was charitable in nature.
[Id., SOF 19]
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2
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 15, 2022, asserting several claims for relief
against Defendants Charles J. Fox, M.D and YVMC, including: (1) medical negligence,
(2) vicarious liability, (3) respondeat superior liability and (4) corporate negligence. [#1]
Defendant YVMC filed their Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on May 23, 2024,
seeking a determination that Plaintiff may not recover medical expenses waived through
UCHealth’s Financial Assistance Program. [#80] Plaintiff filed a response and Defendant
replied. [## 86, 94 3]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);
Henderson v. Inter–Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). The movant
bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, which the movant may do “simply by pointing out to the court a lack
of evidence . . . on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim” when the movant does
not bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664,
670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving
party must establish, as a matter of law, all essential elements of the [claim or affirmative
defense on which summary judgment is sought] before the nonmoving party can be
obligated to bring forward any specific facts alleged to rebut the movant’s case.” Pelt v.
Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008). In other words, the moving party “must
3 Defendant YVMC filed two reply briefs. [## 92, 94]
version, for purposes of resolving the Motion.
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The Court considers the later-filed
support its motion with credible evidence showing that, if uncontroverted, the moving
party would be entitled to a directed verdict.” Rodell v. Objective Interface Sys., Inc., No.
14-CV-01667-MSK-MJW, 2015 WL 5728770, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (citing
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331). If the movant carries its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the nonmovant “to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts that would
be admissible in evidence in the event of trial.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 (quotation omitted).
“[A] ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact
depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210
F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th
Cir. 1987). Evidence, including testimony, offered in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture,
or surmise. Bones v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). A fact is
“material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine”
if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Where the record taken as
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289
(1968)).
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III.
ANALYSIS
In Defendant’s Motion, rather than attempting to assert the absence of evidence
to support a particular claim, Defendant appears to seek a ruling which would set a cap
on damages for medical expenses that Plaintiff could expect to obtain at trial. Specifically,
Defendant YVMC seeks a determination that Plaintiff may not recover medical expenses
waived through UCHealth’s Financial Assistance Program. [#80] But application of the
collateral source rule as it pertains to a damage reduction is contingent upon the jury first
awarding a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. As another court in this district has explained,
“Colorado's collateral source rule specifically provides for the reduction of certain
amounts by the Court after a jury verdict is awarded.” Walters v. Encompass Ins. Co.,
No. 06–cv–01688–LTB–KLM, 2007 WL 3090766, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2007)
(emphasis in original) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13–21–111.6). For this reason, courts in
this district have rejected making a determination of law related to the applicability of
Colorado's collateral source rule and its “contract exception” prior to a jury verdict. 4
Walters, 2007 WL 3090766, at *3; Krauss v. Beach, No. 07-cv-02115-KLM-MJW, 2008
WL 4371939, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2008) (denying motion for summary judgment
which sought a ruling on the application of the collateral source rule); see also Black v.
Hieb Enters., Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 362–63 (10th Cir.1986) (“It [is] the jury's function, as the
4 In Smith v. Jeppsen, the Colorado Supreme Court held the trial court properly applied
the collateral source rule pre-verdict. 277 P.3d 224, 228 (Colo. 2012) (citing Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 10-1-135). But this pre-verdict subsection applies when a party seeks to exclude
evidence that the plaintiff already recovered his loss from the collateral source. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 10-1-135. Here, Defendant does not ask the Court to exclude any evidence.
Indeed, Defendant argues the collateral source rule does not apply. [#80 at 7-11] Thus,
the determination regarding whether the collateral source rule applies and whether or not
there should be a reduction by the court in any judgment for Plaintiff should be made after
a jury verdict. See Walters, 2007 WL 3090766, at *3.
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trier of fact, to determine the amount of damages that would fairly compensate [the
plaintiff] and the jury has wide discretion in making that determination”) (citing Bennett v.
Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.1985)); EEOC v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., No.
01 C 4218, 2002 WL 1750946, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2002) (“[T]he determination of
damages is, at least in the first instance, for the jury. [Defendant] has cited no authority
permitting the Court, without hearing all the evidence . . . to set the outer limits of damages
before trial.”).
As another court in this district explained, Defendant is, “in essence, seeking an
impermissible advisory opinion as to a post-verdict ruling.” Walters, 2007 WL 3090766.
But the determination of law that Defendant seeks becomes wholly unnecessary if the
jury finds for Defendant on the issue of liability. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED and any determination of whether Plaintiff’s damages should be reduced by the
discounts he received will be made post-trial, if necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
[#80] is DENIED.
DATED: January 29, 2025
BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
United States Magistrate Judge
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