Amara v. CIGNA Corp, et al

Filing 588

ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 580 Motion for Reconsideration of 579 Enforcement Order. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 1/10/20. (Gutierrez, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JANICE C. AMARA et al, individually, and on behalf
Civil No. 3:0l-CV-2361 (JBA)
of others similarly situated,
Plaintijjs,
V.

CIGNA CORP. AND CIGNA PENSION PLAN,
Defendants.

January 10, 2020

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
RULING ON ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS

On August 16, 2019, the Court issued a ruling [Doc.

#

579] (the "Enforcement Ruling")

that denied aspects of Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Court Rulings and for Sanctions [Doc.

#

571]

(the "Enforcement Motion"). Specifically, the Court ruled that Defendant Cigna was in compliance
with an earlier ruling [Doc. # 486] (the "Methodology Ruling") that set forth the method for
converting already-paid lump sum retirement benefits into annuities. (Enforcement Ruling at 34.) In reaching that conclusion, the Court clarified and reiterated its prior ruling that Cigna was
to utilize the mortality tables and interest rates in effect at the time the lump sum was received.
(Id.) Separately, the Court declined to entertain a methodological dispute regarding the payment

of early retirement benefits because Plaintiffs had not pursued that issue in their motions related
to methodology, and the Court also declined to consider arguments regarding Cigna's February
26, 2019 Plan Amendment that Plaintiffs made for the first time in reply briefing. (Id. at 4-5.)
On August 23, 2019, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration [Doc. # 580] of these aspects of
the Court's Enforcement Ruling.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.

I.

Discussion 1

Motions for reconsideration require the movant to set "forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which [the movant] believes the Court overlooked in the initial decision or
order." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)l. The Second Circuit has explained that "[t]he major grounds
justifying reconsideration are 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."' Virgin Atl. Airways,

Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18B C. Wright, A. Miller,
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478). This standard is "strict," however, and

reconsideration should be granted only if "the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter
the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).

If "the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided," the court should deny the
motion for reconsideration and adhere to its prior decision. Id.
In support of their motion, Plaintiffs make four principal arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue
that the Enforcement Ruling's order as to the '"year(s) to be used to determine the interest rate and
mortality table for calculating the annuity value of the lump sum distribution for purposes of
determining the offset,"' (Reconsideration Motion at 7 (quoting Enforcement Ruling at 3)), should
be reconsidered because it "simply adopts the 'Company Interpretation' that Cigna fabricated after
this Court's January 2016 and January 2017 methodology rulings" and because the "Court never
addresses the arguments Plaintiffs made about the reformation that the Second Circuit affirmed

1

history.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with this case's extensive background and

requiring Cigna to provide the 'full value' of the A+B relief, the plain terms of the 'the plan
provisions' on the Applicable Interest Rate, the regulations prohibiting use of 'lookback' interest
rates for present value calculations ... , and the language in the Section 204(h) notices that this
Court approved," (id.). Second, Plaintiffs argue that it was error for the Court to treat their motion
as to early retirement benefits as foreclosed because Cigna "had an obligation under Second Circuit
precedent to seek clarification or modification of the reformation and this Court's orders," (id. at
11 (citing CBS Broadcasting v. FilmOn.com, 814 F.3d 91, 99-100 (2016)), and because "this Court
invited Plaintiffs to file a motion after refusing to hear Plaintiffs' arguments on these issues until
Cigna 'implement[ed] its interpretation,"' (id. (citing Ruling on Methodology for Calculating
Attorneys' Fees [Doc.# 550] at 1-2)). Third, Plaintiffs take the position that the Court was wrong
to "'decline[] to consider"' arguments raised on reply related to Cigna's February 26, 2019 Plan
Amendment '"to the extent that Plaintiffs raise[ d] a new issue."' (Id. at 5 (quoting Enforcement
Ruling at 6).) Plaintiffs maintain that their arguments as to Cigna's February 26, 2019 Plan
Amendment were properly raised because these arguments were intended "to show that Cigna was
continuing the strategy expressly described in its 10-Ks and 10-Q's of applying the 'Company's
interpretation' to 'open aspects' of this Court's orders." (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiffs contend that
reconsideration is necessary because the Enforcement Ruling "does not address the standards for
deciding Plaintiffs' motion." (Id. at 4.) To this point, Plaintiffs maintain that their Enforcement
Motion should have been governed by the standards of an equitable decree and that Cigna as a
fiduciary was required to "'diligently attempt to comply with the injunction in a reasonable
manner' by seeking clarification from the court," (id. (citing CBS Broadcasting, 814 F.3d at 99100)), while Cigna has taken the position that the Enforcement Motion was governed by the
contempt standard, (id. at 4).

