Eureka V LLC v. Ridgefield, et al

Filing 238

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER denying 213 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b), Signed by Judge Dominic J. Squatrito on 5/31/11. (Blue, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
EUREKA V LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD,
ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:02CV00356 (DJS)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
The plaintiff, Eureka V LLC (“the Plaintiff”), brought this
action against the Town of Ridgefield, the Board of Selectmen of
the Town of Ridgefield, the Board of Finance of the Town of
Ridgefield, the Economic Development Commission of the Town of
Ridgefield, the Bennett’s Farm Development Authority, Barbara
Serfilippi in her official capacity as the Town Clerk of the Town
of Ridgefield, and the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town
of Ridgefield (collectively, “the Defendants”)to enjoin the
Defendants from (1) taking by eminent domain the Plaintiff’s real
property located in Ridgefield, Connecticut, and (2) implementing
the Bennett’s Farm Corporate Park Preliminary Project Plan.
(Dkt. # 154, Third Amended Complaint, First and Second Counts.)
The Plaintiff also sought money damages in connection with
alleged violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”)
(Dkt. # 154, Third Amended Complaint, Third and Fourth Counts.)

On February 4, 2011, the Court granted the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to Counts Three and Four of the
Third Amended Complaint, which alleged FHA violations, and denied
that motion as to Counts One and Two of the Third Amended
Complaint, which allege violations of certain Connecticut
statutes, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article First, § 11 of the Connecticut
Constitution.

Now pending is the Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) requesting the entry of a final judgment as
to Counts Three and Four.

As further explained below, the

Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 54(b) certification (dkt. # 213) is
DENIED.

DISCUSSION
STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides in pertinent part that
“[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief . . .
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims
or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.”

“For a proper entry of partial final

judgment under Rule 54(b), three requirements must be satisfied:
(1)[m]ultiple claims or multiple parties must be present, (2) at
least one claim, or the rights and liabilities of at least one
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party, must be finally decided within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and (3) the district court must make an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and
expressly direct the clerk to enter judgment.”

Information

Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 294 F.3d 447, 451 (2d
Cir. 2002)(internal quotation marks omitted).
APPLICATION OF RULE 54(b)STANDARD
There is little doubt that the first two Rule 54(b)
requirements have been satisfied: the Court’s summary judgment
ruling “ends the litigation [of the Plaintiff’s FHA claims] and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment
entered on th[ose] claim[s].”

Information Resources, Inc., 294

F.3d at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The third factor

“is addressed to the ultimate decision to direct the entry of
judgment; given the permissive nature of rule 54(b) . . . , this
decision is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district
court and is to be exercised in the interest of sound judicial
administration.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[A]lthough Rule 54(b) allows the district court to order the
entry of a final partial judgment if it determines that there is
no just reason for delay, thereby permitting an aggrieved party
to take an immediate appeal, institutional respect for the
historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals requires that
such a certification not be granted routinely.

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Thus, we have

said that the power should be used only in the infrequent harsh
case where there exists some danger of hardship or injustice
through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.”
Betancourt v. Giuliani, 30 F. App’x. 11, 12 (2d Cir.
2002)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Greer v. St. Bonaventure University, No. 02-CV-409S, 2004
WL 1563084, (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004), the court, having determined
that some of the plaintiff’s multiple claims had been finally
decided by a ruling on a motion to dismiss, considered whether
the entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) would be in the
interest of sound judicial administration.

The court declined to

direct the entry of a final judgment as to the dismissed claims,
noting that “a single factual scenario forms the basis of
Plaintiff’s Complaint,” it was “extremely unlikely that
Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissed claims would be resolved in
time to be tried with the remaining claims,” and that entry of
final judgment would require the defendants “to litigate an
appeal of the dismissed claims at the Second Circuit while
simultaneously preparing for trial on the claims remaining before
this Court.”

Id. at *2-*3.

Similar circumstances to those noted in the Greer court’s
denial of the plaintiff’s motion for the entry of final judgment
are present in this case.

Counts Three and Four of the Third

Amended Complaint (the dismissed FHA claims) rely extensively on

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the same factual allegations as are contained in Counts One and
Two.

Additionally, “[i]t is a virtual certainty that an appeal

of the dismissed claims would not be resolved in time to be tried
with the remaining claim.”

Byrne v. Telesector Resources Group,

Inc., No. 04-CV-0076S, 2007 WL 2403721, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2007).

Finally, “simultaneously litigating the remaining

claim[s] and an appeal is not in the interest of sound judicial
administration.”

Id.

The Court agrees with the determination

made in Greer that these circumstances do not warrant the entry
of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s motion for Rule
54(b) certification (dkt. # 213) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 31st day of May, 2011.

_______/s/ DJS_______________________________________
DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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