Hoid v. Boulder County Sheriff's Office

Filing 49

ORDER by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 2/6/2024, re: 47 Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Kathryn Starnella is ACCEPTED. ORDERED that those portions of plaintiff's Motion to Object the Recommendation and to Amend Comp laint [Docket No. 48 ] that object to the recommendation are OVERRULED. ORDERED that plaintiff's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. ORDERED that those portions of plaintiff's Motion to Object the Recommendation and to Amend Complaint [Docket No. 48 ] that seek leave to file an amended complaint are referred to Judge Starnella.(jtorr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 23-cv-00616-PAB-KAS
EDWARD HOID,
v.

Plaintiff,

BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Kathryn Starnella [Docket No. 47]. The magistrate judge
recommends that the Court grant defendant’s motion to dismiss. Docket No. 47 at 2.
Plaintiff filed an objection to the recommendation on January 31, 2024. Docket No. 48.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Edward Hoid is currently a prisoner being held by the Colorado
Department of Corrections. Id. at 5. Mr. Jones filed this lawsuit on March 3, 2023,
Docket No. 1, due to actions by various employees of the Boulder County Sheriff’s
Office (“BCSO”) while Mr. Hoid was being held at the Boulder County Jail as a pretrial
detainee. Docket No. 47 at 2. Mr. Hoid filed an amended complaint (“the complaint”)
on May 4, 2023. Docket No. 17. In his complaint, Mr. Hoid alleges various acts of
misconduct by BCSO employees related to the handling of Mr. Hoid’s diabetes while he
was detained. Id. at 4–20. Construing Mr. Hoid’s complaint liberally, Judge Starnella
identifies six claims made by Mr. Hoid: (1) Claim One (ADA Discrimination and

Deliberate Indifference): violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Claim Two (Serious Bodily Injury):
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (3) Claim Three (Assault and Discrimination): state law claim of assault
and violation of Mr. Hoid’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4)
Claim Four (Severe Bodily Injury): deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) Claim Five (Severe Bodily Injury): deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (6)
Claim Six (Eighth Amendment; Cruel and Unusual Punishment): deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Docket No. 47 at
6.
On August 30, 2023, BCSO filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Hoid’s complaint on the
grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hoid’s claims and that
Mr. Hoid fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docket No. 32 at 5–19.
Judge Starnella’s recommendation finds that: (1) the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction because Mr. Hoid’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not clear
from the face of his complaint; (2) the BCSO cannot be sued in an individual capacity;
(3) Mr. Hoid has not shown that BCSO is subject to liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because Mr. Hoid failed to identify a specific policy that
was a moving force behind Mr. Hoid’s asserted constitutional injuries or that such policy
was made with deliberate indifference; and (4) Mr. Hoid has not adequately pled an ADA
violation because he did not show that the alleged misconduct of BCSO employees was
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by reason of his disability. Docket No. 47 at 7–17. Judge Starnella therefore
recommends that the Court dismiss each of Mr. Hoid’s federal claims without prejudice.
Id. Judge Starnella also recommends that the Court dismiss Mr. Hoid’s state law
assault claim because Mr. Hoid has not shown a compelling reason for the Court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim if it dismisses Mr. Hoid’s
other claims. Id. at 17–18.
Mr. Hoid filed his Motion to Object the Recommendation and to Amend Complaint
on January 31, 2024, in which he objects to Judge Starnella’s recommendation and
seeks leave to amend his complaint. Docket No. 48.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss a
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Such dismissal is
not a judgment on the merits; rather, it is a determination that the court lacks authority to
adjudicate the claim, attacking the existence of jurisdiction. Creek Red Nation, LLC v.
Jeffco Midget Football Ass’n., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1293 (D. Colo. 2016). A court
lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it
becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia, 945 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
The dismissal is without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213,
1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may take two forms – a facial attack or a
factual attack – each with distinct analytical frameworks. United States v. Rodriguez3

Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001). A facial challenge focuses on the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Id. In resolving a facial challenge, “the
district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. By contrast, a
factual challenge allows a party to “go beyond allegations contained in the complaint
and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends.” Id. (citation
omitted). In addressing a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, “the court does
not presume the truthfulness of the complaint’s factual allegations, but has wide
discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to
resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).” Id. (citation and quotations
omitted); see also Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.
2001) (“a court’s reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the
motion into a Rule 56 motion”). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction
lies with the party asserting it. Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th
Cir. 2005).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege
enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes the plaintiff’s “claim to relief . . .
plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The ‘plausibility’ standard
requires that relief must plausibly follow from the facts alleged, not that the facts
themselves be plausible.” RE/MAX, LLC v. Quicken Loans Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1163,
1168 (D. Colo. 2018) (citing Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Generally, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
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defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555) (alterations omitted). However, a plaintiff still must provide “supporting factual
averments” with her allegations. Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.
2009) (“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim on which relief can be based.” (citation omitted)). Otherwise, a court need
not accept conclusory allegations. Moffet v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d
1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it
has not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009) (quotations and alterations omitted); see also Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (“A
plaintiff must nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to
survive a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). If a complaint’s
allegations are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191
(quotations omitted). Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat
forgiving, “a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Bryson, 534 F.3d at 1286 (alterations omitted).
The Court will “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection is proper if it
is specific enough to enable the Court “to focus attention on those issues – factual and
legal – that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” United States v. 2121 East 30th
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Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
construes his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991).
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Hoid’s motion consists of two separate parts: (1) an objection to Judge
Starnella’s recommendation and (2) a motion for leave to file an amended complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). See Docket No. 48 at 3 (“In light of the foregoing,
please do not dismiss [the complaint;] I respectfully request to be allowed to amend the
complaint instead.”). The Court will refer that part of Mr. Hoid’s motion that seeks leave
to file an amended complaint. This order will address Mr. Hoid’s objections to Judge
Starnella’s recommendation.
In his objection, Mr. Hoid does not identify any specific findings of fact or
applications of the law that were incorrect in Judge Starnella’s recommendation. See
id. at 1–3. Instead, Mr. Hoid argues that he “did substantively prove a basis for this
action.” Id. at 2. Mr. Hoid asserts that his “condition was used by the Defendant as a
means to inflict injuries,” and that he “substantially demonstrated such.” Id. at 1. Mr.
Hoid supports his objection with three additional contentions. Mr. Hoid states that, in
April 2023, jail staff repeatedly denied him medical services, altered his medicine
dosage, obstructed his ability to contact jail medical staff, and altered his medical
records. Id. at 2. Mr. Hoid alleges that similar actions took place in March 2023, which
caused him to faint and be injured. Id. at 2–3. Mr. Hoid states that he “supplied proof”
for his March allegation. Id. Finally, Mr. Hoid contends that jail staff altered his medical

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records to no longer reflect an acknowledgment of their misconduct and that this
“proves it was their goal to inflict injuries.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Hoid’s objection reasserts the allegations in his complaint. The Court agrees
with Judge Starnella’s determination that none of the allegations in Mr. Hoid’s complaint
sufficiently demonstrate that the actions of BCSO employees were undertaken pursuant
to a policy of deliberate indifference. As such, any proof provided by Mr. Hoid of the
actions of individual BCSO employees is irrelevant to Judge Starnella’s determination
that BCSO was not subject to municipal liability under Monell. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
690–91. Furthermore, neither Mr. Hoid’s complaint nor his objection presents support
for the contention that Mr. Hoid’s alleged mistreatment, while detained, was due to him
having type 1 diabetes. Because Mr. Hoid appears to object only to the correctness of
Judge Starnella’s recommendation, without identifying any factual or legal errors, the
Court will overrule Mr. Hoid’s objection. Stamtec, Inc. v. Anson, 296 F. App’x 518, 520
(6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“Objections disputing the correctness of the magistrate’s
recommendation, but failing to specify the findings believed to be in error are too
general and therefore insufficient.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Kathryn
Starnella [Docket No. 47] is ACCEPTED. It is further
ORDERED that those portions of plaintiff’s Motion to Object the
Recommendation and to Amend Complaint [Docket No. 48] that object to the
recommendation are OVERRULED. It is further
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ORDERED that plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that those portions of plaintiff’s Motion to Object the
Recommendation and to Amend Complaint [Docket No. 48] that seek leave to file an
amended complaint are referred to Judge Starnella.

DATED February 6, 2024.

BY THE COURT:
____________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge

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