Cigna generally responds that Plaintiffs "fail to identify any data or controlling decisions
that the court overlooked in the [Enforcement] Order" and that they "simply rehash the same
arguments they have made - and the Court has rejected - for years, even citing to their own briefs
as support" as to most issues. (Def.'s Opp. [Doc.

#

585) at 1.) Cigna also specifically addresses

Plaintiffs four arguments. First, Cigna opposes Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Motion on the basis
that the Enforcement Ruling was correct on the merits, as "the Court did not misinterpret its prior
methodology orders (Dkts. 459, 485, 486, 507, 517) on interest rates/mortality tables" that ordered
"Cigna to convert the Part B amount already paid from a lump sum to an annuity in the year that
the Part B amount was paid using the actual assumptions in place that year." (Id. at 2.) Second,
Cigna states that the Court properly declined to entertain Plaintiffs' argument as to early
retirement benefits because Plaintiffs "failed to timely object to the payment of remedy benefits as
of the later of the earliest retirement date under Part A or the person's actual benefit
commencement date," noting that "[t]his 'later of' approach has not changed since Cigna's 2015
filings." (Id. at 2.) Third, Cigna maintains that the Court properly refused to consider Plaintiffs'
argument as to the February 26, 2019 Plan Amendment because it amounted to a "new argument
and new evidence" raised "for the first time in Reply" and, further, "ha[ d] no bearing" on the
Enforcement Ruling entered by the Court. (Id. at 22.) Fourth, Cigna argues that the Court properly
explained the standards it was applying in the Enforcement Ruling as it "interpreted and applied
its own prior orders, explained the reasons for its decision, and concluded ... that Cigna's approach
was correct under the A+B methodology ordered by the Court.'' (Id. at 20.)
The Court agrees with Cigna that Plaintiffs are essentially attempting to relitigate issues
already decided. Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Motion does not present any previously overlooked

decisions or facts, but instead restates the arguments presented in their Enforcement Motion and
subsequent reply.
Although Plaintiffs insist that the Enforcement Ruling conflicts with "the reformation that
this Court ordered and the Second Circuit affirmed in 2014," (Reconsideration Motion at 1), the
Court cannot agree that it overlooked its previous ruling on reformation, Amara v. CIGNA Corp.,
925 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D. Conn. 2012), or the Second Circuit's opinion affirming that ruling, Amara
v. CIGNA Corp., 775 F.3d 510,513 (2d Cir. 2014). Indeed, both of those earlier rulings formed the

basis of the very Methodology Ruling that Plaintiffs sought to enforce. The Enforcement Ruling
necessarily considered and adhered to those earlier rulings, as the Enforcement Ruling simply
reexamined the Methodology Ruling and reiterated the conclusions made there. For the Court to
agree that the Enforcement Ruling conflicts with controlling authority would be to disturb the
Methodology Ruling itself. 2 Plaintiffs' argument as to controlling authority is thus unavailing. 3

Relatedly, Plaintiffs have made arguments in both their Enforcement Motion and
Reconsideration Motion regarding IRC § 417's requirements as to on annuities and interest rates,
(see Pls.' Reconsideration Reply [Doc. # 586] at 6; Reconsideration Motion at 8; Enforcement
Motion at 21-22), which were previously raised and litigated at the methodology phase, (see, e.g.,
Pls.' s Objs. to Cigna' s Revised 204(h) Notices [Doc. # 464] at 17-25 (arguing that IRC § 417 and its
implementing regulations prohibit "lookback" interest rates); Pls.' Response to Cigna's Submission
on Methodology [Doc.# 437] at 43 (raising argument that "regulations allow 'look-backs' but for
no more than five months")). The Court did not overlook these arguments previously in finalizing
its methodology, and thus it has no obligation to revisit them now.
2

To the extent that Plaintiffs raised other arguments as to controlling authority in their
supplemental notices, these also fail.
3

In their First Notice of Supplemental Authority [Doc.# 581], Plaintiffs provided the Court
with a collection of ten recent lawsuits from across the country that "challenge the use of' old and
outdated' interest rates and mortality tables in order to lower retirement benefits compared with
retirement benefits calculated using current interest and mortality factors.'' (First Notice of

Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Motion also fails to identify any facts that the Court overlooked
that would alter its conclusion. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should reconsider the Enforcement
Ruling because it did not "address how named Plaintiff Annette Glanz's or deposition witness
Steven Curlee's retirement benefits are being diminished by Cigna's use of 'lookback' interest rates
and 'outdated,' and unlawful, mortality tables." (Reconsideration Motion at 1.) Plaintiffs had used
these beneficiaries as examples to show how the use of interest rates and mortality tables in place
at the time the lump sum was received "would cut into 'the full value' of the A+B relief."
(Enforcement Motion at 26.) Although the Enforcement Ruling did not discuss these specific
examples, they were presented in Plaintiffs' briefing along with the demonstration of how these
beneficiaries would receive more compensation if the Court were to adopt the methodology that
Plaintiffs now advance. The Court was not persuaded that this argument was relevant to enforcing
the methodology actually adopted, and so did not address it in its ruling. Because the Court has
previously considered these facts, the Court has no need to reconsider these facts now.
Plaintiffs' argument as to Cigna's February 26, 2019 Plan Amendment also fails to satisfy
the standard for reconsideration. Plaintiffs introduced their argument that the Cigna Plan

Supplemental Authority at 2.) All of these cases are in the early stages of litigation, and none has
produced an opinion that is binding on this court.
Plaintiffs also filed a Second Notice of Supplemental Authority [Doc. # 587] alerting the
Court to the Second Circuit's recent decision in Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 18487-CV, 2019 WL 7042414 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2019). In that case, the Second Circuit "authorize[d]
district courts to grant equitable relief -- including reformation -- to remedy violations of
subsection I of ERISA, even in the absence of mistake, fraud, or other conduct traditionally
considered to be inequitable." Id. at *6. Although that case is controlling authority, the Court does
not see how this proposition about the availability of a remedy is relevant to the enforcement of
the remedy here.

Amendment was "clearly contemptuous of the Class' rights under the reformation and the Court's
methodology orders and of this Court's authority to enforce its own orders" on reply, (Pis.'
Enforcement Reply [Doc.# 573) at 2), and, as such, the Court declined to consider this argument
"to the extent that Plaintiffs raise a new issue," (Enforcement Ruling at 6 n.1). In doing so, the
Court considered whether the Cigna Plan Amendment had relevance as to Plaintiffs' earlier
arguments regarding the annuitization of the offsets but otherwise foreclosed any new argument
that the Cigna Plan Amendment itself was contemptuous and in violation of the Court's earlier
rulings. Such an approach was not manifestly unjust, as arguments made in a reply brief cannot be
used to broaden the issues before the Court. See Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993).
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that reconsideration is necessary on the grounds that the
Enforcement Ruling did not directly address the standard of review, citing Beckford v. Portuondo,
234 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2000), in support of this argument. In Beckford, the Second Circuit remanded
a two-sentence summary judgment order and explained that the decision was "too spare to serve
as a basis for [appellate] review." Id. at 130. The Court explained that the district court must explain
the standard it applies to facts, and that it must set forth the "legal theory forming the basis of the
ruling." Id. (quoting Atkinson v. Jory, 292 F.2d 169, 171 (10th Cir. 1961)). The eight-page
Enforcement Ruling satisfied those requirements. In addressing what was ultimately a purely legal
question, the Court provided references to its prior opinions and elaborated on the logic behind
its earlier conclusions. Thus, the Court has set forth its "conclusions of law sufficient to permit
appellate review" of its Enforcement Ruling. Badgley v. Santacroce, 815 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir.
1987).
In sum, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the strict standard for reconsideration, and the Court
will not alter its Enforcement Ruling.

II.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 10th day of January 2020.